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ABSTRACT 
In the past, capitalist development in Malaysian has been inhibited by factors 
such as underdevelopment, a lack of human capital, dependency and the tensions 
caused by an ethnically divided society. However, in February 1991, Mahathir 
presented the Vision 2020 Plan which pointed to the challenge ahead to turn 
Malaysia into an industrialised and developed nation by the year 2020. This plan 
embodied the liberal economic policies and administrative reforms that he had 
advocated since assuming the premiership in 1981. 
The thesis aims to examine the implementation of Mahathir's Vision 2020 in 
Sabah which, in ethnic terms, is the most heterogenous State in the periphery of The 
Federation of Malaysia. It is the author's hypothesis that the diverse problems these 
liberal policies have encountered economic, social and political spheres are largely 
due to communal conflict. Further, such ethnic conflicts have produced some 
unintended outcomes. As in the past, the structural problems associated with meeting 
the challenges of Vision 2020 will prove to be a continuing source of conflict 
between Sabah and the Federal Government. For instance, the Bumiputera 
entrepreneurial and Vision Village development programmes have met with problems 
of an overdependence on government, an attitude which was instilled in them over 
the 20 year of the NEP (1971-1990). Public enterprises continue to incur huge losses 
and Mahathir's alternatives to them are Privatization and Corporatization. The 
implementation of the Vision Village programme has also been problematic due to 
the existence of traditional subsistence farming which resists commercialization. 
Furthermore, industries in urban areas remain undeveloped and centralised. Thus 
Sabah's poorly developed industrial infrasturucture and the absence of successful 
Bumiputera entrepreneurs has hindered the Vision Village development. Meanwhile, 
the Bumiputera entrepreneurs remain reliant on Government contracts and the 
concessions which it grants in order to sustain their businesses. Finally, despite the 
liberal orientation, the policies relating to National Education, National Unity, 
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economic development and Islam still indicate attempts to preserve Bumiputera and 
Islamic domination in politics. 
Thus, Mahathir's liberalism will produce unintended consequences and uneven 
development. This indicates more serious conflicts to come. 
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A UTHOR'S DECLA RA TION 
This thesis, which critically analyses national planning in Sabah in particular 
and Malaysia in general, is my original work. It is the result of my research at the 
University Of York from January 1995 to May 1998. Most of the information which 
is not available in Britain was obtained during my five months of research in Sabah 
in 1996. This work has not been previously published; either in whole or in parts. 
lü 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
CHAPTER TWO: History of Malaysia and the Planning System 
CHAPTER THREE: Mahathir's Vision 2020 
CHAPTER FOUR: Bumiputera Entrepreneurs and Village Development in Sabah 
CHAPTER FIVE: National Education Development in Sabah 
CHAPTER SIX: Vision 2020, Islamization and Communities 
in Sabah 
CHAPTER SEVEN: Conclusion 
APPENDICES 
Appendix A: The Sulu Treaty 
Appendix B: The Map of Sabah within Malaysia 
Appendix C: Malaysia: Rate of Poverty and Average Monthly Household 
Income According to Strata and Target Group 1987 
Appendix D: Machinery for the Co-ordination of the National Development 
Policy 
Appendix E: The IS-EO Model: A Simple Representation of Malaysia 
Appendix F: Business Times Report on the SMI Scene in Malaysia 
Appendix G: The Quality and Productivity Management Structure and the 
Process of Quality Improvement Model 
IV 
Appendix H: Incidence of Poverty and Number of Poor Households, 1990, 
1995 and 2000, The Mean Monthly Gross Household Income 
by Ethnic Group, 1990 and 1995 and Selected Socio-Economic 
Indicators by State, 1990-1995 
Appendix I: Organization Chart of Ministry of Industrial Development 
Appendix J: Strategy Structure of Bumiputera Participation Unit During the 
NEP 
Appendix K: The Model of National Education Philosophy and National 
Education System 
Appendix L: Organization of KBSR Implementation 
Appendix M: Tables 4 and 5: Showing the Ethnic Composition of the People 
of Sabah who are Politically Divided According to Ethnicity, 
Religion and Political Alignment. 
Appendix N: Maps Showing the Distribution of the Non-Muslim 
Bumiputera, Muslim, and Chinese. Populations in Sabah 
Constituencies, Districts and Divisions. The Maps also 
Indicate the Variety of Languages and Cultures of the Sparsely 
Populated Region and the Needs for Effective Mechanisms to 
Unite Them as Malaysians. 
GLOSSARY 
ENDNOTES 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
V 
LIST OF TABLES 
One The Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1996) Development Expenditure 
Two Rate of Poverty and Average Monthly Household Income According 
to Strata and Target Group 1987 
Three Mean Monthly Gross Household Income by Ethnic Group, 1990 
and 1995 
Four (a) Incidence of Poverty According to the Urban and Rural Areas, and 
Economic Indicators of the Fourteen States in Malaysia. 
Four (b) Selected Socio-Economic Indicators by State, 1990-1995. 
Five Capital Ownership in Malaysia According to Ethnicity After the NEP 
(1971-1990). 
Six Ownership of Business Premises Between Bumiputera and Non- 
Bumiputera in Sabah. 
Seven and Eight 
The Ethnic Composition of the People of Sabah who are Politically 
Divided According to Ethnicity, Religion and Political Alignment. 
vi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
One Map of Sabah 
Two Machinery for the Coordination of the National Development Policy 
Three The IS-EO Model: A Simple Representation 
Four The Quality and Productivity Management Structure, and the Process 
of Quality Improvement Model 
Five Organization Chart of the Ministry of Industrial Development 
Six Strategy Structure of Bumiputera Participation Unit During the NEP 
Seven Scenario of the Future Vision 2020 Village 
Eight The Working of the National Education Philosophy and the System of 
Education in Malaysia 
Nine Organization Chart of KBSR Implementation 
Ten Maps Showing the Distribution of the Non-Muslim Bumiputera, 
Muslim, and Chinese Populations in Sabah Constituencies, Districts 
And Divisions. The Maps also Indicate the Variety Of Languages and 
Cultures of the Sparsely Populated Region and the Need for Effective 
Mechanisms to Unite them as Malaysians. 
vii 
PREFA CE 
My beliefs concerning the utility of planning changed after I spent nearly five 
years as a student in the USA. I was amazed that politicians and industrial 
corporations did not discuss economic planning in the media. For them, it did not 
seem that planning - in the form of State intervention - was necessary in order for 
society to function effectively. My belief that State led planning was becoming 
redundant was only strengthened when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. 
Locally, Malaysia was also struggling to implement its Five Year Plans and 
the New Economic Policy. The success of these plans depended on events which 
were beyond the control of planners and decision-makers. This has occurred despite 
the fact that there have been efforts to liberalize the administration of the multi-ethnic 
Malaysian society. It is factors such as these which remain beyond the direct control 
of planners and decision makers that form the "grey area" that I have explored in this 
thesis. 
The measures which Mahathir has taken to liberalize government 
administration have made this study more interesting compared to a study of the New 
Economic Policy (1971-1990). It is the multi-ethnic Malaysian society which has 
made the implementation of the Vision 2020 very challenging. As a matter of fact, 
Mahathir has outlined nine challenges before Vision 2020 development plans can be 
successfully implemented. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Since gaining independence in 1957, Malaysian history may be understood 
as embodying three successive strategies of national development. These strategies 
have been enshrined in various planning policies formulated with the assistance of 
the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) of the Prime Minister's Department. The EPU, 
however, has no political power in its own right. The national plans reflect political 
decision-making by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet (Faludi, 1973: 1-8). They 
assume a broad commitment to a mixed economy system, where much economic 
activity is driven by private capital and enterprise, but the state has extensive powers 
to pursue national priorities by various forms of intervention. The three stages differ 
from one another in the priorities and targets that receive special emphasis, and in 
the scale and methods of state intervention in the economy. 
The first strategy was dominant during 1957-1969, under the Premiership of 
Tengku Abdul Rahman. Its main characteristic was a continuity with the British free 
enterprise model of economy and planning. The economy was not the main focus 
of political activity during the period leading up to and immediately following the 
formation of the Malaysian Federation of 14 states in 1963. In 1969, however, racial 
riots in Kuala Lumpur led to a major policy change. The new strategic thinking of 
Prime Minister Tun Razak focused on the adoption of the New Economic Policy 
(NEP), which was in force from 1971-1990. The NEP was a strongly interventionist 
policy designed to restructure the already divided multi-ethnic society and to 
eradicate poverty. 
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The third strategy of long-term development has been in operation since 1991, 
under the auspices of Prime Minister Mahathir and his Vision 2020. This strategy 
and its rhetoric fits in with the world-wide climate of opinion on economic matters 
that has been prevalent since the Cold War ended in Soviet defeat. The world was 
a witness to the empire of directive state planning collapsing under the weight of 
economic dysfunctions while the realm of free capitalist enterprise triumphed. Like 
other political leaders throughout the world, Mahathir took the lesson that state 
planning should never be regarded as ultimately a possible alternative to markets and 
capitalist entrepreneurship. Vision 2020 represents a shift towards liberal economic 
thinking, in which the promotion of private enterprise and competitive markets is a 
key ingredient in any development strategy that a government might viably pursue 
over the long term. On the other hand, like all development plans, Vision 2020 is 
the product of political processes rooted in national history. The conditions of a 
multi-ethnic state with an economically dominant ethnic minority (the Chinese) and 
largely poor indigenous peoples (the Bumiputeras) were politically no less pressing 
in 1991 than in 1971. Vision 2020 consequently combines some western liberal 
policies, e. g. privatisation, with efforts to develop the economic potential of 
Bumiputera communities in particular, and to foster a modern Malaysian nation 
unified by a shared commitment to both economic progress and Islamic values. 
All national development plans seek to transcend conditions that are perceived 
to have held economic development back. They express political will to achieve 
progress and define important terms of state power legitimation. They use 
technocratic language in their formulations, but their targets, budgets and statistical 
equations are inevitably the result of political transactions between conflicting 
interests. What is true of plan formulation is even more true of the multi-layered and 
complex process of plan implementation. The development plans are documents of 
political centralisation while their implementation testifies to the centrifugal forces 
of locally established conditions, interests and alliances. Within the micro-worlds of 
plan implementation, local politicians, officials, businessmen and others use the 
centrally issued plans as a resource as much as a guide in their own decision-making. 
The process of plan implementation may result in successes and failures of greater 
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or lesser degree. It is, however, unlikely ever to result in an unmitigated success on 
every count, because its micro-political processes are bound to produce some 
unintended outcomes. 
World history gives many examples of planned development campaigns. 
They often show contradictory elements in the centrally issued plans, and always 
some unintended outcomes in their implementation. The nature of the theoretical 
contradictions and practical resistances varies from case to case. Stalin's Russia, 
Mitterand's France and Nyerere's Tanzania are cases born of diverse ideologies and 
historical contexts, with accordingly diverse problems encountered in the plan 
implementation process. But they are all cases of local implementation practice 
turning out to be problematic for the central planner, at least in some respects. 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an account of the Malaysian case. I 
outline Malaysian history with a special emphasis on development planning; examine 
the ideological shift from NEP to Vision 2020; and present detailed evidence 
concerning the implementation of three important dimensions of Vision 2020 plans 
in Sabah, an especially underdeveloped and peripheral state within the Malaysian 
Federation. 
Before giving a more detailed account of the research objectives and methods, 
however, it is appropriate to offer a thumbnail sketch of Malaysian society. 
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1. THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF MALAYSIAN SOCIETY, ECONOMY 
AND POLITICS 
Geographically, twelve of the fourteen states in Malaysia are located in the 
Malay Peninsula and two are on Borneo Island. In itself, this geographical spread 
gives some preliminary indication of the various cultures which have arisen in these 
diverse areas. In addition to this cultural and geographic diversity, Malaysia is also 
a multi-ethnic society. 
From its population of about 20 million, the Bumiputeras make up 60% of the 
population, Chinese 30%, Indians 9.5% and other ethnic groups 0.5%. These groups 
are also made up of various cultural backgrounds. Sabah had a population of 2.1 
million in 1996. Its population was then made up of 143,700 Malays; 381,300 
Kadazan/Dusun; 250,300 Bajaus, 61,600 Murut; 310,300 other Bumiputeras; 234,900 
Chinese; and 196,600 others. The Sabah figures do not indicate that Muslims 
comprised the majority of the population. Of the listed ethnic categories, only the 
Malays are predominantly Muslim. In addition, there are about 515,800 foreigners 
in Sabah who are mostly Muslims (Department of Statistics Sabah, 1996). 
Conflicts are inevitable in a heterogenous society where the various groups 
have different social, economic and political backgrounds. ' Even before 
independence, there were already ideological and ethnic differences among 
Malaysians. For example, although the Chinese have adopted the capitalist ideology, 
the Malays - who live mainly in rural areas - have been protected by Muslim Sultans. 
The Malays and the other indigenous groups are classified as the Bumiputeras or 
"children of the soil". In terms of religion, the Bumiputeras are made up of both 
Muslims and non-Muslims. The non-Muslim Bumiputeras are made up of Buddhists, 
Pagans, and Christians. 
In economic terms, the Malaysian domestic economy has been dominated by 
the Chinese since colonial times. The Chinese capitalist spirit was favoured by the 
British colonial rulers. Thus, the economic structure is divided so that the urban 
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Chinese make their living through trade and industries. On the other hand, the 
Bumiputeras live mainly in the rural areas and earn their living through agriculture 
and subsistence farming. Some of the rural Bumiputeras, particularly in Sabah and 
Sarawak, still make their living by hunting and gathering. Thus, income inequality 
between the urban Chinese and the rural MalaysBumiputeras is inevitable unless 
there is some effective form of income redistribution. Besides, the Malaysian 
dependent economy can be adversely affected by world economic recession, which 
can also become an obstacle to the income redistribution policy. In fact, since 
independence the Government has attempted to diversify its economy to overcome 
such problems. 
The State capitalist development projects of the NEP did not benefit the rural 
population (Ariffin, 1994). The income difference between the urban and the rural 
populations is still large, although both incomes have increased compared to the 
earlier period. In fact, the transformation of the economy from one based on 
agriculture to one based on industry has contributed further to the problem of poverty 
in rural areas. By 1995, manufacturing provided 2,051,600 jobs which only 
1,428,700 remained working in the agriculture. Statistics from the Seventh Malaysia 
Plan indicated that manufacturing supported 2,051,600 jobs compared to in 1,428,700 
in agriculture. This industrializing and urbanizing trend will continue unless 
Malaysia is affected by recession. It is going to cause unemployment in the 
peripheral regions. Poverty is still a persistent problem in the peripheral States such 
as Sabah, Sarawak, and Kelantan, where agriculture is still the major component of 
the economy. Most of the rural poor in Sabah are still living in houses made of 
bamboo and palm leaves. In the urban areas, poverty can be characterised by the 
presence of people living in squatter housing. However, Malaysian economic 
development has led to a rise in people with middle income earnings (Seventh 
Malaysia Plan, 1996-2000: 8). But in comparison to other developing nations, 
Malaysia's economic growth since independence is commendable, with an average 
GDP growth of 6.7 % during the NEP (1970-1990) and 8.7 % during economic boom 
under the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1996-2000). However, the growth is contributed 
more by the World economic recovery since 1987 and the presence of MNCs. 
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In political terms, the Malaysian Government has largely been controlled by 
UMNO-dominated party coalitions. In the initial period of independence, the 
coalition was called the Alliance. After the 1969 Racial Riots, the coalition adopted 
the name National Front (Barisan Nasional). The United Malay Nationalist 
Organization has dominated Government, thanks to the constitution which stipulates 
that Islam should be the official religion and Malay the official language. ' Although 
people of other faiths are free to practice their own religions and teach their own 
language, the constitution gives the Bumiputeras and the Malays privileged access 
to offices of government. In any case, the Government has always given priority to 
the Bumiputeras in its policies and planning. This was especially marked under the 
NEP. Many scholars regarded the NEP as the death of democracy, because it seemed 
to promote Bumiputera socialism. ' State intervention under the NEP gave priority 
to the Bumiputeras in all aspects of development. They had greater opportunities in 
access to education, business, trade, and Government positions. These policies were 
an attempt to restructure the socio-economic basis of society and to eradicate poverty. 
Millions of Ringgits were spent on the Bumiputeras' development. The NEP 
discriminated against the Chinese, in an attempt to reduce the inequalities between 
them and the Bumiputeras. 
Malaysian national development must take into consideration the fact that 
socio-economic inequality within Malaysia is divided along ethnic and regional lines 
(Jomo, 1986). Furthermore, this inequality is being reinforced along political and 
economic lines, where the MalaysBumiputeras have the political power, while the 
Chinese gain economic power. These divisions of power are not coincidental but are 
the result of historical as well as cultural and ideological differences. 
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?. IDEENTIFICA TION OF THE PROBLEMS 
In formulating my thesis, it is important to consider the various development 
problems development in Malaysia in general and Sabah in particular. This is 
particularly so with regard to the problems that the NEP encountered in its attempt 
to restructure society and eradicate poverty. This task is interesting as, by its own 
standards, the NEP was not a successful policy. For example, although it set a target 
of achieving 30% Bumiputeras capital ownership in business and trade, the figure had 
reached only 20.3% when the NEP ended in 1990. Further, individual ownership of 
capital stood at the even lower figure of 12% (GOM: 1991). However, in social 
terms at least, the NEP was partially successful as Bumiputera enrolment in degree 
courses had doubled in relation to Chinese enrolment. However, this increase is 
primarily a quantitative one which, as I argue in chapter 5, has had the unintended 
consequence of reducing quality. 
In economic terms, the Government was faced with falling prices in 
Malaysia's major commodities: rubber, palm oil and cocoa. In response, it created 
incentives for multi-national corporations (MNCs) to invest in Malaysia as a way of 
attempting to diversify the economy. The MNC's capital is also deemed necessary 
to balance Chinese economic domination and to create more employment. In 
addition, Malaysia has broken its dependency on agriculture by developing heavy 
industries. A good example of this occurred in 1985 with the development of its first 
national car: the Proton. However, as Malaysia itself has little capacity to develop 
a car industry, it has had to take the more expensive route of buying Mitsubishi 
technology from Japan. Thus, although the Proton is constructed in Malaysia, it is 
made with Japanese technology. As a result, Malaysia's automobile production can 
be manipulated by the Mitsubishi Company, which is capable of imposing unfair 
conditions on the Government (Jomo, 1989: 44-47). As a consequence, although 
economic growth is being achieved, it is being done at great cost. The problem of 
Malaysia's dependence on foreign technology also indicates the failure of national 
planning in Malaysia to address this long standing problem. Due to the dependency 
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problems brought about by capitalist exploitation, the NEP income redistribution 
objectives led to various unintended outcomes. ' 
Furthermore, despite the numerical growth of Bumiputeras entrepreneurs, 
many Bumiputeras are still dependent on Government contracts and concessions. In 
open tenders, the Bumiputeras cannot compete with wealthier businessmen such as 
the Chinese. Because of this unfair competition, some Government contracts are 
reserved for Bumiputeras contractors only. In rural development, the Bumiputeras 
are still dependent on the Government to provide basic social and economic 
amenities. This dependence has cost millions in public expenditure and the amount 
is increasing annually. But despite this economic assistance, the developmental 
imbalance between the backward rural areas and the more developed urban areas still 
persists. However, the Government needs the support of the Bumiputeras to preserve 
its legitimacy. Thus, the State can manipulate the Bumiputeras to preserve its power 
by constant reminders of the social, political and economic privileges which would 
be lost if the Chinese dominated the Government. At the same time, the Chinese - 
who want to protect their business interests - have had to negotiate with the 
Government concerning the allocation of resources for national development. It is 
difficult to reconcile these conflicting demands upon and interests in the national 
development plan. However, the NEP was successful in legitimizing the 
Bumiputeras' power and in establishing Bumiputera institutions for the promotion of 
Bumiputera interests. 
Due to the various problems facing Malaysian national development during 
the NEP, the Government responded by putting up a number of alternatives. For 
instance, the importance of Islamic values in Vision 2020 illustrates Malaysia's 
determination to create its own national image rather than following the West's lead. 
At the same time, Malaysia has had to consider the multi-ethnic nature of its society 
and its present free market economy. Although Vision 2020 reflects a movement in 
the direction of Islamic Socialism and modernization, it simultaneously promotes a 
free enterprise economy through its policies on Privatization, Malaysia Incorporated 
and National Industrialization. Ironically, these policies are in direct conflict with 
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Islamic ideology, particularly the prohibition on earning interest (the "riba"). Non- 
Muslims welcome the free market, but oppose the use of Islamic ideology. However, 
the Malaysian administration has dealt with this conflict by creating Islamic 
economic mechanisms to cater for the needs of the Muslims. These include Islamic 
banking, management, insurance and Islamic ways of investing. Logically, adopting 
a single planning ideology is both easier and more practical than having two planning 
ideologies. A single planning ideology enables easier implementation and 
management. At the moment, decision-makers have to reconcile these two groups 
in order to implement the plan. For instance, although Mahathir was originally anti- 
Chinese, he has shown some willingness to be reconciled with them under the Vision 
2020 grand plan (Means, 1991). Planners have to consider these two groups when 
formulating their plans. However, both economic ideology and national ideology are 
politically important in Malaysia. Due to the problems of participation of Islamic 
communities in trade and industry, the Islamization Policy is seen as an attempt to 
bring about modernization among the Islamic communities in Malaysia. In addition, 
modernization of Islam is inevitable if it is to survive the global economic challenges. 
In response to the dependency problems facing Malaysia, the Mahathir 
leadership has taken several steps to overcome the problems. Under the Vision 2020 
Development Plan, Malaysia adopted an export oriented economic strategy. Under 
this strategy, Malaysia needs to industrialize to increase the productivity and quality 
of its exports. This is indicated by the privatization and corporatization efforts that 
have been going on since the mid-1980s. This means that Malaysia needs not only 
financial capital but human capital which can contribute to this development. The 
National Education Policy needs to be reviewed in line with the Vision 2020 
development. Thus some of the privileges in education under the NEP need to be 
reconsidered so that Bumiputeras' subsidy mentality can be abolished and become 
competitive. Furthermore, the dependency on developed countries for trade and loans 
has to change. Other than that, Malaysia needs a more competitive economy in order 
to cope with globalization and liberalization. ' How these global challenges can be 
met is an important question that motivates my analysis of the implementation of 
Mahathir's policies in Sabah. 
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In response to the political problems, the leadership has also adopted several 
measures to curb money politics, patronage and cronyism in the Government and 
National Front component parties. 
All these measures are being implemented in line with Mahathir's Vision 2020 
challenges, which are: (1) to create a united Malaysia; (2) to create free individuals 
who are progressive, calm, self-confident, and possess a national pride that will be 
respected by others; (3) to create and develop a stable democratic society that will 
become a model for other developing nations; (4) to create a moral and ethical 
society; (5) to create a liberal and tolerant society where all Malaysians can practice 
their own beliefs but remain loyal to their nation; (6) to create a scientific and 
progressive society that not only uses technology but also contributes to technological 
development; (7) to create a caring society and caring culture; (8) to create a just 
society through equal distribution of income; and (9) to create a prosperous society 
that has a competitive, dynamic and stable economy. Of these nine challenges, 
numbers one to five and seven focus on mental aspects and social values, while six 
emphasizes science and technology, and eight and nine address the economy. Thus 
in terms of focus, Vision 2020 primarily emphasizes the human aspects of 
development. These challenges are reflected in the policies which are discussed in 
this thesis. Despite the multi-ethnic nature of the society, some of the policies seem 
to favour one ethnic group over the others. 
Due to the unique features of the Malaysian society, economy and politics, 
planners and decision-makers play important roles in reconciling these various 
differences. How these roles are being undertaken in Malaysia is examined in this 
thesis. In addition, it is also important to examine how the development policies 
contradict one another. Malaysian National Development planning and its 
implementation problems has been the subject of an economic study (King, 1990), 
while Sabah itself has been the focus of a study by a political historian (Luping, 
1994). This thesis aims to contribute to this field of knowledge by detailed 
examination of the implementation of Vision 2020 development policies and 
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administration in Sabah in particular. It covers the political, economic and social 
dimensions of the problems of national development. 
In developing this thesis, various literature on national development plans in 
developed nations, socialist development plans and development plans in developing 
nations have been reviewed. For instance, Soviet planning had met with various 
social constraints in the implementation of planning (Andrle, 1994: chapters 6-7). 
A study on national development in Southeast Asia also found that religious and 
cultural factors have been an impediment to national development (von Der Mehden, 
1980). 
In Bumiputera entrepreneurial and village development, studies have indicated 
various problems of implementation. The Malaysian Economic Consultative Council 
Report on the NEP indicated various unintended outcomes. Whether this trend can 
be changed is doubtful unless Malaysia's social, economic and political structure 
change. 
In National Education Development, various literature has also been reviewed 
which indicates the important role of education in social restructuring, eradication of 
poverty and nation-building. However, the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000) 
indicates that Malaysia is still lacking the necessary skilled manpower. The 
Bumiputera privileges in education have, in fact, affected the quality of education. 
In the process of meeting the target to increase the numbers of Bumiputera 
professionals, the quality of education and the national need for vocational manpower 
are being sacrificed. This imbalance in national education development needs to be 
examined in this thesis. However, the Bumiputera quota in education has led to the 
growth of a new Malay/Bumiputera middle class. The new Bumiputera society is 
now involved in various professions, compared to the pre-NEP period (Means, 1991: 
317). This also indicates a new kind of conflict in Malaysia in addition to the 
persistent religious and ethnic conflicts. Finally, the poor quality of education, 
particularly in the rural areas, needs to be resolved. 
In a multi-ethnic society, contradictions in policies are inevitable. The policy 
on Assimilation of Islamic Values In Administration is one such policy. Ever since 
the revival of Islam after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the Islamic party, 
the Pan-Islamic Party of Malaysia, has posed a challenge to the legitimacy of the 
UMNO as the champion of the Malays and their Sultans (Mutalib, 1989: 113-125). 
In addition, the 1980s also witnessed the growth of various Islamic movements 
including some which the Government identified as deviationist (Means, 1991: 71- 
74). These traditional groups of Muslims clashed with the authorities on several 
occasions. In response, Mahathir has taken steps to curb the activities of such 
groups. As a preventive measure, Mahathir has made several reforms to modernize 
Islam. However, in this process the policy has been questioned by the non-Muslim 
opposition, who felt that their own religions and worshippers could be suppressed and 
discriminated against. At the same time, the Government has to preserve the good 
image of Islam as an official religion among the non-Muslims. Like the Muslims, 
the non-Muslims also have their own ethnic culture besides their religion. The 
Islamization measures have led to the rise of Islamic social and economic institutions. 
For instance, one of the latest developments in this effort is the establishment of the 
Institute of Islamic Understanding. 
Available Government data on Bumiputera entrepreneurial development, 
vision villages, National Education, Islamization Policy, National Unity and other 
Mahathir's Policies indicates some implementation problems. Thus, in this case 
Sabah leaders have to make their own decisions on the best means of 
implementation, which involves changing the targets and objectives of the plan. 
Thus, at the State level, the actual objective of the plan is not being achieved or takes 
longer to be achieved. In addition, the policies of Vision 2020 contain some 
ideological contradictions. These have caused implementation problems, leading to 
national and regional conflicts involving leaders, interest groups and political parties. 
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3. OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is an empirical study of Malaysia in general and Sabah in 
particular, regarding a planned development campaign. It examines the influence 
exerted upon the process of planning implementation by social, economic and 
political forces. Although previous studies have contributed various arguments 
regarding these problems, this one will further our understanding of this area by 
studying the implementation problems in the peripheral Malaysian State of Sabah. 
The social, political and economic factors that influence the implementation of 
national development plans may appear in various forms, depending on the nature 
and characteristics of the country and on the approach of those involved in planning, 
decision-making and implementation. From such evidence, one hopes to assess 
whether the present policies and mechanisms of implementation will be able to meet 
Vision 2020's nine challenges. In this regard, I have decided to study the following 
areas of the Vision 2020 development plan which are: 
The history of Malaysia and its planning system which led to the adoption of 
Mahathir's Vision 2020. 
2. An assessment of the New Economic Policy and Mahathir's new direction 
under Vision 2020 
3. The problems of Bumiputera entrepreneurs and Vision Village Development. 
4. The problems of National Education Development 
5. The problems of Islamization, National Unity and Integration. 
6. As this thesis is more of a critical analysis of planning my main aim is to 
assess the unintended outcomes rather than the intended outcomes. 
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Thus, with this thesis, it is hoped that a better definition can be found of the 
roles of planner and decision-maker in national development. In addition, I hope to 
find some conclusions to the problems of planning' which will be practically relevant 
to Malaysia. The debate is not really about theory of planning and markets, but 
about the problems of Vision 2020 implementation in its initial stages. 7 However, 
an understanding of the concepts and ideologies of market and planning is vital in 
this thesis. 
4. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND PROCESS 
My analysis of the problems of implementation in the Vision 2020 
Development Plan begins by studying the problems, achievements and failures of the 
NEP, as well as the state of the economy, society and Government at that period. 
Government reports, particularly the Malaysian Economic Consultative Council 
Reports on the NEP, served as a bench mark in the analysis. Various relevant 
studies on development were also referred to in studying development problems in 
Malaysia. To give a better focus, studies on Malaysian development are also 
reviewed. 
The most vital part of an analytical framework associated with the study of 
national development planning is to examine the formal mechanisms of 
implementation which have been in place and the innovations made in the 
implementation of Vision 2020. For instance, this involves the Federal and State 
mechanisms of implementation which have been created to deal with certain 
development programmes. In addition, this means that in the process of 
implementation, these decision-makers are actively involved in clarifying the plan 
objectives, targets, capacity and prospects of implementation. The formal 
mechanisms in the context of this thesis include the Prime Minister's Department, the 
Ministry of Public Enterprise, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Agriculture, 
the Ministry of National Unity and Social Development, the Ministry of Rural 
Development and those institutions involved in the propagation of Bumiputeras 
interests. All these agencies are involved in implementing policies relevant to the 
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Vision 2020 Development Plan. Within this formal mechanism it is important to 
examine the various conflicts involved in the implementation, such as the 
bureaucratic and leadership problems in the implementation machinery. In addition, 
this also necessitates an examination of the public resources involved in 
implementation. 
Studying the implementation of national development plans also requires one 
to study informal process of implementation. This includes studying the roles of 
decision-makers, party leaders, implementers, financial controllers, planners, 
entrepreneurs, workers, and interest groups. As the problems in Malaysian 
Development are about social inequality between the Bumiputeras and the Chinese, 
this involves examining the informal networks that have developed in the Malay and 
Bumiputera dominated Government. Finally, it also entails examining the responses 
of other ethnicities in the multi-ethnic Malaysian society. 
Problems of implementation are to be expected in all national planning 
systems. However, different systems of planning deal with problems according to 
their own values. It is difficult to be fully rational in addressing planning problems 
as they involve humans and human errors. However, most governments try to keep 
implementation problems secret by categorising them as classified information. Such 
secrecy is obviously functional for the Government, as public knowledge of its 
problems could clearly affect its legitimacy. The co-ordination agencies play an 
important role in identifying implementation problems in national planning. 
However, theoretically, planning is a system made up of various institutions which 
are interdependent. As a consequence, factors which affect the Treasury are likely 
to have repercussions for the rest of the planning institutions. As the heads of the 
system, national leaders have to find alternative strategies to deal with planning 
problems or the whole system may encounter a crisis. Often a planning system's 
problems are caused by structural defects within the system itself. For example, a 
plan that is based on market principles needs democratic planning institutions that 
can co-ordinate production and the redistribution of income and resources, as well 
as socio-economic development. This will require negotiation, consultation and 
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parliamentary debates in order to reach consensus before the plan is actually 
implemented. In addition social, political and economic trends mean that the plan 
loses its validity unless changes are made in line with these trends. For instance, the 
use of high-technology labour-saving machinery may cause unemployment. This 
trend will require new systems of education, new thinking approaches from society 
and even ideological changes. Thus, planning as a system is not particularly 
responsive to change. Planning needs to adopt a pragmatic critical and democratic 
approach. Considering these factors, my responsibility in this area is to find 
empirical evidence regarding the causes of the problems of implementation in Sabah. 
This also requires one to examine the reactions and responses of the national leaders 
in dealing with these problems, considering that they have to protect Bumiputeras 
interests and the Islamic ideology despite the multi-ethnic nature of the society. In 
addition, social inequality in Malaysia is brought about by the Chinese domination 
of the economy and the elites' trying to maintain their power in government. 
In analysing the outcomes of the research, some comparison has to be made 
in the leaders' initial aims and the outcomes. These outcomes are assessed against 
other research and views of the opposition. The suitability of the policies and errors 
are also assessed against the economic, social and political situations in the country 
and the empirical evidence. 
5. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis focuses on the initial stage of the implementation of the Vision 
2020 development plan. Its first task is to establish what particular elements are 
lacking in planned capitalism. In doing so, it integrates sociological, historical, 
interpretative, theoretical and policy forms of analysis (Rutland, 1985; and Rudner, 
1975). As we know, without State intervention, conflict between the bourgeoisie and 
the proletariat is inevitable. State intervention is necessary to avoid the conflicts 
caused by market monopoly and exploitation of the workers. Politically and socially, 
free competition is preferred by developed nations as they have more capital and high 
technology. This raises the question of the role of social, economic and political 
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structures in a free market economy. However, even though innovations have been 
made to adapt these structures to changing situations, developing countries still have 
problems of poverty and other social ills. Since the demise of the Soviet Union in 
1991, most nations have begun to adopt the capitalist development ideology. Thus, 
I embarked upon the process of testing the Malaysian Vision 2020 development plan. 
The trial of "Vision 2020" begins at the national level, providing a general sense of 
the problems in Malaysia as a whole. Following this, the thesis proceeds to examine: 
planned entrepreneurial development; national education development in Sabah; and 
planning of Islamization and community relations in Sabah. As this is only the initial 
stage of implementation, it is more a critical analysis of the implementation problems 
than an evaluation of Vision 2020's performance. Thus, this thesis is about the 
problems of structure and decision-making. Although I support the liberal approach 
to planning in a free market, I argue that it is not feasible in a politically, ethnically 
and economically divided society. Previous experience indicates that the Government 
has always been met with dilemmas and crises', which are complicated further by the 
population's divergent religious beliefs which put the national ideology to the test. 
This occurs despite the fact that the direction taken by Mahathir's under Vision 2020 
will help Malaysia to sustain its economic growth and enable it to accumulate a 
surplus that can be distributed for the welfare of the people. As a result, my method 
can be decomposed into the following aims: 
Identifying issues of national development in Malaysia. 
2. Studying Government information and the process of development planning 
in Malaysia. 
3. Explaining faults in the development plan, such as its impact, causes and 
effects, seriousness and consequences. 
4. Finding other explanations, examples and alternatives for the problems of 
implementation. 
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5. Investigating who is responsible. 
6. Investigating the responses of the people, to obtain a balanced picture of the 
problems from both sides through local and national newspapers as well as 
the electronic media. Foreign media and independent reports are very useful 
in that they provide independent views of the problems in Malaysia. 
7. From these investigations, the author develops the arguments for this thesis. 
Most of the information for this dissertation is drawn from government 
sources i. e. ministry and department publications. The data are in the form of 
statistics, annual reports, pamphlets, working papers, policy papers, and five-year plan 
reports. In addition, newspaper articles are used to provide some feedback 
information on the government's current policies. 
Second, some studies on Sabah also serve as a source of reference in my 
study. However, in comparison with Peninsular Malaysia, little research has been 
performed on Sabah and so literature on West Malaysia has proved useful in 
formulating this thesis. Anthropological studies on the various ethnic groups in the 
remote rural areas of Sabah by Western researchers have also provided some useful 
insights into the traditional communities in Sabah. 
Third, where possible, I have gathered data on Malaysia's neighbours in 
South-East Asia. It is intended that this will serve as a source of comparative 
reference by which it will be possible to judge whether or not Malaysia is really 
performing as well as it claims. 
Fourth, reports from the United Nations, the World Bank, the Association of 
South-East Asian Nations, private reports and private associations' pamphlets have 
also proved to be useful in this thesis. 
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Finally, local and national newspapers are very useful in providing evidence 
about the pitfalls of the government's policies and plans. However, I find that the 
present government is more interested in announcing and publicising its new plans 
and programmes than in announcing their outcomes. Thus, assessing the outcomes 
of the government's policies is the most difficult task of my thesis. 
6. PLA N OF THE THESIS 
Chapter 2 of this thesis is the "History of Malaysia And The Planning 
System. " This history maps out the processes and problems of planning in Malaysia 
and its impact on the society. This history culminates with the promulgation of 
Mahathir's Vision 2020 on 28 February, 1991. 
Chapter 3 is entitled "Mahathir's Vision 2020" and attempts to put the grand 
plan into perspective. It examines the plans, policies and reforms relevant to Vision 
2020. 
Chapter 4 is entitled "The Development of Bumiputera entrepreneurs and 
Vision Village Development". It examines the problems of Bumiputeras 
entrepreneurial development in the agricultural and industrial sectors. The main aim 
is to change the rural Bumiputeras into successful entrepreneurs by the year 2020. 
It is part of the decentralization plan following the Bumiputeras development 
programmes which concentrated on urban areas during the NEP. 
Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the various structural problems in Sabah. Chapter 
5 is focused on "National Education Development In Sabah. " It examines 
educational reform and the implementation of Vision 2020 in Sabah. Chapter 6 is 
entitled "Islamization and Communities In Sabah". This chapter attempts to explain 
the problems of ideology and culture in the implementation of the national 
development plan. 
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Chapter 7 is the thesis' concluding chapter. It summarizes the findings of the 
previous chapters, which cover the preliminary implementation problems of the 
Vision 2020 development plan. It suggests that there is no straightforward solution 
to the implementation problems of Vision 2020 development in Sabah, as they are 
structyral problems which originate from colonial era and from Kuala Lumpur. The 
present structural problem is due to the fact that Mahathir policies are ethnically 
based on Bumiputeras and Islamic ideology. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORY OF MALAYSIA AND THE 
PLANNING SYSTEM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is a historical survey of Malaysia from the Colonial period to the 
present Mahathir era. It shows the impact of foreign influence on both the local 
politics and the economy of a rich hinterland. It also provides an account of how 
Malaysia achieved independence and created development which improved the 
standard of living in a multi-ethnic society. As a result of this development, 
Malaysia was brought into foreign and local conflicts. The chapter also shows how 
a new nation, formed in a hurry in 1963, dealt with communal problems through the 
Five-Year Plans, social reforms, and prepares to be an industrialised nation by the 
year 2020. Finally, Sabah's development problems are also examined. 
1.1 Historical Background Of Malaysia Up To World War II 
Early Malaysian history began with the Malacca Sultanate founded by a 
Sumatran Prince, Parameswara in 1400. ' He later adopted Islam and turned Malacca 
into a centre for the spread of Islam. The turn of events in the regions finally led to 
British intervention in Malaya and Borneo about five centuries later. 
First, in around the 7th century, the Arabs came to Southeast Asia in order 
to trade for spice. That was followed by the Portuguese attack on Malacca in 1511. 
The Portuguese turned Malacca into a fortress and a sanctuary for trading ships. The 
defeated Sultan, however, escaped and established the Johore Sultanate (1641-1758) 
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and sought the assistance of the Dutch against the Portuguese. The powerful Dutch 
were then successful in taking over Malacca. Third, in 1785, the British established 
their first colony in Penang; they founded Singapore on 28 January, 1819 and became 
the Dutch's only rival in the region. Fourth, in 1824 the Anglo-Dutch Treaty was 
signed and, as a result, Malacca was transferred to the British in exchange for 
Bencoolen in Sumatra. ' Using a line drawn across the Strait of Malacca, British 
influence was limited to the lands which were later to be Malaysia. Malacca, Penang 
and Singapore were initially called the Straits Settlement and were administered by 
a British governor. As a consequence, British imperialism charted the present 
Malaysian boundaries. 
Since Malaya was still economically, socially and politically underdeveloped, 
the British waited for the right moment to intervene in the rest of Malaya. 
Researchers such as Gullick (1958) and Ryan (1967) referred to Malay society on the 
eve of British intervention as distributed primarily along the coastal regions and river 
valleys. The system of control adopted by the Sultans involved imposing the 
payment of tributes which indicated loyalty. Their palaces were usually located 
along strategic areas of the river. The structure of authority in a sultanate was, the 
Bendahara (Chief Ministers), Ministers (menteri-menteri), the Temenggong 
(Commander of Troops and Police), the Penghulu Bendahari (Treasurer), Menteri 
(Secretary of State) and Shahbandar (Harbour Master and Collector of Customs). 
The Bendahara had power to impose payment of tributes on the communities that 
lived along the river valleys. The rivers served as their main source of livelihood 
and sampan (a small rowing boat) was often the only means of transportation. 
Individual subjects paid taxes on the land, levies on trade, and served the sultans in 
developing village communities. They lived through subsistence agriculture, fishing, 
hunting and gathering and simple trading. As they were often exploited by the 
palace lords, they led a simple life so that they could migrate easily when forced to 
leave. 
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There were no precise figures concerning the population of the Malay 
peninsula. However, there are demographic records for some states. For instance, 
in 1891 Selangor had a population of 26,578 and the province of Wellesley had 
52,836 in 1860. The population of Kedah in the 1850s is estimated to be about 
100,000 (Ahmat, 1984: 4-8). These figures indicate that the region was sparsely 
populated. The population in Malaya was mostly Malays until the Chinese arrived 
in the 19th century. They came as labourers to the Straits Settlements especially the 
newly founded Penang (1786) and Singapore Islands (1819). When tin was 
discovered in Perak (1850s) and Selangor (1860s), a large number of Chinese 
immigrant workers came to the Malay Peninsula. Thus, the number of Chinese in 
the main land increased too (Ryan, 1967: 171). These immigrants were not attracted 
to Sabah and Sarawak as the two regions were still underdeveloped. Thereafter, with 
the discovery of rubber in 1876 and its success after 1896 due to the demand of 
rubber by the mass production of cars, many Indian labourers were employed in the 
European plantations. These are some brief accounts of immigrant workers in West 
Malaysia which led to the multi-ethnic composition of Malaysian society (Ryan, 
1967: 112-118). 
The British decided to intervene in the rich tin mining3 state of Perak in 1871 
when there was a scramble for the throne among the royal successors. Raja 
Abdullah, who claimed to be the rightful sultan sought British intervention to help 
him secure the throne. The British recognised Raja Abdullah as the rightful ruler 
after the Pangkor Agreement of 20th January, 1874. Their intervention was justified 
on the pretext of restoring law and order even though it angered the Malay chiefs. 
J. W. Birch was appointed the first Resident in Malaya on 30 October, 1874 to help 
the Sultan administer the state. 4 
The system of appointing a Resident to help the Sultan administer his region 
was extended to other Malay states. The sultans of Selangor (1875), Pahang (1887) 
and Negeri Sembilan (1889) requested British intervention to restore law and order 
in their states. Thereafter, the British worked to improve relations with the Malays. 
Living conditions and communication networks were improved and tax exemptions, 
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granted on certain basic necessities all resulted in an increase in trade. ' The proper 
and more efficient management of the tin mines (which were formerly under the sole 
control of the corrupt Malay chiefs who had rights to levy taxes) later led to a rise 
in the income for the populations in Perak, Selangor and Sungai Ujong. As the states 
developed, the British realised that there were different systems of land 
administration in each of the four states. As the British were previously not aware 
of this matter it made been difficult for their administrators to handle land problems 
and, consequently, they found it advantageous to develop a common land law. 
Furthermore, new immigration laws covering all of Malaya were needed to facilitate 
the movement of workers from India and China. The British authorities thought that 
a single administration for all the four states might solve the administrative and 
financial problems. The less developed state of Pahang could then receive assistance 
from the other three states. The problems of the four British Residents were 
considered and the proposal to form a federation was agreed. This agreement was 
officially signed in July 1895 after the Resident of Perak, Frank Swettenham 
persuaded all four Sultans to agree, and the federation came into being in 1896. 
Frank Swettenham was then appointed Resident-General of the Federated Malay 
States, and a constitution was drafted to define the powers of the Governor, High 
Commissioner of the Federated Malay States, Residents and the Malay Sultans. The 
constitution provided for the formation of a federal council whose members included 
representatives from the Malay, British and Chinese communities. This council 
possessed the authority to form legislation, and was regarded as a symbolic beginning 
of both constitutional government and the modern nation. It also led to an increase 
in the states' revenue and enabled the federal government to improve the economy 
and living conditions. For example, public services were introduced such as an 
agricultural development programme, railways, medical service and British 
educational system. At this time (1890s), in fact, the development of Malaysian 
agriculture was stimulated by the introduction of rubber tree seedlings from Brazil. 
The seedlings became the basis of the plantations that were to meet the growing 
demand for rubber as the twentieth century progressed. 
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The formation of the federation was followed by the expansion of British 
power to the northern Malay states of Trengganu, Kelantan, Kedah and Perlis in 
1909.6 Finally in 1914, the British forced the Sultan of Johore to officially accept 
a British adviser and the whole of the Malay peninsula fell under British influence. 
However, Trengganu, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Johore remained as unfederated 
states. 
In Northern Borneo, the British influence was expanded by giving a charter 
to the North Borneo Company in 1881 to manage the state. Prior to the rule of 
Chartered Company, North Borneo had been under the Sovereignty of the Brunei 
Sultanate but this was later ceded to the Sultan of Sulu due to difficulties in 
maintaining control of the territory. The British had intervened in Northern Borneo 
after helping the Sultan of Brunei to bring law and order to an area that was plagued 
by pirates who preyed upon the trade routes of the Western coast of Borneo. The 
area in the northern part of North Borneo that was then already under the Sultan of 
Sulu was bought by the British from the Sultan in a treaty signed on 22 January 1878 
which granted the area of North Borneo under his control to Baron de Overbeck and 
Alfred Dent Esquire. (The Sultan of Sulu claimed North Borneo when it gained 
independence in 1963 through Malaysia: see Appendix A on the 1878 Treaty). The 
British then granted a charter to the North Borneo Company to manage the state 
(1881) and Treacher became its Governor from 1882 to 1887. At this time, Sabah 
had little in the way of natural resources that could be profitably exploited. Workers 
had to be brought in from Hong Kong, Indonesia and India as North Borneo had a 
very small population. Chinese labour was brought to Sabah only in the 1920s and 
1930s. 7 Before that, it seemed that Sabah was employing mainly Indonesian 
immigrant workers. According to Ryan (1967), about 33% of the workers in 1921 
in Sabah were Javanese. The indigenous population consisted mainly of Bajau, 
Brunei, Kadazan, Murut, Bisaya, Sungai, Suluk, Eastern Bajau and other groups. The 
Bajau, Brunei and Suluk, Bisaya and Sungai, Bugis and other groups who originated 
from Kalimantan were mostly Muslim. It is believed that they were, in general, the 
original people of Borneo who had accepted Islam since 1440 and among whom the 
faith had developed ever since (Harrison, 1964). With the exception of the Brunei, 
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these people speak Malay as their second language but do not regard themselves as 
Malay. Besides the Chinese and Indonesians, the shortage of labour meant that 
Indians and people of Filipino origin were also brought in to work on the British 
plantations. Thus, the shortage of labour caused people of many different origins to 
be relocated in Sabah which explains its present multi-ethnic profile. 
In Sarawak, a British merchant adventurer - Brooke - came to power after 
helping the Sultan of Brunei put down rebellions and combat. piracy in the region. 
In recognition of his assistance the Sultan of Brunei installed him as governor in 
1841. Brooke's government was based on local tradition and custom and he 
introduced very few Western ideas. Brooke sought British government assistance 
only when necessary but he was successful in eradicating piracy and head-hunting. 
Later, he annexed the Trusan Valley in 1884 and Limbang in 1890 from the Brunei 
Sultanate. The two areas became Sarawak's Fifth Division. In Sarawak, the Brooke 
government also brought in Chinese labour and other immigrants due to the shortage 
of workers. ' 
Like Sabah, Sarawak's early population consisted of many indigenous groups 
including Malay, Kedayan, Indonesians, Bisaya, Melanau, Kelabit, Murut, Kenyan, 
Kayan, Sea Dayak (Iban), Land Dayak, Punans and a few other jungle hunter 
gatherers. As in North Borneo and Brunei, the Muslim religion was firmly 
established in Sarawak since 1440. Both Sarawak and North Borneo have an 
enormous diversity of cultures. Yet, the populations of Sarawak and Sabah were 
small and the land sparsely populated. The population was concentrated around 
river valleys and along the rich coastline. This cultural diversity has remained a 
feature of the region and presented a challenge at a much later date for development 
plans produced by the centralised state. 
The British government was not actually eager to administer Malaya, North 
Borneo and Sarawak. They were merely interested in protecting the trade route to 
China and, hence, their own trading interests. The British also wanted to make sure 
that other powers did not build strategic positions in Malaya and Borneo. However, 
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their presence had played an important role in changing the economy of Malaysia 
which in the early days was solely subsistence farming and fishing. 
By 1880, Europeans began to invest their capital in tin mines and introduce 
Western technology. By 1904, Malaya had become the largest tin producer in the 
world. Tin-smelting became Malaysia's first industry and the first step towards 
modernisation. At the same time, the rubber-planting industry was flourishing due 
to high demand in the USA. During the boom years from 1910 to 1912, the price 
of rubber rose to about $5 per pound and, as a consequence, thousands of acres were 
planted throughout West Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak. The two industries enabled 
the development of communications that further stimulated economic development 
and also enabled the administration to build hospitals and schools. The population 
of West Malaysia increased rapidly due to immigrant workers. 
However, from 1920 to 1932, a few years after World War I, Malaya was 
badly affected by an economic slump due to over-production of tin and rubber. The 
situation worsened when economic depression struck the world from 1929 to 1932. 
So, with the declining state income, the Sultans in the Federated Malay States 
became aware that they had lost much of their power in exchange for economic 
prosperity, whereas the Sultans of Unfederated Malay States held a lot of power and 
prosperity. When the Sultans of the Federated Malay States suggested that their 
power be returned, it received strong opposition from the Chinese who were afraid 
of losing their businesses. ' Unfortunately, the step toward decentralisation from the 
Federal Council was shelved due to the Japanese invasion in December 1941. 
2. THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN POLITICS IN MA LA YSIA 
After World War II1° the British had already put up a plan for the 
development of Malaya which entailed a total reorganization of the British 
Administration. The British Colonial office proposed that Malaya be united, forming 
a Malayan Union. Under this proposal, the Federated and Unfederated Malay states 
would be united, the Malay Sultans would lose all their powers, and the state 
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governments would be subordinate to the central government. Laws would be passed 
by a Central Legislative which would be the most powerful legislative organ as it 
controlled the whole of Malay Peninsula. The approval of this plan by the Malay 
Sultans was not required as they had been reduced to the role of mere advisers when 
Malaya turned into a British colony. Citizenship would be given to all those born 
in Malaya and those who had been in permanent residence in Malaya for ten out of 
the previous fifteen years. Sir Harold MacMichael was also sent to secure the Malay 
Sultans' signatures to agree to abdicate their thrones. 
However, many of the Malays who were politically aware formed the United 
Malays Nationalist Organization (UMNO) in 1946 to oppose the proposed Malayan 
Union (Ryan, 1967: 211-235). Due to the Malay opposition, the Malayan Union 
proposal was replaced by Malayan Federation which, in 1948, became the basis of 
the present Malaysian Constitution. The Federal Constitution provided for more 
members in the Legislative Council and seven members in the Federal Executive 
Council. Both the Legislative and the Federal Executive Council members were 
nominated by the British Government which was an important step toward the 
formation of an elected Federal Council. In December 1951, the Kuala Lumpur 
Municipal Elections were held for the first time and won by the Alliance parties of 
the UMNO and Malayan Chinese Association. The Alliance defeated the 
Independence of Malaya Party led by Dato Orin who had resigned from UMNO. 
UMNO believed that independence could be achieved through constitutional means. 
The Malayan Communist Party was not immediately banned after the war. 
They had organised the Malayan People Anti-Japanese Army and fought side by side 
with the British in the Malayan jungle during the war. The communists had actually 
planned to take control of the government before the British administration was 
restored. When this plan failed, they launched subversive campaigns by infiltrating 
the vital institutions of society such as the trade unions and political parties, and 
eventually controlled them by force. With support from Communist China, they 
created disturbances by assassinations, demonstrations and strikes. When the 
situation deteriorated, the colonial government declared a state of emergency. Under 
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these emergency powers, the police were able to detain and arrest all those suspected 
of being involved in subversive activities and violence. The Director of Operations, 
Harold Briggs also began the resettlement schemes by which those living in rural 
areas not controlled by security forces were resettled in new villages. The plan was 
successful in weakening the communist movement as villagers could no longer be 
forced to supply their needs. When Gerald Templer became the High Commissioner 
of the Federated Malay states, he stepped up operations against the communists. He 
instigated village guards, village security councils and regulations which aimed to 
improve villagers' welfare in order to win their support. Templer's regulations 
combined military suppression and social development to great effect and the 
communist threat was contained and eventually began to subside. 
The growth of the Malayan economy also contributed to the success of the 
emergency operations. The rise in price of tin and rubber due to the Korean War, 
provided a welcome source of income to pay for the considerable cost of the anti- 
communist campaign. 
During the struggle against the communists, elections were also held in July 
1955. The Alliance parties of UMNO, MCA and MIC won 51 out of 52 seats and 
Tengku Abdul Rahman became the first Chief Minister. The birth of this communal 
alliance indicated that there were problems in uniting the various, ethnic, economic 
and political interests into one party. The Chinese who were beginning to dominate 
the business sector due to their growing economic prosperity, brought about by the 
British "divide and rule policy" also wanted to protect their business interests. This 
policy was also partly initiated by the need to protect the Malay and indigenous 
interests who wanted to preserve their traditional lifestyle in the villages and as rulers 
of the Malay land. However, after the 1955 elections, the Alliance demanded self- 
government within two years and total independence within four years. In 1956, a 
Malayan delegation consisting of Sultans and Federal Ministers went to London to 
claim independence by 1957. On August 5 1957 an agreement to form a Malayan 
Federation was signed in Kuala Lumpur for an independent Malaya after considering 
the Reid Commission report. However, the Reid Commission was reviewed to 
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accommodate the views raised by the Malays on preserving the Malays' privileges 
in the constitution as they were the majority in the Alliance government. At mid- 
night on 30th August 1957, a declaration of independence was made at the Merdeka 
Stadium, Kuala Lumpur with Tengku Abdul Rahman as Prime Minister. The Sultan 
of Negeri Sembilan, Tuanku Abdul Rahman ibni Al-Marhun Tuanku Muhammad was 
appointed as the first Malaya Head of State (Yang di-Pertuan Agong) for five years 
on a rotational basis with the nine sultans of Malay states. The new constitution 
preserved Malay rights and privileges. The land policy made it compulsory to have 
the approval of the Ruler's Conference on any legislative or administrative act, to 
change these special privileges. The Malaya constitution also provided that Islam be 
the official religion and the Malay language the national language. Malay rulers 
were also made the head of Muslim religion in their state, and the paramount ruler 
(Yang di-Pertuan Agong) was made the head of Muslim religion in Penang and 
Malacca as neither had a Malay king. " The constitution also provided that, "every 
person has right to practice his religion, " and promulgate it but, "state law may 
control or restrict the propagation of any other religious doctrine or belief among 
persons professing the Muslim religion. " 
The constitution also provided that, with the use of Malay as a national 
language, no person should be prohibited from using or learning any language; 
"Federal and State Governments shall have the right to preserve and sustain the use 
and study of the language of any community, " and the full implementation of Malay 
as national language should be achieved gradually over ten years. Within those ten 
years English could still be practised in all government communications. 
The functions of the Malay rulers in the new constitution were those of 
upholding the constitution, protecting the special position of the Malays and Muslim 
religion, giving consent for legislation to be passed, appointing ministers, dissolving 
cabinets and attending the ruler's conferences. 
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The new constitution also allocated powers to the States and Federal 
Governments. The Reid report allocated extensive powers to the Federal 
Government. These included defence, external affairs, internal affairs, civil and 
criminal law, federal citizenship, naturalization and aliens, state and federal elections, 
finance, trade, commerce and industry, shipping, communications, federal works and 
power, surveys, education, medicine and health, labour and social security, welfare 
of Aborigines, and censorship and publications. State governments were allocated 
power over land laws and licences, Muslim law, religion and Malay custom, 
agriculture, local government, local services, state works and water, and state 
administration. Matters such as social welfare, scholarships, protection of wild 
animals, town and country planning, vagrancy, drainage and irrigation, and 
rehabilitation of mining land were the joint responsibility of the Federal and States 
Governments. The Reid report also allowed some institutional flexibility through 
delegation of power. The Federal authorities could delegate responsibilities to the 
States or States' powers to the Federation through agreements made by executive 
action. The states could decide whether to adopt federal legislation or not. 
Federal revenue was derived from both import and export duties and income 
tax, while a large proportion of states' revenues came from the land. But the 
Federation agreement also allowed Federal funds to be transferred to the states by 
allocation and grants. This encouraged the state's dependency on federal grants in 
the years that followed independence. The Reid report proposed to give the states 
a more precise share of federal grants over a five year period, rather than an annual 
grant. Malaya adopted its First Five-Year Development Plan beginning in 1956 and 
ending in 1960. Other states not in the Federation such as Singapore, North Borneo 
(Sabah) and Sarawak were also heading for changes after the war. Sabah (North 
Borneo) had a Six-Year Plan (1959-64), Singapore a Four-Year Plan (1961-1964), 
and Sarawak a Four-Year Plan even before Malaysia was formed. 
Sabah was not affected by the communist insurgency after the war although 
communist influence did spread to both Sarawak, in the form of the Sarawak United 
People's Party, and the neighbouring nation states of Indonesia and Brunei. Sabah 
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and Sarawak were given new constitutions and turned into British colonies rather 
than being subject to indirect rule. There was almost no resistance or objection to 
British action, especially in Sabah, as there was little developed local political 
consciousness at that time. In fact the majority of the people had welcomed their 
liberation by the British and Australians from the Japanese regime. Under the 
Colonial system, the British government could provide funds for reconstruction. In 
Sarawak, Anthony Brooke who already had quarrelled with Raja Vyner Brooke, 
opposed the plan to make Sarawak into a British colony. The Raja wanted Sarawak 
to be reconstructed by Britain. His proposal was just passed by the Council Negeri 
in May 1946 by a vote of 18 to 16, and Sarawak became a Crown Colony on Ist 
July 1946. While Malaya and Singapore were busy fighting the communists12, Sabah 
and Sarawak were undergoing economic development. Sabah's economy improved 
particularly by exporting timber to Japan but also through the export of rubber and 
copra. Thousands of acres of British rubber plantations were developed at this time 
which stimulated the growth of the agricultural sector. Sarawak also produced rubber 
and pepper for export. 
In the 1959 Malaya general elections, the Alliance won 74 of the 104 seats 
and continued in government. This represented the beginnings of parliamentary 
government and the strong representation of the Alliance allowed the idea of a 
Malaysian Federation that had been under discussion since 1958 to keep its place on 
the political agenda. However, the move towards the formation of Malaysia was a 
complex one as it was influenced by the political conditions and events occurring in 
Sarawak, Sabah and Singapore. 
The two states of North Borneo and Sarawak, both located in Borneo, had 
shown some interest in joining the proposed Malaysian federation. After a number 
of discussions with the parties involved, the idea regarding the formation of Malaysia 
was approved in 1961. A commission chaired by Lord Cobbold visited Sabah and 
Sarawak between February to April 1962 and reported that the people of the two 
states had agreed to join the Federation of Malaysia. Most Singaporeans also agreed 
with the opinion of the Commission and outcome of the meetings of the respective 
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leaders whose states were to join the federation as they were keen to gain 
Independence from Britain. So, in July 1962, it was agreed that Malaysia be 
officially formed on 31 August, 1963 (see the map in Appendix B). 
The formation of Malaysia was opposed by Indonesia and the Philippines. 
The Indonesian Government aspired to annex North Borneo and Sarawak when the 
British left Borneo and alleged that the people of North Borneo and Sarawak had not 
been consulted. The rebellion in Brunei led by Azahari in December 1962 which 
opposed the formation of Malaysia was used as further evidence by the Indonesians, 
to support their own opposition stance towards Malaysia. The Philippines also 
claimed North Borneo, on behalf of the Sultan of Sulu who had leased the area to 
the North Borneo Company in 1878. 
These political confrontations turned into armed aggression when Indonesian 
forces crossed the boundaries of Sarawak and Sabah from Kalimantan Borneo. 
However, this aggression did not prevent the formation of Malaysia. Tengku Abdul 
Rahman met Sukarno in Tokyo in May 1963 and began the negotiations which 
resulted in an agreement in July 1963, Malaysia being officially formed on 31 
August, 1963. 
Although the people of Sabah and Sarawak had agreed to join Malaysia, at 
the insistence of Indonesia and the Philippines, the United Nations conducted an 
opinion survey in the two states. The UN reported in August 1963 that the people 
of the two states favoured the formation of Malaysia, of which they were to be part, 
and 16 September 1963 was then fixed as the official date for North Borneo and 
Sarawak to join Malaysia. Malaysia also became a member of the Commonwealth 
nations. 
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Both the Philippines and Indonesia responded by breaking diplomatic links 
with Malaysia. However, the Indonesian confrontation was finally settled by 
negotiation and a peace agreement was signed in Jakarta on 11th August, 1966. 
Nevertheless, the Philippine Government has still not officially dropped its claim on 
Sabah. 
There were various obstacles and challenges on the road to the formation of 
Malaysia. Firstly, Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore were ethnically, 
economically, and politically different. The emerging Malaysian Federation would 
have about 50 indigenous groups, all of whom made their living differently. In 
addition, there were other immigrant groups such as the Chinese, Indians, 
Indonesians, Filipinos and Europeans each with their own group interests. The total 
population was small and, as a consequence, the land was sparsely populated. The 
land itself was largely undeveloped and inhabited mainly by peasants and tribal 
people living by subsistence agriculture. Furthermore, Malaya, Singapore, and 
Sarawak were faced with communist insurgency and Sabah was occasionally troubled 
by pirates originating from the Philippines. World War II had also given the people 
of the federation a bitter lesson in the need for strong armed forces to defend their 
homelands and that was impossible to achieve as isolated units due to the small 
population of Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore. 13 
The Prime Minister, Tengku Abdul Rahman was a lawyer by training who 
had gained valuable experience in drawing up the Malayan constitution and 
negotiating independence. He proceeded with negotiations to form Malaysia based 
on the Malayan precedent and thus the Malayan Constitution formed the basis of the 
present Malaysian Constitution. The Malaysian Constitution protected the special 
privileges and rights of the Malays although other ethnic groups were granted rights 
of citizenship. Malay became both the national language and the official language 
in the public services and in the educational system, replacing the English language. 
However, English served as a second language (the English language is still widely 
used in Malaysia today especially in the private sectors). Islam was also adopted as 
the official religion. 
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Subsequent to the formation of the Federation, political developments such 
as the PAS (Islamic Party Of Malaysia) and the control of Kelantan and Trengganu 
after the 1959 general election, continuing communist threat, Indonesian policies of 
confrontation and the plural society had influenced the system of socio-economic 
development in Malaysia. Even though the Bumiputeras were granted privileges and 
priority in education, scholarships, religion, licences and other opportunities as 
stipulated in the constitution, Tengku was very cautious about implementing these in 
order not to antagonise other ethnic groups. Other ethnic groups were given the 
freedom to practice their own religions as long as they did not infringe the purity of 
Islam. For instance, although business could help the Malays raise their standard of 
living, it had to be achieved according to syariah law of "riba" (the Islamic 
prohibition on earning by interest). 
3. MALAYSIA'S PLANNING SYSTEM (1950-1995) 
When Malaysia was formed, many of the existing administrative practices 
were automatically adopted. Tengku remained Prime Minister, Kuala Lumpur 
became the Federal Capital, and the Government's economic policy retained the 
format of a development plan. During the transition period from 31 August 1963 to 
1965, the Second Five-Year Malaya Plan (1961-1965), Sabah Six-Year Plan (1959- 
64), Singapore Four-Year Plan, and Sarawak Second Four-Year Plan (1964-68), were 
still implemented. The First Malaysia Five-Year Plan was inaugurated for 1966- 
1970. Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore required development plans after 
World War II on the recommendation of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
And Development (IBRD). These plans served as a pre-condition to the application 
for assistance from IBRD. Countries with the best plans were usually given better 
financial assistance. Thus, it is interesting to observe how early historical events had 
influenced the development of the planning system. 
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3.1 The Malaya Five-Year Plans 
The IBRD study of Malaya in 1954 recommended that its development should 
be promoted through the private sector. The Alliance which won the 1955 General 
Election laid the foundation for the future planning system of Malaya and later that 
of Malaysia itself. Due to the lack of qualified and experienced officials who could 
set up the machinery for planning and co-ordinating economic development, a British 
expatriate, Oscar Spencer was recruited to head the Economic Secretariat of the 
Economic Committee of the Executive Council. These two agencies were 
responsible for formulating the economic policy and preparing the development plans. 
With the official establishment of the Economic Committee in April 1956, the 
planning office was removed from the direct control of the Federal Treasury. The 
First Malaya Plan was also influenced by top-level bureaucracy which mainly 
consisted of British expatriates. So the First Malaya Five-Year Plan was based on 
their experience of the Draft Development Plan (1950-1955). In the Draft 
Development Plan (DDP), priority was given to correct an imbalance in the economy 
which was due to over dependence on rubber and the communal division of 
economic activity. A large number of the Malays who formed a majority in Malaya 
were engaged in agricultural activities. The strategies adopted to deal with the 
imbalance were to promote economic growth and to diversify the economy in order 
to enable a better choice of jobs for the future (Rudner, 1975: 26). The threat from 
communist guerillas which prompted the declaration of the Emergency may have 
influenced the British to change their "divide and rule" policy in Malaya. The free 
enterprise ideology was also useful in countering communist propaganda. 
Furthermore, the formation of United Nations Organizations after World War II 
played an important role in encouraging colonial rulers to improve conditions in their 
colonies. Former top British civil servants in Malaya such as Frank Swettenham who 
sympathized with the indigenous inhabitants also played an important role in 
influencing the British policy in Malaya (Turnbull, 1974/75: 239-254). Besides a plan 
for post-World War II reconstruction, Malaya was also preparing a plan for 
independence. So it seemed that many of the plan's priorities were formed in a hurry 
and influenced by events of that time. 
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3.2 The First Malaya Plan (1956-1960) 
The First Malaya Five-Year Plan was prepared in haste for presentation at the 
London meeting in December 1956 to January 1957 in order to convince Britain of 
the need for financial assistance for an independent Malaya. The plan which was 
approved in October 1956 with a fund of $1,138.5 million. " It had four objectives 
which are listed in order of priority: (1) rubber planting, mining, port construction, 
agricultural modernization, and the stimulation of industrialization, (2) education, 
improvement in health services especially in rural areas, and the most urgent water 
supply schemes, (3) housing, transportation, communications, and electric power and 
(4) public administration. 
The overall objective was that, when all these priorities had been achieved, 
the rate of public and private investment would rise creating more employment. 
Thus the main role of the plan was to preserve and advance the interest of the 
capitalist groups in the hope that their investments would create more jobs. The plan 
failed to provide guidelines about raising the wages of workers and to prevent 
exploitation. The poor rural farmers benefitted little from the plan as it took time for 
the linkage effects from the public investments in industries in the urban areas to 
reach them. Besides, entrepreneurs were still unwilling to invest in the rural areas 
due to communist threats, and the government emergency regulations such as curfew 
hours encouraged the concentration of industrial and commercial development in the 
towns. 
The First Malaya Plan encountered problems with under funding due to falling 
revenue from the decreased prices of rubber and tin. Furthermore, foreign investors 
transferred their profits overseas. This situation was exacerbated by emergency 
regulations which generally confined development to safer urban areas. 
The Treasury's stringent measures caused ill-feelings in the groups which they 
affected; groups such as the rural population and wage earners. These groups 
demanded improvements in the social services, health services, education and 
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housing. When the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party took the east coast in the 1959 
General Elections, the Alliance Federal Government had to divert some of their funds 
to rural areas. This political situation indicated that democratization of the 
development planning via electoral pressures could help identify the needs and 
problems of the people. 
Socio-economic programmes that aimed to promote political and economic 
stability under the plan usually achieved better target performance. In education, the 
Inter-Communal Education Committee under Tun Razak undertook the task of 
designing an educational system that would promote national integration, nation- 
building and development for the people of various ethnicities who comprised 
Malaya. The education policy aimed to ensure that every child would have access 
to primary education by 1960.15 As a result there was an increase in the number of 
pupils. Increased funds were required to build classrooms and the target was 
achieved in 1958, two years ahead of schedule. By 1960,95% of eligible children 
attended school. The Treasury approval of extra expenditure had partly contributed 
to the target's achievement, but the good performance of the plan at the primary level 
might also have been caused by the high motivation of the teachers who at that time 
held most of the UMNO committee posts in the village branches. Nevertheless, 
development in secondary, technical and agricultural education was impeded by 
financial constraints. Furthermore, divisive communal interests affected the 
development of new national type government secondary education which could serve 
all. The lack of secondary schools defeated the whole purpose of education as an 
agency for promoting social mobility and nation-building. Many school leavers were 
unable to gain places in secondary schools in order to continue their education. Only 
a relatively prosperous minority could afford to continue their secondary education 
in towns. 
The lack of funds was also seriously felt in the health services. However, 
despite its manifest failings, the first Malaya Five-Year Plan provided a useful 
framework for the next Five-Year Plan. 
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3.3 The Second Malaya Five-Year Plan (1961-1965) 
The Second Malaya Five-Year Plan (1961-1965) was an improved version of 
the First Malaya Plan. The machinery of the planning system was applied to Sabah 
and Sarawak when the plans of the two East Malaysian states were absorbed in 1963. 
Thus, it is important to analyse the problems of the Malayan plans in comparison to 
those of East Malaysia's plans especially those in the Sabah region. By the time of 
the Second Five-Year Malaya Plan, the planning machinery had expanded to meet 
its increasing responsibilities. It was organized into: (1) National Development 
Planning Committee, (2) Economic Planning Unit, (3) Departmental Staff Units, (4) 
National Operations Room, (5) State, District and Kampong Rural Development 
Committees and (6) Co-ordinating and Expediting Development Activities by 
Ministry of Rural Development. 
The Second Malaya Plan was allocated RM5,050 million which was twice the 
sum allocated for the First FYP. Federal projects and public enterprise were awarded 
RM2,150 million and private sector investments RM2,900 million. Malaya had to 
finance the plan through foreign loans, and by liquidating its assets due to the falling 
prices of rubber and tin. The Second Five-Year Plan had five objectives. Overall, 
these aimed to improve the rural population's standard of living. At the same time, 
it attempted to achieve some balance in economic development so that living 
standards could be maintained and more employment created for the growing labour 
force. This was achieved through diversification and expansion of the economy in 
both the agricultural and industrial sectors. Finally, social development was 
expanded in education, public health, housing, as well urban and rural utilities. 
Under the first objective, the rural populations were provided with basic 
public services and socio-economic development such as rural industries, incentives 
in agriculture, education and rural clinics to improve their standard of living. The 
rural electricity served about 9,949 households in 1956 and the number served in 
1960 increased to 12,000. By June 1963, the Central Electricity Board alone 
recorded an increase by 6,606 households. The major projects in the rural 
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development were rural roads (RM163,773 target), Land Development (RM161,707 
target), and Drainage And Irrigation (RM120,615 target). By June 1963,72% of the 
expenditure for rural roads, 75% for rubber replanting and 48% for drainage and 
irrigation was spent. 
The failing rural health services were given more funds in the Second Malaya 
Five-Year Plan with a total sum of RM39,390. By the end of 1963,27 health 
centres, 93 sub-centres, 406 mid-wifery clinics were funded, and the majority of 
RM92 million expenditure for education was spent on various school programmes for 
rural children. Agencies such as the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA), 
and the Rural Industrial Development Authority (RIDA) were created to speed-up the 
implementation of rural development programmes. By the June of 1963, FELDA had 
provided 37 thousand families with 179 thousand acres of land in the new settlement 
schemes. 
Due to the falling prices of tin and rubber, there had to be increased 
exploitation of these two products in order to maintain the national income and 
standard of living. Thus, although there was an increase in production in these two 
sectors, they were not so successful in creating more employment. 
In an effort to diversify Malaya's major exports so that it would not be so 
highly dependent on rubber and tin, the government's resources were mobilised to the 
maximum. This was the government's last resort in its effort to ensure that the 
Second Malaya Five-Year Plan would be successful. Oil palm plantations increased 
from 135,000 acres in 1960 to 153,00 in 1962 whilst food crop plantations rose from 
118,000 in 1960 to 146,000 acres over the same period. The need for agricultural 
research to increase productivity was recognised by investments in and improvements 
to the Agricultural College at Serdang. The government also provided many 
incentives for the growth of new industries such as tax relief, tariff protection, 
investment estates and attempts to enlarge the Malaysian market. These incentives 
resulted in an increase of 20% in the manufacturing and construction sectors between 
1962 and 1963. The Pioneer Industries Ordinance that was passed in June 1963 
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recorded the establishment of 99 new firms with a called-up capital of RM134 
million. Malayan Development Finance Limited, World Bank and Bank Negara also 
played important roles in financing industrial development. 
In terms of social development, the government was strongly committed to 
providing sufficient education for future generations. The steps that were taken in 
education development began, firstly, with the appointment of the Education Review 
Committee. This was later followed by reforms in Education with the establishment 
of the Education Act 1961, a new education policy and the national-type schools. 
This resulted in the expansion of secondary schools and the introduction of 
vocational schools. In addition, the University of Malaya was moved from Singapore 
to Kuala Lumpur and the College of Agriculture, Serdang expanded to meet the need 
for skilled manpower for national development. There was an overall increase in the 
number of secondary schools by 90% and the rural schools in general by 137% 
which was also followed by an increase in the number of classrooms. 
At that time, blue collar vocational schools were less attractive as many still 
preferred the white-collar job track. The educational ethos at that time placed 
quantity above quality. However, the policy was a positive step in the future 
development of education. But, in reality, it was not able to meet Malaya's skilled 
manpower needs other than as a system for propagating national interest. Besides, 
entrance to the University of Malaya gave better opportunities and advantages to 
students from well-off families compared to less competitive students from rural 
areas. The active lobbying of political parties especially Malayan Chinese 
Association who represented the Chinese interest, had led to the relaxation of Malay 
language requirement for non-Malays. 
The success of the First and Second Malayan Plans - particularly in rural 
development - was assisted by the Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak's, effort. 
His other posts as Minister of National and Rural Development and Minister Of 
Defence had exposed him to various challenges and experiences. He was an 
excellent manager, thinker and planner and was responsible for the introduction of 
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the Red Book Plan. In his speech on national development, he warned that the 
implementation of plans would not be successful without the participation of the 
people. The Red Book Plan which he adopted in the administration of development 
ensured that programmes were implemented and unsuccessful ones identified. An 
English expatriate who was Chief Planning and Development Officer in the Ministry 
of National and Rural Development, C. G. Ferguson (1965: 150-151) in his writing 
was impressed by Tun Abdul Razak's excellent leadership in the implementation and 
administration of developments. 16 Furthermore, better organization, cooperation and 
the end of Emergency Regulations contributed to the success of the rural 
development programmes. 
However, urban-rural imbalance in development led to rural-urban migration. 
This migration was also partly influenced by better road communications and public 
transport which were introduced to the villages. Although the Malayan government 
built 2,150 flats and 8,463 houses by June 1963, these were insufficient. The 
migration had led to the squatter housing problems around the cities, especially on 
the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur. Even today, these remain a significant sight around 
cities and large towns which is a testimony to both the limitation of a planning 
system which relied heavily on free enterprise and inability of the agencies 
concerned to cope with the problems. 
3.4 The Pre-independence Sabah Development Plans 
Like Malaya, North Borneo (Sabah) adopted the Reconstruction and 
Development Plan for the periods 1948-1955 and 1956-1960 after the devastation 
caused by World War II. Sabah received grants from the British Colonial and 
Welfare schemes. Funds were also coming from the Colombo Plan, United Nations 
agencies and private foundations (Ongkili, 1972: 80). Compared to Malaya, there 
was little political development in Sabah after the Reconstruction and Development 
Plans. Malaya went ahead to achieve its independence from Britain after that and 
had its own Malaya Five-Year National Development. However, by the mid 1950s, 
political parties and leaders began to arise in Sabah. In addition, Sabah was already 
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building up its own economy by exporting timber, rubber and copra. At the same 
time, Britain was anticipating giving its colonies in Borneo (i. e. Sabah, Sarawak and 
Brunei) independence. Thus, it was necessary for Sabah to have its own socio- 
economic development plan for independence. Although the colonial power had 
formulated the five year plans beginning in 1956, these were difficult to implement 
due to a lack of trained personnel (Ongkili, 1972). As Sabah's economy improved, 
it adopted its own Six-Year Development (1959-1964) plan prior to independence in 
1963 (Lim, 1986: [156-170] and Gudgeon, in Sullivan Leong, [19811). The Sabah 
Plan was necessary as the funds which Britain could spend on its colonies were 
limited. However, Sabah needed a longer phase of six years for its development plan 
due to its lack of implementation capacity. 
The Sabah First Six-Year Development Plan (1959-1964) was continued after 
the achievement of Independence and incorporation into Malaysia on 16th September 
1963. The increase in funding and better treatment of its colonies indicated that 
Britain was under pressure from the United Nations to rebuild and modernise both 
its present and former colonies. The plan was based on the objectives of promoting 
economic growth, human resources development, modernization, and the reduction 
of social inequalities (Lim, 1986: 168). 
As in Malaya, the pressing social tasks at that time were in education and the 
health services particularly the rural areas. Before 1963, in Sabah, there were more 
missionary and private run schools than government schools, for out of 519 schools 
in Sabah, only 146 were government schools, 121 mission schools, 116 being 
Chinese and other systems accounting for 136. Of these, 489 were primary schools, 
thirty were secondary schools and one was a technical school (George, 1981). The 
trend continued even a decade after independence. With regard to the education of 
girls, parents were still accustomed to the norm that girls should remain at home and 
hence they were given little encouragement to attend school. However, at the time 
there are increasing numbers of girls going to school compared to in the earlier days. 
With the thriving timber industry, plans were set for the improvement of the 
educational system in preparation for Sabah's future needs. 
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In health services, further improvements were needed to deal with the problem 
of tropical diseases. However, the birth rate was also rising while at the same time 
the death rate showed a declining trend. With the ratio of doctors, nurses and 
hospital beds below standards, many services needed to be expanded into the rural 
areas. So, there remained plenty of room for improvement in the medical services. 
Government propaganda campaigns were also required to educate people about 
tropical diseases and overcome the beliefs and fallacies about traditional cures. Other 
than government funding, Sabah also received assistance from the World Health 
Organization and UNICEF. Like Malaya, Sabah also inherited the British system of 
administration and legal system up to the district level. However, the native laws 
and administration were preserved to deal with matters such as family inheritances, 
marriages and other family problems. The social structure remained largely based 
on ethnicity and regions. The Chinese, who were mainly traders lived in the towns 
while the locals (Bumiputeras and indigenous peoples) lived in the rural areas. The 
rural population were mainly farmers while those living in the coastal areas earned 
their living by fishing. There was also a rural labour forces on the British 
plantations. 
On the whole, the pre-independence Sabah Development Plans were just 
drafts; they were merely individual departmental estimations of expenditure and not 
actual expenditure. According to Lim (1986: 168): 
"they were not comprehensive development plans with explicit 
economic targets and a concern for internal consistency. " 
Therefore, it did not matter much whether the Sabah Plan was Six-Year Plan or Five- 
Year Plan. In fact, Ongkili (1972) argues that Sabah adopted the same Five-Year 
Planning system as in Malaya after its Reconstruction and Development Plan (1948- 
1955). Whereas Lim (1986) argues that Sabah adopted the Six-Year Plan for the 
period only in 1959-1964. Thus, it is not clear whether the 1948-1955 
Reconstruction and development Plan was extended further in Sabah due to 
implementation problems or it subsequently adopted two five-year Plans as viewed 
by Ongkili. However, the author is certain that Sabah had a Six-Year Development 
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Plan (1965-1970). However, Ongkili (1972: 79) did indicate implementation 
problems of the pre-independence plans due to the lack of trained man power and 
labour. 
Nevertheless, these pre-independence Plans were successful in promoting 
economic growth in Sabah through export of the main primary products such as 
rubber, copra and timber. Because of the British Colonial policy that its colonies 
should be able to produce raw materials for Britain, industrialization was neglected. 
However, the exports of these primary products indicated that Sabah's revenue 
increased from RM7.2 million in 1947 to RM98.0 million in 1963. The increase was 
contributed to largely by the rise in the export of timber compared to rubber (see 
Pang in Kitingan and Ongkili [1989: 82-88]). Economic growth had enabled the 
development of better economic and social infrastructure such as sea and land 
transportation, as well as telephone and postal services. 
On achieving independence through Malaysia in 1963, Sabah continued with 
its own Six-Year Development Plan (1959-1964) but received more funds from the 
Federal Government in Kuala Lumpur in comparison to the Colonial Administration. 
These funds were mainly for economic and social infrastructure development. The 
Peninsular Malaysia system of rural development was also introduced in Sabah. The 
Second Sabah Six-Year Development Plan (1965-1970) was later incorporated into 
the First Malaysia Plan (1966-1970). 
3.5 The First Malaysia Plan (1966-1970) 
The central bureaucracy of the Five-Year Malaysia plan was located in the 
National Operation Room in Kuala Lumpur. It served as a nerve centre for planning 
operations against poverty, ill-health and illiteracy. Economically Malaysia had 
problems in financing the plan because the prices of its major exports, rubber and tin, 
were subjected to international market fluctuations and politically Malaysia faced 
confrontation with her Indonesian neighbour. Further, it was apparent that the most 
delicate matter in the future of such a plural society was to maintain national unity 
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and integration. Finally, the people's standard of living had to be improved. The 
plan had five objectives which were similar to the Second Malaya Plan except that 
it now needed: 
"To promote the integration of the people and states of Malaysia by 
embarking upon a development plan explicitly designed to promote 
the welfare of all. " 
(GOM, First Malaysia Plan 1966-1970: 7) 
In addition to the Five-Year Plan, Malaysia also adopted a 20 year perspective 
plan with long-term targets and objectives outlined as follows: (a) a per capita 
income of RM1,500 in 1985, (b) 2.4 million new jobs, (c) a more equal income 
distribution, (d) better education, health services and housing, (e) better infrastructure 
for economic growth and (f) a healthier population. All these were possible if 
Malaysia had a diversified economy, high investment and rising rate of saving. 
The First Malaysia Plan absorbed both the Sarawak Second Five Year Plan 
(1964-1968) and Sabah Second Six-Year Plan (1965-1970). Some programmes were, 
of course, revised where required to suit the newly formed Federation of Malaysia. 
With an enlarged boundary and a high rate of population growth, Malaysia needed 
more money for socio-economic development. Malaysia which consisted of Malaya 
(50,840 square miles), Sabah (28,490 square miles), and Sarawak (48,340 square 
miles) has a total area of 127,670 square miles. The population of Malaysia at the 
start of the First Malaysia Plan was 8.052 million in Malaya, 520,000 in Sabah and 
835,000 in Sarawak which totalled 9.411 million people. Communication and 
infrastructure especially in Sabah and Sarawak were not well developed. The 
economy of Sabah and Sarawak was still dependent on primary products such as 
timber, agriculture and fishery. 
As Malaysia had a deficit in its international balance of payments, one step 
taken to combat this was to reduce the amount of imported foodstuffs. This loss was 
compensated by increasing the agricultural production of the sparsely populated 
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hinterland. Nevertheless, despite the balance of payment deficit, Malaysia found no 
problem in obtaining foreign loans as the prospects of the First Malaysia Plan were 
good. There were impressive growth rates in the manufacturing sector in areas such 
as tobacco products, the chemical industry, machinery, metal, non-metallic minerals 
and basic metals, food products, beverages, wood and rubber products, transportation 
equipment, building construction, iron ore and tin. As a consequence, the gross 
domestic product of Malaysia grew to RM8,078 million in 1965 at a rate of 6.4%. 
At the same time the consumption of the private and public sectors rose due to high 
living standards and capital formation (2.8 %a year). Motor vehicles, radios and 
electricity were in high demand. The projections of GNP and the prices of domestic 
goods were good except that Malaysia had to cope with both a rising population and 
the price fluctuation of its major export products. These two problems needed to be 
tackled so that the people's living standards could be improved. 
Since the public and private expenditure of RM4,550 million was financed by 
deficit financing, the government had to make sure that the money was spent 
effectively. A development administrative unit under the Prime Minister's 
Department was established and a central purchasing system was adopted to make 
sure that the fund was not wasted. Government projects were done just to meet its 
minimum standard requirement and so quality was compromised. Thus, it failed to 
take into consideration the long-term effects of the projects. Most of the socio- 
economic development funds of RM3810 million went to agriculture and rural 
development. 
The government needed to encourage the people's support and participation 
in the implementation of its planned programmes. But its free enterprise ideology 
had made the rich richer while the rural people lived in poverty thus widening the 
inequality gap even further. The government's reliance on the private sectors to 
improve the economy did not work. The government failed to take into consideration 
the fact that theoretically the duties of running the state and free enterprise could not 
converge. The private sector failed to deliver the goods that the government 
expected. Foreign companies remitted their income home rather than paying taxes 
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and contributing to Malaysia. Thus, even during the early days of independence, 
Malaysia already had a "free riders" problem. 
In Sabah, socio-economic development during the First Malaysia Plan was 
still far behind Peninsular Malaysia. For instance, in education, mission schools 
remained the best choice for well-off families. These schools provided education up 
to secondary school which enabled students to obtain their Cambridge School 
Certificate. To further their study for Cambridge High School Certificate, students 
had to transfer to the capital city in Kota Kinabalu. Most Chinese sent their children 
to Chinese primary schools and transferred to English schools for secondary 
education. A few Islamic schools were planned and were beginning to take shape 
but most Muslim children learned to read the Koran from the village guru's home. 
Due to the lack of quality government schools, Sabah Foundation sponsored some 
promising secondary school students to study in Peninsular Malaysia. Scholarships 
to study overseas were offered only to the lucky few. Only well-off families, 
especially the Chinese, were able to send their children for university education 
overseas and consequently they tended to have a superior education to the 
Bumiputeras and others in Sabah. The same social trend was appearing in Malaya 
and associated with racial prejudice which treated Bumiputeras as lazy and backward. 
In the 1969 General Elections, the Alliance lost its two-thirds majority in 
Malaya and therefore could not push forward its planned programmes in parliament. 
Friction between the Chinese and the Malays during the election campaigns resulted 
in the May 13th racial riot in Kuala Lumpur. The parliament was suspended and 
elections in Sabah and Sarawak were delayed although the riots did not spread to the 
two states. Most of the rural population in Sabah and Sarawak did not even know 
about the rioting in Kuala Lumpur probably due to government control of the 
electronic media. Besides, anyone raising sensitive issues that might destroy the 
communal unity and undermine social order could face action under the Internal 
Security Act. Newspapers charged under the Sedition Act could also face risk of 
being closed down. 
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When the elections were resumed in Sabah and Sarawak in June and July 
1970, the Alliance in Sabah won 16 parliamentary seats. In Sarawak, the Alliance 
parties consisting of Party Bumiputera, Sarawak Chinese Association and Pesaka won 
only 9 of the 24 seats. Later, the Sarawak United People Party (SUPP) members 
joined the coalition which enabled the Alliance to form a government with a two- 
thirds majority. 
During parliament's suspension, some solutions were worked out to restore 
peace and harmony. Tun Abdul Razak had also assumed the post of Prime Minister 
after ousting Tengku. " The Department of National Unity was established and 
goodwill committees were organised to conduct community activities. The National 
ideology, Rukunegara18 was adopted in mid 1970, its stated aim being to unite the 
nation, to build a democratic, liberal, progressive and just society. At this time, a 
new policy was drawn up for Malaysia known as the New Economic Policy (NEP). 
When the parliament resumed after the Alliance Government gained the needed two- 
thirds majority from the overdue Sabah and Sarawak parliamentary elections, the 
NEP was ready. It became a vehicle to safeguard and promote the interest of both 
the Malays and the indigenous groups (Bumiputeras) in Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak. 
The NEP was given twenty years (1971-1990) to achieve its two pronged objectives 
of eradicating poverty and restructuring Malaysian society. As the NEP was the 
beginning of active state intervention to protect and advance the privileges of the 
Malays and the indigenous groups, it attracted much of criticism from the other non- 
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Bumiputera communities. The target of the NEP was to achieve 30% Bumiputera 
participation in the private sector by the year 1990. 
3.6 The Five-Y ear Plans And The NEP (1971-1990) 
The NEP was put into practice during the Second Malaysia Five-Year Plan 
beginning in 1971. Like the previous plans the Second Malaysia Five-Year Plan 
aimed to overcome problems that had been identified in the previous plans. 
However, due to the racial riots, the Second Malaysia Five-Year Plan adopted the 
slogan of "A Just Society" which is one of the five principles of Rukunegara (the 
national ideology). Its objectives incorporated the NEP objectives which were 
summarized as follows: (1) the two-pronged objectives of NEP to eradicate poverty 
and restructure society, (2) the modernization of rural lives, (3) the rapid and 
balanced growth of urban activities, (4) the creation of a Malay commercial and 
industrial community, (5) partners in all aspects of the economic life and (6) better 
opportunities and additional resources. 
In dealing with the problem of poverty during the Second Malaysia Five-Year 
Plan, the government hoped to ensure that development and economic growth would 
benefit all, and that the poor would have a fair share of the economic growth. The 
redistribution of income was not as practised in Western countries but in the form of 
better public services for basic needs, subsidies and education for all eligible children 
up to university level. The Bumiputeras were to be given priority in admission to 
local universities and in the award of scholarships. Quotas were also set for 
admission of the Bumiputeras in those fields of study where they lagged behind. 
With better education, the government argued Bumiputeras would become more 
competitive and also provided the government with the skilled manpower necessary 
for the implementation of planned development programmes. Due to pressing needs 
in education, the Second Malaysia Plan projection showed that education expenditure 
would grow to RM350.8 million in 1980 compared to RM25.8 million in 1969. 
Restructuring did not entail taking from one community and giving to another. It 
aimed at building a just society in which no one group monopolised the economy. 
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This was to be done by active government intervention in the economy. So, Malay 
privileges were no longer restricted only to land, ownership laws, government 
employment, and distribution of government services. The restructuring of society 
would, it was hoped, result in a complete overhaul of Malay society, in which the 
Bumiputeras would participate actively in economic development and urbanization. 
The Second Malaysia Plan had a better rationale of planning with the 
adoption of growth zones concept. For instance, in regional planning and land 
development, in Pahang Tenggara the poor regions were being integrated into the 
growth zones. This concept was overlooked during the FMP. For instance the 
Jengka Triangle development was not so successful because it was isolated from the 
economic growth zones. Opening more lands that had little economic growth 
potential would not help the settlers improve their standard of living hence causing 
many to quit. The concept of growth zones came after the mid-term review of the 
plan in 1973 and was adopted in the Johore Tenggara and Pahang Tenggara land 
development. But the Federal Government land development plans were constrained 
by the fact that State Governments had jurisdiction over most of the suitable land. 
State governments usually preserve lands that have good revenue earning potential 
for their own projects. 
The NEP was integrated into both government programmes and private 
enterprises. In the public sector the quota for the Malays in the Administration and 
diplomatic services and education was actually exceeded. The rapid development had 
resulted in the need for more specialised training for the Bumiputeras and more 
universities. Nevertheless, economic growth alone would not solve rural poverty. 
The rural Malays were well embedded in their culture and development which came 
from above, had little effect on them. Perhaps democratization of the development 
process would have helped them to participate more actively. However, Sabahans 
had never experienced direct rule from the Sultans who were more receptive to 
changes. Traditions and cultures became the main obstacle to development. 
However, the Second Malaysia Plan was successful in promoting economic growth. 
The fall in oil prices also highlighted the fact that Malaysia could not rely on the 
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export of raw materials to achieve economic growth. The diversification of the 
economy and industrialisation of the First Malaysia plan needed to be intensified. 
Malaysia's GDP, however, did grow to 7.4% exceeding the target of SMP which was 
6.8%. In poverty eradication and restructuring programmes, one of the negative 
effects was a "subsidy mentality" in the Bumiputeras rather than self-reliance. The 
last two years of the Second Malaysia Plan saw the height of student unrest in 
universities about the issues of social inequality and poverty. 
The Third Malaysia Five-Year Plan (1976-1980) showed good prospects for 
Malaysia. Her investments in economic diversification were beginning to bear some 
fruit. This was coupled with a strong world economy which led to the rise in 
demand for her exports. Malaysia had new manufactured products especially from 
food processing, electrical goods, rubber products, plywood and chemical products. 
There were 50 industrial estate schemes and 9 free trade zones in Peninsular 
Malaysia by the time of the TMP. These facilities had attracted even the 
transnational corporations from the USA and Japan due to rising costs in their own 
countries. They were especially attracted by the cheap but educated Malaysian 
labour. Women were being employed in large numbers in factories throughout 
peninsular Malaysia and by 1980 their numbers reached 80,000. 
However, due to inflation which was running at 7%, the government had to 
be able to balance its expenditure with its earnings. Public campaigns on inflation 
were launched. One of the campaign slogans was "grow your own food. " Out of the 
expenditure of $18.6 billion in the public sector, 25.5% was spent on agriculture, 
9.5% in mining, manufacturing and commerce, 16.6% on social development, 36.5% 
on infrastructure development, administration and environment, and 11.9% for 
defence security. Programmes on the eradication of poverty took 38.2% of the total 
development expenditure. The states targeted for the programmes were in Kedah, 
Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu, Malacca, Sabah, and Sarawak. 
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The private sector had become partners with the public sector as required by 
the NEP. The investment in the private sector was 26.8 billion out of 44.2 billion 
investment targets. The TMP was financed through local and foreign loans which 
was risky if the finance and monetary systems were mismanaged. The other 
challenges to TMP were the need for increased staff and experts in the new fields 
brought about by industrialisation. For instance, experts in environment protection 
were needed with the enforcement of the Environment Quality Act. 
Based on the overriding objectives of the NEP, the TMP's objectives were: 
(1) reducing the incidence of rural poverty, (2) reducing the incidence of urban 
poverty, (3) enhancing the quality of life, (4) equal shares irrespective of ethnicity 
in all walks of life, (5) 30% Malay ownership in economic assets, 40% non- 
Bumiputeras, and 30% for foreigners, (6) fostering entrepreneurship amongst 
Bumiputeras, (7) encouraging and supporting private and foreign investments, (8) 
promoting the further mobilisation of human and other economic resources for 
development and (9) developing and expanding the social and physical infrastructure 
of the economy to effectively sustain the above objectives. 
The Third Malaysia Five-Year Plan hoped to increase productivity so that 
Malaysia would have a strong economic base for the future generation. While, at the 
same time, it had a large amount of untapped resources in Sabah, Sarawak, Johor and 
Pahang. The most promising of these was the exploration of petroleum and gas on 
the East coast of Malay Peninsula and the West coast of Sabah and Sarawak. The 
development of infrastructure and growth centres in Sarawak did not need much 
expenditure as it was only a matter of making improvements. Finally, effective 
promotion strategies were needed for Malaysian-made goods. 
Meanwhile in Sabah, the NEP had also led the Federal Government to do 
something for Sabah under the Chief Ministership of Tun Mustapha. Tun Mustapha 
was alleged to have abused his power and was seldom in Sabah. 19 As a result of 
this, Harris, the State Finance Minister resigned to form the BERJAYA Party. The 
party was later headed by Tun Fuad who had resigned as Head of State in order to 
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do this. Following the State Elections in April 1976, USNO won 20 seats and 
BERJAYA 28 ousting Tun Mustapha (USNO) out of power. Under the new 
BERJAYA state government, the NEP was beginning to make its presence felt in 
Sabah. For instance, Kojasa Enterprise, a state owned shop, was started in order to 
offer bargain prices on goods and better services and undercut the Chinese 
shopkeepers. It had several branches in Sabah. Many public and statutory bodies 
were set up to help the Bumiputeras start their own businesses. 
Nevertheless, by 1980, Bumiputeras were still unable to take charge of the 
economy despite government subsidies. The Bumiputeras who were awarded 
government contracts, sub-contracted them to the Chinese who had both large sums 
of capital behind them and more business experience. This, in fact, helped to 
promote co-operation between the Chinese and the Bumiputeras, but it defeated the 
purpose of creating successful Bumiputera entrepreneurs. They were just sleeping 
partners of the Chinese and waiting to get their shares when payment claims were 
ready. This used to be termed "Ali Babaism. " 
In Sabah, many of the government's statutory bodies which were set up to 
help the Bumiputeras were running at a loss due to inefficiency and mismanagement. 
For example, in 1980, Sabah Land Development Board losses were estimated to be 
more than $30 million. Due to these heavy losses, the Chief Minister, Datuk Harris 
decided that a private agency, the Sime Darby Group be appointed to take over the 
management of Sabah Land Development Board (SLDB) on 21st July 1981. On 11th 
August 1981, Harris amended the Inquiry Commission Ordinance Chapter 16 which 
outlined the conduct of officials of statutory bodies. The amendment allowed a 
surcharge to be made on the officials who abused public funds. 2° Harris' speech on 
the amendment mentioned: 
"Large sums of public funds which have been allocated to statutory 
authorities and other Government sponsored agencies have been 
mismanaged. Millions of ringgit have been wasted and many projects 
have not succeeded to the extent we have hoped. " 
(Campbell, 1986: 326) 
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When Mahathir assumed the Malaysian Premiership on the retirement of 
Hussein on 16th July 1981, he immediately introduced many reforms and measures21 
and pushed hard to put the NEP into practice after a mid-term review of the TMP 
showed that the target of 30% Bumiputeras participation would not be achieved by 
1990. Mahathir had been one of the strong supporters of Tun Razak in formulating 
the NEP, and the mid-term review provided a good opportunity for him to push 
forward with new ideas from his previous experience as Minister of Trade and 
Industry in order to transform Malaysia into a newly industrialized country. 
However, at this time, Malaysia also faced recession and the falling prices of its 
major exports. So the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-1985) had to be financed by 46% 
foreign borrowing (RM4.6 billion in 1982) with 54% coming from domestic sources 
(Hua 1983: 162). Other than that, Malaysia borrowed from the World Bank only for 
specific projects and purchases. 
Between 1982 and 1985 Mahathir put forward policies such as Clean Efficient 
and Trustworthy Administration Through Leadership By Example, Look East Policy, 
Malaysia Incorporated, Privatization, National Industrial Policy, National Agricultural 
Policy, and Assimilation of Islamic Values in Administration. These policies outline 
future changes under Mahathir's administration which will be discussed further in this 
thesis. And due to recession and poor performance of NEP, he launched a campaign 
against what he saw as the Bumiputeras' subsidy mentality. 
In line with the Look East Policy, Malaysia sought assistance from Japan and 
Korea to achieve its objective of becoming a newly industrialised country. Most 
industrial projects during the Third Malaysia Plan and the first two years of the 
Fourth Malaysia Plan were given to Japanese and Korean firms. The state-led 
industrialisation stretched the financial resources of the country to the limit. Despite 
the proposals to promote and institutionalise honest and efficient administration 
contained in the plan, the industrialization programs were marred by many blunders, 
unaccounted losses, corruption, frauds, scandals, conflicts of interest, debt, money 
politics and mismanagement. 22 Much of the industrial development promoted by the 
Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia such as Perwaja, cement and Proton car 
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projects were running at a loss. In particular the RMI billion Proton car project was 
criticised as economically unfeasible. 
The expenditure on industrialization programmes not only increased 
government debt, but also affected other programmes in the Fourth Malaysia Plan 
due to budget cuts. It was estimated that public expenditure was cut from RM1,027 
million in 1983 to RM984 million. The education, defence and home affairs budget 
was slashed by 16% to RM548 million. Most of the expenditure was used to pay for 
the new industrialization projects undertaken mainly by Korean and Japanese 
companies. 
Because of the debt burden, there was increasing state intervention, 
restrictions and reforms. The first of such interventions, which stimulated protest 
from a number of interest groups, was the amendment of the Societies Act 1981. 
This allowed the government to shape and restrict political association and 
participation. Independent trade unions were replaced by in-house unions in 
accordance with the Japanese model. Notably, however, the Japanese workers 
received higher levels of remuneration than Malaysians. By such moves, the 
government restricted workers from demanding for better wages. In addition, 
Mahathir's policies marked an important stage in that they indirectly encouraged a 
much closer relation between business and politics -a cause of much criticism by the 
opposition parties and interest groups. In fact, the Malaysia Incorporated Policy 
promotes such relationship between the public and the private sectors which, of 
course, needs well disciplined managers when it comes to managing corporate 
finance. 
The Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-1990) was the last opportunity for Mahathir's 
government to achieve the NEP's objective of eradicating poverty and restructuring 
society. The recession that affected Malaysia between 1982 to 1986 had taught 
planners the importance of human resources development in achieving economic 
growth. A well trained labour force - especially from the Bumiputeras - was found 
to be an important factor both in increasing productivity and redistributing income. 
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For instance, industries - especially MNCs - are employing cheap female labour in 
large numbers to work in factories. The recession had also prevented the NEP's 
objectives being fully achieved. During this period there was labour unrest, political 
corruption, favouritism in the award of privatised projects, and mismanagement. This 
was marked by allegations of interest groups about mismanagement, discrimination, 
labour unrest and award of privatised government projects to UMNO politicians. 
These problems also highlighted the fact that economic factors played a significant 
role in national unity. These public criticisms of Mahathir's policies also indicated 
their growing awareness of human rights and freedom, equality and democracy. 
Due to mismanagement, the economic development and growth that has been 
achieved has benefited only a few opportunists and has left the poor the poorer. 
Malaysia needed to have people, especially Bumiputeras, who could manage and 
regenerate wealth. Furthermore, the greater reliance on revenue and domestic saving, 
and reduction in borrowing to finance the Fifth Malaysia Plan meant that managerial, 
administrative and scientific expertise was needed to raise economic productivity. 
Expert knowledge was seen as central to improve economic growth, in the marketing 
of new products, to the effective and efficient utilisation of resources, and increase 
the rate of investment. Such measures, it was argued, would not only overcome the 
effects of recession, but create more employment, stimulate business and industrial 
activity, and encourage an increase in corporate ownership by Bumiputeras. These 
measures also aimed to reduce unemployment and its associated problems that had 
resulted from the world wide recession. 
The overall strategies in achieving economic growth in Malaysia as reflected 
in Mahathir's policies were: privatisation, the efficient management of the economy, 
the mobilization of the agricultural sector, the stimulation of industrial development, 
a greater emphasis on research and development, the further development of human 
resources, the improvement of spatial planning, the development of urban centres and 
an increased female participation in the development process. 
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In addition to the national unity programmes implemented since the 1969 
riots, the Fifth Malaysia Plan re-emphasised the need for positive values in national 
development. They were: values crucial to national unity, a strengthened work ethic, 
entrepreneurial spirit, religious values and a clean environment. These values were 
emphasised due to problems of corruption and mismanagement which had been 
associated with previous plans and damaged Malaysia's international image. Besides, 
with the implementation of the privatisation policy, projects involving large amounts 
of capital needed people who were competent and reliable to manage and administer 
them. The Bumiputera Malaysia Finance Ltd., (a government owned finance agency) 
scandal in 1983 involving a business transaction of about US$580 million had taught 
Mahathir's government a bitter lesson. 
Fortunately, economic recovery came to Malaysia in 1987 with an economic 
growth of 5.2%. This was due to an improvement in the world economy and the rise 
of Malaysia's exports such as electronics, the Proton car, sawn logs, sawn timber, 
palm oil and petroleum. Jomo et al (1989) argue that the recovery was linked to a 
growth in world trade cycle but would not have been so strong had it not been for 
the diversification of Malaysia's exports and its programme of rapid industrialization. 
In the late 1980s, Malaysia had political problems such as deregistration of 
the UMNO party due to internal quarrels. There were public demonstrations against 
favouritism in the award of the privatised projects23, low wages, rural poverty and 
industrialization. The incidents led to many arrests under the Internal Security Act, 
a last resort in handling political opposition and trouble-makers. 
Meanwhile, in Sabah, Parti Bersatu Sabah (United Sabah Party) had gained 
power in mid 1985 after defeating the National Front Party of BERJAYA which was 
led by Harris. Under Harris, many new development projects and public enterprises 
were implemented hastily. Sabah did achieved strong economic growth but observers 
regarded it as fragile economic growth. In addition, his government suffered from 
inefficiency, mismanagement and corruption. A number of issues had been important 
for the PBS's success including increasing Sabah's share of the oil and gas income 
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in Labuan. One of the winning issues of PBS was regarding Harris's decision turning 
Labuan Island, a part of Sabah, into Federal Territory. The Territory (Kuala Lumpur 
and Labuan) was constitutionally created for some administrative reasons. Besides, 
the persistent problems of rural poverty were becoming a political issue in Sabah. 
Nevertheless, the former Chief Minister, Datuk Harris Salleh had developed 
Sabah greatly and brought some social change during his nine years' rule. He 
followed the same pattern of development as that adopted in West Malaysia in 
accordance with the implementation of NEP in 1970. Harris was remembered as a 
Chief Minister in a hurry. It was also probably due to his attempt to achieve the 
NEP objectives (which were not doing so well as reported in the mid-term review 
of the Third Malaysia Plan). During his rule, Sabah received an amount of federal 
assistance and the beginning of some modem industries such as shipping, oil and gas 
in Labuan; car assembly and paper mill in Sabah. 
The Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986-2000) incorporated the recommendations of 
the Report of the Cabinet Committee to review the implementation of the Education 
Policy (1979) implemented during the Fourth Malaysia Plan and which had revealed 
important changes in Malaysia's education system. For instance, pre-school 
regulations had been enacted which had given the government power to supervise, 
control, coordinate, train teachers, develop the curriculum and upgrade the quality of 
pre-school education. The 1984 a nationwide study had shown that there were 
279,000 children between the ages of four to six attending pre-school education. 
These centres, nurseries, etc. were run by the Ministry of Rural Development and 
private agencies such as the church, religious bodies, social organizations and 
individuals. The new curriculum for primary schools, which was introduced to in 
1983, needed teachers to teach a new subject on manipulative skills (a "kemahiran 
hidup" subject to acquaint students with basic practical skills other than the usual 
subjects), but the class-teacher ratio in the new curriculum for primary schools had 
also worsened slightly. 
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In secondary education, measures had been taken under the 4th Plan to 
increase the number of rural children in the science streams by providing residential 
science secondary schools and the MARA Junior Science College. However, the 
enrolment in vocational schools had increased relatively little from 12,500 in 1980 
to 13,700 in 1985. This indicated that social attitudes towards vocational education 
had changed if compared to the 1960s in Malaya when there too had been little 
response to increase the numbers taking vocational courses. 
The 1985 data showed that the ratio of students to teachers was 2.2 million 
to 92,200 (24: 1) in primary schools, in secondary schools, there were 918,400 
students to 40,300 college trained teachers and 16,600 graduate teachers (16: 1). 
There were shortages of teachers in subjects such as science, physics, chemistry, 
mathematics, English and Bahasa Malaysia, but an excess in social science subjects. 
In line with the NEP's objectives, the participation of Bumiputeras in tertiary 
education had increased. The number of Bumiputeras taking diploma and degree 
courses in local institutions had risen and now outnumbered the Chinese. The 
percentage of Bumiputeras out of 25,046 attending diploma courses was 94.5% 
compared to 4.9% Chinese in 1985. The percentage of Bumiputeras of 37,838 
students attending degree courses was 63.0% compared to 29.7% Chinese. At 
Independence in 1963, Malaysia's only university was University of Malaya. By 
Fifth Plan, Malaysia possessed the University of Science, National University, 
University of Agriculture, University of Technology, International Islamic University, 
and Northern University of Malaysia. Bumiputeras were provided with preparatory 
courses after completing secondary education prior to entering diploma and degree 
courses in engineering and sciences. 
Besides education, other social developments were made in community areas 
such as youth, sports, social welfare, and information and broadcasting. The overall 
objective was to inculcate what the government regarded as positive values oriented 
towards community development, self reliance, and nationhood. But most of the 
achievements in social development were concentrated in Kuala Lumpur and its 
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surrounding regions. In the states such as Sabah, this type of development was 
minimal and projects associated with sports, culture and youth did not achieve the 
standards of professionalism typical in the West. Professional sports were only in 
football, horse racing and golf. But there is now growing awareness concerning 
social development. There was increased expenditure: culture $12.50 million, 
community development (KEMAS) $48.47 million, Aborigines Department $60.65, 
Youth $26.00 million, sports 85.48 million, social welfare services $34.00 million. 
One of the problems was due to the lack of professional staff and research in these 
fields. A significant form of assistance in social development was provided by Japan 
in the form of professional guidance through the Japanese Overseas Volunteer Corps. 
The expenditure on information and broadcasting was slashed to $51.99 
million (1986-1990) compared with 91.12 million during the previous plan. This was 
probably due to the commissioning of private television in 1985 which was owned 
by some members of the UMNO elites. Furthermore, the increase in the use of 
cheaper, locally made television programmes from 60% in 1980 to 100% of 
broadcasts in 1985 had also reduced costs. The measures were also taken partly due 
to the need to reduce the influence of Western movies on the audiences, as well as 
in response to critics from traditional Muslims. Furthermore, this is in line with the 
Policy on Assimilation of Islamic Values in Administration. 
The success of NEP programmes in fostering Bumiputeras participation in the 
private sector and encouraging them to attend higher education was reflected by the 
increasing size of the Bumiputeras' middle-class. The income redistribution 
accomplished by economic growth had created a new Malaysian middle class from 
the Malay communities. So, rather than bringing about social equality, it divided the 
society further in terms of ethnicity and income. Malays are now divided into rural 
Malays, urban Malays, new land settlement Malays, the urban poor Malays, and 
urban middle class Malays. 
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In Sabah, the growth of timber industries since Tun Mustapha's rule, had also 
brought about many wealthy Chinese timber tycoons. The timber industries did not 
create jobs for the rural population as cheap labour was recruited from Indonesia and 
the Philippines. While politicians and their Chinese partners gained huge acres of 
timber land, the rural farmers were confined to their small pieces of paddy land. 
Their land title was protected according to native laws but had less value in the land 
market compared to the ordinary title. Thus, a small Sabahan wealthy class had been 
created. Furthermore, Bumiputeras graduates who had been sponsored to study 
overseas and local universities by Sabah Government were beginning to become 
established in their jobs which also created a new middle class in Sabah. 
During BERJAYA rule under Datuk Harris (1976-1985) which had strong 
federal leaning, many of the NEP programs were extended to Sabah. A 
diversification of the economy was started which helped to boost the economy of 
Sabah and created new jobs. By the time a new state government, headed by Datuk 
Pairin`;, under Sabah United Party (PBS) was formed in mid 1985, the incidence of 
poverty in Sabah, according to Households Income Survey in 1984 was reduced to 
33.1%. 
Under PBS, the Sabah Action Blue Print (SAB) was launched in 1987 which 
aimed to give Sabah a conceptual framework to guide the implementation of 
economic development. The Sabah Five-Year Plan which ran from 1986 to 1990 was 
a revival of the earlier Sabah Plan. Further diversification of the economy will be 
its overall objective. Although it sounds similar to the Malaysia Plans and the NEP, 
SAB provides a better strategy to deal with local economic problems that had been 
overlooked by the Federal government. This is due to the fact that Sabahans (as well 
as Sarawakians) had a different culture and their own way of earning a living 
compared to Peninsular Malaysia. Furthermore, the West Malaysians who occupied 
most of the top positions in the central planning agency were not familiar with the 
situation in Sabah. But SAB had a major weakness in that it failed to integrate social 
development and economic growth. Further, the ministerial committees involved 
were headed by politicians who had little experience in business. According to Pang 
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et al (1990), most ministries involved are not so committed in implementing SAB. 
This was probably due to the lack of experienced leadership in developing the 
economy and a dependent population. The increase of poverty during PBS 
government is a testimony to the poor performance of SAB. SAB had no clear target 
which made it difficult to assess and it became merely a budget spending plan. For 
instance, during BERJAYA administration, the incidence of poverty was 33.1% in 
1984 compared to 58.3% in 1976. By 1987, the incidence of poverty had risen to 
35.3%. The incidence of poverty in Sabah by 1987 was worse than Sarawak which 
showed a continuous decline. This indicated that a change of government had a 
negative effect on the poverty eradication programmes in Sabah. 
The Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995), was put forward when Malaysia had 
already recovered from the economic recession. Prior to the plan, and the end of 
NEP in 1990, the National Economic Consultative Committee was formed to discuss 
the future economy of Malaysia. Henceforth, it was argued that planning should take 
into consideration inflation, cost of development, growth and redistribution of income 
and wealth, national unity and social progress. The future redistribution policy would 
take into consideration the various ethnic groups, regions and the interests of the 14 
states. 
3.7 The Transformation Of Malaysia And Liberalism In The 1990s: The Way 
Fönvard 
Today, Malaysia does not have to rely primarily on agricultural and petroleum 
for its exports. The Proton car is beginning to sell well around the world. By 1990 
Malaysia had exported more than 10,000 Protons. The year before, the Proton car 
had made a profit of RM32.5 million and revenue of RM820 (US$ 303) million. 
1990 was the best year for Malaysian economy when its economic growth reached 
11.3% in the first three months due to expansion in foreign investment after the 
depression of the mid-80s. A blessing in disguise came when Malaysia was about 
to embark on its Sixth-Year Plan (1991-1995). Her foreign deficit was temporarily 
solved by the rise in price of oil due to the Gulf War. The National Front had also 
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just won the October General Elections although it lost the state of Sabah to the 
Sabah United Party (PBS) and the state of Kelantan to Pan-Islamic Party Malaysia 
(PAS). Parliamentary elections also showed that DAP gained more in Penang, Kuala 
Lumpur. PAS and Semangat 46 (a new party formed by former UMNO Vice 
President, Tengku Razaleizh) won all the parliamentary seats in Kelantan but two 
MPs defected to the National Front after the elections. These opposition parties 
formed the new front during the elections, "Gagasan Rakyat" to fight the National 
Front. After the failed attempt to wrestle power from the National Front during the 
General Elections, the Gagasan Rakayat seemed to lose its public appeal and 
disbanded. 
With a fresh mandate from the October 1990 general elections a new cabinet 
line-up was appointed which showed some new faces and younger people. Mahathir 
was also ready for some fresh ideas. In a speech given at the Malaysia Trade 
Council Conference entitled "Malaysia: The Way Forward, " he put forward Vision 
2020 to turn Malaysian to a fully industrialised country by the year 2020. The 
Vision identified nine challenges namely: national unity; a free, calm, confident and 
strong society; a democratic nation; a moral and ethical society; a liberal society; a 
progressive society that utilises science and technology; a caring society; economic 
justice and a competitive, active, stable and dynamic society. All these are problems 
that concern individuals particularly Bumiputeras who are still backward and living 
in traditional ways. Although some of these challenges are nothing new to the well 
off Chinese and Bumiputeras, unity, individual development, morality and democracy 
will remain the toughest challenges irrespective of ethnicity and social position in a 
multi-ethnic society. 
In preparation for the Vision 2020 grand plan, reformation started with the 
government machinery, the Civil Service. First, the civil servants were awarded a 
pay rise in 1990, as demanded by their union CUEPEC, and they adopted a new 
philosophy in line with the Vision 2020 and industrialization policy. The New 
Remuneration Scheme (SSB) emphasizes the importance of quality and productivity 
and civil servants are evaluated annually based on these criteria. Inefficient civil 
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servants are allowed to opt for early retirement at the age of 40. This policy aimed 
to promote a culture of excellence among civil servants based on seven core values 
of quality, productivity, innovation, discipline, integrity, accountability and 
professionalism. The pyramid shaped organization chart was reduced and a flatter 
shape introduced to both cut staff and facilitate a faster flow of information. This 
new system was implemented in steps until 1994. 
At the same time, the National Trust Share Scheme awarded a handsome 
bonus and dividend to the Bumiputera shareholders at the end of 1990. To enable 
all Malaysians to invest irrespective of ethnicity, two new kinds of trust scheme have 
been introduced since 1990 which are called Bumiputera Trust Share (for 
Bumiputeras) and National Trust Share (for all Malaysians). The former investment 
scheme is guaranteed against market fluctuations while the latter is not. All these 
positive factors helped the National Front government campaign in the last 1990 
general elections and helped dismiss some of the opposition allegations against the 
government policies. Although the two schemes enabled non-Bumiputeras to 
participate in the trust investment through the National Trust Scheme, Bumiputeras 
can invest in both schemes. These schemes are good incentives for the Bumiputeras 
but discriminate against the other ethnic groups. 
Nevertheless, in Sabah, PBS - who had won the July 1990 state election for 
the third time since 1985 - continued to raise issues about deteriorating state rights. 
A factor which gained PBS Sabahan support especially from the non-Malays. So, 
in the October 1990 Parliamentary General Elections, the PBS tried to undermine 
National Front by withdrawing from the National Front coalition. This was done 
after seats were allocated among the National Front parties and candidates nominated. 
So it won all the 14 seats allocated with little opposition as the rival BN party USNO 
was only allocated 6 seats. Prior to this, there was already political friction between 
PBS leaders and the UMNO dominated Federal government particularly on religious 
and development issues in Sabah. 
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The Second Outline Perspective Plan (1991-2000) and New Development 
Policy (1991-2000) were adopted in June 1991 after the controversial NEP twenty 
year-term expired in 1990. These two outlined all the future agenda for the next ten 
years. On 10 July, 1991, the -Sixth Malaysia Plan was ready which served as a 
foundation for a new era. 
Basically the New Development Policy (NDP) aimed to replace the NEP 
which ended in 1990. Although NEP had improved Bumiputera participation in 
business and industry, the 30% capital ownership target was not achieved relative to 
the Chinese and the foreigners targets. The NDP represents only the first phase of 
a larger plan to turn Malaysia into an advanced nation by 2020. The NDP also 
marked a significant departure from state intervention in the economy adopted ever 
since the 1969 racial riot. The NDP emphasized economic growth for social 
restructuring and poverty eradication. 
The overall objective of the Sixth Malaysia Plan was to build a united, 
socially just and resilient nation. The allocation of RM104 billion was for 
infrastructure, social development and defence. The allocations were divided as 
follows: 
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DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES FUNDS ALLOCATED 
Communications sector $73 million 
Energy sector $979 million 
Infrastructure and development $19 billion 
Transportation $10.76 billion 
Commerce and industry $5.75 billion 
Education $8.5 billion 
Health $2.25 billion 
Agriculture and rural development $9 billion 
Armed forces $6 billion 
Security $1.5 billion 
Combat poverty $600 million 
Others $41.402 billion 
TOTAL $104 billion 
Table 1. The Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1996) 
Development Expenditure 
(Source: TEER, 1991) 
With the privatisation policy implemented since the recession the 1980s, the 
government allocation for the economic development was reduced. Through the 
privatization policy, the private sector became a partner with the government in 
restructuring society. The government only owns shares in these companies in line 
with the Bumiputeras 30% equity. The private agencies which now produces some 
revenues for the nation are: power company, Tenaga Nasional; Malaysian 
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International Shipping; Heavy Industries Corporation; telephone company, Telekom 
Malaysia; Port Kelang; Malaysian Shipyard and Engineering; Proton car; Fima 
Holdings; Peremba; Sports Toto; and Desaru Tourist Resort. The original intention 
was to reduce government spending, promote the laissez faire economy hence helping 
to achieve the NEP's objectives. However, the privatization policy was perceived as 
controversial as Bumiputeras are still dependent on the government. In addition, only 
a few get richer from the privatization while the consumers have to pay higher prices 
for the privatized goods. Jomo et al (1989: 123-128) found that it promoted state 
capitalism rather than private enterprise. For instance, the former Finance Minister, 
Tun Daim was alleged to have secured government contracts for his own companies. 
Even UMNO owned companies were awarded the government contracts. For 
instance, the North-South Highway was built by UMNO owned company, United 
Engineers Malaysia (Jomo, 1989: 129-133). The corporations that are owned by 
UMNO and known to be involved in government contracts are Fleet Holdings Sdn. 
Bhd, Hatibudi Sdn. Bhd., Waspavest Sdn. Bhd., Korporasi Ushaha Bersatu, and 
many other UMNO linked companies. These corporations have several companies 
under them which monopolised almost all the vital and money making government 
contracts (Gomez, 1994: 48-155 and McVey, 1992: 103-126). 
During the second half of the 1980s, many allegations had been made against 
the government concerning malpractice in the privatization process. Thus, the 
government had to take counter measures which led to abused human and democratic 
rights. These included outlawing labour unions and excessive use of the Internal 
Security Act during the "lalang operation" in 1987. 
Privatization and industrialization had been accompanied by a neglect of the 
agricultural sector, so that food imports had increased notably. This was associated 
with urban migration when many plantation estates went into property business as 
commodity prices fell during the recession. Further, wages in the industrial sectors 
were 4 times higher than the agricultural sector. Although these privatized agencies 
are monopolists they are not able to respond to increased demand due to 
inefficiencies. For example, the power company, Tenaga Nasional cannot provide 
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sufficient power due to increased demand from the growing number of industries. 
But in Sabah, where the Sabah Electricity Board was not yet privatized, there were 
frequent blackouts too which caused losses to many business leading to a hunger 
strike until the matter was dealt with by the central government. As a result, the 
Sabah Electricity Board was proposed for privatization. Furthermore, industries 
tended to be concentrated in Peninsular Malaysia rather than in Sabah, Sarawak and 
other peripheries. 
Mahathir brought many changes to Malaysia in the 1990s through his policies 
of privatization, corporatization and industrialization which had been introduced 
during the mid 1980's. Due to the liberalism policies, Malaysia needs to produce 
quality products and services to be competitive in the international market. These 
in themselves indirectly challenge Malaysians to change their cherished traditional 
lifestyle. In October 1991, the Standards and Industrial Research Institute of 
Malaysia (SIRIM) allocated RM40 million to design quality products. The Malaysian 
Technology Development Corporation, which was established in December 1992, will 
also help the SMIs in terms of capital and research. Malaysia has also adopted the 
Japanese strategy of support for the small and medium-sized industries and employs 
the assistance of Japanese advisers and volunteers. 
Some progress is also being made in the field of mass communication and 
information technology. Despite this progress, as the multi-ethnic country is 
predominantly Muslim, censorship of sex and violence received strong approval in 
particular from the traditional Muslim community. The government television and 
radio are means of Islamic propagation. Koran reading is part of the television 
programmes in the early morning, evening and mid-night. In addition, coverage of 
Islamic events such as Koran reading competitions are being given priority, and other 
programmes have to be temporarily cancelled. More air time is also given on Islamic 
talks and education compared to the past. However, with the first private television 
channel, TV3, the government has adopted positive views towards talk shows on 
television that discuss current problems. The government is also aware that too much 
censorship will affect the domestic film industry. Besides, there are now numerous 
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video stores selling laser discs which are hard to censor. Pay TV channels are 
beginning to be introduced in Malaysia such as the Mega TV, Measat Broadcast and 
Metro Vision. The Information Minister estimated that there will be about 20 
channels including pay televisions in the near future. 
Whilst determined to develop Malaysia materially, Mahathir had also tried to 
modernise Islam. It may be that the allegations of dishonesty and corruption against 
his administration by the PAS leaders in Kelantan has motivated him to take these 
measures. Other than that there have been some deviationist teachings of Islam such 
as Al-Arqam. Besides, statistics showed that there have been an increasing number 
of crimes and social problems in the first two years of the 1990s. There has also 
been an increase in the numbers of child abuse, drugs among secondary school 
children, missing persons, rape and murder. Mahathir had already introduced Islamic 
commercial institutions from 1983 and also the International Islamic University. But 
seeing the current social problems and the misinterpretation of Islam by some groups, 
he established the Institute of Islamic Understanding in July 1992. Its prime duty is 
to preserve and promote Islamic values to Muslims and to non-Muslims alike. In 
June 1995, a rehabilitation centre for Islamic deviationists and those who have lost 
faith in Islam was established. 
Some changes were also made in education to meet the needs of skilled 
manpower in international business. English once again began to play an important 
role in education. Non-Chinese parents are also encouraging their children to learn 
Mandarin. In August 1995, the Minister of Education announced that the period 
taken to study for Bachelor Degrees, except in medicine, will be three years only. 
There is also an elite secondary school, Kolej Tuanku Jaafar, established in 1991 to 
cope with the educational needs of the upper class. But, the pressing need faced by 
Malaysia in education is a shortfall of 13,000 mathematics teachers. Besides this, 
some schools such as the Tamil Language schools that serve the minority of Indian 
students have received little attention. 
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The 1990s also saw the beginning of a trade war with developed countries. 
In December 1990, Mahathir proposed the formation of East Asian Economic 
Caucus. The purpose of this was to build a strong regional market which would act 
as a protection against developed countries and reduce dependency on the west. The 
U. S, in particular, attached the condition of a clean human rights record for its trade 
and military assistance. This was particularly after allegations of human rights 
abuses in the late 1980s which could have affected Malaysian trade if the U. S 
imposed sanctions. 
The 1990s also marked the expansion of the UMNO in Sabah. With this 
expansion, the United Sabah Nationalist Organization, (a Muslim dominated party 
and a National Front component) was dissolved and its members absorbed into 
UMNO. Prior to this, USNO was the only component member of the National Front 
in Sabah after the multi-racial party, PBS, withdrew from the National Front during 
the October 1990 elections. However, USNO was not able to garner Muslim support 
as they were opposed to Tun Mustapha's leadership and thus were politically divided. 
Therefore, uniting the Muslims under UMNO helped to strengthen the National Front 
in its campaign against the PBS government. A Federal Secretary's Office was also 
established in Sabah. When there were allegations that the PBS government had 
been abusing federal funds, the Federal Development Office was also expanded to 
channel and implement the federal development programmes. These two machineries 
also enabled Kuala Lumpur to communicate effectively in Sabah. UMNO was 
popular with the Malays in Sabah. Federal projects were launched to compete with 
the state projects and to win the support of Sabahans. UMNO raised development 
issues and pointed out that Sabah, under the PBS, lagged behind Peninsular Malaysia 
in terms of economic growth. For example, in 1991 Sabah only registered 4% 
economic growth compared to 8% in Peninsular Malaysia. The economy was also 
hit by the Federal ban on export of raw timber from Sabah in 1993. In addition 
Sabah had a problem with immigration from the Philippines and Indonesia. 
Immigrants from these areas had become a source of cheap labour in Sabah thus 
depriving locals of suitable employment. As a measure of the problem, the 1989 
figure showed that there were about 103,000 foreign workers in Sabah. They were 
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being employed mainly in timber camps, agricultural plantations and on construction 
sites. This situation was inevitable since the local traditional land owning subsistence 
farmers were not used to waged employment. 
The UMNO plan to regain control of the Sabah state government was stalled 
when five assemblymen of the dissolved USNO defected to the PBS. They alleged 
that they were improperly treated by UMNO and might not have a chance to be 
nominated in the next elections. Indeed, at the end of 1993, the Sabah's Chief 
Minister from PBS was found guilty of abusing his power by granting projects to his 
family. As a consequence, he dissolved the cabinet and called for elections on 18th 
February 1994. PBS won 25 of the 48 seats but after a few weeks the Chief 
Minister, Pairin, resigned on 17th march when his assemblymen defected to National 
Front parties. So the National Front State Government (a coalition) was installed 
with Sakaran as Chief Minister who held office during the transition period until he 
was appointed the Head of State for Sabah. His Chief Minister's post was then taken 
over by Salleh, the son of the recently retired Head of State. By that time, Sabah 
had been promised many development projects during the election campaigns. One 
of the largest was the RM100 million Sipitang hospital. Poverty in Sabah became 
a UMNO campaign issue during the 1994 Sabah Elections. So, Mahathir had to 
restart the programme of uniting the various ethnic groupings of Sabah that had been 
polarised during the PBS rule. Integration between Kuala Lumpur and Sabah was 
also enhanced by UMNO expansion in Sabah. The new Deputy Prime Minister, 
Anwar who had led the election campaigns in Sabah in 1994 also received popular 
support in Sabah. 25 
By the end of the Sixth Malaysia Plan, Mahathir has proposed several huge 
projects including the launch of the Puterajaya New City Centre on 9th August 1995 
due to become Malaysia's future administrative centre. This was made possible by 
the new mandate Mahathir gained during the April 27th, 1995 General Elections. 
Many argued that the huge prestige projects are unnecessary when there are still 
issues such as pressing rural poverty and environmental problems which remain to 
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be addressed. But unemployment was reduced to 2.9% during the first three months 
of 1995. 
4. PROSPECTS 
The problems that lie ahead for Malaysia are clearly outlined in Mahathir's 
Vision 2020 Challenges. Malaysia has a long history of dependency going back to 
the Colonial period which has left a legacy of problems that have persisted until 
today. For instance, Malaysia is still struggling to correct the imbalances that exist 
in terms of income and opportunities between the urban and rural areas. Poverty still 
persists in Malaysia; particularly in the peripheral states. Furthermore, some 
indigenous populations in the rural areas are still living according to traditional 
patterns of subsistence farming and shifting cultivation. Poverty among farmers is 
exacerbated when the commodity prices decreased in the international market. In 
addition, some poverty alleviation programmes and the free health services have 
improved the birth rate and slowed down the death rate. 26 Although industrialization 
provides new employment opportunities for farmers, the agricultural sector has 
become less significant in the economy which also affects the restructuring effort to 
increase their income. 
Furthermore, Malaysia is still dependent on MNCs for its exports. Despite 
the huge amount of employment this has created, the wages for local workers are still 
low. Thus even though they are employed, this is insufficient to bring them out of 
poverty. Workers' living conditions are still unsatisfactory. This is exacerbated by 
the existence of illegal foreign workers from the neighbouring countries. `' 
To overcome the dependency problems, the Bumiputeras need to mend their 
differences with the Chinese and be united. However, this is an uphill battle as the 
Bumiputeras are still insisting on preserving their privileges. The Islamization 
process is also in conflict with the National Unity Programmes. Since the Chinese 
still dominate the economy in the urban areas, the rural areas become the source of 
support for the Bumiputera dominated government. 
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Furthermore, the NEP and the administration have created the structure for 
Bumiputera domination in politics. It seems difficult to dismantle the structure since 
there are many dependent populations especially in the rural areas. The Mahathir 
reforms which have been implemented in order to meet the Vision 2020 challenges 
have, themselves, been met with various social, economic and political obstacles. 
These problems are evident in the peripheral states generally, and Sabah in 
particular. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This historical analysis has shown that the development of the Malaysian 
economy is divided into three stages. Firstly, during the Colonial Administration and 
Tunku Abdul Rahman Administration, there was a free enterprise economy. This 
was followed by the direct state intervention in the economy during the NEP. 
Finally, after the unsuccessful NEP experiment, Mahathir has attempted to liberalise 
the economy. This liberalisation is inevitable as NEP has exacerbated the 
dependency problems and ethnic differences. Thus, it only preserved the social 
conditions which led to the 1969 racial riot and, in doing so, made the recurrence of 
such an event likely in the future. However, this sets a good example where politics 
are put above the economy. Nevertheless, this analysis also shows that the economy 
plays an important role in success of the various Malaysian Plans and in the decision- 
making process. For instance, the implementation of the various Malaysian Plans has 
been influenced by world economic recession and recovery since the First Malaya 
Plan. All these factors influenced development in the peripheral state of Sabah. 
On the whole, the factors discussed in this chapter and Mahathir's admission 
of the challenges, indicate the struggle against dependency is far from complete. The 
author will discuss the problems facing Vision 2020 Development Plans further in 
the ensuing chapters. 
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CHA PTER THREE 
MAHATHIR'S VISION 2020: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 
I INTRODUCTION 
This chapter compares the NEP and Mahathir's liberal policies in order to 
identify the changes and continuities after 1990. In this endeavour, the author has 
chosen to examine some of Mahathir's key policies. These are: Malaysia 
Incorporated, Privatization, Public Service New Paradigm, National Agriculture, and 
National Industries. Economically, the changing trend in the agricultural and 
industrial sectors has provided some interesting clues on Mahathir's export led growth 
strategy. These sectors are determinants to the success of the social restructuring 
thrusts as outlined in the National Development Policy and Second Outline 
Perspective Plan (1991-2000). In political terms, economic success will consolidate 
the position of the UMNO dominated National Front Coalition. All these need 
social, economic and political reforms to overcome the implementation problems 
faced during the NEP (1971-1990) as discussed in this chapter. Thus, it seems that 
the NEP serves as a useful framework in Mahathir's Vision 2020 grand development 
plan. 
1.1 Background To The Problems 
When the NEP ended in 1990, the Malaysian economic base had widened 
from its narrow focus on agriculture to include manufacturing. Indeed since 1970, 
the share of agriculture in GDP has been falling. Further, manufacturing is also 
rapidly catching up with the agricultural sector in terms of its contribution to 
employment. In terms of export, manufacturing surges ahead of other products (Huq, 
1994: 160,7th. Malaysia Plan, 1996: 35-66). Malaysia had begun developing its 
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heavy industries since the early 1980s, increased its investment, and doubled its GDP. 
In agriculture, economic recovery since 1987 offered better commodity prices. 
Nevertheless, despite these advances, the NEP was not able to achieve its 
overall targets. For example, the Department of Statistics showed that the rate of 
poverty in Peninsular Malaysia was 18.4% in 1984 whereas by 1987 it had only 
decreased to 17.3%. In Sarawak the rate of poverty was 31.9% in 1984 and the rate 
was only reduced to 24.7% in 1987. Whereas in Sabah the rate of poverty was 
33.1% in 1984 but the rate increased to 35.3% in 1987. The Poverty Line Income 
was RM350 per month for a household of 5.14 persons in Peninsular Malaysia, 
RM429 per month for a household of 5.24 and RM533 per month for a household 
of 5.36 in Sabah (IDS, 1991: p. 153-154 and IDS: p. 3-48) (see Appendix C for details 
on poverty according to regions and target groups). 
In regional terms, some states benefitted more from government development 
programmes in industry. The Western corridor in West Malaysia was more 
developed as most of the industrial estates were located in this area. Whereas, the 
Eastern part of Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak, lagged behind industrially. 
Furthermore, the backward rural areas require proper electricity and water supplies 
(Johari and Chang, 1990: 60-86). 
Regarding the 30% capital ownership target by Bumiputeras, the NEP on? y 
achieved about 20%. However, ownership of capital by individual Bumiputeras 
(excluding state enterprises) was only 12%. ' The programmes which aimed to 
increase the numbers of Bumiputera entrepreneurs were not so successful in building 
self-reliance. Instead, they created a "dependency culture" in which the Bumiputeras 
relied on government contracts and concessions. Until Bumiputera entrepreneurs are 
competitive enough, the 30% Bumiputeras ownership of capital will be difficult to 
achieve. As a consequence, income differences according to ethnicity will continue, 
communal differences will be heightened and the racial riots - such as the one in 
1969 - will be inevitable in the future. 
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In education, the NEP faced problems of quality, high drop-out levels among 
poor students, an excess of art students compared when with science and vocation 
and technical students, lack of skilled manpower in industries and a lack of 
Bumiputeras in professions such as architecture, accountancy, engineering, dentistry, 
surveying, and law compared with the Chinese. ' Due to the large numbers of art 
students, it is no surprise that Malaysia is facing structural unemployment particularly 
among art graduates. As a consequence, many arts graduates find they have to be 
retrained before they can be employed. 
Theoretically, Malaysia faces the problem of "foreign dependency" due ' '-. the 
expensive projects implemented under the NEP. For instance, its reliance on foreign 
investors puts its economy at the mercy of foreigners. By 1995 Malaysia had faced 
a large foreign current account deficit of RM17.5 billion (FEER, 12.10.1995: 142). 
Finally, the NEP faced problems of mismanagement and inefficiency in 
implementing its various development programmes. Among them were the Bank 
Bumiputera scandal, losses incurred by Bank Negara (Central Banak) through foreign 
business transactions, and losses in heavy industries and public enterprises. ' These 
indicate only the larger losses; many more are simply unaccountable. The nature of 
these problems may have provided the main motivation for Mahathir to formulate the 
privatization policy in 1983. 
The NEP faced strong opposition from the Democratic Action Party under a 
Chinese leadership, Lim Kit Siang due to its discrimination against the Chinese in 
economic and the administrative areas. The NEP also faced some opposition from 
the Pan Islamic Party (PAS), as the administration of the NEP failed to consider 
traditional Islamic views. Because of this problem, PAS branded the National Front 
administration under Mahathir as "un-Islamic. " The NEP had not only produced 
resistance from the opposition parties, but had also caused internal conflict within the 
UMNO and the National Front Coalition. UMNO had a leadership crisis which 
culminated in Tengku Razaleigh challenging Mahathir for the UMNO presidency. 
Razaleigh lost the party elections but brought the matter to court over issues of party 
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constitution and UMNO was deregistered. The party had to be renamed NEW 
UMNO and Razeligh formed his own party from the UMNO splinter group. ' MCA 
and PBS, the component members of the National Front also expressed dissatisfaction 
against the coalition. MCA raised the Chinese issues and had leadership squabbles 
from within the party. At regional level, Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) raised the 
"Twenty Points Agreement" as conditions for joining the Malaysian Federation. In 
particular it demanded a better share of the oil royalty with the discovery of the 
offshore oil field on the West Coast of Sabah. ' 
Thus, before Malaysia entered the next new round of development in the 
1990s, the Malaysian Economic Consultative Council (MAPEN) was formed to study 
the economy after the NEP. The Council was appointed from distinguished members 
of society irrespective of whether they supported the government or the opposition. 
This was an attempt to obtain the views of various parties regarding the economic 
future of Malaysia. However, certain members of the opposition parties who were 
appointed to the Council boycotted it. The Council reported that the NEP had 
difficulties in the following areas: 
"(1) Inefficient implementation machineries; (2) mismanagement of 
public enterprises; (3) lack of skilled manpower for industries and low 
quality of education; (4) ineffective entrepreneurial development 
programmes; (5) leakages and unethical behaviours such as 
committing trade offenses, drug abuse, moral degradation, 
entrepreneurs who are dependent on government, political patronage, 
and involvement of politicians in business; and (6) difficulties in 
adapting to the new socio-economic structure created by NEP. " 
(MAPEN, 1990: 98-107) 
Due to the various problems and constraints, future development programmes 
are pressurising the state government, finance, resource and the people to do better. 
Simultaneously, capitalist development and exploitation pushed the rural people 
further to the periphery. In addition, administrative problems during the NEP not 
only hampered national development but also cost the government a significant 
amount of money. Therefore, under Vision 2020 the government is reforming its 
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management and implementation machineries at all levels. Restructuring public 
service in line with liberal policies is needed to reduce conflicts and to speed up the 
implementation process. Economic problems and mismanagement in the government 
can also trigger ethnic tensions which would hamper any effort to create national 
unity. In general, administrative reform will help to promote a good image of the 
government. Furthermore, the Japanese model of industrial development requires co- 
operation between the public and private sectors. Unless the government improves 
its quality of management, the required co-operation will be difficult to achieve. ' 
These are some of the points in Mahathir's agenda for the 1990s which will 
be discussed in this chapter. However, his liberal ideas, such as the "bottom up 
approach" and the flat organization structure, will face various challenges as the 
present administration is not fully democratic (Case, 1993). In addition, the liberal 
ideas will face various challenges from the traditional communities and ethnic groups. 
Thus, Mahathir's administration will need to consider both social and political justice 
and to be pragmatic in its future development programmes. 
Some liberal ideas are needed after the controversial NEP which caused 
Malaysia to be labelled as a neo-fascist state by Western scholars. State intervention 
through the NEP, while emphasizing capitalist development and growth, had caused 
unbalanced development. Johari and Chang (1990: 84-86), in referring to studies on 
development from the 1960s to the 1980s, found that capitalist forms of development 
caused further inequality rather than eradicating of poverty as they intended. 
Furthermore, liberalism was prompted by the various demonstrations and protests 
during the last few years of the NEP (Halim, 1990: 82-83; and Jomo, 1989: 7). This 
view concurs with Johari and Chang (1990) who showed that NEP caused widening 
inequality which formed the major issue of the troubles during its last years. Thus, 
the liberal views of these Western scholars have to be considered in this thesis. 
Some of them argue that the conflict in the Third World due to growing global 
liberalism is inevitable. For example, Krasner (1985) summarised the position as 
follows: 
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"North-South conflicts are rooted in profound symmetries of power, 
and that political weakness and vulnerability are fundamental sources 
of Third World behaviour. " 
However, he seems to be supportive of the 1980's policy on Malaysia Incorporated. 
A condition in which the public sector works together with the private sector. 
Nevertheless, Page (1994: 624) found: 
"Government interventions played a much less prominent role and 
frequently less constructive role in the success of the newly 
industrializing economies of Southeast Asia, while adherence to policy 
fundamentals remained important. " 
Page suggests that we look at the policies, institutions and economic circumstances. 
On the other hand, Streeten (1991: 123) found: 
"The lag between technological advance and political institutions is 
said to be responsible for many of our problems. " 
Further, Malaysia has a large traditional rural population which is obviously 
still backward and dependent on the state. Thus, Jomo (1990) is critical of 
Malaysia's National Development Policy which emphasizes a liberal approach to 
economic growth for social restructuring. However, Bumiputera bourgeoisie and the 
rural population cannot be dependent on the government forever. Under the liberal 
approach to administration, the Bumiputeras are required to use their special 
privileges to contribute to the state's development. Liberalism is being welcomed by 
the Chinese. This is indicated by the various elections after 1990 where the Malayan 
Chinese Association gained more seats compared with the NEP period. However, 
as indicated in the National Development Policy (1991-2000) and the Second Outline 
Perspective Plan (1991-2000), the government still relies on economic growth to 
bring about equality. Additionally, the management is now aware of the importance 
of the "bottom up" approach. Even this will be very difficult to put into practice 
because of the existence of a backward rural population particularly in Sabah. Such 
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populations are still unaware of their democratic right, and remain dependent on the 
elites who wish to maintain power. 
2. MA HA THIR'S POLICIES AND STRATEGIES OF IMPLEMENTATION 
Mahathir divided the problems and constraints facing Malaysia's national 
development into Vision 2020's nine challenges which were outlined in Chapter Two. 
These nine challenging values are important ingredients of an industrialized society 
in which everyone is interdependent. Furthermore, the globalization of the economy 
demands that Malaysia produces quality goods that can withstand international 
competition. To achieve this, Mahathir looks to Japan for guidance in line with his 
Look East Policy. Mahathir admired the Japanese economy where large corporations 
(zaibatsu) have co-operated with the government to create a stable economy. He also 
admired the Japanese concept of "Kaizen. " This is a process by which Japanese 
companies strive to improve the quality of their products in stages until there is a 
zero defect. From the Japanese, Mahathir also learned that Malaysia can industrialize 
according to its own ways, values and resources. The nine challenges outlined under 
Vision 2020 require Malaysians to be both mentally and physically prepared. These 
challenges will build a strong Malaysian nation where the people will only identify 
themselves as Malaysians. 
Furthermore, adopting concepts from the "Kaizen" way of thinking, Mahathir 
fixed a period of a thirty year deadline for Malaysia to become an industrialized 
society. In the 30-year period, there are six Five-Year Malaysian Plans. These five- 
year plans are six stages in which the administration seeks to improve the quality of 
Malaysian industries and standard of living by the year 2020. The first stage was the 
Sixth Malaysian Plan in which Malaysia was already involved in various heavy 
industries. The latest development during the Sixth Malaysia Plan was the building 
of light airplanes, the second national car (Produa) and launching of the Malaysian 
satellite. During the second stage under the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000), 
Malaysia will emphasize high technology. Nevertheless, the real challenges will be 
in human resource development, social harmony, and justice. Vision 2020 also 
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emphasized social participation and cooperation rather than exploitation which was 
a central feature of the NEP. 
The move towards liberalism was felt as far back as 1983 when Mahathir 
introduced the twin policies of Privatization and Malaysia Incorporated. These were 
not new, but were based on Japanese models. The problems and success of the NEP 
prompted Mahathir to introduce more liberal policies in the future development of 
Malaysia. Thus, liberalism is Mahathir's agenda in the 1990s. This is being 
indicated in the National Development Policy (1991-2000) and Second Outline 
Perspective Plan (1991-2000). Furthermore, globalization of the economy has 
prompted Mahathir to take measures to enable Malaysians to compete at international 
level. This requires managers who are able to produce quality services and products. 
This is also compatible with the globalization challenges. Since Malaysia's industrial 
development is based on the Japanese model, it has to receive Japanese technical 
assistance and maintain friendly ties with Japan as well as familiarity with their 
culture. The Japanese model and culture will serve as a comparison to the Malaysian 
society particularly the Bumiputeras. 
In a preface to the Second Outline Perspective Plan dated 17th June 1991 
which was to replace the NEP Mahathir wrote: 
"The second Outline Perspective Plan (1991-2000) which incorporated 
the National Development Policy marked the beginning of a new era 
in our effort to make Malaysia into a developed nation in all aspects 
by the year 2020. The goal of National Development Policy is to 
achieve economic development to create a just and united nation. 
NDP is based on the achievement and experience of the past decades 
and will continue on with the process to eradicate poverty and 
restructuring of society. This policy will be implemented based on the 
principle of growth and equal distribution to achieve a just 
redistribution for all level of society. " 
(Prime Minister's Department, 1991: viii) 
He further emphasized that the achievement of the goals and targets of OPP2 
(RRJP2) and NDP depend on stable and continuous economic growth. 
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Based on the problems and bitter experience under the NEP, the OPP2 and 
NDP adopted the following strategic thrusts: 
"(1) To create an optimum balance between the goals of economic 
growth and equal distribution. (2) To ensure a balanced development 
for all the major economic sectors to motivate them to establish some 
linkage among each other so that economic growth can be optimized. 
(3) To reduce and eradicate inequality, and social and economic 
imbalance within the nation to encourage a more just partnership and 
equal opportunities from the economic development for all 
Malaysians. " (4) To promote and preserve national integration by 
reducing the wide gap of imbalance in the economic development 
among the various states and between urban and rural areas. (5) To 
develop a progressive society where all the people live in harmony, 
have positive social and spiritual values as well as pride and love for 
the nation. (6) To develop the human resource including a disciplined 
and productive manpower, and to develop the required skills to face 
the challenge of industrial development through a culture of excellence 
without sacrificing the goal of social restructuring. (7) To make 
science and technology as a vital thrust in planning and socio- 
economic development which need effort to develop capability and 
motivation in strategic technology based on knowledge and develop 
the science and technology culture in the process of developing a 
modern industrial economy; (8) To ensure that in the effort to achieve 
economic development, proper attention be given to protect 
environment and ecology in the long term to ensure a continuous and 
sustainable national development. " 
(OPP2: 5-6) 
Most of the agencies for the implementation of these eight strategies have 
been in existence since the NEP. However, some new agencies are being established 
since the promulgation of the Vision 2020. This is particularly those involving 
industry, entrepreneurship, rural development, human development, privatization, and 
Malaysia Incorporated. ' Although some agencies have expanded, others are being 
reduced under the Civil Service restructuring programmes. (See Appendix D 
regarding the machinery for the co-ordination of the National Development Policy) 
These will be discussed further in this chapter where relevant. 
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2.1 Agricultural and Rural Development 
During the NEP, the state took an active role in developing agriculture in line 
with its policy of social restructuring and the eradication of poverty. This was 
because most of the rural poor were farmers, particularly paddy farmers and 
traditional fishermen. The problem of low income, productivity and poverty in the 
agricultural sector in the rural areas had been known since the Colonial 
administration. In addition, there was over dependence on rubber as an export 
commodity despite the inconsistent price of rubber on the international market. 
Logically, the problem of poverty among farmers in the rural areas could be 
overcome by raising their income and productivity, better marketing techniques as 
well as crop diversification. Furthermore, unbalanced development will cause rural 
urban migration which could pose urban social problems. 
Thus during the NEP there were many state agricultural agencies which dealt 
with the problems of rural agriculture and crop diversification. Since many rural 
farmers are the privileged Bumiputeras, the NEP served as an instrument for the 
leaders to allocate more funds to the agricultural sector. Thus, during the NEP, the 
state pursued large scale development of new lands in an attempt to improve 
conditions for both the landless and the poor farmers. An effort was also made to 
improve management of traditional farms. These agricultural programmes could not 
be implemented without the creation of a number of agencies such as: Federal Land 
Development Authority, Fisheries Development Authority, Agricultural Bank, 
National Paddy and Rice Board, etc. Farmers Organization Authority, etc. In addition, 
states such as Sarawak and Sabah also formed separate agencies to deal with the 
agricultural problems. ' 
However, by the late 1970s, the agricultural share of GDP was rapidly 
declining (Abd. Rahman, 1994). With this decline, logically unbalanced 
development, rural poverty, low productivity persist. All were influenced by the 
fluctuating price of agricultural commodities overseas; an indication of dependency 
on the developed nations to buy its agricultural products. This has to change, as the 
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developed nations have well developed agricultural production techniques. For 
instance, Malaysia has had a problem in the past exporting its oil-palm when the 
USA alleged that Malaysian oil-palm was not healthy. In addition agricultural 
activities are not so profitable as manufacturing. Thus despite government 
intervention, agricultural development was not able to achieve the NEP objectives of 
social restructuring and the eradication of poverty. The Household Income Survey 
(1987) showed that the problem of poverty among rubber smallholders, paddy 
farmers, coconut smallholders and fishermen were still not effectively solved. While 
the rate of poverty in the rural areas is triple that of the urban areas. 
Despite attempts by National Agricultural Policy to modernise agriculture and 
increase both its productivity and quality, the 7th Malaysia Plan shows that this 
sector is now contributing less to GDP, employment and exports. In 1990, it shared 
18.7% of the GDP but declined further to 13.6% in 1995. It contributed 26% of the 
employment in 1990 but declined from 22.2 percent in 1990 to 13.1 percent in 1995. 
Furthermore, the NAP 1984 was not able to meet the need for food self-sufficiency. 
Thus, Malaysia is importing more food than it exports, despite its population of 20 
million in a country that is still sparsely populated (7th Malaysia Plan, p. 234, Table 
8-6). These trends have continued since the end of the NEP. 
The trends in agricultural production indicate managerial inefficiencies. This 
is contributed partly by the government policies to help the Bumiputeras and partly 
by dependency on the developed nations. In principle, the statutory bodies on 
agriculture such as FELDA, FAMA, state agricultural agencies, Fisheries 
Development Authority, Malaysian Cocoa Board, etc. have promoted imperfect 
competition. Agricultural production is monopolised by these agencies which fixed 
the prices of agricultural products. The prices offered to farmers for their products 
are too cheap to enable them to increase their income (Wan Hashim, 1988: 83-94 & 
123-143). Thus these agencies of exploitation need to change their strategies in line 
with the liberalization of the economy. They need to be corporatized or privatized. 
The agricultural production needs to operate according to market forces. This means 
that state intervention through price control and agricultural subsidy must cease. The 
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management of agriculture will need to be based on large scale production 
(Silvaligham, 1993: 186-187; and Rendam, 1994: 18). Thus, the government ought 
to encourage land consolidation and large estate plantations. This means traditional 
farming and fishing ought to be replaced by mechanization in order to be efficient 
and competitive. 
Furthermore, to reduce dependency on the developed nations in the export of 
agricultural products, the strategy of "down-stream" processing of agricultural 
products should be implemented. This means that in the future more agro-based 
industries will be established in the rural areas. Under the Vision Village 
development programmes announced by Mahathir on 4th July 1996, the government 
is encouraging the growth of village agro-industries, land consolidation and rural 
human resource development. Vision Village is one such attempt to reorganize and 
modernize the rural community so that it will be more efficient by the year 2020.9 
2.2 Industrial Development 
Malaysia is rich in both agricultural and natural resources compared with 
other developing nations. Vast agricultural and mineral resources in the 1960s and 
1970s enabled Malaysia to implement many socio-economic development 
programmes. The over-dependence on agricultural products and natural resources as 
a source of national income, however, made Malaysia neglect the growth of a strong 
industrial structure. Industrial development, which was left entirely to the private 
sector, did not benefit the public much in terms of employment and income 
distribution. World recession in the 1980s also affected the prices of Malaysia's main 
commodities, such as oil-palm, cocoa, rubber, petroleum and others. Obviously, the 
eradication of poverty through the green revolution also proved unsuccessful. Thus, 
industrialization is the best alternative; although there might be some other motives 
which need to be identified, such as ethnic and regional differences and foreign debts 
problems. Some sceptics view this step as a late start. Furthermore, globalization 
of the economy has also required that Malaysia be well-informed regarding the latest 
world trends, and in the use of high technology to remain competitive. 
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Industrial development in Malaysia has been marked by dependency on the 
West. This dependency is the result of Malaysia's industrial policies since the 
Colonial Administration. During the NEP, Malaysian industries were mainly 
producing goods for import substitution. (see Appendix E on the stages of 
industrialization in Malaysia) Although large sums of money were spent on heavy 
industries particularly during Mahathir's era, they were not competitive internationally 
and also made huge losses which wasted public funds. However, these industries 
attempted to meet the NEP's aims of encouraging Bumiputera participation in 
commerce and industry and 30% ownership of capital. To achieve these targets, 
many projects were implemented in a hurry although they were not particularly 
feasible considering the economic, social and political factors in Malaysia (Jomo, 
1989: 1-8). 
Under Mahathir's Administration, it is the first time that Malaysia has had its 
own National Industrial Policy. This was introduced in 1985 during the NEP and has 
continued through the 1990s. The objectives of Mahathir's Industrial Policy are: to 
encourage Bumiputera participation in all sectors of the economy; decentralize 
industry; encourage the growth of potential agro-based industries; promote high 
technology and training in the potential fields, and intensify the growth of SMIs. 
Mahathir's Industrial Policy is also implemented based on the Industrial 
Master Plan (1985-1995). Compared to the NEP, Malaysia in general is moving 
from the Import Substitution Stage to Export Substitution Stage. The move to export 
substitution under Mahathir's Administration is a slightly drastic measure as the 
Prime Minister was trying to overcome the dependency problems in terms of capital 
and technology (Jomo 1989: 2). To meet these challenges, Mahathir's Administration 
is now introducing the quality paradigm in the Civil Service, upgrading the nation's 
industrial infrastructure, improving its marketing facilities locally and internationally. 
The IMP outlined several measures to meet the challenges of industrial development 
to increase exports by increasing efficiency. These are in the form of incentives to 
encourage the development of foreign and local heavy industries as well as SMIs. 
These are in the form of export incentives, loans, marketing and training. However, 
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the IMP still places special emphasis on Bumiputeras' participation in commerce and 
industry. Furthermore, the IMP touched on the need to create a network for the free- 
flow of information and effective monitoring system of industrial production. The 
IMP also indicated the need for the restructuring of agencies involved in 
industrialization. However, at the early stage of implementation it tended to favour 
heavy industry and foreign investors over SMIs and local investors. Thus, this 
measure could affect the development of SMI and Bumiputera participation in trade 
and industry. 10 
The export-led strategy witnessed other new concepts in the implementation 
of industrial development. These are the IMP's intra-industry linkages, one-district 
one-industry, down-stream processing, and quality. However, these concepts are also 
attempts for Bumiputeras' advancement in trade and industry. The intra-industry 
linkage concept is meant to provide co-operation between larger industries and SMIs. 
Thus, SMIs must keep up with the pace of development in heavy industry. This 
includes domestic, regional and global co-operation in industrial development. 
Several strategies are adopted to implement the intra-industry linkages concept. 
However, these strategies are merely an extension of former strategies under NEP 
such as infrastructural development, industrial parks, loans, marketing, and assistance 
for new Bumiputera enterprises. These strategies are given a new vigour under 
Mahathir's clean, efficient and trustworthy management. But, the decentralization 
theme in industrialization under Vision 2020, indicates some contradictions with the 
IMP (1985-1995) measure which is, "acceptance of the economies of location i. e., 
virtual abandonment of regional dispersal efforts. " To advance Bumiputera interests, 
it introduced the Vendor Development Programme, the Umbrella Concept and the 
creation of Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community. The Umbrella 
Concept enabled Bumiputeras to become involved in the franchise business, while 
the Vendor Programme provide opportunities for SMIs to give supporting services 
to large companies. 
Finally, under export-led growth, Malaysia needs large scale production in 
order to maximize profit and accumulate capital. This means it needs to use high 
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technology industries compared to the present and the NEP labour intensive 
industries. " This also means that Malaysia has had to import foreign technology 
seeing that it lacks the skilled manpower and technology, and thus perpetuates the 
dependency problems further. 
On the whole, the National Industrial Policy required contributions from the 
private sector in order to meet its goals of increasing exports. Therefore, since 1985, 
Mahathir has introduced the Privatization and Malaysia Incorporated Policies. This 
will be discussed in the next section. On the whole, industrialization is an attempt 
to reverse the dependency problems by increasing Malaysian manufactured exports. 
But evidence shows the contrary. The 1994 nationwide study on the SMIs found that 
many local industries, especially SMIs, are still not well-integrated into the 
mainstream of industrialization. The SMIs products are still of low quality and 
production techniques remain primitive (see Appendix F on the problems facing 
SMIs. ) Thus, all these need State assistance in order to change. Since most of 
Malaysia's present exports are still from MNCs rather than local manufacturers. As 
a result, the dependency problem is inevitable. 
2.3 The Malaysia Incorporated and Privatization 
These two policies are closely connected, and were introduced in 1983. 
Basically, the Malaysia Incorporated is based on the premise that: 
"Successful national development, particularly facing global 
competition, requires the public-private sector collaboration and co- 
operation and adherence to the perception of the nation as a corporate 
or business entity jointly owned by both sectors... The rapid 
economic growth will, in turn, generate more job opportunities and 
further increase in revenue which could be channelled to finance 
socio-economic development projects and public administration 
improvements. " 
(Abdul Hamid, 1994: 767-768) 
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This policy is modelled on the Japanese idea in which state and private sectors co- 
operate with one another in industrial development. However, in the case of Japan, 
the relationship between the government and the private sector is more informal. 
There is some sort of contractual relationship to help one another, particularly in 
finance, when the needs arise (Lee, 1989). However, without any well-established 
private companies which can work closely with the Malaysian government, 
particularly within industrial development, the corporatization concept cannot be 
implemented. Therefore, the Malaysian policy adopts a strategy to privatize some 
prospective government agencies. However, under the Malaysian privatization 
concept the 30% equity must be reserved for Bumiputeras. Until such agreement is 
reached, privatization cannot be implemented. The methods of privatization are: sale 
of Equity or Assets; Lease of Assets; management Contract; Build-Operate Transfer 
(BOT) or Build-Operate (BO) and corporatization. 'Z 
Sale of equity involves the transfer of management responsibility, assets and 
personnel. The lease method only involves the transfer of rights to use assets for a 
specific period. However, where feasible, the sale of assets can be negotiated after 
the lease. The lease method was used in the privatization of the Royal Malaysian 
Aircraft Maintenance Depot. The management contract merely involves 
appointments of professional management expertise where the public agencies lack 
the required skills in the specified field, or where mismanagement occurs. The 
Build-Operate Transfer and Build-Operate are methods by which the private sector 
funds and builds ongoing privatized projects such as highways and water supplies. 
On completion, the company can impose charges to cover its expenses for a specified 
period. Examples of the BOT are the North-South Highway and the second Link to 
Singapore. However, the Build-Operate method does not involve transfer of the 
facility to the government. Examples are Sistem Television Malaysia Bhd., Kuala 
Lumpur Light Rail Transit, and Plaza Rakyat. 
In addition to privatization, and in line with its Malaysia Incorporated Policy, 
the Government introduced various strategies to promote a closer relationship 
between public and private sectors. These are strategies such as: promoting 
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dialogues, forums, seminars, workshops, the creation of consultative panels between 
the two sectors, improving the quality and productivity of the Civil Service, etc. 
Recently, these approaches have been improved to promote better understanding and 
participation at both national and international levels of the organization. These are 
among the main reasons which led to the adoption of the new paradigm within the 
Malaysian Civil Service. It means that the Civil Service has to adapt to the changing 
working environment around the world which involves the use of high technology 
and which is customer-orientated. Due to this policy, there have been several points 
of co-operation between private and public sectors, particularly since the Vision 2020 
was promulgated in 1991. Several guidelines have also been issued to promote a 
positive relationship between the private and public sectors (Abdul Hamid, 1994: 
767-830). 
Both policies marked the beginning of economic liberalization. Malaysia has 
learned from the NEP and communist countries that public enterprises are 
burdensome and unprofitable. The Privatization Masterplan was ready on 8th 
February 1991, just twenty days before Mahathir proposed the Vision 2020 ideas. 
In a foreword to the masterplan, Mahathir seemed convinced that the government was 
departing from the old approach of state intervention in the economy. Some laws are 
being streamlined to expedite implementation of the privatization projects. Many 
programmes have also been implemented in line with the Malaysia Incorporated and 
privatization policies which involved both private and public sectors. 
Considering the present stage of social, economic and political development, 
the author thinks that these policies will cause various conflicts within Malaysia. The 
groups which have benefitted most under the NEP will not want to surrender their 
privileges and positions. These groups will place demands on the government 
regarding the implementation of the Privatization and Malaysia Incorporated policies; 
particularly with respect to the problems of Chinese domination of the private sector 
and the existence of MNCs. Thus, the two policies will face some implementation 
problems due to these conflicts. 
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A study of Port Kelang Container Terminal, showed that the problems of 
implementation were due to a shortfall of skilled government personnel, legal 
obstacles, protracted negotiations with employees, and differences concerning 
acceptable terms and conditions of sale (Leeds, 1989: 753-752). Nevertheless, 
government statistics can still convince the people of the viability of the two 
policies. From 1983 to December 1993, the government has privatized ninety 
projects. So far, it has gained RMIO, 749.37 million from the privatization proceeds. 
Between 1993 and 1994, fifteen of these privatised agencies have been listed in the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. This has enabled the public to invest in these 
companies either privately or through the government sponsored schemes such ASB 
(Bumiputera Share trust) and the ASN (National Share Trust). This is an 
improvement on the funding of loss making public enterprises during the NEP. 
Stock market flotation also enables the public to participate indirectly in the Vision 
2020 National Development. The private and public sectors are beginning to 
understand their new roles regarding Vision 2020 national development. Both sectors 
are beginning to accommodate one another compared with their relationship two 
decades ago. In his speech at the UMNO General Assembly on 4th November 1993, 
Mahathir stated: 
"We have introduced many changes to the administrative system. If 
previously we co-operated less with the private sector, today we 
consider the public and private sectors as a team that work together 
to develop the country. " 
3. VISION 2020 DEVELOPMENT AND REFORMS IN THE CIVIL SERVICE, 
This section examines some of the changes that have been made in the 
implementation mechanisms of related agencies, due to the new management 
paradigm in the Malaysian Civil Service. 
The new management paradigm of the Civil Service will, hopefully, provide 
a better infrastructure and well-trained people capable of successfully implementing 
and withstanding the Vision 2020 challenges. The second transformation of the 
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Malaysian economy will force the people to adopt a new attitude and a new social 
perspective. The economy will be transformed from the financially centred paradigm 
to the human-centred paradigm. Material development will be replaced by human 
centred development which will create a Malaysian society that values quality. 
Mahathir's awareness concerning quality is noted from his early policy on "Clean, 
Efficient and Trustworthy" Government which was introduced as a slogan for the 
1982 elections campaign. However, the Civil Service discrimination against the 
Chinese by setting quotas in favour of the Malays and Bumiputeras has not changed. 
Measures such as pass with a credit in Bahasa Malaysia in the public examinations 
for entrance into the Civil Service have made it tougher for the Chinese and gives 
advantage to the Malays and the Bumiputeras. Thus the Civil Service is dominated 
by Bumiputeras and Malays (Means, 1991: 25-27). 
The implementation of quality improvement guidelines in the Malaysian 
Public Service is marked by the renovation of several offices. Some departments 
which implemented the guidelines renovated their counters and provided better space 
for customers than before. Some required counter service staff to wear uniforms. 
Most headquarters, especially the Federal Departments, are now displaying their 
Client's Charter. In implementation of development projects, a new planning and 
implementation system of development projects was introduced. (See guidelines on 
quality management issued by the Prime Minister's Department in Appendix G) and 
various publications by the Chief secretary to the Government, Tan Sri Ahmad 
Sarji). 13 
Under the new system, the National Development Council (NDC) was 
established to replace the National Action Council (NAC). The council is chaired 
by the Prime Minister and its members consist of the Deputy Prime Minister and 
eight other senior cabinet members with the Director General of the Implementation 
Monitoring and Evaluation Co-ordination Unit, as Secretary. Its functions are to 
ensure proper implementation in line with the NDP and the five-year plans. The 
NDC is assisted by the National Development Working Committee chaired by the 
Chief Secretary to the Government and its members are mainly top civil servants in 
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the agencies related to the implementation of development projects. Chiefly, the 
Working Committee's functions are mainly to ensure that implementation of 
development is in line with the NDP and the plans to identify implementation 
problems, to ensure that the system and procedure of implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation are efficient and effective, and to assess implementation capacity. The 
other mechanisms of implementation under the NDC are the Ministry Development 
Committee, State Development Council (which replaces the State Action Council) 
and the District Development Committee (which replaces the District Development 
and Action Committee). Under the National Development Policy, the National 
Development Council has established the Programmes Of The Hard Core Poor 
(PPRT) to deal directly with the problems of this group. The new system will 
hopefully be able to improve the implementation of development projects. 
Total Quality Management (TQM) cannot be implemented if the Civil Service 
still performs its work in the established ways. Thus, it involves a thorough reform 
of the Civil Service. In addition to the new system in implementation of 
development projects, new management techniques are also being introduced such 
as: productivity and performance evaluation, the new system and work procedures, 
client's charter, improvement of the counter services, right-sizing, work ethics and 
values, inspectorate system, etc.. All these are being introduced in line with the 
Quality Service Paradigm to meet the changing needs of both society and the 
economic structure. These new management techniques are more applicable to the 
Privatization, Malaysia Incorporated and National Industrial Policies. However, these 
techniques of implementation will confront various problems in the underdeveloped 
rural areas and in dealing with the rural population. This is due to the lack of proper 
infrastructure and implementation capacity in the rural areas. Thus, under the poor 
conditions in the rural areas, implementation of development projects under the new 
system will still be delayed. 
The annual performance evaluation for civil servants, which awards pay 
increments (stagnant for poor performance), a year increment (average), double 
increment (very good) and triple increment (excellent) also has some weaknesses. 
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These awards are decided by the selection committee based on the individual 
performance in annual evaluation. Some civil servants who have a good relationship 
with the manager are being awarded triple increment, although they have not 
produced quality services. In addition, the system could destroy team-work within 
government agencies. Consequently, there are suggestions that the award should be 
group-based rather than individual-based. Due to this type of discrimination, the 
National Union for Civil Servants (CUEPEC) proposed that this system be abolished. 
Demand for quality services from civil servants without increasing salaries to 
comparable private sector levels has also persuaded many top civil servants to leave 
the service. So the system that allows government servants to retire for mediocre 
performance is also taken advantage of by excellent ones, who then retire early and 
join the private sector. Thus, the services could be affected if there is a lack of 
experienced and efficient civil servants at the top. 
In fact, it is the government's leadership that makes an efficient civil service. 
Malaysian leadership in the National Front Coalition Government has always been 
dominated by UMNO ever since the NEP. The laws that were enacted during the 
NEP such as the Sedition Act, Official Secret Act and the Industrial Co-ordination 
Act are still being practised. There is no purpose in making administrative reforms 
if the government is still managed by the same group of people with the same values 
and laws. Efficiency can only be brought about by a fully democratic government 
that respects human rights and freedom. Total Quality Management is in fact 
contradictory to the humanistic management approach. This is against the bottom up 
approach management as popularized by the government at the same time. TQM, 
as practised in Malaysia, is just an attempt to meet the demands for international 
standards which is a new form of colonialism that keeps Malaysia dependent on the 
West. Thus, TQM is a form of exploitation of workers which is not much different 
from the NEP. Evidently, TQM caused the doubling of development expenditure 
under the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1996). However, the quality management 
paradigm has resulted in some improvement in the Malaysian Civil Service. The 
Seventh Malaysia Plan Report (pp. 685-710) showed that there has been an 
improvement in the implementation performance of development projects approved 
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under the Sixth Malaysia Plan. The changes in the Civil Service is evident in 
industrial, agricultural and rural administration. 
Most ministries and their agencies have to conform with the management 
paradigm of the Civil Service in implementing the Vision 2020 development 
programmes. The new management paradigm is based on the Malaysia Incorporated 
and Privatization Policies. The Government is concerned about efficiency, quality 
and profitability in line with its focus on export led growth as a way of reducing 
dependency on the developed world. For instance, MITI's agency the National 
Productivity Centre, became the National Productivity Corporation. Furthermore, the 
various forms of assistance under the NEP, such as training, marketing and loans are 
being reorganized into the Vendor Development programmes, Umbrella Concept and 
through special government promotion. This is in line with the IMP strategy of 
creating intra-industry linkages. However, at this initial stage, MITI continues to 
provide incentives to foreign investors in the form of industrial estates allotment, 
loans, tax holidays and free trade zones. In addition, SMIs are less developed and 
still not using modem technology (Seventh Malaysia Plan: 263-302). 
In agriculture, the implementation agencies of the NEP are still functioning. 
However, there are attempts to privatize certain agencies and close some conflicting 
agricultural agencies. This is in line with the liberal policy of reducing state 
intervention in agriculture. This means agriculture must be based on free enterprise. 
Government subsidy will be reduced and large scale farming through mini-estates 
takes the place of traditional farming and inefficient smallholders. The mini-estate 
form of management has already been put into practice by the Rubber Smallholder 
Development Authority. 
Furthermore, the Ministry of Rural Development also announced the new 
philosophy and strategy for rural development on 28th November 1994. A new 
approach is required since the Integrated Rural Development was not dealing directly 
with the problems of rural poverty. Thus, the problem of poverty persists. An 
improvement in this respect seems to require various forms of social assistance, 
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rather than an increase in the poor's income through increased productivity as is 
assumed in the integrated agricultural and rural development programmes. Under the 
new system of rural development, the Ministry of Rural development created an 
agency to manage the rural development programmes under the "Vision Village 
Movement, " the Institute of Rural Advancement (INFRA). The new management 
under the Vision Village is a vast improvement on the old system where 
infrastructure was given higher priority than human development. The "Vision 
Village Movement" also involves the private sector and non-government 
organizations other than the District's government agencies. INFRA will train the 
rural people in the modern management of villages through various programmes that 
have been outlined by the Ministry of Rural development under the "Vision Village 
Movement. " This change in management is deemed necessary due to the so-called 
second transformation of village economic structure. By 2020, when the people have 
adopted the values of excellence and quality, each village will have small industry, 
service industry, clean environment, competitive agricultural and industrial sector, 
rural-urban migration, intelligent infrastructure, well planned village and higher 
income. Due to the adoption of the liberal approach in economic undertakings and 
the free market system, Malaysians must adopt the qualities of a competitive 
individual. The "Vision Village" also adopts a new paradigm in the management of 
rural development. The new paradigm emphasizes participation; growth, equity and 
stability; the market economy, human development and preservation of the 
environment; learning organization culture; systematic, integrated development, etc. 
All these will place emphasis "development from below" to allow the creation of 
self-reliance and free individuals, while government participation is reduced to that 
of guide and motivator. 
The Vision Village will make rural areas attractive, progressive and profitable. 
Its management is based on corporate concepts and operation strategies. The 
organization is commercialized and adopts a strategy of maximum profit. This 
strategy places results and accountability first and emphasizes the new management 
paradigm. 
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The target of the "Vision Village Movement" will involve 3000 villages by 
the year 2000. In the first year of operation, the Movement will involve 642 villages. 
The villages are categorised as state assembly election constituency areas (482 
villages), Land Development Authorities areas (50 villages), Regional Development 
Authorities (70 villages) and the poorest villages (40 villages). Rural problems will 
be identified in advance so that a plan of action can be prepared and implemented 
with the participation of the rural people. All these "Vision Village Movement" 
strategies are based on the new paradigm on management of the Malaysian Civil 
Service. " 
4. HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 
The problem of manpower has been troubling Malaysia ever since the British 
intervened and ruled its various states. The multi-ethnic component of Malaysia's 
population is due to the past effort of the British Administration to employ more 
labour in their plantation industries, particularly the Indians, Chinese and Indonesians. 
However, in the 1990s Malaysia needs skilled manpower for industrialization. The 
burden of training the human resource in agriculture and industries has been placed 
in the public sector in line with the National Education System. Although, private 
education is now being encouraged it is still subjected to strict control from the 
Federal Government. 
Due to industrialization, the Malaysian Civil Service, as the largest employer, 
had to adopt new training programmes to meet the needs of the Industrial Master 
Plan, the Privatization Policy and the Malaysia Incorporated Policy. The 
globalization and liberalization policy also necessitates that the government adopt a 
global training approach even if it involves learning the English language in addition 
to the National Language, Bahasa Malaysia. The Government still maintains strict 
control on education. Until now, rural education posed the greatest challenge to the 
government's goals of restructuring society and eradicating poverty. Under the 
Second Outline Perspective Plan, the government clearly stated that: 
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"A special emphasis will be given in the effort to improve the quality 
of education and school facilities to reduce the high rate of drop outs 
in the primary and secondary schools particularly in the rural areas, 
improving the employment prospects among school leavers and assist 
them to get advance training within the education system" 
(OPP2: 29) 
Furthermore, under Vision 2020, current technical and scientific knowledge 
has become insufficient. In order to develop further, Malaysia needs an ethical and 
disciplined work force. Training on these matters has now been given greater 
emphasis at primary school level under the National Education System. However, the 
Public Service Department through the Institute of Public Administration has been 
training public servants on good ethics and discipline in line with the Privatization 
and Malaysia Incorporated Policies as well as the Quality Campaign just discussed. 
The need for such training is also in line with the "Policy on Assimilation of Islamic 
Values in Administration" and the need to combat corruption and mismanagement. 
In addition, the Ministry of Human Resources has its own agencies, 
programmes and training schemes which are designed to meet the needs of Vision 
2020. In 1989, the Ministry established the National Vocational Training Council, 
(NVTC). Following this, the Human Resource Development Council, (HRDF), was 
established in November 1992. The NVTC is more of a planning body and the 
HRDF is the implementation agency on human resource development. Since July 
1993, various training schemes have been introduced. The need for both quality and 
recognised qualifications in industry led to the establishment of the National 
Occupational Skill Standards and Malayan Skill Certificate. 15 
5. IMPERFECT COMPETITION AND CRONY POLITICAL CAPITALISM 
The dependency problems in Malaysia are partly attributed to the former 
British Colonial Administration. By the time the British left Malaysia, society was 
already communally divided. Furthermore, free enterprise under the Premiership of 
Tengku Abdul Rahman only perpetuated the problems. The state policy of non- 
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intervention failed to address the problems of income inequality according to 
ethnicity and regions. The promulgation of the NEP in 1971 as discussed earlier, 
was an attempt to overcome the dependency problems through social restructuring 
and the eradication of poverty. A target was set so that by 1990, Bumiputeras would 
be able to own 30% of the business and capital. Other nations have never adopted 
this unique form of income redistribution measure. Putting the policy on paper 
before reaching a communal consensus was undemocratic. Implementing it would 
be even tougher especially for a new Malaysian Federation. Implementation needs 
social engineering and ingenuity. However, in principle, capital accumulation works 
on the principle of efficient large scale production as well as competitiveness, not to 
mention profit and loss. Furthermore, accumulation and creation of capital also take 
a long time to produce results and, in order to do so, need a stable economic and 
political context. In addition, the successful accumulation of capital on a national 
scale requires a skilled workforce as its human capital. The NEP reverses the 
principle of capital accumulation as envisaged by Marx. The most important 
characteristic of the NEP was imperfect competition and crony capitalism. Indirectly, 
this policy perpetuated the dependency problems and defeated the purpose of social 
restructuring and eradication of poverty. 
The Bumiputera ownership target in business and industries is still being 
continued under the Vision 2020 development plan. Thus in principle Malaysia is just 
promoting imperfect competition in the economy which will also cause further 
inefficiency. This perpetuates the problems of inefficiency as in the NEP. Efficiency 
plays a significant role under Vision 2020 development as it involves heavy 
industries and the use of high technology. Thus, losses will be larger than those 
incurred by the NEP and, indeed, this has become evident recently. Furthermore, this 
involved foreign capital and high technology which is dependency on a large scale 
compared to the NEP. This also represents an exploitation of Malaysia's natural and 
human resources. Based on these arguments, Vision 2020 is a more efficient form 
of State exploitation rather than efficient production to meet the export led strategy. 
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Inefficiency still persists in the Government implementation machineries. In 
agriculture, the income of farmers has not improved much due to mismanagement 
and leakages of the funds (Silvalingam, 1993: 8). This indicates that if a government 
cannot manage agricultural development properly, it is unlikely that it will be 
successful in industry without foreign assistance. Inefficiency in agricultural 
management means that the rural-urban imbalance still persists because it is difficult 
to reverse (Siwar and Ariff Hussain, 1992: 249-272). This inefficiency also involved 
Government heavy industries and other public enterprises. 
Inefficiency can also be witnessed in the way government contracts are being 
awarded, the involvement of political businessmen and financial management. It is 
true that Mahathir's policies have led to the growth of capital. Nevertheless, the 
approach has not led to an increase in the productivity of local entrepreneurs. This 
is because of their dependency on government contracts and concessions. Malaysia 
needs genuine entrepreneurs who can make a contribution to the nation without 
depending on the government. Gomez (1994) showed that Mahathir's policies have 
led to the growth of political businessmen and big corporations with political links 
(see also McVey, 1992). This kind of crony capitalism persists despite the 
administrative reform and the new remuneration system for civil servants. 
Businessmen who claim to be strong supporters of ministers and VIPs usually 
obtain endorsement, particularly in receiving loans which involve large sums of 
money. Due to this privilege, favoured businessmen are able obtain multiple bank 
loans. This leads to a situation where they use the loans from one bank to pay off the 
debts from another. Business dealings are done to protect political interests although 
they may not be profitable and productive in the long run. Thus, this could cause 
political conflicts within the National Front Coalition unless everyone receives a fair 
share. Thus the National Front Coalition is just like a club where members enjoy 
many privileges especially the award of government contracts (see McVey, 1992; and 
Gomez 1994 for a detail study of the political businessmen in Malaysia). 
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Economically, imperfect competition has caused a rise in the prices of 
government controlled goods such as cement, flour and chicken. In the past, 
producers have demanded that the prices of these goods be raised in response to the 
rise in prices of other goods. They refused to sell these goods until the government 
raised the prices. 16 In the case of cement, dealers were stock-piling cement and 
smuggling it out to Thailand. Thus protected industries in Malaysia have not been 
able to meet the targets of production and demands of consumers. In 1996, it was 
disclosed that Perwaja incurred a loss of RM2.3 billion. " This kind of loss has been 
experienced ever since the NEP. Imperfect competition is also bad for the growth of 
small and medium industries as they are not able to compete with the larger capital 
intensive industries. Inefficiency brought about by imperfect competition has 
involved all levels of administration from the Federal to the State Governments. 
Shaikh's study (1992) found that, "Malaysia's public enterprises had low rates of 
return and well below opportunity costs of funds. " He showed that the Government 
classification of public enterprises for 1986 was; 63 (13.9%) sick, 140 (30.9%) weak, 
48 (10.6%) satisfactory, and 201 (44.4%) good. 18 Inefficiency even crept into the 
Malaysian Central Bank (Bank Negara). This was alleged to have lost about 
RM30,000 million due to its speculative activities in the money market. This led the 
Governor of the Central Bank to resign (Othman, 1994: 9-127). 
All these issues - particularly state involvement in privatized agencies - can 
actually work against the idea of liberal administration. However, the idea of 
promoting close co-operation between government and big corporations can help to 
integrate some businesses which are owned by the various ethnic groups. This, 
however, has also been inhibited by the need to protect Bumiputera interests, too. 
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6. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEP ON MA HA THIR'S POLICIES: 
CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES 
It is still too early to assess the impact of Mahathir's Vision 2020 
development policies. However, initial examinations of his policies and the current 
socio-economic trends indicate an attempt to continue on with the old policies and 
strategies despite the changes made in the 1990s. 
Politically, the NEP served to consolidate and legitimize the Bumiputera 
dominated government. Since the NEP's termination in 1990, the laws and state 
machineries for the protection of Bumiputera and Malay privileges have not changed. 
With the policy on "Assimilation Of Islamic Values In Administration, " Islamic 
ideology is also being propagated to project the good image of Islam as a National 
ideology. Although Islam has been the National ideology, before 1985 it was not 
openly propagated in the administration. The influence of Islam within UMNO, the 
dominant party in National Front, has even divided the party leadership itself. The 
Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar is an evident supporter of the Islamic group, which 
could challenge those supporting Mahathir. '9 In addition, due to the need to reach 
the target of 30% Bumiputera ownership of capital, ethnic politics is becoming 
prominent. The National Front parties led by UMNO are openly involved in the 
acquisition of Government contracts. `° This is added to by the prevalent practice of 
money politics which Mahathir is beginning to eradicate in order to preserve UMNO 
and the National Front legitimacy. 
From the point of view of economic development, Malaysia is still dependent 
on the West in terms of capital and technology. This situation has continued even 
after independence and through-out the NEP. Strong economic growth in Malaysia 
brought about by the export of electrical goods is mostly due to the existence of 
Multi-National Corporations. In reality, Malaysia is still struggling to build its local 
small and medium scale industries, and to encourage the use of modern technology 
and automation. 2' In addition, the dependency problems are exacerbated by the lack 
of skilled manpower to fuel the process of industrialization. 
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Since independence, the government has made efforts to modernize society 
by developing Malaysian industry, agriculture and infrastructure. In conjunction with 
this, there are also policies devoted to rural-urban problems and even the 
Government's own administration. However, there still exists a huge number of the 
traditional rural population who make their living through subsistence agriculture. 
This imbalance in development is worsened by the recent industrialization 
programmes. More money is being spent on industries, leaving the agricultural sector 
poorly managed despite the large amount of funds which are allocated to it. The 
motivation to industrialize and promote the growth of heavy industries stemmed from 
the need to achieve 30% Bumiputera ownership of capital. This has distracted the 
government from the real issues of social restructuring and eradicating poverty. In 
addition, recent rises in the price of goods have affected the poor most. This could 
also affect the government's objective to restructure the society and eradicate poverty 
through economic growth (see Appendix H). The government's controversial policies 
can also be seen in the National Education Policy, National Unity Policy and the 
Assimilation of Islamic Values In Administration. Due to these, there is not much 
difference between the NEP and present Mahathir's Vision 2020 development 
policies. Despite their privileges, the Bumiputeras are still unable to catch up in 
education, business and industry. The NEP and the current policies have, in fact, 
perpetuated dependency among the Bumiputeras and prevented the spirit of 
competition within a multi-ethnic society. Since unbalanced development still 
persists, the NEP strategies need to be continued under the Vision 2020 development 
plan. 
7. CONCLUSION 
On the whole, although Mahathir's liberalization policies were intended to 
overcome dependency problems in Malaysia, they have actually worsened them. 
Malaysia has become trapped in huge foreign debts since Mahathir took over the 
Premiership in 1981 due to his loss making focus on uncompetitive heavy industries. 
The reforms in the Civil Service have also been costly but there has been no 
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corresponding improvement in efficiency as is evident in this chapter. Thus, 
Mahathir's policies are just another form of capitalist exploitation. 
One significant change in the economy, however, is that the agricultural sector 
is contributing less to GDP and employment compared to the industrial sector; a 
trend which has given strong support for Mahathir's liberal policies on trade and 
administration. This will make it possible to increase Malaysian exports. Inevitably, 
the agricultural sector has had to adopt the capitalist form of production and 
associated land reforms. Even this has been inhibited by the need to protect 
Bumiputera privileges and traditional farmers. While agricultural contribution to GDP 
is falling, local manufacturers and heavy industries are not doing as well as expected 
and Malaysia has had to over-rely on MNCs for its export earnings. 
The ruling National Front coalition is still dominated by United Malays 
National Front. However, there are some noticeable changes within UMNO, namely 
the strengthening of its Islamic values, internal conflict and its expansion in Sabah 
in 1993. Most of the old guard in UMNO have been deposed in party elections or 
have been given less significant posts within the Government. The new generation 
in UMNO are younger and more self-centred. Only exploitation of the rural peasants 
and Muslims will continue to keep them in power. This is likely to lead to an abuse 
of the Bumiputera privileges and a worsening of the communal problems. 
Nevertheless Anwar, Mahathir's new Deputy, has always emphasized continuity 
(kesinambungan) in his various speeches. 
The dependency problems have not only led to increasing foreign debt but 
also to rising prices. These increases have affected the poor most and have worsened 
poverty as well as the rural-urban imbalance in terms of development. Imperfect 
competition which has been brought about by the need to protect Bumiputera 
interests has also perpetuated inefficiency in the government and the economy. 
105 
CHAPTER 4 
BUMIPUTERA ENTREPRENEURS AND VISION VILLAGE 
DEVELOPMENT IN SABAH 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines state intervention against the problems of rural poverty, 
and poor Bumiputera participation in commerce and industry. These two problems 
were first dealt with under the NEP (1970-1990) but were not satisfactorily resolved, 
particularly in Sabah (National Economic Consultative Council Report 1990: 17-120). 
The two objectives were popularly known as the "two-pronged" objectives of NEP. 
Further, the NEP's attempt to reduce the income imbalance between the well off 
Chinese and the less developed Bumiputeras did not meet its target of 30% 
Bumiputera participation in commerce and industries. This was due to political, 
social and economic constraints on the policy plans. As a consequence, alternative 
solutions were adopted after 1990 in dealing with public enterprises and rural 
development. This study focuses on the initial period of the Vision 2020 grand plan. 
1. I Background Of The Problems 
1.1.1 Geography A nd History 
Before examining the problems in Sabah, it is vital that one understands both 
its historical and geographical background. Sabah has an area of 28,500 square miles 
and, as such, it is the second largest state in Malaysia. Although it has a hilly 
interior, about 85% of the land is suitable for agriculture. ' The sea is a natural 
supply of all sorts of food and the forest is rich in timber. Its other natural resources 
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are petroleum, methanol, copper and even gold. Thus, if they are properly managed 
and exploited, Sabah has wealthy natural resources. 
Historically, Sabah was ruled by the Chartered Company (1880-1940) and the 
British Administration (1946-1963). It inherited British administrative and legal 
systems. Although the British also brought some economic development in Sabah, 
they neglected the rural areas and the Bumiputeras. Their capitalist approach to 
development has caused an imbalance in terms of income between the well-off urban 
dwellers - especially the Chinese - and the low income Bumiputera rural dwellers. 
The urban areas have better infrastructure in terms of communication, electricity and 
running water than the rural areas. The imbalance has persisted up to the present day 
despite the government development programmes which have been operating since 
1963. Most of the Bumiputera rural dwellers earn their living through subsistence 
farming. The big plantations used to be owned by British companies. Presently, 
there are some plantations which are managed by the Sabah Land Development 
Boards and Federal Land development Boards to resettle the landless. However, due 
to the restructuring programmes, public enterprises are being established in 
manufacturing which can help expedite development in the states. In Sabah, although 
the Bumiputeras dominate the political scene, historically the Chinese capitalists have 
held economic power. Thus, the political power of the Bumiputeras frequently comes 
into conflict with the Chinese capitalist power. This conflict will be the determining 
factor in the implementation of the government development plans in Sabah. 
1.1.2 The Problems 
Although the NEP showed some improvement in Bumiputera participation in 
commerce and industry, the rural areas have not experienced full impact of this 
policy. This is especially so for rural areas in peripheral states such as Sabah, 
Sarawak and Kelantan. Nevertheless, the government was pleased that the 
Bumiputera participation in commerce and industries had increased as is indicated by 
20.3% capital ownership by 1990 compared to the 2.4% level in 1970 (see Table 5). 
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1970 1990 Target Malaysia (1990) 
Bumiputera 
(including Trust 
Agencies etc. ) 
2.4 30 20.3 
Other Malaysians 32.3 40 46.2 
Foreign Residents 63.3 30 25.1 
Nominated 
Countries 
2.0 - 8.4 
Table 5. Capital Ownership Of Share Companies After 
The NEP Ended In 1990 in Percentage 
Source: Malaysia Outline Perspective Plan (1991-2000), GOM, K. L, (June 1991). 
Various public enterprises were established as a way of allocating resources and 
encouraging Bumiputera participation in commerce and industry. If compared to the 
cost to the nation, the author thinks that the increase is not worth the money spent 
(FEER, 12.10.1995: 142). 
However, the NEP was not able to fully achieve its objectives. As a 
controversial policy which discriminated against the Chinese in economy, it led to 
further rifts between the Chinese and the Bumiputeras. Some thought that NEP 
spending benefitted the Chinese capitalists as they generally supplied the equipment 
and facilities which are necessary for development . 
Despite the NEP, factors such as urban-rural imbalance in development, 
poverty, regional social and economic differences, the issue of poor Bumiputera 
participation in commerce and industry persist. ' All these are characteristics of 
dependent capitalist development. Thus, when the NEP ended in 1990, its two 
pronged objectives of restructuring and eradication of poverty had to be further 
pursued under the National Development Policy (1991-2000). However, in line with 
Vision 2020, the Government has reformed its administration to be more efficient 
than before. This is also in line with the policies on Privatization, Malaysia 
Incorporated and National Industrialization. These policies are alternative means to 
l 
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improve Bumiputera participation in commerce and industry. Thus, it is interesting 
to examine their implementation in Sabah. 
Although the present Vision 2020 development provides a liberal framework 
for Bumiputeras entrepreneurial development, it still faces implementation problems. 
Industrial and Vision Village developments are faced with various conflicts. The 
large Bumiputera dependent population is coupled with dependency on foreign capital 
for development. Its heavy industries are not competitive enough compared with the 
MNCs. Exploitation by the MNCs is not conducive to the development of the less 
competitive SMIs. The development of industrial parks will primarily benefit MNCs 
as they are more competitive compared to the local companies. 
Furthermore, without private Bumiputera capital, the industrial decentralization 
which is required by the Vision Villages project will be difficult to implement. 
There needs to be efficient market mechanisms whereby the rural population can 
market their products rather than depending on Government. In addition to these 
problems, there is also a lack of skilled manpower which means that Sabah is largely 
without one of the key ingredients for successful capitalist development. Therefore, 
Bumiputeras dependency is inevitable. 
The privatization and corporatization of public agencies are also impeded by 
the need to protect the Bumiputera share in ownership of capital as well as in 
management. Thus, although these agencies have adopted corporate and private 
sector concepts, they are subject to Government control and protection. Thus the 
situation of imperfect competition which was discussed in chapter three is inevitable 
even under Vision 2020 development. 
With the present level of development, the management will face many 
constraints in implementing Vision 2020 effectively. A possible problem in this 
regard is that the present managers are still unfamiliar in implementing industrial 
development. For instance, the existing agro-based industry such as cocoa, oil palm, 
and rubber are slow to venture into down-stream processing. The Bumiputera 
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entrepreneurial development will only be successful if the government can organize 
the various ethnic groups into a huge corporate organization. This means that the 
different ethnic groups will have to work together to unite their resources and 
increase productivity 
However, as the government is interested in maintaining its own political 
domination, it is unlikely that there will be true co-operation and unity between 
Bumiputeras and the Chinese, as well as between Bumiputeras of different 
ideological backgrounds. Thus, although some programmes are not so feasible, they 
are implemented only to preserve the Government's political interests. For instance, 
it does not make sense to have a decentralized plan for industry in Sabah when the 
urban areas themselves are not yet fully industrialized. The rural population has few 
skills and experience in starting their own rural industry. Furthermore, the failure of 
the decision-makers in the NEP did not provide the positive experience needed to 
implement Vision 2020 development. 
Taking all these points into account - and also considering the lack of modern 
technology - it will take longer than 2020 for Bumiputeras and rural areas to 
industrialise. These points are a reflection on decision-makers in Kuala Lumpur who 
have failed to take into account Sabah's stage of development when they embarked 
on the Vision 2020 grand plan as well as the usual Five-Year Plan and the Outline 
Perspective Plan (1991-2000). The decision makers are quick to put aside their 
previous failures and create new plans to preserve the government's legitimacy as 
they did under the NEP. This may be what the Prime Minister, Mahathir, means 
when he tearfully proclaimed the Malay Poem (sajak) "Unfinished Struggle 
(Perjuangan Yang Belum Selesai)" during the UMNO gathering in 1996.3 
Since the NEP, public enterprise in Malaysia has been a means by which the 
state has intervened to increase Bumiputera participation in business and industry as 
well as in ownership of capital (Milne, 1976: 235-261). From the Marxist point of 
view, this will undermine the ethnic and social structure in Malaysia and will 
transform the Malaysian state. This means there will be some conflict between the 
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new and the traditional society. This is not the only source of potential conflict as 
ethnic difference- may also assume themselves into a class struggle. All these 
potential conflicts originate from the attempt to create and accumulate Bumiputera 
capital. Lim (1985: 56-59) has revealed some contradictions between state capital 
accumulation and Malays/Bumiputeras interests. The state's direct involvement in 
capital accumulation is seen as an attempt to preserve Malay/Bumiputera legitimation 
in government. This gives rise to a situation where the state competes with private 
capital (which represents various ethnic groups and foreign investment in Malaysia). 
This has affected Bumiputera capitalists. The effect of state capitalism could be even 
worse in peripheral Malaysian states such as Sabah. However, the government 
programmes to promote the growth of Bumiputera capitalism have undermined the 
state itself. The privatization of public enterprise is seen as the beginning of the loss 
of autonomy of the state. According to Halim (1990: 82-83), this loss is countered 
by increasing authoritarianism combined with economic liberalism. Privatization was 
not due to an attempt to redistribute income but due to losses incurred by the public 
enterprises. Studies by Bumiputera scholars themselves indicate that there has been 
some mismanagement of the public enterprises other than the lack of skilled 
manpower (Halim [1990]; Shaikh [1992]). Furthermore, other scholars such as Leeds 
(1989: 741-754), and Lim (1985: 37-59) indicate that there is mismanagement and 
corruption in the Malaysian public enterprises. Other than the Vision 2020 
Development Plan, various proposals have also been forwarded by the Bumiputera 
Economic Congress to improve the situation. Let us examine the problem by looking 
at the peripheral Malaysian state of Sabah. With the loss of the government 
legitimation and autonomy especially in the urban areas, it is likely that the 
Bumiputera leadership will shift their attention to the rural areas. Furthermore, 
industrialization of the rural areas is necessary as the economic trend shows that 
agriculture is contributing less to GDP and employment. Unless steps are taken to 
decentralize the industries in the urban areas, the income inequality gap between the 
urban and rural areas will widen. Thus, the Vision Village human centred 
development will help to retrain the villagers who have been pushed to the margins 
of capitalist development and bring them to the mainstream. 
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Marvin (1989: 764-785), in his study of a Malay Village in Peninsular 
Malaysia, found that rural development in Malaysia has been successful in bringing 
about infrastructural improvement. However, this has not encouraged the villagers 
to fend for themselves. Instead, they are becoming dependent on the government to 
develop their villages. This approach seems to turn into a tradition the 
development of rural Malaysia. As a consequence, the new approach under, the 
Vision Village Programme is trying to reverse this problem whereby development 
starts from below (i. e. the bottom up approach). The new approach will also 
encourage the development of agro-based industries. Studies such as those by Parikh 
and Thorbecke (1996: 375) on industrialization in India found that rural 
industrialization does help to improve the standard of living in the villages with 
industry when compared to those without. In addition, this has also led to the growth 
of a new service sector. However, this does not mean that agricultural development 
in the rural areas should be neglected by the government as both sectors are good 
labour absorbers. However, an over reliance on agriculture will not be able to handle 
rapid population growth. As Alauddin and Tisdell (1991) point out, due to 
population growth, the green revolution must be followed by industrialization for 
labour absorption. Islam et al (1987) found that, considering the high cost of 
industrialization, both sectors should play complementary roles. Indeed, the high cost 
of industrialization has led many scholars to point out the need to revitalize 
agriculture and encourage down-stream processing. Furthermore, consideration 
should be given to various structural, distributive and political problems. Rural 
industries should also take into consideration market fluctuations in the price of their 
products. If market fluctuations occurred, they would leave the villagers with debts 
and lead to a poor living standard. As Briggs showed in his study on the economic 
crisis in Tanzania between 1974-1976, due to villagisation policy, one should not 
force peasants to do something which they are unsure and uncertain about. The 
villagers must be allowed to think for themselves about the profitability and benefit 
of the programmes. However, Park and Johnston's (1995: 201-203) study of rural 
development in Taiwan pointed out that in addition to government policies external 
factors have also contributed to the success of rural industries in Taiwan. In addition 
to the government policies, it is the capitalist motive that led to successful 
112 
industrialization of rural Taiwan. For instance, rising income provided the rural 
people with sufficient start-up capital to begin small and medium industries. 
Successful rural industries served as good role models for other villagers to follow. 
In addition to the well educated human capital and fitting vocational education, 
Taiwan's leadership is pragmatic in their implementation of the government's policies. 
Due to the various problems facing public enterprises, the author doubts 
whether the Vision Village programmes can be successfully implemented. In order 
to develop a better definition of the problems, the author will examine the 
Bumiputera entrepreneurial programmes and "Vision Village" development in the 
peripheral Malaysian state of Sabah. 
2. B UMIPUTERA ENTREPRENEURIAL DEVELOPMENT IN SABA H 
The development of public enterprises in Malaysia and in Sabah in particular 
was originally based on the guidelines of the NEP. In Sabah, the early public 
enterprises mainly dealt with commerce, timber, agriculture, fisheries, and natural 
resources. It was only under the BERJAYA rule (1976-1985) that public enterprise 
was expanded to manufacturing. All these expansions were implemented during the 
NEP. They included cement manufacturing, vehicle assembly, brick making, 
shipbuilding engineering, clinker manufacturing, flour and feed production, coconut 
oil processing, and sugar refinery. By the 1990s, the manufacturing activities of 
SEDCO had expanded. These public enterprises are also involved in the service and 
commercial sectors. Other than that, these public enterprises also have the social 
restructuring responsibilities which usually take the form of incentive schemes for 
Bumiputeras in commerce and industries. With the expansion of state enterprises, 
their management and organization has become more complicated. Thus, by the 
1990s, the major state enterprises such as SEDCO and the Sabah Foundation were 
beginning to restructure their organizations'. It appears that the state realised that it 
could not combine its commercial activities with its social responsibilities. This 
means that if the state makes little profit, there will be less money for welfare. Let 
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us then examine the roles and functions of these public institutions. What problems 
do they have in implementing the policy plans? 
The implementation of Bumiputera entrepreneurial development involves 
many ministries and agencies. The 1990s is a period of institutional restructuring. 
For instance, in May, 1995, the Federal Ministry of Entrepreneurial Development was 
established in Kuala Lumpurs Its role and functions are based on the following 
objectives: to develop prospective Bumiputeras entrepreneurs, to foster a competitive 
spirit, to assist Bumiputeras financially and in infrastructural developments, to co- 
ordinate various programmes implemented by its various agencies, and to instill co- 
operation between Bumiputeras and non-Bumiputeras. The Ministry also handles 
matters relating to Bumiputera incentive schemes in commerce and industry. This 
scheme takes the form of credit, training, licences, and provision of business 
premises, and industrial sites. These facilities and infrastructures are important for 
the promotion of new Bumiputera entrepreneurs who still need guidance and 
assistance. Even though the Ministry's functions include services to non- 
Bumiputeras, priority is given to Bumiputeras. The final goal is to create a 
Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community that is able work with other 
communities. Thus, it is vital that the government establishes some links between 
Bumiputera entrepreneurs and successful entrepreneurs so that they can share 
experience and expertise. 
The various agencies which are under the Ministry are the Commercial 
Vehicle Licensing Board, Council of Trust for the Indigenous People (MARA), 
Urban Development Authority, Malaysia Development Bank Berhad, Malaysia 
Handicraft Development Corporation, and Credit Guarantee Corporation. These 
agencies involve millions of ringgits of public funds which are sufficient to achieve 
the objectives and strategies that have been outlined by the ministry. Among these 
agencies, only MARA has a branch in Sabah. MARA caters only for Bumiputeras, 
unlike the other agencies under the Ministry which have a wider ethnic scope. 
Within its focus on the Bumiputeras, MARA has broad functions which cover 
training, credit and development of the infrastructure for Bumiputera entrepreneurs. 
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Although MARA has a branch in Sabah to implement the Federal policy plans as 
land matters fall under state power, MARA's federal programmes such as the 
provision of business premises have difficulty in finding suitable sites. Thus after 
overcoming the problem of horizontal linkage, the management then finds difficulty 
in vertical linkage at the state level. In addition, MARA is incurring financial losses. 
Indeed, most of the programmes undertaken by MARA are later closed down without 
it even being announced to the public what problems have led to the closure. For 
instance, the bus transport and the "satay ria" ventures have been closed down 
without giving the public a chance to voice their interests about these public ventures. 
2.1 The Ministry of Industrial Development Sabah and The Bumiputera 
Enlrepreneurs6 
The agencies under Ministry of Industrial Development Sabah are the 
Department of Industrial Development Research, the Bumiputera Participation Unit, 
and Sabah Economic Development Corporation. Although their broad objective is 
to promote and co-ordinate the growth of industries, the Ministry - as indicated by 
its organization structure - has placed a strong emphasis on the participation of 
Bumiputeras in commerce and industries in line with the NEP's objectives. One of 
its agencies, the Department of Industrial Development, is continuing the effort to 
identify industrial potential in Sabah. 
To understand the way in which the promotion of Bumiputera participation 
in commerce and industry is being organized and implemented, I shall examine the 
two agencies of implementation, SEDCO and BPU. These two agencies were 
originally created in line with the objectives of the New Economic Policy (1971- 
1990) (see Appendix I). 
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2.2 The Sabah Economic Development Corporation (SEDCO)7 
In line with the NEP, Sabah has also developed its own public enterprises and 
Bumiputera entrepreneurs. In commerce and industry, the Sabah Economic 
Development Corporation (SEDCO) is the implementation agency responsible for the 
development of Bumiputera entrepreneurs. This agency helps the state government 
with the production of import substitution products. SEDCO is involved in 
manufacturing, real estate development, the service sector, and trading. In line with 
the Vision 2020 development, SEDCO has recently established a subsidiary, 
SEDCOVEST. This agency provides incentives for the creation of successful 
"Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community". The various undertakings of 
SEDCO's subsidiaries in the manufacturing, real estate, service, and trading sectors, 
indicates a capability to produce quality products that can be marketed overseas. 
2.3 The Objectives, Role And Functions Of SEDCO 
SEDCO was originally established to achieve the NEP's objectives of 
eradicating poverty and restructuring of society. Thus, under the NEP, it also had 
to: accelerate economic development of Sabah by identifying, initiating and investing 
in projects that are consistent with the government's priorities and are financially 
sound; to prepare the necessary infrastructure for the promotion of industries and 
commercial areas in the state; and, to achieve a strong financial foundation. 
To achieve the objectives, it has to adopt the role of pioneer in establishing 
new industries, economic infrastructure, creating business opportunities for 
Bumiputeras and development projects through joint-ventures with both foreign and 
local investors. After the experience of the NEP, SEDCO's role has not change much 
but there is pressure to adopt a new role in line with the Vision 2020 particularly in 
creating a Bumiputera Commercial And Industrial Community. Its new role will also 
emphasize modernization, promote the business image of Sabah as well as industrial 
development. 
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Thus, in line with the Vision 2020 challenges, SEDCO as a public corporation 
functions as the state's industrial machinery. It functions under the directive of the 
Minister of Industrial Development and ensures that industrial infrastructure such as 
industrial estates and industrial facilities which can create employment and economic 
growth are in proper order. This is in line with the Ministry of Industrial 
Development objectives which are: 
"(a)To accelerate the growth of the manufacturing sector to ensure a 
continued rapid expansion of the State's economy and to provide basis 
for attaining the social development consistent with the policies of the 
government, and, (b) To enhance and co-ordinate the promotion of 
investment opportunities for efficient utilisation of the State's natural 
resources. " 
(MID, 1990) 
2.4 The Bwniputera Participation Unit (BPU)8 
Another agency, the Bumiputera Participation Unit (BPU) also plays an 
important role in helping Bumiputera entrepreneurs. This agency was created in 
1977 during the height of the implementation of the New Economic Policy in Sabah. 
It still plays an important role in helping to meet the Bumiputera quota in commerce 
and industry. It acts as a co-ordinating agency in entrepreneurial development which 
spans all sectors. The BPU gives Bumiputera status to Bumiputera companies. This 
status provides them with privileges in acquiring government contracts and is 
awarded to companies which meet certain conditions. For a sole proprietor to 
acquire Bumiputera status, the company's shares must be totally owned and managed 
by Bumiputeras. In partnerships and limited companies, 51 % of the shares must be 
owned and managed by Bumiputeras. In addition, to register with the BPU's 
Contractor Centres, a company must possess a valid licence. The registration 
classifies the contractors in groups ranging from A to F. Group A enables 
contractors to undertake government contracts up to the value of RM500,000 above. 
While, at the other end of the scale, group F entitles contractors to undertake 
government contracts with a value of RM70,000 or below. In addition, all 
government works with a value below RM50,000 are reserved for Bumiputeras. 
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2.5 The Objectives, Functions And Roles Of The BPU 
The BPU's objectives can be summarised as attempting to increase 
Bumiputera participation in commerce and industry in line with the Vision 2020 
development. (Formerly, it attempted to achieve the NEP's objectives). To do this, 
the BPU needs to assist Bumiputeras by whatever means are in line with the current 
policies. Its assistance comes in the form of training, finance, advice, guidance, 
management, preparation of working papers. Thus, the BPU serves as a vital 
Bumiputera institution which helps to improve their socio-economic condition. The 
organizational structure of the BPU consists of the Director who is responsible to the 
Minister of Industrial Development and assisted by a Deputy Director and supporting 
Units. These are the Research and Planning Section, Enforcement and Monitoring 
Section, Training and Guidance Section, Administration and Finance Section, 
Contractor Registration Section, and Bumiputera Status Registration Section. All 
these sections have their own roles and functions but all of them help to achieve the 
overall objectives of the BPU regarding Bumiputeras. Recently, with the 
establishment of the Ministry Of Resources And Enterprise, some of the training 
roles of the BPU have been taken over by the new Ministry. 
Since its establishment in 1977, the BPU has acquired a broad experience of 
the problems which Bumiputera entrepreneurs' face. One of the main problems is 
poor servicing of their loans. ' Based on the previous development experience, the 
government required that all contractors who undertake government projects need to 
be registered with the Contractors Service Centre (PUKONSA) at the BPU. In 
addition, to register for Bumiputera status, a company must possess a valid business 
licence and meet the requirement on the percentage of Bumiputera ownership of its 
shares. Once a company gets its Bumiputera status, it enjoys special privileges of 
access to government tenders and government negotiated contracts. The attainment 
of Bumiputera status requires the approval of a committee set up for this purpose. 
Since PUKONSA keeps record of these companies, it can serve as referrals to these 
registered companies. Other than that, the BPU monitor the private sectors to ensure 
that government policies regarding the requirement on the employment and ownership 
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of shares in the private companies are being observed. Thus, the process in ensuring 
that Bumiputeras enjoy their privileges and shares in commerce and industry is 
clearly outlined by BPU even after the NEP (see Appendix J: The Strategic Process). 
Regarding the award of government loans to Bumiputera entrepreneurs, the 
Committee to implement the credit schemes for Bumiputeras was created in 1978. 
At first, the award of the loans was not properly administered and controlled. When 
there were poor repayments by 1983, the government began to enforce some 
guidelines regarding the power of, and the amount of approval that can be sanctioned 
by, an official. However, with the creation of the finance companies by the State 
Government, the loans which help Bumiputera entrepreneurs are being disbursed 
through the Sabah Credit Corporation or other related agencies. Thus the 
responsibility for managing the loans falls on these credit agencies. This dealt with 
the problems in the past where BPU and Rural Development Corporations held the 
responsibilities to make sure that loans were being repaid. 1° However, this does not 
prevent loans from being misused for other purposes and then defaulted on (Ongkili 
and Leong in Johari, 1989: 141-165). 
However, a question arises concerning Bumiputera companies which own 
Bumiputera status licence but are not in operation. Most Bumiputera contractors 
boast about their potential to attain Bumiputera status. These companies remain 
dormant until there is a chance to acquire government contracts. Many Bumiputera 
companies have been granted the Bumiputera status, but it is hard to identify their 
business premises compared to the Chinese which dominate the urban areas. This 
indicates that these so called "two Ringgits companies" are possibly owned by civil 
servants or by those who are just waiting for government contract opportunities 
which they will carry out in addition to their main job. This is possible as some state 
contracts are not being tendered, but are based on negotiated terms of contract. In 
the negotiated contract, contractors can negotiate the worth of their undertaking. In 
contracts for the supply of goods, price of goods can be pushed up or low quality 
products supplied. Thus, registration under the Contractor Service Centre 
(PUKONSA) and the granting of Bumiputera status to eligible companies can be 
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abused. Besides, the BPU's objective is to increase Bumiputera participation in 
commerce and industry. It is an incentive scheme rather than selective on the 
approval of the PUKONSA certificate and Bumiputera status. Since there are still 
very few successful Bumiputera entrepreneurs, BPU training programmes hope to 
deal with the problems regarding the applicant qualification. Furthermore, although 
the government can increase the Bumiputera ownership of licences, it cannot increase 
the Bumiputera ownership of capital. It is capital that creates successful 
entrepreneurships not the government or society. " In addition, most of the 
Bumiputeras owned companies are concentrated in large urban areas and only a few 
are located in the underdeveloped districts. Thus, any government projects in the 
underdeveloped districts have to be undertaken by contractors from the urban areas. 
This is especially so when the better off urban contractors have greater licence status 
and better relationships with the administrators than the Bumiputeras in the interior 
districts. Thus, among the Bumiputera themselves, there is some inequality of access 
to government contracts. Thus, unless the problems associated with a lack of capital 
can be overcome, the problem of dormant companies will persist. Furthermore, due 
to lack of capital, Bumiputera contractors are known to have sub-contracted their 
contracts to wealthier Chinese contractors. This phenomenon was termed "Ali 
Babaism" during the NEP. In terms of the ownership of business premises, the non- 
Bumiputeras still predominate in Sabah. 
Thus, SEDCO and BPU are two agencies that are directly involved in the goal 
of increasing Bumiputera participation in commerce and industry. However, due to 
corruption and mismanagement, the public are losing confidence in the government's 
agencies and departments. ' These problems are expected to be overcome by the 
recent administrative reforms under the New Remuneration Scheme. The areas that 
need to be given particular attention in the government agencies are financial 
management and interdepartmental co-operation. Furthermore, the globalization of 
the economy requires managers to handle international finance and co-operation with 
confidence. Time management is also important to improve productivity and 
competitiveness. This can be achieved by using high technology and providing 
training incentives for staff. 
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However, as public enterprises established for the purpose of helping 
Bumiputeras are becoming a burden to the government, the privatization policy was 
introduced in 1983 to deal with these problems. 13 This policy will involve various 
subsidiary companies under SEDCO that are currently making a loss. The state 
Ministry of Finance records show that many public enterprises in Sabah are not 
profitable. The large losses were revealed by the Sabah State Secretary at a 
conference organised by the Institute for Development Studies Sabah (formerly the 
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance). The policy on Bumiputera 
entrepreneurial development is obviously in conflict with the State Treasury's 
objective of safeguarding and reserving public funds. Most public enterprises do not 
evaluate the programmes they implement. If they do, the results are not made public 
until millions of Ringgits are lost. The people at the grassroots level do not, or at 
least, do not want to know what is going on because they do not benefit very much 
from the programmes personally. Most of these public enterprises are chaired by 
politicians especially strong party leaders. These people consist of party leaders who 
lost their seats in the general elections but were subsequently appointed to public 
office because of their influential position in the party. They are not really popular 
politically among the people. Thus, there is some conflict between political 
appointees and civil servants. Political interference in the running of public 
enterprises has also caused public servants to lose their motivation. However, the 
government has not allowed these problems to become an obstacle in carrying out 
their development plans. In fact, millions of Ringgits have been spent on these 
public enterprises despite their losses. Under the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995), 
SEDCO was allocated RM43,302,000. This figure is estimated to increase to 
RM216,058,410 under the Seventh Malaysia Plan. " The five fold increase is due to 
the development of the Kota Kinabalu Industrial Estate at Telipok. As an alternative, 
Mahathir's Privatization Policy becomes the future guideline for future SEDCO's 
ventures. Under SEDCO's restructuring programmes, its commercial activities will 
be taken over by Kesabah Holdings Ltd.. 15 This will enable SEDCO to concentrate 
on its socio-economic activities of helping Bumiputeras. This solution has been 
taken to overcome SEDCO's conflicting roles in the past. 
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3. THE PRIVA TIZA TION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN SABA H 
In line with the privatization policy, the Federal Ministry of Entrepreneurial 
Development introduced the umbrella and vendor programmes to help Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs. Under the umbrella concept programmes, Bumiputera companies are 
given incentives to market the products of well established companies. This concept 
has enabled many Bumiputera companies to get involved in the franchise business. 
In the vendor programmes, SMIs are given assistance so that they can provide 
supporting services to well established companies. 16 For instance, in order to 
manufacture the Proton car, it was necessary to establish many supporting industries. 
While many private companies have been set up in Peninsular Malaysia through 
these programmes, Sabah is only just starting to build up its industrial estates and 
free trade zones. The privatization of loss making public enterprises only began after 
the 1990s. The privatization policy in Sabah only began recently although there have 
been talks about privatization since the policy was introduced by the Mahathir 
administration. For instance, the State privatization committee was only formed in 
December, 1991 which is roughly eight years after the privatization policy was 
introduced by Mahathir. Privatization of some public enterprises in Sabah is 
necessary as most of them are making losses. From the RM2.3 billion investment 
in public enterprises, the state government only receives 1% return (B. M.: 20.12.91). 
This indicates that there is a poor link between the Federal and State Ministries in 
implementing policy plans. Federal circulars are slow to be implemented in Sabah. 
At this stage, the implementation process mainly involves paper work and internal 
reorganization. In addition, Sabah is lacking skilled manpower to fill the positions 
in privatized companies. Furthermore, both federal and State government's under the 
PBS (1985-1994) were quarrelling over Sabah's position within Malaysia. 
Indirectly, privatization encourages the growth of large corporations. 
Successful companies can be listed in the stock market thereby enabling the public 
- especially Bumiputeras - to buy shares. The Amanah Saham Bumiputera 
(ASB) 
provides opportunities for Bumiputeras to invest in the stock market. " ASB is 
guaranteed by the government and prevents the Bumiputeras from incurring losses 
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due to market fluctuation. Thus, although government firms are being privatized, the 
government still maintains the New Economic Policy measures of ensuring 30% 
Bumiputera ownership in these privatized enterprises. This is also in line with the 
Policy on Corporatization of Malaysia which was introduced in 1983, a few months 
before the Privatization policy. Under this policy, the private and public sectors are 
required to work together to increase productivity. This is based on the Korean and 
Japanese model rather than that of the French. This is also based on the Mahathir's 
Look East Policy. " Thus, these three policies form the main guidelines in all future 
government ventures. However, this creates two conflicting institutions; public 
enterprise and the private sector with government interests. Thus, the Malaysian 
entrepreneurial development is functioning like the double-edged sword as it cuts 
both ways. All these measures and problems are due to the need to protect 
Bumiputera interests and the national ideology. 
In Sabah, privatization has drawn the attention of both the National Front and 
the opposition parties. This is especially so where privatization will benefit certain 
groups and involves large sums of money. However, their attention is drawn because 
privatization measures will make some individuals richer. Thus, their concern is not 
really to protect the public interests but their own personal and political ones. The 
public has no say in the privatization of these public enterprises. Although, in the 
past, privatization has involved raising the prices of certain public goods, the public 
or consumer groups have not been consulted about this. Voting in the assembly or 
parliament will surely be won by the government. Thus, as yet, there is no open 
debate in parliament and the assembly regarding privatization and government 
enterprises or corporate bodies. 19 Most of the debates have been pre-arranged and 
have been a matter of formality. Further, there has never been any public hearing 
on matters affecting the public interests. 
However, in the past only political matters such as challenging the validity 
of appointment of Chief Ministers were heard in court. In addition, it is the 
appointment of officials in these privatized agencies which are becoming the political 
issue rather than the public interests. The appointment of certain indigenous groups 
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or people from West Malaysia is being questioned. The way public enterprises are 
going to be sold to Chinese companies will also be a political issue for ethnic parties. 
In the past, the sale of Sabah Forest Industries by the PBS government to the 
Chinese owned Lion Groups in September, 1993 became a central issue for the 
National Front during the 1994 Sabah Elections. During the election campaign in 
Sabah, the Deputy Prime Minister Anwar promised to renegotiate the terms on the 
sale of SFI if the National Front won. When the National Front won the elections, 
many more agencies were targeted for privatization. The sale of SFI was honoured, 
but the ownership of shares by Bumiputeras had to be renegotiated. '° Thus, any deal 
on privatization must first meet the requirement of 30% Bumiputera share ownership. 
Such developments do not represent a total privatization of the various agencies but 
something like a government managed privatization. 
Furthermore, the privatization of these very expensive agencies always 
involved well established companies from West Malaysia. This is a good sign for 
national integration. Other than bringing capital investment to Sabah, such 
privatizations also build a good working framework between the people in West 
Malaysia and Sabah. Business interactions between the West Malaysians and 
Sabahans will enable both sides to share each other's experiences and will bring them 
closer together. Some of these companies are owned by influential people in the 
National Front parties in West Malaysia. However, co-operation has been construed 
by opposition parties as exploiting Sabah's natural resources and wealth. Often, this 
is solved by offering appointments and preserving the 30% Bumiputera quota in 
ownership of shares and properties. Thus, the Privatization Policy led to the rise of 
new Bumiputera middle level managers in Sabah. The top level managers are 
usually appointed from former public servants who have had good relations with the 
politicians and who are usually Western educated. Furthermore, under the present 
Islamization policy people will have better chances of being employed in these posts 
if they are Bumiputera, Muslim and UMNO members. There is no point in 
privatization, if the agencies concerned are still managed by the same people. 
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Privatization of government agencies led to the development of corporate 
monopolies rather than free competition and efficiency. Most of these expensive 
public enterprises are located in the urban areas. This, in itself, causes a regional 
economic imbalance. Furthermore, most of the industrial parks that are being 
planned are located in the urban areas. The government will promise foreigners 
many incentives in order to encourage them to invest in Sabah. In the process, many 
of the Bumiputera privileges will be eroded. The main motive of foreign 
corporations is profit and they do not care if they have to insult national or Sabahan 
leaders. The author also thinks that national leaders sense something negative about 
foreign investors. `' Unless Bumiputera entrepreneurs improve their management 
efficiency, they will not be able to compete in a free market condition and the 30 % 
Bumiputera capital ownership target cannot be achieved. Furthermore, the present 
level of Bumiputera capital ownership will not be sustainable. 
Therefore, in the 1990s after much frustration with the public enterprise 
development programmes in urban areas, it is logical to shift to the "development 
from below approach" or decentralization. However, since most villagers are not 
ready for industrialization, it is feared that the approach will be hastily implemented 
and will result in more authoritarian management. In addition, the goods produced 
will not be of good quality. These issues will be discussed further in this chapter. 
4. VISION VILLA GE DEVELOPMENT: FROM INFRAS7RUCTUREAND NEW 
LAND DEVELOPMENT TO INDUSTRIAL AND HUMAN CENTRE! ) 
DEVELOPMENT 
Plans to improve the Bumiputeras' standard of living will not be complete 
without addressing the rural areas. Since the NEP was implemented in 1971, various 
development programmes are being financed in the rural areas. The implementing 
agencies start with Federal agencies and are followed by state agencies and village 
organization. Most of the present rural development programmes are based on 
models created by the Federal Government. During the early days of independence, 
the Deputy Prime Minister Tun Razak introduced the Red Book Plan (Ferguson, 
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1965: 149-167; and First Malaysia Plan [1966-1970: 3-4]). The plan's basic aim was 
to provide an infrastructure for the rural areas. During the NEP, an integrated 
approach to rural development was introduced. Under the Vision 2020 development 
plan, the Vision Village model is being introduced. Thus, the success of the 
implementation of rural development depends on good relationships between the 
federal and state agencies. This horizontal link has to be improved in order to ensure 
that the relevant policies and plans can be communicated effectively to state 
government. Thus to ensure proper implementation, some Federal agencies have had 
to expand to Sabah. In addition, new agencies are being established and new 
services are being introduced. These horizontal links have been hampered as 
Peninsular Malaysia is separated by sea and can only be reached after three hours of 
air travel. 22 Thus, there has to be two-way communications between the Federal 
Government and the States. According to the twenty points agreement, when Sabah 
entered Malaysia in 1963, it was supposed to be equal partners with the rest of 
Malaysia. But some of the twenty points have been eroded in the process of 
implementing policy plans. Even though circulars from the Federal agencies can 
reach Sabah within a day, most of them take years to be implemented by the State 
government. The main reason for late implementation is due to shortage of financial 
allocations. In addition, these circulars have to be circulated from the Chief 
Minister's Department to the various districts. 23 When the policy plans reach the 
districts and villages, officers are still unfamiliar with the programmes to be 
implemented. These problems are added to by other administrative problems. All 
these factors are acting together to delay the implementation of development plans. 
Thus rural development remains the toughest challenge for the National Front 
Government. Nevertheless, this responsibility has to be carried out as most of the 
Bumiputeras are living in rural areas. 
Rural development involves implementing officers, agriculture, infrastructure, 
finance, and the people. There is almost no manufacturing in Sabah's rural villages. 
Thus, development involves several institutions and an integrated approach towards 
development. These institutions are the Sabah Land Development Board, the 
Department of Agriculture, the Rural Development Corporation (KPD), Sabah 
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Foundation, Ministry of Rural Development (federal and state), Community 
Development Centre, and District Office. Of course, this involves the Chief 
Minister's Department which acts as a co-ordinating agency for the overall state 
development. In addition, this also involves political leaders and representatives from 
the national to the district and village levels. 
At the district level, the co-ordinating body for rural development is the 
District Development and Security Committee. This Committee is chaired by the 
District officer. Its members consist of various supporting agencies, including the 
People's Development Leader (PKR) who is a political appointee. 2' PKR is the right 
hand man of the assemblyman or the member of Parliament. He is usually appointed 
due to his position as the head of the party or deputy head in the constituency. As 
each district has more than one constituency, there could be two or more PKRs in 
each district. He attends all government functions and meetings in the district. Due 
to his position, he is more influential than the District officer who is merely a civil 
servant. The PKR is second to the elected representatives in the district. However, 
he is more accessible than the Assemblyman or Member of Parliament. An 
assemblyman or Member of Parliament could also be a minister and could hold other 
public offices in the capital and seldom come to his constituency. Thus a PKR is 
favoured by the people especially if he is kind with his cash and provides grants for 
small village projects. 
The District Office is only an administrative centre of the district. Thus in 
a poor district where economic activities are slow, the co-operation of various 
agencies dealing with agriculture, industries and commerce is needed. The aim is to 
create sufficient trade and economic activities to raise the income of farmers and their 
standard of living. This integrated approach to development is being co-ordinated 
by the District Development and Security Committee (Chee, 1983: 76-136). 
In the early days of independence in 1963, the Agriculture Department was 
solely responsible for agricultural development. During the green revolution, the 
Sabah Land Development Board was established in 1969 to deal with the problems 
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of new land development and settlement schemes. Later, at the height of the NEP's, 
the Rural Development Corporation (KPD) was established in 1976. Other public 
enterprises dealing with agricultural activities are the Sabah Rubber Fund Board, the 
Federal Land Development Board, the Sabah Forest Development Authority, and KO- 
NELAYAN. The KPD's various programmes are classified into human development, 
economic development, incentive schemes and infrastructure for farmers, and 
environmental development. These comprehensive programmes cover a range of 
activities from planting to the marketing of agricultural products. However, since its 
initial aim was income redistribution and not productivity, many of the KPD's 
subsidiaries incurred losses. In addition, financial management under the Bumiputera 
managers and board members has resulted in some conflicts of interest. These are 
largely due to indecision over whether to preserve Bumiputera interests or to pursue 
a "rational" economic decision. Thus increasing numbers of Bumiputera workers are 
being employed despite falling productivity (Gunting, 1986). 
In the end, most of the KPD's 26 subsidiary companies were privatized and 
became Bentaniaga Limited (B. M.: 30.8.95). Other than the KPD's subsidiaries, the 
Sabah Land Development Board has also been corporatized to improve management 
efficiency. The Sabah Paddy Board was closed down and its functions taken over 
by Department of Agriculture and a Federal agency, the National Paddy Board. The 
privatization of these agencies is in line with the new National Agricultural Policy 
to increase productivity in agriculture. This can be done through efficient 
management of agricultural land and the adoption of a market economy. This step 
is taken with the aspiration that it can create successful Bumiputera entrepreneurs in 
agriculture. Thus public agencies dealing in agriculture must all work within the 
framework of building an industrial society. 
However, agricultural development lacks integration with other agencies. This 
needs to be improved so that farmers can receive full benefits from the government 
incentive schemes and subsidies. The Vision 2020 grand plan also brought about the 
expansion of Federal agencies to deal with agricultural problems in Sabah. Recently, 
the Malaysian Agricultural Research Institute and Malaysian Farmers Association 
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Board were expanded to Sabah. More federal agencies will be expected to expand 
in Sabah if the implementation problems continue. Financially, the agricultural sector 
is receiving assistance from both Federal and State Government25. 
Furthermore, agricultural development in Sabah seems to be fragmented. As 
yet, there is no successful large scale farming by local private individuals - 
particularly Bumiputeras - except plantations owned by foreign companies and state 
managed farms. Agricultural development in Sabah has led to the creation of new 
village settlement schemes. In contrast to traditional villages, agriculture in these 
new settlement schemes is being managed in the form of estates. The large lands in 
the new land development schemes manage by the Federal Land Development Board 
(FELDA) and (Sabah Land Development Board) SLDB enabled mechanization and 
large scale farming. On the other hand, agricultural development in traditional 
villages is still beset with cultural and ideological conflicts. 
The failure of the various agricultural, commercial and industrial policies to 
deal with problems of poverty and societal restructuring has led to the adoption of 
alternative strategies. By now, decision-makers have learned from their experience 
in implementing the NEP. The problems should be clearer and more focused. On 
the contrary, the Vision 2020 reflects another grand plan taking an implementation 
period of thirty years. In Vision Village programmes, the villagers become the target 
of implementation in this long and unrealistic plan. My opinion is that, once 
villagers are successful in their enterprises, they will move to urban areas. In the 
West, capitalist development was accompanied by people working for the landlords 
becoming waged earners in factories. However, most Malaysian traditional villagers 
are land owners no matter how small their land is. There are also people who 
acquire land through the new land settlement schemes. These new schemes are part 
of the government's effort to encourage Bumiputeras' participation in agriculture 
entrepreneurship during the green revolution. 26 These new settlement schemes are 
managed by agricultural agencies such as FELDA, the Sabah Land Development 
Board, etc. These lands are being planted especially with major export crops such 
as cocoa, palm oil trees, rubber trees. Villagers of the Vision Village are encouraged 
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to participate in growing these crops. However, they are given incentives to start 
their own agro-based industries to manufacture these major agricultural products 
rather than export them raw. Let us examine the implementation of these 
programmes in the peripheral state of Sabah. 
What are the prospects of achieving the objectives of Vision Village 
programmes under the strategies that have been outlined by the Federal Government? 
These strategies are being adopted in the light of the previous problems under NEP. 
The Vision Village is an attempt to move away from the old concept of 
"development from above" to one of "development from below. " In other words, it 
is part of the decentralization plan for industrial development. The ultimate goal of 
Vision Village is to create a society that has strong motivation, initiative, is 
knowledgeable and has sufficient discipline to implement the village modernization 
programmes. To achieve these goals, the Vision Village has to meet seven 
objectives. On the whole, these objectives set standards for the villagers of the year 
2020. They involve positive values such as: self-reliance, participation, educating the 
future generation, new thinking on land ownership so that small farms can be united 
into large scale farming, a determination to create the industrial scenario, 
empowerment of villagers and equipping them with the skills to implement Vision 
Village programmes. However, these objectives do not show a serious concern to 
increase productivity and quality. These are two factors in increasing the income of 
villagers who have been living on subsistence income and poverty. In addition, the 
objectives do not mention problems that are involved in overcoming ethnic 
differences in the rural areas. Unless these objectives include the poor villagers and 
other ethnic groups, the Vision Village objectives will suffer from fragmentation. It 
also does not mention how rural village economic development can be linked to the 
private sectors. Doing so will help to promote co-operation between villagers and 
private capitalists (including the Chinese). Thus, it seems that the Vision Village is 
another politically motivated development programme exclusively for the 
Bumiputeras. Although the Vision Village programmes aim to increase the income 
of villagers, they do not mention ways and means to finance these village industries. 
It looks like a cheap means of development compared to the finance provided for the 
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big public enterprises in urban areas. The bottom up approach to development 
should also be able to reverse the public finance "top bottom approach". This will 
prevent "leakages" in the rural funds before they reach the villages (Silvalingam, 
1993: 6-12). This will also create savings among the villagers which can then serve 
as start-up capital with which to begin their own SMEs. 
In Sabah, the Federal implementation agencies are the agencies of the Federal 
Ministry of Rural Development, KEMAS. The State Ministry of Rural Development 
agencies are the Community Development Centre and the District Office. However, 
due to the integrated approach of rural development, many other government agencies 
are being involved. However, allocation for rural development particularly public 
infrastructure is very small compared to economic allocation for agricultural 
development. 
Before examining the implementation of problems that Vision Village might 
face, it is extremely important to examine the problems of village development 
during the NEP. The old approach of village development in Sabah was based on 
the integrated village development. In this integrated approach, which is still being 
practised today, committees were set up at state, district and village level. At the 
state level, the committee was chaired by the State Development officer and consisted 
of 22 members from various related departments. These departments cover 
responsibilities for the development of areas such as the infrastructure, economy, 
administration and planning, communication and public relation. In addition the 
Community Development Officers are included as members. Infrastructure 
development includes road construction, electricity supply, water supply, for example. 
The agencies responsible for the economy are Agriculture Department, Department 
of Industry, Veterinary Department and others. 
The district level committee of the old model village programmes consisted 
of the District officer as chairman, and the members consisted of state agencies 
branches in the district. At the grass root level, there is the committee on model 
village development. The social strategy of the model village is to train villagers so 
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that village harmony can be preserved and standards of living improved. The 
economic strategy represents the provision of public utilities and agricultural 
development. The old model does not mention developing village agro-based 
industries. This strongly indicates that at that time agriculture was the main source 
of income. The implementation of the old model village used to start with a work 
camp co-ordinated by the Community Development Centre. The participants 
consisted of the Village Development Committee members and the villagers. 
Funding was provided by the Federal and State Government. However, most of the 
funds are being provided by the state government. Other than that, the members of 
the implementation committee also provided their own assistance in terms of advice 
and subsidies. 
However, this old approach to village development which is still practised 
today embodies the "development from above" style. As a consequence, there has 
been little democratic practice at grass root level. Thus, the village chief is not 
democratically elected but appointed on the basis of his loyalty to the government 
in power. There has been little effort to increase income through mechanization 
although there should have been under the development plan. In addition, farm sizes 
are small and there is little opportunity for large scale production. Illiteracy among 
villagers causes communication problems. This makes it difficult to convey 
knowledge on modern village management and modern farming. The villagers are 
being kept at subsistence level. However, looking back to about three decades ago, 
it cannot be denied that there is some improvement in public services. However, due 
to political interests, model village developments are not evenly implemented. 
Due to the various problems encountered in village development, new 
strategies are being adopted under the "Vision Village" programmes. These 
programmes were first introduced in 1994 in Peninsular Malaysia, where they 
emphasized the importance of agro-based industry. The "Vision Village" movements 
can be understood if one refers to Mahathir's Policy on New Direction in Village and 
Rural Development. This policy was envisaged in April 1984. The policy objective 
is to reduce the rate of poverty in rural areas by increasing the income of farmers and 
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smallholders. In the long run, this will serve as a motivation for them to be involved 
in the commercial sector and to invest. Its strategies are: commercial management 
by uniting all the small farms, development of village industry, and regrouping of 
small villages for better public services. In other words, the policy is the first step 
in developing capitalism concept at the village level. This sounds more interesting 
and challenging than the old model. This is manifested in the form of the present 
"Vision Village" movement. 
However, the Vision Village movement in Sabah cannot be implemented 
immediately in all areas. As a start, three Villages are being selected to be 
developed into Vision Villages. But past experience casts some doubt on the 
sincerity of the leadership in developing the villages in Sabah. Indeed with a change 
of government, these programmes could just be forgotten. For instance, with a 
change of government and strategies, villages which were developed under the old 
model are turning into ordinary Sabah villages. Under the BERJAYA government, 
the responsibilities of village development came under the Director of People 
Development Leaders, who is a political appointee. 
When the PBS were in power, the People Development Leaders (PKR) came 
directly under the Chief Minister's Department and separated from the Community 
Development Centre. This, left the Community Development Centre with fewer 
responsibilities and, as a result, it became neglected. As a matter of fact, the centre 
was overgrown with shrubs and grasses. The responsibilities for village development 
were taken over by the Institute for Human Development (Institiut Pembangunan 
Insan). 
When the National Front government came to power in March 1994, the 
Ministry of Rural Development was subsequently established. Thus, the Chief 
Minister's Department is relieved of some of its duties concerning rural development. 
With the new Ministry of Rural Development, the implementation of rural 
development becomes the sole responsibility of civil servants with the Minister at the 
apex. Although the officials are merely facilitators, there is a hierarchy of decision- 
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makers from the federal to the state and district levels. Thus, Vision Village 
programmes will still be facing the same bureaucratic problems. Further, there are 
many government departments and agencies involved in the Vision Village 
Development, each with their own objectives and motto. Because of this, there is 
likely to be misunderstanding and mismanagement. Successes and failures could be 
claimed or blamed as the work of certain departments or agencies. Most officials 
seem to agree that the failures and delays in village development are caused by poor 
planning. '' 
The selection of villages to be developed as Vision Villages is frequently 
made on the basis of which constituencies were won by the National Front. Thus 
constituencies under the opposition are often left out. Indeed, the actions of civil 
servants to implement the plan in opposition constituencies used to be branded as 
showing support for the opposition. Thus, before an official could implement the 
plan, he would already be transferred to a different district or department. This kind 
of allegation is often false, but only the fear of those who worried that their political 
interests would be upset if development is implemented evenly irrespective of the 
communities' political allegiance. Thus questions in the implementation of rural 
development plan involve political, economic and social interests. 
How are the Vision Village programmes implemented in comparison with the 
old programmes? Is the new decision-making process in village development more 
effective? With the recent reform of the Malaysian Civil Service organization by the 
former State Secretary, Tan Sri Ahmad Sarji, rural development should be more 
effective. The government's facilitator role in the Vision Village Development is no 
different from the old approach in which the agencies concerned planned and 
allocated budgets. Thus, there is likely to be a situation where villagers are referred 
from one agency to another in order to meet their needs. 
Basically, the Vision Village Movement is based on the human centred 
development philosophy. This is in line with the liberal ideology and the need to 
improve the quality of living in the rural areas so that they will be compatible with 
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the current knowledge and lifestyle. However, the philosophy still sticks to the 
integrated strategy as one of its two strategies. The second strategy is human 
development. In implementing the Vision Village, first the villages that need to be 
developed are chosen. The implementation machineries consisted of the Central 
Committee, Working Committee, Regional Co-ordinating Committee and Village 
Action Committee. All these Committees have separate duties. An annual allocation 
will be provided for the Vision Village development which will be sub-divided into 
infrastructure development, economic development, human development and 
miscellaneous expenses. 28 
All the changes in village development under the Vision Village Movement 
are in line with Mahathir's earlier policies as discussed in Chapter 3. However, 
specifically the Vision Village Movement outlines seven initiatives that need to be 
taken by individuals which are: (1) human development, (2) development of a 
harmonious family, (3) development of a society that has identity and strong 
motivation, (4) quality infrastructure, (5) competitive economy, (6) effective delivery 
system, and, (7) creating an institution that is responsive to change. The Vision 
Village Movement will involve the non-government bodies and private sector, society 
and individuals other than the government agencies. Furthermore, the condition for 
the success of the Vision Village are: (1) the highest minimum education and 
appreciate the need for continuous learning process, (2) introduction of modern 
technology (3) the broad use of information technology (4) changing of the basic 
economic activity, (5) quality infrastructure, (6) liberal and open mind, and, (7) 
guided by the market. The scenario of the future Vision 2020 Village is 
schematically shown in Figure 1 below: 
135 
Competitive Agricultural Sector 
I 
Clean Environment 
_ý 
Changing Migration Trend -' 
Infrastructure , 
Service Industry 
ý-- "Intelligent" 
Excellent Quality Of 
An Individual 
Higher Income 
Small R Medium Industry 
Fig 9: Scenario Of The Future Vision 2020 Village 
(Adopted From Berita Harian: 4th. July, 1996) 
However, unless the management emphasizes productivity, the Vision 
Villagers' income will not increase. This emphasis requires a broader application of 
mechanization in agriculture, down-stream processing of products and efficient 
marketing. Providing the villagers with better public facilities without actually 
increasing their income could create disaffection. For instance, providing a telephone 
service without increasing the villagers' income will only increase their expenses 
unless they are given a special rate. Socially, this will also increase income disparity 
among villagers and exploitation of the low income group. 
Without some independent union in which villagers can discuss their 
economic matters, any major problems that arise will be referred to politicians. 
Independent farmers or labour unions will help to voice and unite their opinions 
6_ Well Planned Village 
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regarding the economic future. Thus the grass roots level must first be instilled with 
democratic views so that they are aware of their civil liberties. It is democratic 
forces which will move the government into action. Unless this has been achieved 
in politics, rural development will still face the same bureaucratic and political 
problems as under the NEP. Free economic competition will not be effective in 
improving economic efficiency if there is little freedom of choice. 
Financially, other than the allocation of Ministry of Rural Development, the 
departments which are members of the Vision Village Development Committee also 
provide funding on matters that fall under their responsibilities. In addition, 
assemblymen and members of parliament have their own constituency grant. 
However, development programmes can be implemented on a voluntary basis with 
the co-operation of the villagers. The voluntary approach to implementation is 
referred communally as "gotong royong. " Under this voluntary service, the villagers 
get together to build community halls, clean up the villages, build bridges, build 
better houses for the hardcore poor, among other projects. While men do the menial 
jobs, the ladies prepare the food and drinks. This kind of community service has 
been practised for generations in traditional villages. The government is reviving it 
to instill community spirit among villagers. It is cheap, but development officers and 
funding agencies are not happy with the quality of work done under this concept. 
Without this voluntary approach the allocation of RM90,000 for each Vision Village 
will not be sufficient. However, this allocation is supplemented by other agencies 
within the Vision Village Development Committee. This was also the practice under 
the old approach of village development. It is a standard practice to allocate 
government funds to the various villages. 29 
Furthermore, grants from the Assemblymen and Members of Parliament can 
supplement the village development funds. These grants are distributed in an ad hoc 
manner. " They used to be allocated on the spot, especially during political rallies 
at general election time. If "gotong royong" can be organized, the village projects 
can be completed on time. As a consequence, the villagers increasingly rely on 
assistance from the politicians rather than on the projects under the formal 
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development plan budget. A request for these grants are made by the Chairman of 
the Village Security and development Committee. This practice bypasses the civil 
servants implementing the five-year development plan. This ad hoc approach has 
increased the villagers dependency on their elected representatives. If village 
representatives think that their villages have been bypassed, then the elected 
representatives will be cursed. Busy elected representatives used to give the village 
representatives some letters of reference to refer their problems to the responsible 
agencies. Thus, at the end of the day, village matters will all go back to the District 
Officers and other civil servants concerned. This is because most payments to village 
projects have to go through District Office, the treasury and related government 
agencies. Thus, there is not much difference from the NEP in the informal approach 
of implementation of the Vision Village programmes in Sabah. 
5. IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS OFBUMIPUTERAS ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
AND VISION VILLA GE PROGRAMMES 
Historically, the Sabahan Bumiputeras have relied on subsistence earnings and 
the capitalist ideology was totally absent from their culture. This is in contrast to the 
Sabahan Chinese for whom capitalism is their life blood (Han, 1971). Thus, it is not 
surprising that the problems which affect Bumiputera entrepreneurial development in 
Sabah are shortage of capital, mismanagement, poor infrastructure, uncompetitiveness 
and a lack of business and entrepreneurial experience. As the government was 
concerned about attaining the objective of 30% Bumiputera participation in business 
and industry, substantial amounts of credit was provided for Bumiputeras at the initial 
stage of implementation. This was especially during the Third Malaysia Plan when 
government reviews showed that the NEP's objectives were far from being achieved. 
When economic recession ensued during the first half of the 1980s, the government 
cut down loans for Bumiputera entrepreneurs. This step was also taken due to the 
poor repayment rates. 
Poor management on the part of the government also contributed to the failure 
of many Bumiputera entrepreneurs. During the USNO rule under Tun Mustapha, 
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there was an abuse of public funds which depleted the Sabah Treasury. Following 
BERJAYA rule (1976-1985), many public enterprises experienced losses due to 
mismanagement and corruption. This occurred despite the BERJAYA government 
manifesto to free the Sabahans from Mustapha's regime and bring about prosperity. 
The intention to help Bumiputeras through the creation of various public enterprises 
was met with huge losses due to mismanagement and corruption. 3' This was 
followed by PBS rule (1986-1994) headed by Pairin who was a Christian and a local 
Kadazan native. Under the PBS, little effort was made to develop Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs as the state leaders were busy quarrelling with the Federal Government 
over Sabah's status in Malaysia. As the government was headed by a Christian, the 
non-Muslim Bumiputeras were alleged to have enjoyed better opportunities in 
business, government licences and village projects. When the National Front 
Government was formed in 1994, the leadership had learned the pros and cons of 
national development planning. It is evident that it is almost impossible to 
implement central planning programmes without the co-operation of the state 
governments. On the contrary, the national government as a whole inherited a large 
foreign debt from the NEP development programmes. 
Lack of proper infrastructure discouraged Bumiputeras to start new enterprises 
or expand the existing ones. Firstly, more than half of the areas in Sabah still have 
no electricity. Further, the urban areas including Kota Kinablu always experience 
power failures. This is obviously not conducive to the growth of industry. 
Furthermore, vast areas of Sabah still have no running water. Other than these infra- 
structure problems, most villagers are either subsistence farmers or small traders of 
agricultural products. This trade of agricultural products usually takes place during 
the weekend open market called "Tamu" locally. Only a fortunate few are able to 
obtain stalls in the district council markets to trade daily. In spite of that, the 
products sold are of low quality even though they are cheaper than those in the 
Chinese grocery stores. Thus, the flexible low prices of the villagers' products make 
them prone to exploitation by wholesalers and experienced businessmen. 
Government intervention by fixing and controlling the prices of agricultural products 
is contrary to free market principles. Another form of state exploitation occurs when 
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the Government buys agricultural products such as palm oil, rubber and cocoa which 
are relatively cheap locally, only to sell them in the export market at a higher price. 
Thus Vision Village development must provide the villagers with a better income. 
An increase in their income will raise their standards of living and change their 
traditional way of life and culture. The old mode of production must be replaced by 
the capitalist mode of large scale production. This will enable farmers to market 
their products not only locally but also internationally. This means that the 
government must be able to create trade links between farmers and traders outside 
the countries. However, all these issues hinge on the question of capital. Farmers 
have little capital to carry on their trades. Without capital and knowledge of modern 
marketing, their products cannot find a good market and appropriate prices. 
Furthermore, trade links not only serve farmers, they are also useful for the 
development of cottage industries such as the manufacturing of simple products like 
tapioca chips. Sabah still has problems in developing Bumiputera entrepreneurs 
capable of developing agro-based industries in the villages. The large capital owned 
by the Chinese can actually serve to develop rural industries through some form of 
partnership or trading cooperation. It will take time to rebuild these relationships 
after the discriminatory measures imposed on the Chinese under NEP. Unless the 
bridge is repaired, the division of Sabahans into urban Chinese and rural Bumiputeras 
will affect the development of genuine Bumiputera capitalism. The Bumiputeras are 
still too dependent on government contracts. 
As political power is in the hands of Bumiputeras, responses to their problems 
involve administrative reorganization. For instance, a new Ministry of Rural 
Development was established in 1996. This institutionalizes the problem of rural 
development rather than dealing with its roots. In other words, the problems of rural 
poverty require careful planning rather than radical solutions. This political solution 
is not likely to be successful in dealing with rural problems. For instance, although 
the Bumiputeras have been in power since the NEP, they failed to bring about 
balanced development and equality. Despite all the power and institutions, the 
government has not been successful in handling the problems of Bumiputeras and 
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rural development. This means that the government does not have the resources to 
deal with their problems. It needs time and planning to allocate the scarce resources 
for Bumiputeras and rural development. In a way, this is right as there is no drastic 
solution that could deal effectively with the economic, political and social problems. 
However, most previous and present planning policies prioritise economic, rather than 
social, development. An indirect form of income redistribution is provided in the 
form of free public services. Social welfare assistance is provided only selectively 
for the long-term poor. Although there are some social benefits, the scheme is still 
not comprehensive enough to allow everyone to enjoy it. Under the five-year plan 
budget, the welfare budget is quiet small when compared to other social service 
budgets. Thus the people - especially the self-employed - have to work constantly. 
The family is still a good form of social security for the rural people. However, this 
is not able to handle the problems of rural poverty. The present policy is likely to 
perpetuate inequality and poverty. The division of the society into rural and urban 
means that any rural programmes will only benefit the Bumiputeras not the Chinese. 
However, being successful entrepreneurs, the urban Chinese are able to fend for 
themselves. They have acquired organizational structures which enable them to live 
without depending on the government. Thus, successful Bumiputera entrepreneurs 
are needed to provide leadership in dealing with economic and social problems. 
Without good Bumiputera leadership and capital, it appears that the state has to bear 
all the economic and social responsibilities. Cultural revolution alone without skilled 
labour and capital would only work to the disadvantage of the Bumiputeras. In 
addition, the objectives of Vision Village does not mention how farmers can increase 
their productivity under the present conditions. There are no production targets. 
Farmers cannot expect to improve their standards of living without increasing 
productivity. Unless productivity is emphasized by the management, the development 
process could lead to another cycle of poverty and dependency. 
Until 1995, the Bumiputeras entrepreneurial development still faced the same 
problems in Sabah. The problems persisted because the government was run by the 
same Bumiputera interest group. If the government has been dominated by 
Bumiputeras, then why are there problems in achieving the 30% Bumiputera 
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ownership in commerce and industry? The government tenders and licences could 
easily be awarded to, or reserved for, Bumiputeras. Although the state has power to 
increase the awards of tenders and licences for Bumiputeras, it cannot increase 
Bumiputera ownership of capital and assets. These require individual initiatives and, 
once acquired, efficient management is needed to maintain and invest them. The lack 
of capital among Bumiputera entrepreneurs is apparent by examining the classes of 
licence possessed by Bumiputeras. The Bumiputera Participation Unit record in 1994 
shows that of the PUKONSA certificates awarded according to classification, there 
are more non-Bumiputeras holding Class A licences, while there are more 
Bumiputeras holding class C to F certificates (see BPU, 1994 in Manjun, 1995). 
Thus, it is obvious that Bumiputeras are still not capable of handling businesses that 
require large capital. Further, it also remains that many Bumiputera entrepreneurs 
are still dependent on government contracts. The manufacturing licences given out 
by the Federal and state government to Bumiputeras are not in operation as required 
until suitable government contracts are available. The 1994 figures showed that out 
of the 5 15 licences given out only 247 were in operation. The status of the others 
were not in operation or unknown (Manjun, 1995). Furthermore, Manjun (1995) 
shows that in terms of ownership of business premises, the non-Bumiputeras still 
predominate. The non-Bumiputeras have more permanent business premises while 
the Bumiputeras predominate among the small stall operators (see Table 6 below). 
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Total Ownership 
Types Of Premise B NB Total 
1. Shophouses 1,968 (22.8%) 6,662 (77.2%) 8,630 
a. Permanent Blds. 708 (12.7%) 4,866 (87.3%) 5,574 
b. Semi-Permanent 357 (19.9%) 1,433 (80.1%) 1,790 
c. Temporary Blds. 903 (71.3%) 363 (28.7%) 1,266 
2. Hotel 38 (19.8%) 154 (80.2%) 192 
3. Warehouse 26 (6.8%) 356 (93.2%) 382 
4. Stall 2,797 (77.6%) 808 (22.4%) 3,605 
5. Light/Factory/ 
Workshop Blds. 
166 (16.4%) 848 (83.6%) 1,014 
6. Business Office 36 (13.1%) 238 (86.9%) 274 
Total 5,031 (35.7%) 9,066 (64.3%) 14,097 
Table 6. Ownership Of Commercial Buildings In Sabah (1984-1991) 
Source: Bumiputera Economic Congress Sabah 1995 In The Context 
Of New Sabah. "Participation Of Sabah's Bumiputera In Commerce 
And Industry, " By Masidi Manjun. 
(Notes: B- Bumiputera, NB - Non-Bumiputera) 
However, since Bumiputeras are relying on the government, they look 
successful externally; for example, many own luxurious vehicles. They have, 
however, poor records of servicing their loans (Ongkili & Leong in Johari, 1989). 
Politicians also seize the opportunities provided under the Bumiputera incentive 
schemes to run businesses themselves. The Bumiputera businessmen still rely for 
their survival on the government contracts such as supply government agencies 
requirements, services, and government building construction projects. '` Thus, they 
are not contributing much to the development of the state as required. When 
payments for the jobs performed are delayed, these contractors use to come begging 
for payment at the agencies concerned. Many Bumiputera contractors meet the 
relevant officials with stereotypical reasons for not completing their contracts. The 
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agencies involved in paying contractors are the Public Works Department, the State 
Development Department, the Federal Development Department, the Sabah State 
Treasury, Federal Treasury and other departments related with the development 
projects. The Public Works Department is the one that provides approval for finished 
projects. Thus one can see many frustrated and happy contractors at the PWD 
counters. To expedite payment, most contractors befriend the supporting staff. Thus 
sleaze is a common matter, especially in the canteens and coffee shops which are 
frequented by government officers. This is acceptable according to local tradition but 
not to Western standards. Sometimes contractors just pay for the lunch or breakfast 
of the related staff at the canteens. However, on other occasions, contractors will 
promise a percentage of the payment if it is expedited. Thus, these staff are at the 
directive of the contractors rather than the officer-in-charge. Sometimes, contractors 
give officers tickets to travel overseas. All these phenomena arise due to the lack of 
capital among Bumiputera entrepreneurs. The factors I have discussed indicate that 
Bumiputera entrepreneurs are not capable of taking up big projects without 
government assistance. The poor image of Bumiputera entrepreneurs has also made 
it difficult for them to acquire loans from commercial banks and finance companies. 33 
Other than weaknesses in assets and money capital, Sabah also faces problems 
in human capital. Thus, agencies have been set up since the NEP to train 
Bumiputeras in commercial and industrial skills. However, by 1995 this problem still 
lingered on. There is possibly something wrong with the course programmes and the 
participants. The focus of attention in the course is development of Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs. The course content includes building the right attitudes in commerce 
and entrepreneurships, practical training at some successful business companies, 
operation management, and how to compete in the business world. 
Due to the above problems, the Federal Government which is dominated by 
UMNO in the National Front coalition promised that it will revive the Sabah's 
economy when it formed the next government in Sabah. Once in power in March 
1994, the National Front promised to -bring about reform within 100 days. As a 
result most of the PBS's existing policies on development such as the Sabah Action 
144 
Blue Print were abolished, and the National Front created its own plans for Sabah. 
These are the New Sabah Campaign, Sabah Outline Perspective Plan, and the Sabah 
Industrial Master Plan, Privatization Plan, and the creation of new implementation 
agencies. During the 100 days of the National Front Government, various projects 
especially federal projects that were delayed under the previous government were 
implemented. Many new and large scale development projects were launched such 
as new five star hotels, golf courses, and housing projects. Further, there was also 
a reorganization of government agencies and privatization of unprofitable public 
enterprises. Later, the Sabah Outline Perspective Plan were introduced to replace the 
Sabah Action Blue Print (SAB). A National Front blue print is being emplaced. 
Compared to the Outline Perspective Plan, the SAB did not set a specific time period 
for its implementation. Without a time frame, it will be difficult to assess its 
achievements. However, the Blue Print did outline previous performance, Sabah's 
strengths, weaknesses and constraints, new economic and social infrastructure, 
priorities, roles and responsibilities. It did not mention the capacity or means of 
delivery. It was as if the PBS's SAB was content to manage with what Sabah 
already has. For instance, the SAB does not specifically mention the means by 
3' which employment and investment should be created. 
On the other hand, the Sabah Outline Perspective Plan is very confident about 
Sabah's social and economic prospects. It sets strategies and targets to increase 
production, create employment, deal with inflation, create private investments, and 
redistribute income. The main difference with SAB is that the Sabah Outline 
Perspective Plan (1995-2010) detailed its delivery system clearly. The Sabah Outline 
Perspective Plan has broader means of implementation compared to SAB. This is 
probably based on the National Front Government experiences in Peninsular Malaysia 
as well as its better implementing agencies. Being in the National Front government, 
Sabah has better links with Kuala Lumpur which can help to boost performance of 
the development plan and strategies. The private sector serves as means to promote 
economic growth. Thus investors from Peninsular Malaysia and foreign countries are 
projected to bring capital to Sabah. In this regard, the Labuan International Offshore 
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Finance will be the main incentive for investors to come to Sabah. In addition, there 
are already plans for industrial parks and free trade zones. 
At the rural level, new poverty eradication programmes are being implemented 
in addition to the Vision Village programmes. Although there is an effort to 
restructure and redistribute income, there is no comprehensive plan on restructuring 
and poverty. The policy on the poor that are mostly living in the rural areas only 
concerns the provision of basic needs. At present, it is not well designed to address 
the growing problems of urban poverty caused by internal and foreign migrations. 
In addition, the welfare of the Chinese in urban areas have to be given equal 
attention. Thus the policies on socio-economic development look fragmented and 
discriminatory. 35 
Although National Front Leaders take turns to be the Chief Minister of Sabah, 
the social, economic and political structure indicates that some divisions persist. The 
Bumiputera and Chinese entrepreneurs are still unable to achieve consensus in 
economic, social and political matters. Competition in commerce and industry must 
be made among equals. However, the government is now aware that discrimination 
will cost them dearly in elections. One measure which was taken to show some 
goodwill among the various communities in Sabah and Malaysia in general was the 
recent step to enable all to invest in Amanah Sahara Nasional (National Share Trust). 
Simultaneously, the Federal Government created another scheme exclusively for 
Bumiputeras, Amanah Sahara Bumiputera (Bumiputera Share Trust). Thus while 
making some concessions to the Chinese and non-Bumiputeras in economic matters, 
the government also preserved the Bumiputeras privileges. It is as if they 
simultaneously took one step forward and one step backward. 
The need for a rapid industrialization plan in Sabah arises as the previous 
Malaysian plans have failed. Sabah did not greatly benefit from the high economic 
growth in Malaysia. Rapid industrialization in other states indicates that Sabah must 
prepare its own industrial infrastructure. In addition, a new economic infrastructure 
is needed due to globalization of the economy. Due to its late start in industry and 
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reliance on agricultural exports, Sabah's annual growth in GDP has decreased from 
5.5% in 1988 to 3.0% in 1994. This has occurred despite the fact that Sabah has 
experienced the highest economic growth rate of 14.9% in 1982 (Sabah Industrial 
Masterplan, 1996: 3). Despite the industrialization programmes under Vision 2020, 
Sabah's national product is still largely dependent on the agricultural sector. With 
the depleting timber resource, its exports are declining. The contribution of forestry 
and logging to Sabah's GDP is declining from 20.4% in 1982 to 8.2% in 1994 (Sabah 
Industrial Masterplan, 1996: Table 1.1). According to the SIMP, Sabah's ability to 
pay for its imports has been decreasing over recent years. This structural change in 
Sabah's economy from primary to secondary products was probably the cause of 
higher unemployment rate of 8.9% in 1990 compared to 6% in Malaysia as a whole 
(IDS, 1991: 11). These phenomena influence the implementation of the Government 
plans and policies. According to the Chief Minister, Yong Teck Lee, the economic 
problems in Sabah are: 
"related to the structure of the State's economy, small market size, 
geographical location, high transportation cost, poor infrastructure and 
government machinery. This will need a paradigm shift in planning 
and decision making process and greater commitments from private 
and public sectors. "" 
(D. E.: 16.6.1996) 
In response to these worrying indicators, new plans are being put forward 
under Sabah National Front Government. Problems are dealt with by creating further 
plans. It is amazing that Sabah needs more plans today than it did during the 1960s 
when its timber resources were abundant. The growing need for entrepreneurial and 
rural development in Sabah will lead to more state intervention in the economy and 
society. State intervention seems inevitable as limited resources are available for 
economic and social development. However, the only liberal economic alternative 
available for the Sabah Government is to attract foreign investors and tourists. 
Foreign capital is needed to develop industries in Sabah. Foreign investors are also 
good alternatives to Bumiputera and Chinese entrepreneurs. The Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs alone will not be able to get the industrialization programmes off the 
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ground unless they have sufficient capital. Privatization of government public 
enterprises is one of the responses of the government to poor performance of 
Bumiputera entrepreneurs and its public enterprises. 
It is hard to know how much the Chinese have in the banks in the form of 
capital. Nevertheless, data from the BPU shows that the Chinese still predominate 
in the business and industrial sectors. Even without these data, hindsight shows that 
the Chinese still own a majority of the business premises in the urban areas. Thus, 
the problem of capital will be the first obstacle to be overcome in order to develop 
a self-reliant Bumiputeras businessmen. 
Government measures to control the export of round logs have recently met 
with a peculiar response from timber exploiters. This led to the rise of illegal timber 
exploiters and the illegal export of round logs (a persistent problem in Sabah timber 
business). Recently the government discovered that logs worth more than hundred 
million ringgits have been shipped illegally. In addition, the Timber Trader 
association has also expressed its displeasure with the ban on log exports. They 
petitioned the government to lift the ban as they were not making enough profit. 
Processing the logs caused wastage in the wood as some part of the logs is discarded 
in the down-stream processing. 
Regarding the Vision Village programmes, the main implementation problems 
are in traditional villages. These villages represent various ethnic groups such as the 
Kadazan, Bajau, Murut, and Rungus. Thus, the villages are isolated culturally. 
Furthermore, the mountainous topography of these regions makes it difficult for 
agricultural mechanization. In one Murut region in the southern interior, the 
government responded to the problems by resettling the villagers via new land 
settlement schemes. This, however, means that the government has to take the 
responsibility of the village management, land allotment, and the provision of 
infrastructures. However, this kind of land settlement in Peninsular Malaysia has also 
encountered problems where settlers abandoned their lands. " This happened when 
the settlers discovered that their income had not improved much. This will probably 
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remain the norm for this kind of settlement schemes in Sabah in the next twenty 
years. However, the government has already anticipated these problems by preparing 
its industrial master plan. 
Furthermore, ideologically, Islam does not promote economic activities that 
are against the concept of Islam. An example of such prohibited activities would be 
manufacturing rice wine and farming pigs. These kinds of products have good 
markets in the Western world and non-Islamic countries. Thus, ideological 
restrictions also become an impediment in Bumiputera entrepreneurial and "Vision 
Village" development programmes. The Islamic economic system as an alternative 
is discussed in Chapter 6. 
6. SOME UNINTENDED OUTCOMES 
The problems of implementing Bumiputera entrepreneurial and rural 
development in Sabah have led to increasing government intervention in the 
economy. This is performed in the name of Bumiputera interests. Rural and 
entrepreneurial development are a means to legitimise the National Front 
Government. The Sabah Outline Perspective and the Sabah Industrial Master Plan 
are game plans formulated by the state against Chinese capitalists. This, leads to a 
situation where state capitalism is competing against Chinese private capitalism. This 
is contrary to the policy in Japan and South Korea where there was some 
collaboration between big corporations and the state. However, Sabah still has no 
Bumiputera corporations which are large enough to serve as implementation 
machinery of the state. In this context, it is ironic that supplies for development 
projects come from Chinese stores. Thus while the Chinese exploit the government 
development and investment projects, state capitalism is exploiting as well as 
mobilizing the Bumiputeras to achieve their political means. Thus the announcement 
of large scale government projects are being welcomed by Chinese capitalists. It is 
not surprising that there is some kind of partnership between the managers 
representing the state and the Chinese capitalists. Thus, the present gameplan and 
framework needs to change if there is to be meaningful development for all parties. 
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The future technological development will also benefit the Chinese and foreign 
capitalist suppliers. Thus, this will deepen the structure of dependency of the 
Bumiputeras in Sabah. As happened in Malaysia in general, Sabah will accumulate 
a large foreign deficit. By 1996, Sabah had already experienced a trade deficit. The 
only means of repayment is from export of agricultural and natural resources. Thus 
state capitalism in Sabah is competing against the well equipped foreign and Chinese 
capitalists. It is ironic that the government is attracting foreign investors but 
discriminates against its Chinese citizens. 
The prospect of building an agro-based industry for foreign markets is still not 
so bright. Sabah itself is importing foodstuff including rice and fruits. 38 Its major 
export product is still timber. Thus, the state government has large dependent rural 
population and, at the same time, a significant number of urban Chinese capitalists 
as well as foreign capitalists. This will only lead to growing government expenditure 
and even more vigorous planning. Government intervention, however, has proven 
not so conducive to the growth of private entrepreneurs. The Chinese can respond 
to the government intervention in the economy by manipulating the prices of their 
goods and services. Second, they can move their capital overseas where it is more 
profitable. In the past, the Chinese response to government discrimination has been 
to reinvest overseas. This, can be seen in the number of Chinese professionals 
migrating overseas during the New Economic Policy. However, the government 
policy of Bumiputera entrepreneurial development has led to the growth of informal 
sectors such as night street vendors. In addition Bumiputeras are now dominating 
the open air and weekend market trade. In transportation, better public roads 
between the rural and urban areas has led to the growth of Bumiputera mini-bus 
operators and taxis. Before the NEP, almost all areas of business were dominated 
by the Chinese. In addition, civil servants are now involved in small business 
operations especially during the weekends. Some civil servants are also involving 
themselves in businesses by joining up with the contractors in government projects. 
Some become vendors going from one office to another selling goods such as 
sandwiches, and even dresses which they have bought at cheaper prices from 
neighbouring countries such as Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. In addition, 
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the privatization of government services has opened up some opportunities for civil 
servants who wish to do extra work. However, these kinds of businesses have not 
reflected any quality improvement of Bumiputera in business products and 
management. These are phenomena which can be seen with hindsight on the 
outcome of Bumiputera entrepreneurial development programmes. Those who are 
operating as companies and in a modem environment will also notice little difference. 
Bumiputeras are just interested in making quick money rather than serving their 
customers needs. This might be one of the reasons why prices in Sabah are higher 
than in Peninsular Malaysia although Sabah is part of the common market in 
Malaysia. As a response, the Chinese are presently shifting to new areas of business 
due to overcrowding in these kinds of business. Most Chinese are now concentrating 
in businesses that require large capital investment. 
Thus, the effect of the Vision 2020 Plan in so far as it concerns 
entrepreneurship and rural development in Sabah has been to reorganize and expand 
existing Bumiputera privileges. Such a preservation is required in order for the 
government to keep its legitimation in politics and stay in power. In other words, the 
government is creating fear among the Bumiputeras that if they are out of power, the 
development of rural areas and entrepreneurial programmes will not be implemented. 
The Deputy Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim used to say: "we must use 
our power in government to champion the rights of the people. " 
Thus, unless industrialization and privatization benefits the Bumiputeras, it is 
likely that they will not be implemented. The Bumiputera privileges become the 
determining factor in decision-making. According to one treasury official, money is 
allocated according to plan, but projects are not implemented due to the need to 
preserve political interests. Thus funds can be manipulated to preserve political 
interests. For example, it is possible that funds for certain constituencies are diverted 
to other constituencies or other projects that promote Bumiputeras political interests. 
It is also possible that some development programmes which are feasible in certain 
regions are being diverted to other less feasible ones. Therefore, unless there is full 
democracy, implementation of the development plan will always face political 
151 
interference (Case, 1993). For instance, states that used to be ruled by opposition, 
such as Kelanatan are amongst the most backward in Malaysia. In addition 
peripheral areas which have not yet experienced full penetration by the state 
capitalism, have a poor infrastructure. Finally, economic interests are always given 
priority over social interests. An example of this is that many settlers in Telipok in 
the District of Kota Kinabalu are being displaced due to the building of the Kota 
Kinabalu Industrial Parks. This is the largest industrial park ever developed in 
Sabah. The land owners are now being compensated by the Federal Government. 
Compensation takes time and represents the most significant task which could delay 
implementation of the projects. Thus, land owners are being pushed further to the 
fringe of capitalist development. This also indicates that Sabah's regional planning 
fails to predict the future land needs. The Vision 2020 grand plan is thus useful in 
predicting the future economic and social needs. However, in the process of trying 
to achieve objectives of Vision 2020, it is possible that more and more land owners 
will be displaced. Thus capitalist planning is effectively promoting foreign and local 
investors while displacing some local people. This, in itself, is pushing the 
traditional farmers and villagers into the peripheral areas. In addition, the 
government will be dependent on foreign capital which could lead to the 
accumulation of large foreign debts rather than a surplus. Without sufficient 
government funds, people's future will also be affected as there will be less money 
for rural development. In one way, long-term planning helps to avoid problems of 
having to compensate land owners. In addition, it helps to identify future social 
needs. 
However, capitalist development is hard to predict as can be seen from the 
case of Bumiputera entrepreneurs. It is difficult to develop entrepreneurship as it is 
an economic process which requires us to make continuous choices. It also needs 
us to utilize capital to the utmost. If the present management does not improve, it 
is likely that Vision 2020 will lead to further inequality. As less funds are available 
due to the diminishing surplus and growing population, rural areas will have less 
money available for development. This will force the people, particularly the rural 
population and Bumiputeras further to the margins of capitalism, a challenge which 
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they need to be prepared for in a capitalist society (King, 1988: 1-23). This means 
a more liberal approach to rural and Bumiputeras development is inevitable in the 
future. The independent attitude of Chinese capitalists enable them to make rational 
economic choices. Privatization of some public enterprises is a rational choice. It 
enables Bumiputeras to take part in commerce and industries. However, unless 
Bumiputeras are able to run their own private banking and financial institutions, the 
cycle of exploitation by the Chinese capitalists will continue. On the other hand, 
Vision Village is a step in the right direction to develop entrepreneurship in the rural 
areas. However, it takes time for the Vision 2020 development programmes to be 
fully implemented. This prediction is based on the current problems facing the 
implementation of Vision Village programmes in Sabah. Officials are still having 
difficulty in implementing Vision Village as they are impeded by the existing village 
and economic structures. Even top civil servants are facing problems in choosing the 
right approach with which to implement Vision Village programmes. This is because 
social and economic development cannot be experimented with to see whether or not 
they will prove successful. Another constraint in the plan is a lack of funds. Thus 
the programmes cannot be implemented in all villages, but only in selected ones. To 
initiate the Vision Village programmes requires the co-operation of village 
committees. However, co-operation can only be initiated if the government provides 
some incentive schemes. So far, there is no village that can be singled out as a 
particularly successful model village in Sabah and which could be copied by villagers 
and administrators in other districts. However, since the political destiny of the 
government is determined by its ability to capture the minds and hearts of the rural 
population, it is likely that implementation is politically motivated. Thus it is 
probable that implementation will not go according to plan. The great concern is that 
the traditional villagers are still unaware of their economic future and civil rights. 
As a consequence, they are likely to be influenced and manipulated by political and 
ideological beliefs. 
Bumiputera entrepreneurs are also thinking of short-term rather than long-term 
benefits. The Prime Minister, Mahathir has suggested that there are some 
Bumiputeras who want to be instantly rich. Thus, it is likely that there will be 
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political corruption in the process of pursuing their "get rich quick" schemes. 
Informally, the outcome of the government policies on promoting Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs is the rise of political businessmen. These businessmen are pursuing 
the get rich quick government contracts, timber concessions and other government 
projects. In this regard, even political constituencies and representatives are not 
being spared from this kind of political businessmen. Thus Bumiputeras and rural 
farmers are not really contributing much to increase productivity in Sabah. Their role 
in future will be to serve as supporting industries to the government's own enterprises 
or privatized agencies. Furthermore, Sabah still has no large scale and successful 
industries which can serve as an umbrella to smaller and medium entrepreneurs. On 
the whole, the institutions for future entrepreneurial development do exist, but the 
prospects are still uncertain. At the initial stage of implementation of the Vision 
2020 grand plan, effective management is the key to success. It is management 
which determines productivity, quality and achievement of objectives. However, the 
loss of confidence by private financial institutions regarding Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs has proven otherwise. 
There is not a single village in Sabah which manufactures exportable 
products. This situation has arisen because the old approach to village development 
placed the emphasis on infrastructure and new land development rather than on the 
development of industries and individual skills. Such an emphasis did little to solve 
the problems of income inequality and regional economic imbalance. The old 
structure of development has in fact impeded the implementation of Vision Village 
programmes. Most of the products are still crude and locally marketable. Timber 
and timber products still form Sabah's major exports. Other than that there are also 
a few other natural resources and agricultural products that are being exported. 
However, where are the manufactured products produced by public enterprises, 
particularly SEDCO and KPD? (see Sabah Yearbook of Statistics 1994, and monthly 
statistics, 1995 and 1996). 
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7. CONCI USION 
With hindsight, previous performance under the NEP demonstrates that - in 
spite of the large sum of investment - the various programmes have yielded little in 
the way of economic return. Public enterprises have not contributed much to 
increase Malaysian exports compared to development in oil palm and rubber 
plantation. In line with the National Development Policy, unless there is strong 
economic growth through industrialization, the objective of restructuring the multi- 
ethnic Malaysian society cannot be achieved. 
However, the development of industrial parks and "Vision Villages" are twin 
mechanisms which are thought to be effective in reducing regional economic and 
income imbalance despite the high capital investment. But, in the mean time, Sabah 
must overcome the nine challenges of Vision 2020. It is difficult for Bumiputeras 
in Sabah to face the challenges of Vision 2020 seeing that the NEP failed to create 
self-reliant Bumiputera businessmen despite the special privileges, financial assistance 
and guidance. It could be that the Bumiputera institutions themselves and the 
political process itself have failed the Bumiputeras. In comparison, the Chinese self- 
reliance have made them successful in trade and industries. Thus, Vision 2020 
national development will take time, experience, confidence and motivation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
NATIONAL EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT IN SABAH 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses some of the main issues of national education in the 
multi-ethnic Malaysian society and in Sabah in particular (Hirschman, 1987: 555- 
577). National education is one of the means by which newly independent countries 
shed their Colonial Education legacy. Despite this common goal, the major ethnic 
groups in Malaysia have found it difficult to reach a consensus regarding the 
education of their children. For instance, the Chinese are against any measure which 
would abolish Chinese schools for the sake of national unity. This lack of consensus 
has placed the National Education Policy in a dilemma. In addition, due to the 
socio-economic structure of society, there is also some disparity in educational 
development as is evident in the peripheral states as well as in the rural areas. These 
have justified the Government's attempt to use education as a tool of restructuring by 
increasing Bumiputera professionals. In this context, the purpose of this chapter is 
to discuss some of the issues relating to National Education such as: (1) investment 
in education, (2) the issue of Bahasa Malaysia, (3) the issue of Islamic education, (4) 
the Bumiputera quota, (4) the issue of academic and vocational education, (5) rural- 
urban imbalance in education, and (7) the issue of manpower needs. 
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1.1 Background To The Problems Of National Education 
Plans to implement the National Education policy in Sabah were first drawn 
up after Malaysian independence in 1963. Prior to that, education under the 
Chartered Borneo Company and the British Colony was left mostly to missionaries 
and the private sector. During that time the Government itself ran very few primary 
and secondary schools. Other factors which are important in understanding the 
problems of education in Sabah are the sparse population and underdevelopment of 
rural areas. Further, in historical terms, the growth of Sabah's Educational System 
is different from that in Peninsular Malaysia. Sabah and Sarawak seemed to adore 
Western styles of education. (Indeed, Sarawak even had a Westerner as its King). 
Since both states were still underdeveloped, the expansion of education was slow. 
As a measure of this, we can consider the 1960 census in Sabah which showed that 
30,000 children of school age were not going to school, compared to 46,957 who did 
attend (Wang, 1964: 199-209). Thus, by rights, Sabah should have prioritised 
education from the beginning of independence. 
Being a new nation, Malaysia needs an education system that will mould the 
fragmented colonial structures into a coherent national organisation. During the 
initial period of independence, textbooks were imported from England and China. 
Due to their origin, the contents of these books were contradictory to nation-building 
efforts of the Malaysian Government. Further, the various ethnic, missionary and 
Government schools had no common purpose. Although the Government was aware 
of these problems, it could not adopt a National Education System without consulting 
the people of various ethnic groups, languages, cultures and religions. All these 
groups have their own, quite different, values and ways of socialization. 
Since 1957, the National Education System has undergone several, discrete 
stages of change. However, running through-out all these changes is the influence 
of a dominant Malay group. As a result, there has been a constant Malay influence 
on the way that objectives and strategies have been formulated. For instance, after 
the 1969 racial riot education reforms were used in the NEP as a means of social 
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restructuring. In particular, priorities were given to the Malays and the indigenous 
people (together termed the "Bumiputera") at all levels of education. Later, in 1979, 
a Cabinet Committee Report chaired by Mahathir reviewed the 1961 Education Act. 
This review was an attempt at reforming national education policy. 
According to the 1989 World Bank Report, Malaysia had 99% enrolment in 
primary schools. Despite this encouraging attendance statistic, the ratio of students 
to teachers in these schools is still too high to ensure good quality education for all 
students. Furthermore, Malaysia is still lacking in qualified staff to teach the subjects 
of mathematics and science. ' This is clearly a problematic situation as qualified 
teachers are the essence of a quality education. Further, ill equipped school 
laboratories have also discouraged students from entering the science stream. 
The problems facing education that I have outlined above are more serious 
in rural areas, especially in the peripheral states such as Sabah. One cause of this 
is that infrastructural inadequacies in the remote rural areas have placed further 
obstacles in the way of education. For example, in many rural areas the roads are 
still unsurfaced making it difficult for pupils even to attend school in some cases. 
Further, even if students can actually get to the classrooms the working environment 
can be quite poor due to a of lack electricity and water supplies. The effects of this 
can be gauged from the performances in public examinations in Sabah and Sarawak 
which, as a whole, are still well below national levels. ` As a consequence, it is not 
surprising that there is a problem with high school drop-out rates in the rural areas. 
Although those dropping out can enter the public skill training centres, in Sabah 
especially, these youths still encounter problems in obtaining a job in their chosen 
fields after completing the course. This is a sign of structural unemployment and 
unbalanced development. 
In higher education, the National Education Policy has been partly successful 
in reducing the ethnically based nature of much employment (Fifth Plan). This is in 
line with the restructuring objectives of the NEP. An indication of the scale of 
changes can be gauged from the dramatic increase in Bumiputeras enroling on degree 
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courses. In 1970 there were only 3,084 Bumiputeras taking degrees whereas this had 
risen to 23,838 in 1985: in other words, nearly an eightfold increase. By comparison, 
over the same period, the number of Chinese and Indians taking degree courses only 
increased by approximately three and four times respectively. However, in this 
context it is important to remember that admissions to universities are not totally 
determined by an individual's academic achievement. Priority is given to 
Bumiputeras on the basis of a quota set by the government. Indirectly, setting quotas 
in this way has had an affect on the quality of education. Donaldson (1994) found 
that students experienced feelings of discouragement, guilt, anger, and pressure to 
overachieve because of racism. Probably the most serious problem, however, is that 
the quality of education is being sacrificed in order simply to meet the quota of 
Bumiputeras. Furthermore, Malaysia is still dependent on the West in higher 
education. According to the Fifth Malaysia Plan, there were about 60,000 Malaysian 
students studying overseas. 
By 1990, the number of student enrolments in the primary to tertiary levels 
had increased by 106%. There were only 2,240,064 enrolments in 1970 compared 
to 4,118,827 in 1990. The number of primary school enrolments increased by 5.28% 
between 1981 to 1989, while the number of secondary school enrolments increased 
by 28% between 1981 to 1989. The enrolments on degree courses were 37,840 
(1985) and 58,000 (1990) in seven public universities which represents an increase 
of 56.91%. 3 Although there is still a lack of teachers in primary and secondary 
schools, the number of teachers in primary schools have increased. There was a 47% 
increase in primary school teachers and a 30% increase in secondary school teachers 
between 1981 to 1989.4 According to the Seventh Malaysia Plan, the total number 
of Malaysians in the education system (i. e. from primary to university levels) in 1995 
was 4,932,650. This total is subdivided into: 256,800 pre-school; 2,766,870 primary; 
1,124,910 lower secondary; 514,970 upper secondary; 80,080 post-secondary; 35,410 
non-graduate teacher education; 17,080 certificate; 46,930 diploma; and 89,600 
degree. The total allocation for education under the Sixth Malaysia plan was only 
RM8,025.2 million whereas this been has increased in the Seventh Malaysia Plan to 
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RM 10,098.8 million. From these statistics, the government can make predictions 
concerning Malaysia's future education and manpower needs. 
In Taiwan where the education system has placed an emphasis on science and 
technology, the statistics show that overall RM37 billion has been spent on education 
(B. H.: 24.6.96). Further, this relatively high expenditure has occurred despite the fact 
that Taiwan's population is only one million above that of Malaysia (that is, 21 
million and 20 million respectively). Malaysia's annual expenditure in education in 
1994 was about RM1,312.62 million. Thus, the Malaysian expenditure is obviously 
insufficient to meet the needs of an industrialized country. Furthermore, many of 
the rural areas have neither proper education facilities nor an adequate infrastructure. 
These is also a need for more expenditure to keep pace with national economic trends 
and the globalization of the economy. As a result, the lack of skilled manpower in 
Malaysia cannot be overcome unless the government is willing to commit itself to 
increased expenditure on education in order to improve quality. In fact, it was the 
lack of suitable manpower which caused the British Administration to bring in 
Indian, Indonesian, Chinese and Filipino workers to Malaysia. 
Furthermore, under the Vision 2020 development plan, the strategy of export 
led development will require efficiency. Effectively, this will mean the use of 
modern technology and mechanization. So, in order to meet this requirement, 
Malaysia will need large numbers of technicians and blue collar workers. As a 
result, the future education development structure will need to achieve some balance 
between academic and vocational education. 
2. THE NATIONAL EDUCATION POLICY AND STRATEGIES OF 
IMPLEMENTA TION 
One function of the National Education System in Malaysia's multi-ethnic 
society is to serve as a symbol of unity, equality and national integration. To do so, 
the present system will need to undergo various changes in order to meet the twin 
demands of society and the economy. Being a new nation, Malaysia needs an 
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education system that can mould the fragmented colonial system into a coherent 
national education system. 
The foundational stage in the development of a National Education System 
was the Razak Committee in 1956 and the Education Ordinance 1957. The 
Committee recommended that a national system of education was needed to inculcate 
a sense of national loyalty in the future generation. As a consequence, textbooks 
which had both a local content and a common syllabus were needed. However, at 
that period the main challenge was to overcome illiteracy and thus quantity was 
emphasised more than quality. Further, like other developing nations, the United 
Nations Educational and Scientific Organization also played an important role in 
developing a national education system for Malaysia. Due to the role of this 
international agency, there is growing pressure to improve the education system. 
In addition, there was also growing pressure from both the United Malay 
Nationalist Organization and Bumiputera political parties to improve rural education. 
Another factor which contributed to the development of a national education system 
was the need for national security as Malaya was being threatened by communist 
insurgencies. The formation of Malaysia in 1963 also triggered a confrontation with 
Indonesia. Thus, in line with the Talib Report (1960), the reviewed Malayan 
Education Policy emphasized the Malay's and Bumiputeras' political and national 
interests. This report recommended that the education system in Malaya should meet 
the needs of a multi-ethnic society. Malay, as a national language, would be used 
as a medium of instruction. The primary school sector was divided into standard 
schools (which were run by the government) and standard-type schools (which were 
financed privately). In the standard-type school, languages other than Malay and 
English could be taught if there was sufficient parental demand. Similarly, secondary 
schools were divided into national and national-type schools. Malay was adopted as 
first language and English as a second. This meant that universities gradually had 
to adopt Malay as their first language. In order to prepare for this change in 
instructional language, more Malay language teachers were trained. Sabah was 
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allowed a ten year transition period before Malay was fully adopted as a first 
language of instruction in 1976. 
Under the Education Act 1961, the Education Policy guaranteed that all 
children must attend school until the age of 14 years. This policy was successful in 
increasing the number of secondary school enrolments. In turn, this increase led to 
a demand for more schools, teachers and public funds for education. The Act 
required that Malay be used as a language of instruction as a first step in promoting 
national development through education. 
The First Malaysia Plan (1967-1970) and the Second Malaysia Plan (1971- 
1975) were the initial periods in which planners started to identify the problems with, 
and strategies of, attaining Education Policy objectives. Rural education was given 
top priority in an attempt to reduce the inequalities between rural and urban 
educational opportunity. As a result of this policy, education in rural areas was 
provided from the pre-school to secondary levels. However, degree and diploma 
level education are still mostly located in urban areas. 
In Primary education, the government has increased its expenditure in rural 
areas to provide schooling even in the most remote areas. Secondary school 
opportunities have also been increased in these areas. In addition, schemes such as 
those providing textbook loans and school food are being introduced to help poor 
students. This has provided rural students with opportunities to further their 
education in universities and institutes which are largely located in the towns. 
The end of the First Malaysia Plan (1966-1970) and the beginning of the 
Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975) were periods when students who had enjoyed 
compulsory education began to finish their secondary education. However, most only 
completed Form Five as there were very few schools that provided Form Six 
education. Most of the schools capable of providing Form Six level education were 
still located in regional capitals and major towns. In addition, rural secondary 
schools provided instruction only up to Form Three. As a consequence, on passing 
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their Lower Certificate of Examination, students from rural areas had to transfer to 
secondary schools located in towns. Thus compulsory education which was 
introduced in the Education Act 1961 brought about demand for tertiary education 
and skills training. This, in itself, required more teachers, more schools, and more 
facilities with the obvious consequence of an enlargement in the education 
organization. In turn, an expanding educational structure required better management 
to co-ordinate the implementation of the education plan. In general, evaluations of 
the initial implementation of National Education Policy have found that rural schools 
were underachieving by comparison with those in urban areas. Students from rural 
schools showed poor levels of achievement in subjects such as science, mathematics, 
and English. Unless this problem is addressed by the Ministry Of Education, the 
government's objective of reducing the inequality gap will not be achieved. This is 
due to the fact that admission to colleges, universities, training institutes and the 
award of scholarships are dependent on good grades from secondary schools. So, 
unless this inequality is addressed, urban students will have better access to tertiary 
education and skills training centres than rural students. Thus the community 
structure itself is already in conflict with the education policy. In addition, an 
increase in the number of secondary school leavers will mean that more tertiary 
institutions and training centres are required. Unless this is successfully implemented 
there be many frustrated teenagers. Any progress which has been made in education 
and training will be rendered meaningless unless it leads to relevant employment. 
The second phase in implementation of the 1961 National Education Policy 
came after the racial riot in 1969. At this time, education became a tool of national 
unity as well as a means of effecting social, economic and political development. 
The national language, Bahasa Malaysia, became compulsory in schools. The 
principles of Rukunegra or National Ideology were also instilled in students. The 
Education Act in 1961 that had been implemented in Malaya, was extended to Sabah 
in January, 1976. The development of rural education was intensified after the racial 
riot in 1969. But this time, as if the education policy was insufficient to function as 
a tool of national unity by itself, it was supplemented with the principles of 
Rukunegara and the New Economic Policy. Thus, those implementing the National 
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Education Policy Plan under the NEP had to manipulate the situation in favour of the 
Bumiputeras. The National Education Policy served as a tool for achieving the two- 
pronged objectives of the NEP: namely, social restructuring and the eradication of 
poverty. These two objectives are based on the principle that people can be united 
if they are equal. However, the NEP's goals have to be examined from political, 
social and economic perspectives. Since the implementation of New Economic 
Policy and National Education Policy effectively gives power to the Malays and the 
Bumiputeras, there is a tendency for mismanagement. This grip on power in the 
national development and education programmes has also been prompted by various 
university student demonstrations during the first half of the 1970s. Partially as a 
consequence of these demonstrations, the 'government was under pressure to deal with 
the problems of inequality and poverty. ' There was also a strong uneasiness 
concerning the Chinese who were dominating the economic sectors in Malaysia. 
Thus various pro-Bumiputeras education programmes were implemented. These 
included: scholarships, the construction of more educational institutions exclusively 
for Bumiputeras, priority for Bumiputeras in admission to local universities, and 
better education opportunities for rural students. 
2.1 Mahathir's Education Reform 
In line with the aspirations of the New Economic Policy and the Rukunegara, 
the National Education Policy was reviewed. A Cabinet Committee chaired by 
Mahathir was set up in 1974 and its report was finally ready in 1979. (At this time 
Mahathir was the Education Minister and later the Deputy Prime Minister). The 
reviewed policy adopted four objectives: 
"(a) To achieve national unity in a multi-ethnic society, (b) to produce 
skilled manpower for national development, (c) to further extend the 
policy of democratization of education in order to strike a balance in 
all aspects of education between rural and urban areas and (d) to 
mould a disciplined and morally refined Malaysian society. " 
(Ministry Of Education, 1990: 4-6) 
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In addition, the reviewed version of the National Education has its National 
Educational Philosophy. If strictly observed, the philosophy aspired to make 
education a tool of national unity. This can only be achieved when the education 
system produces responsible individuals who are capable of making contributions 
towards society. To do this the system needs to be able to cover aspects of 
individual needs such as developing individual potential, intellectual development, 
emotional and physical needs, belief in God, and all the traits of good individuals. 
On the whole, like any other education philosophy it attempts to promote excellence 
in the individuals. However, the philosophy seems to be against the Western 
education philosophy where freedom is cherished above anything else (see Appendix 
K on the philosophical framework And the Education System). Despite this apparent 
conflict, due to the globalization of the economy, the need to learn English language 
and western knowledge is inevitable. In addition, Malaysia is a multi-ethnic society 
where the people have different cultures, beliefs and different level of intellectual 
development. 
By the time of this second review, previous experience had taught planners 
about the types of problem which might be encountered in implementing an 
education policy plan. Assuming that the performances of the 1961 Education Policy 
were evaluated and problems were clarified, then the 1979 Education Policy should 
have had few implementation problems. Indeed, in its four objectives, only the 
democratization of education was not addressed in the old policies. Democratization 
of education represents the first step in a government effort to encourage the people's 
participation in the education of their children. However, Malaysia does not have a 
fully democratic government; only semi-democracy exists. 6 Thus, this situation might 
defeat the goal of democratization in education. Further, although parents are being 
encouraged to "participate" in education there is an important sense in which they are 
effectively powerless. The budget, curriculum, strategies, language of instruction and 
the whole concept of national education have been pre-planned. Thus parents are just 
participating in the Parent Teachers Association but have little actual control over 
what the education of their children. The government has predetermined what 
children should be taught according to the national education philosophy. Knowledge 
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cannot improve without individual freedom. Child development goes through stages 
and cannot be determined by any philosophy. Can one be forced to adopt a 
philosophy and curriculum of instruction? After all, students have to pass the 
national examinations and go to universities. They need to choose their own field 
of interest. Thus the education system should create a conducive environment which 
incorporates a variety of instruction that can help to develop the minds of the 
children. As an evidence of these shortcomings, how can a school expect to develop 
an individual's abilities when some have no playing fields, sport facilities or specialist 
instructors? 
In this context, one possible solution to the problems of poor quality 
education is to encourage the development of a private sector. However, such a 
solution would only create inequalities based on wealth whereas it is government 
policy that everyone should have equal opportunities at all levels of education. An 
alternative way of improving quality is to make admission to tertiary institutions 
competitive. This could be implemented by setting high standards in the national 
examinations. In particular, it would be advantageous for Malaysia if such standards 
where created for moral education rather than for mathematics and sciences. This is 
because by themselves, mathematical and scientific knowledge will only create 
individuals who believe in science rather than in God and the divine spirit. These 
are some of the contradictions in the national education philosophy, and the new 
curricula for both primary and secondary schools (i. e. the KBSR and KBSM, 
respectively). 
After the 1979 review, the National Education Policy adopted the following 
strategies: "(1) Bahasa Malaysia remains as the main language of instruction in 
school, (2) a standard curriculum that is Malaysia oriented, (3) a standard 
examination system, (4) streamlining of educational management, (5) upgrading the 
standard of education as a whole, (6) nine years basic education, (7) democratising 
education in relation to opportunities and quality through the just allocation of all 
aspects of education, (8) introducing education based on 3Rs (reading, arithmetic and 
writing), (9) secondary education based on an Integrated Secondary School 
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Curriculum (ISSC), (10) expansion of vocational and technical education, (11) 
diversifying and increasing the facilities for tertiary education especially for applied 
arts and science, (12) intensifying spiritual and religious education, (13) making the 
teaching of National language and English compulsory in schools and permitting the 
study of other languages i. e, Chinese and Tamil and (14) encouraging co-curricular 
activities, " (Ahmad, 1993: 181-185).. 
2.2 The New Primary School Curriculum 
Following the 1979 review, school curricula underwent considerable changes 
in the 1980s. One reason for these revisions was that rapid social change and 
modernization had made the 1960s curricula largely irrelevant. The New Primary 
School Curriculum (KBSR) was introduced in 1982 (see Appendix L, On The 
Organization). The KBSR strategies were outlined as: (1) an integrated approach to 
teaching and learning, (2) variety in teaching methods with group teaching for same 
ability or mixed ability groups, class teaching and instruction, (3) variety in learning 
activities, (4) "flexibility" in the choice of content and in the use of teaching methods 
and aids, (5) continuous evaluation that is incorporated into the teaching and learning 
process and (6) an "informal" classroom atmosphere with space to allow varied 
activities. These strategies will be examined in more detail as this chapter develops. 
In order to handle the needs of a multi-ethnic society, the new school 
curricula for primary school students were differentiated according to language of 
instruction. However, Bahasa Malaysia is compulsory in all these primary schools. 
2.3 The Integrated Curriculum For Secondary School (KBSM) 
In secondary education, students are differentiated in terms of their interests 
e. g. those studying science, the arts or undertaking vocational training. The new 
curricula are structured into three areas. Firstly, "communication" which covers the 
Malay and English languages and mathematical communication. Secondly, "man and 
his environment" which includes subjects such as Islamic and religious education or 
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moral education for non-Muslims. The third area is "individual development" which 
includes music, art and physical education. Mahathir's future Vision can be 
understood from the new strategies and curriculum of the National Education System. 
Together, they reflect some awareness of individual development, global needs, 
Malaysian values and moral education. ' 
2.4 Tertiary Education 
Some tertiary educational institutions were created to cater specially for the 
Malays and the indigenous people. For example, the MARA Institute of Technology 
was set up with branches in most of the 14 states in Malaysia. MIT conducts courses 
at diploma level and "twins" its degree programs with universities in the USA and 
Britain. Additional vocational and technical schools are also being built. However, 
under the NEP, technical and vocational education play a less important role in 
comparison with academic education. The different weights given to these two types 
of education arose because the Bumiputera dominated government was primarily 
concerned to close the inequality gap with the Chinese in higher education. The 
success of the model programs can be seen by the increasing numbers of 
Bumiputeras in higher education. 
By the 1990s, the implementation of Mahathir's Malaysia Incorporated and 
Privatization policies involved the education sector; particularly higher education. 
However, there is still some scepticism about the privatization measures in education. 
Sceptics argue that, because of the way the policy is being implemented, the 
Bumiputeras' interests will be neglected. Privatization through corporatization is 
more feasible so that educational quality can be improved with flexible management. 
The past system of regulation placed universities and colleges directly under the 
control of the Ministry Of Education. This made it impossible for university 
management to make its own decisions. A flexible, corporate type of management 
will enable universities to earn money and, as a consequence of that, to provide 
better facilities. The need for changes in higher education is being discussed in 
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seminars, conferences, symposiums, parliamentary debates and by the Minister of 
Education himself. 
The government's programme of corporatizing universities will be 
implemented in stages as soon as agreement has been reached with the university 
staff concerning new terms of employment. As a first step towards corporatization, 
the University and the University College Act was amended in 1995. In June 1996, 
the Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar announced the corporatization of Malay's most 
elite school; the Malay College, Kuala Kangsar (MCKK). This is the school where 
most of the Malay leaders studied including Anwar himself. This corporatization will 
enable the MCKK to make its own financial decisions and thus overcome the lack 
of college facilities. One of the most important lacks concerns the necessity of 
computerization. This is especially pressing as various Chinese private colleges have 
already been computerized. However, despite the recent corporatization, the Ministry 
of Education still retains some influence over the MCKK - especially in determining 
the curriculum of this elite school. Prior to this, there were already suggestions that 
the Malaysian universities should be corporatized in stages. This will start with the 
corporatization of the University Of Malaya. However, there are still many issues 
that need to be resolved before this can take place. For example, after the 
amendment of the University and University College Act 1971 in 1995, the National 
Accreditation Board Act was debated in July 1996, and the National Council of 
Higher Learning (NCHL) was established in September, 1996. However, from the 
outlined functions of the NCHL, it does not seem that there will be a decentralization 
of power from the Ministry of Education, nor will more power be given to the 
universities. This appears very similar to the pre-1990s situation, as they both aim 
to expedite economic development and help the Bumiputeras. It seems like an 
attempt to move away from the bureaucracy associated with the old style of 
education. ' The motivation for these changes arises from the government's policy of 
privatisation however, in contradiction to this, the government still does not wish to 
relinquish its control of higher education. Thus, it appears that the government has 
been placed in a dilemma in order to maintain Bumiputera interests. 
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Furthermore, due to the worrying problems in the quality of Malaysian 
education, the idea of Total Quality Management (TQM) is being introduced. In 
their recent speeches, both the Minister of Education and the Head of Higher 
Institutions have begun to talk about total quality management and computerization. 
However, educational studies have discovered that there are various problems 
associated with the implementation of TQMB and computerization. ' 
Regarding entry to public universities, the Ministry of Education has already 
set a target to ensure that 40% of the school leavers will enter university. This goal 
will only be reached if a new intake method is adopted. This new form of 
recruitment will not only be based on academic achievement and excellence, but will 
also take into account leadership quality, sporting activities and general knowledge. 
In other words, in addition to academic achievements, students must also possess the 
ability and character to acquire new skills. The old intake method has restricted the 
number of students to 11% of school leavers. According to the Minister of 
Education, the Universities in Malaysia will be able to accommodate 100,000 
students by the year 2000. However, the new intake method cannot be implemented 
immediately due to the limited number of places at the existing public universities. 
On the whole, the education system takes about 16 years to produce a 
graduate. This length of time has been shortened with the recent ruling to reduce 
university education to three years instead of four. This reduction will help 
overcome the problems of lack of lecturers and space, financial constraints, and the 
high demand for places in higher education and skill training courses. 
As a whole, the implementation of the National Education Policy during the 
NEP was faced with a contradiction between restructuring and quality. The NEP, 
which emphasised quantity and restructuring for the sake of Bumiputeras, affected 
the quality of education. Furthermore, the National Education Policy under the NEP 
polarised the ethnic groups in Malaysia. However, the National Education Policy and 
NEP were partly successful in dealing with the problems of inequality in education 
and the identification of occupation according to ethnicity. The use of Bahasa 
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Malaysia as a language of instruction in schools has also played an important role 
in integrating the various ethnic groups in Malaysia. 1° 
3. OR GA NIZA TION OF THE PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
OFNA TIONA L ED UCA TION" 
As education is a Federal responsibility, the highest decision-making body is 
located in Kuala Lumpur. The whole National Education organization structure, the 
Ministry of Education is headed by a Minister of Education who is assisted by two 
deputy ministers. Just beneath them in the structure are the Director-General and 
Secretary General of Education. Under the Director-General are Directors of 
Education of the fourteen states of Malaysia as well as Divisional Directors of 
various education services. The Director of Education in each state controls all the 
District Education officers in the states. Under the Education Officer are the 
principals of the various secondary and primary schools in the district. In the case 
of Sabah where the state is divided in Divisions and Districts, there are also 
Divisional Education Officers who is higher than the District Education Officers. 
The Divisional Education Officer co-ordinates all the District's Education activities 
and responsibilities that fall under his Division. 
There are also various National Education committees which aid in the 
decision-making process. The highest committee in the Ministry of Education is the 
Education Planning Committee. It is responsible for the formulation, coordination and 
implementation of the policies. Under this committee are other committees 
responsible for: the Central Curriculum, Development, Finance, Higher Education, 
Text Books, and Scholarships and Training. 
Beyond the Ministry Of Education, there are also higher committees in the 
Prime Minster's Department which are responsible for development in general. 
Their decisions are vital on matters of national importance and those relating to 
education budget. The highest is the Cabinet Committee headed by the Prime 
Minister, followed by National Development Planning Committee and Economic 
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Planning Unit which are all under the Prime Minister's Department (see Ministry Of 
Education 1990 for details). 
However, the system of organization and planning does not appear to allow 
for a mechanism which would provide some public input. Thus the system is very 
much like a regime. Under these conditions, there is a strong possibility that certain 
communities or regions are being left out in education development. There needs to 
be freedom for the communities to express their opinions about the education system 
and spending. For instance, unless poor school facilities in the remote rural areas are 
reported by the press, then = no sense of urgency in dealing with this problem will 
be created. Thus this, and other problems, could be covered up rather than being 
addressed. 
4. THE DILEMMA OF NATIONAL EDUCATION IN A MULTI-ETHNIC 
SOCIETY 
Education, as defined by the Oxford Dictionary, is the "training of mind and 
abilities. " Sociologically, it is a form of socialization into certain values and roles. 
In a multi-ethnic society such as Malaysia it becomes problematic as to which 
group's values should be incorporated into the National Education Policy. Indeed, 
the government itself is divided on whether to embody secular or Islamic values in 
education. Recently, the government's leadership - which is dominated by Malay 
Muslims - has directed that Islamic subjects are made compulsory for all Muslims 
attending National Schools and National Type Schools. This is in line with the 
policy on the "Assimilation Of Islamic Values in Administration" that I will discuss 
in the following chapter. Since decision-makers in the Ministry of Education are 
mainly Muslims, Islamic values are being given priority in education. Basically, 
Islamic values work on the principle that Muslims should follow the teaching of 
Muhammad, the Koran, the Syariah and believe in Allah. Briefly, an individual 
subscribing to Islamic values should preserve the sanctity of Islam by the way he 
behaves, eats and prays. This means that Islamic values are concerned not only with 
the soul, but also with how an individual should lead a good life. Thus all these 
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values need a formal processes of socialization if they are to become nationally held. 
As a consequence, Islamic educators believe that the Government must enforce 
Islamic education (even in the private sector) to ensure that Muslims are not exempt 
from subjects. 
However, in a multi-ethnic society where there are differing beliefs and ways 
of socialization, Islamic values and education are likely to be neglected. In one way, 
the enforcement of Islamic education is a positive move as it helps students from 
various ethnic groups to respect Islam and vice versa. On the other hand, non- 
Muslims are required to study moral education. Both these processes are means by 
which Malaysian values are instilled in students as outlined in the "Policy On 
Assimilation Of Islamic Values In The Administration. " However, the National 
Education System cannot force Malay and Islamic values on non-Muslims as such 
an action would be against the Malaysian constitution. Thus, the National Education 
Policy's goal of instilling Malaysian values is difficult to rigorously enforce. 
Besides, National Education also plays an important role in teaching students 
both academic and vocational knowledges. These are necessary to meet the nation's 
manpower needs. Since education is universal anyone, irrespective of religion and 
ethnicity, are entitled to acquire it. However, the major ethnic groups especially the 
Chinese prefer to have their own way of socialization. 
In a multi-ethnic society, the key word in National Education in Malaysia is 
fairness. However, in a politically divided society such as Malaysia, ethnic education 
can be a means of achieving political ambitions. Thus it is difficult to predict what 
the future of National Education will be, especially as it faces the Vision 2020 
challenges. 
The Chinese's suspicion against National Education and vice versa was being 
expressed when it was proposed that the 1961 National Education Act be amended 
in 1990. The Chinese were worried about the particular amendment that gave power 
to the Board of Schools to close schools as this could affect the Tamil and the 
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Chinese National Type schools. Prior to the amendment, the Minister held the sole 
power to close down schools. The proposed amendment was politicised by various 
parties and interest groups such that it had to be postponed so that the views of 
various parties could be heard. Thus the National Education Consultative Council 
was established to hear their views (Ahmad, 1993: 361-396). However, the rationale 
of such an amendment is to put into practice the National Education Philosophy so 
that a strong Malaysian nation can be built through the education system (B. H.: 
15.8.1990). 
5. THE REALITY OF NA TIONA L EDUCATION IN SABAH 
Now that Malaysia has been independent for nearly thirty years and the 
National Education has undergone various processes of change, it is interesting to 
examine what progress has been made in education development in Sabah. A 
particularly revealing way of doing this is to compare how the National Education 
has been implemented in Sabah and Peninsular Malaysia. Indeed, an adequate 
analysis of progress cannot be performed without using some comparative standards. 
Such standards are important so that the analyst is not swayed and confined by 
Federal statistics and the government's Five Year Plan reports on education. The 
Ministry of Education and its agency, the Department of Education, have always 
claimed that good progress has been made during the thirty years of independence. 
However, let us discuss how the National Education Policy has been implemented 
in Sabah. 
5.1 Educational Investment In Sabah 
Historically, when compared to the Chinese, the Bumiputeras in Sabah have 
not enjoyed a good education. One reason for this is that the Bumiputeras live 
mostly in the rural areas whereas the Chinese live in urban areas. During the North 
Borneo Timber Company and British Colonial Administration, children's education 
was left either to private entrepreneurs, missionaries or the Chinese community. As 
a result, the Bumiputeras, who were poor, could not afford to send their children to 
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secondary schools. For religious reasons, missionary schools were not particularly 
attractive to some Muslim students. However, at that time, irrespective of their 
religion, students continued secondary education at missionary schools. However, 
many Bumiputeras could not even afford to complete primary school. Achievement 
based on examination results also caused high drop-out levels among primary school 
students. 
After Malaysia independence in 1963, the responsibility for education in 
Sabah was handed over to the Federal Government. Prior to that Sabah had its own 
Education Enactment that shaped its school system. When the Education Act 1961 
was extended to Sabah in January, 1976, Sabah's educational future was fully dictated 
by the Ministry of Education in Kuala Lumpur. 
If one looks at the history of education in Sabah, Sabahan leaders were 
dissatisfied with the education system. During the USNO regime, the state 
government sent a memorandum to the Federal Government requesting a University 
College in Sabah. Another memorandum was sent during the Berjaya Government. 
This identified nineteen problems such as inefficiency, shortage of facilities, poor 
quality of facilities and instruction, lack of teachers and teacher training, problems 
of implementation of Malay Language as a first language of instruction, lack of 
funding, and the problems associated with Chinese schools. Prior to the 
memorandum, the Sabah Regional Planning Study 1980 was run by the British 
Overseas Development Administration. 'Z This study identified that the urban primary 
and secondary schools systems were experiencing pressure due to high net 
immigration. On the other hand, as rural areas were not well penetrated by the 
education system and hence the problems of rural illiteracy were perpetuated. The 
other problems identified in the 1980 study were identical to those listed by the 
Berjaya Government in its memorandum to the Federal Government. Indeed, even 
up until the PBS Administration in 1985-1994, the Sabahan Government's demands 
had not been met. For example, Sabah still did not have a full fledged university but 
only a branch campus of the National University Malaysia (University Kebangsaan 
Malaysia). 
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Let us examine further the education problems and investment in Sabah 
during the Vision 2020 Development Plan. This is necessary in order to see whether 
there are some significant changes in comparison to the NEP period. First, let us 
examine the student enrolment statistics for Sabah. In 1992, there were 259,921 
primary students and 14,238 teachers. The student-teacher ratio was therefore about 
18; a figure which has remained constant up until the last statistics which were 
produced in 1995. So, in mathematical terms at least, education planners in Kuala 
Lumpur can defend their leaders on the grounds that Sabah has a sufficient number 
of teachers. However, averaging the figures in this way hides a large rural-urban 
disparity. Urban areas obviously have greater population densities than rural areas. 
Thus there is greater demand for teachers in the cities leaving the rural areas with a 
relative paucity. Despite relatively good student-teacher ratios in primary schools, 
the situation is quite different at secondary level. Here, in 1995, there was an 
average of about 46 secondary school students to one teacher. Since the Ministry of 
Education is planning to build more secondary schools in the rural areas, the 
problems of staff shortages in these schools will be more serious than in primary 
schools. The most severe shortage is for graduate and specialist teachers in 
secondary schools. Regarding school space, in 1994 the average number of students 
per primary school was 294 while in secondary schools, the corresponding figure was 
815. One common way of handling this excess demand is to divide the school day 
into morning and afternoon session in which different sets of students are taught. For 
example, primary one to three may be taught in the morning and primary four to six 
in the afternoon. The shortage of school space is also prominent in the urban areas. 
The facilities in Sabah are still obviously insufficient to meet the demand for 
both tertiary education and skills training. Further, even where such facilities exist, 
admission to them is not really competitive. With the present facilities and lecturers, 
tertiary education in Sabah can only accept a limited number of students. The 
number of courses which can be taught is also limited due to the lack of facilities, 
funds, and lecturers. In addition, the skill training institutes and vocational training 
centres have not proved that attractive to qualified school leavers. Furthermore, there 
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are still too few vocational and technical schools to meet the needs of Vision 2020 
development plan. Even the existing ones are poorly equipped. 13 
That these problems have affected the quality of education in Sabah can be 
gauged by its poor examination results in comparison with West Malaysia. The 
number of examination candidates also indicates a low number of science students. 
The system of education has failed to encourage students to enter the science streams 
or to pursue technical and vocational training. The number of examination 
candidates also indicates that the students are lacking in self-confidence in science 
subjects. Instead, students prefer to take arts subjects which they are more confident 
of passing. According to the Department of Education Report (1995), there were 
only 1,723 science stream candidates out of 15,452 candidates for the Malaysian 
Certificate of Education in 1995. In the same year there were only 78 science stream 
candidates out of 1,942 candidates for Malaysian Higher Schools Certificate. This 
recent information dating back to 1990 indicates that the trend is going to pose a 
serious problem for Malaysia. In this respect, the holistic education philosophy has 
failed. 
The lack of trained graduate teachers has also contributed to the poor quality 
of education. The need for such teachers is very difficult to satisfy as the teaching 
profession is so low paid that it does not prove an attractive employment option. 
This problem needs to be dealt with in a realistic way. At its present stage of 
development, Sabah does not need more university graduates. Rather, to develop an 
export oriented economy, Sabah needs more technicians in both the agricultural and 
industrial sectors. The handful of vocational and technical schools that do exist will 
not be able to meet the demands for skilled labour set out in the Vision 2020 plan. 
In addition, the few young people who are trained in technical skills still find it 
difficult to obtain jobs in their chosen fields. In other words, there is either structural 
unemployment, or a mismatching of the training course to the available jobs. " 
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Poor school facilities have not created a conducive environment for the mental 
and spiritual development of children. This situation has been exacerbated by a lack 
of buildings which has forced many schools to have separate morning and afternoon 
sessions as I mentioned above. The poor level of school facilities is particularly 
severe in rural areas. 
There is still a wide gap between urban and rural education in Sabah. Rural 
schools in remote areas have no running water and electricity. Under such conditions 
very few of the students even consider going to university. The federal government's 
failure to resolve this urban-rural inequality represents one of the largest mistakes 
which any government, including the colonial one, has made in Sabah. The various 
administrations have failed to act as catalysts in developing all aspects of Sabahan 
society, especially as far as education for future manpower needs is concerned. The 
rural-urban inequality has persisted despite the fact that it is clearly written in the 
Education Act of 1961, that every child of school age has a right to education. 
Indeed, some natives living in remote areas still have no proper school facilities. 
Despite the Sabah State Government's 1984 memorandum to the Federal Government 
concerning poor school facilities, the problems still persist today. Indeed, there are 
still some schools which are constructed from palm leaves and bamboo. There are 
insufficient classrooms, improper toilets and canteen facilities in schools. According 
to officials in the Federal Development Office and the Education Development 
Division of the Department of Education, these problems will be remedied by the 
year 2000. 
That the education facilities in Sabah are still far from adequate can be 
gauged from a comparison with The Republic of Singapore. The Republic of 
Singapore, which has an equivalent population to Sabah, has 36 Institutes of 
Technical Education and Centres, 8 Institutions of Higher Learning, 18 Special 
Education Schools and 6 religious schools. In this context, Sabah does have many 
more public primary schools (986 compared to 187 in Singapore). Further, it also 
has about the same number of secondary schools as Singapore. Sabah has 147 public 
secondary schools compared to 145 in Singapore (1995 figures). However, Singapore 
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has more private schools which numbered 426 in 1995 whereas Sabah only has a 
handful of private schools. Prior to the 1990s, private schools in Sabah served 
mostly drop-out students. 15 In general, most of the problems regarding education 
facilities in Sabah also affect Peninsular Malaysia except that the problems is more 
serious in Sabah (Seventh Malaysia Plan, 1996-2000: 303-339). 
The poor quality of education in Sabah has attracted much attention recently; 
especially from the opposition parties who want to capitalise on the issue. As a 
consequence, many suggestions about how the local educational system could be 
improved are being made. Indeed, Najib, the new Minster of education, has had to 
acknowledge that the fund for the education in the Seventh Malaysia Plan is still 
inadequate. This shortage of money has occurred despite the fact that Sabah, 
Sarawak and Pahang are given the highest funding for education among the 14 states 
(R. N.: 12.7.1996: 26) . Furthermore, 
in comparison with the West Malaysians, some 
groups feel that they have been discriminated against in terms of access to better 
education. 
5.2 The Issue Of Bahasa Malaysia AsA First Language Of Instruction 
Let us move on to examine the implementation of Bahasa Malaysia as the 
National Language and the language of instruction in Sabah. The implementation of 
Bahasa Malaysia in Sabah was completed in 1976 when, prior to this, all schools and 
universities used English as their instructional language. Initially, the main problems 
with this change in language occurred in schools where all the teachers gave 
instruction in English. As they were not well versed in Bahasa Malaysia the teaching 
quality was affected. There was also serious lack of specialist Bahasa Malaysia 
teachers. Indeed, the problem was particularly acute in the Chinese and Indians 
where the teachers could only speak in broken Malay. The promotion of Malay as 
a national language had an obvious affect on the standard of English which was 
attained in schools. In the long run, this will have negative consequences for the 
students. Being skilled in foreign languages is an obvious advantage to students who 
wish to seek employment in multi-national corporations or to attend foreign 
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universities. However, the goal of making Bahasa Malaysia the language of 
instruction in schools has been applauded by staunch nationalist politicians. 
The new salary scheme under the National Education System required 
teachers to pass Bahasa Malaysia with credit at Malaysian Certificate of Education 
Examination level. Thus, teachers who were not proficient in this language found 
themselves either demoted or had their contracts terminated at the end of their 
probationary period. 
In higher institutions, there is still a lack of reading materials written in 
Malay, and so the use of English textbooks and journals is inevitable. Recently it 
has been suggested by university officials that a flexible attitude on the use of 
English in higher institutions is adopted. 16 
It will be recalled that one of the reasons Bahasa Malaysia was made the 
language of instruction in school was to promote national unity. However, recent 
events have proved this policy to be ineffectual. For example, although the new 
generation Chinese and indigenous groups are now able to speak proper Bahasa 
Malaysia, they have not been absorbed into the Malaysian values. From the 
signboards on the Chinese shops and business premises, it is obvious that they are 
still using Chinese wordings. Indeed, even if they do use Bahasa Malaysia on 
signboards, there are often spelling and grammatical errors. Recently the 
government, through its agency Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, has had to strictly 
enforce the regulation requiring the use of Bahasa Malaysia as the main language on 
signboards. Thus improper signboards on Chinese business premises have had to be 
removed. 
However, simply learning Bahasa Malaysia does not necessarily assimilate an 
individual into Malaysian values. Indeed, many people learn second languages 
without being absorbed into the culture which is associated with that language. Thus, 
the use of Bahasa Malaysia as a means of uniting the diverse peoples of Malaysia 
is questionable. After nearly forty years of using Bahasa Malaysia as a first language 
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of instruction communal division still exists. Having said this, Bahasa Malaysia is 
still the best instrument for encouraging interaction between the people of various 
ethnicities and languages. It has also served as a lingua franca in the region for 
centuries. 
Although government policy is directed towards the use of just one 
instructional language, some ethnic groups are demanding that their own language 
be taught in school. This is the case with the Kadazan who see language as one 
means of preserving their cultural heritage. In addition, since the Kadazans 
themselves are comprised of various ethnic groups, internal disputes have also arisen; 
for instance, between the Kadazan and Dusun about who should be the dominant 
group. This issue is important because the dominant group will be better able to 
advance its ethnic concerns in the social, economic and political spheres. 
Furthermore, nationalizing schools by making Bahasa Malaysia the first 
language of instruction has caused a deterioration in the teaching of English. " This 
indicates that such a policy should be implemented with care so that important 
languages, such as English, are not neglected. As a result of this deterioration in the 
standard of English, some remedial programmes have been created to promote 
English. In Sabah, Britain is giving assistance through the Rural Primary English 
Programme. This might also effect other languages - such as Chinese and Indian - 
as the schools are following a nationalised curriculum. 
Compared to the issue of Islamic education that I mentioned above, the 
enforcement of Bahasa Malaysia in schools is more effective. This is because the 
government requires at least a credit in Malaysian in the Certificate of Education for 
entry into the Civil Service, tertiary education and in applying for Government 
scholarships. Nevertheless, these are not sufficient incentives for people who neither 
wish to further their studies in Malaysia nor work in the Government sector. This 
policy has also restricted the Government's capability to employ specialists from 
foreign countries as well as from the local Chinese and Indian communities. Thus, 
even though someone has the required skill, he cannot be employed in a permanent 
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Civil Service post without a credit in Bahasa Malaysia in the Malaysia Certificate of 
Education. Indirectly, this policy restricts an individual's freedom to work. 
Furthermore, to be fair to other ethnic groups such as the Chinese and Indians, some 
special assistance needs to be provided to help them learn Bahasa Malaysia. Despite 
the use of Bahasa Malaysia as a language of instruction, the performance of 
Bumiputeras in education - particularly in science and mathematics - is still 
unsatisfactory. In higher levels of education, the Chinese are now performing better 
in Bahasa Malaysia passing, and even surpassing, the performance of the 
Bumiputeras (Ahmad, 1993). 
However, due to the Government's privatization programmes which have 
encompassed the Education System, it seems that Bahasa Malaysia is losing its 
significance in Malaysian education. There are now even some measures to make 
Malaysians proficient in English. Issues are also being raised concerning the more 
flexible use of English in Tertiary education. All these moves have their roots the 
Vision 2020 challenges which require a workforce that is effective in the global 
economy. 
Furthermore, under Section 152 of the constitution, ethnic groups are allowed 
to teach and learn other languages. Thus, although the use of Bahasa Malaysia can 
help national integration, the Chinese and Tamil schools cannot be abolished. 
Indeed, Mark Koding -a Sabahan M. P. - was charged under the Sedition Act for 
raising the issue of abolishing these schools. On the other hand, when the Chinese 
have indicated that they will go against the Malay and Bumiputera interests, their 
request have not been entertained. For instance, the Chinese requests for their own 
university and to teach in their own language were not considered (Luping, 1994: 
513-514). 
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5.3 The Issue Of Secular And Islamic Education In A Multi-Ethnic Society 
It cannot be denied that either an Islamic or a moral education provides the 
necessary pre-requisite for a disciplined future generation. As the official religion 
of a multi-ethnic nation, Islam's image will be tarnished if Muslims do not behave 
as Islamic strictures require. The development of Islamic Education and its 
integration in the secular education system was partly responsive to the Islamic 
revival in 1979. It is also the responsibility of the government through the state's 
Islamic Affairs Department to propagate Islam by creating schools run on Islamic 
principles 
Recent trends, such as the increase in drug abuse and serious crimes (e. g. 
murder and rape) indicate that the school system needs to emphasize moral values 
to a much greater extent. Despite the strict moral code found in Islamic teachings, 
a majority of these immoral activities involved Muslims. Furthermore, it was 
estimated that about 2.5% of students have discipline problems, and 0.25% become 
involved in serious crimes such as drug abuse, theft and the possession of dangerous 
weapons (NST: 28.4.88). (When interpreting these statistics, however, it should 
remembered that they apply mainly to urban, rather than rural, schools). This 
situation has occurred about six years after the implementation of KBSR and 
subsequently the KBSM both of which aimed to create moral individuals. 
Indirectly, the problems with morality represent a significant challenge for 
Islam as a National Ideology from which the national education values are being 
formed. Under Mahathir's Administration the leadership has gained awareness about 
the need to preserve and instill Islamic values in Muslim students who attended the 
national schools. Islamic values play a significant role in ensuring the success of 
Vision 2020. Mahathir has always emphasized that Malaysia should develop 
according to its own values and available resources. Without Islamic education in 
national schools, the Government would have failed in promoting Islam as its official 
ideology. The National Education Philosophy in Malaysia is in fact based on the 
Islamic philosophy of knowledge. This philosophy is divided into two sections: the 
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Fardu Ain and Fardhu Kifayah. This means that students are required to learn and 
be taught both spiritual and worldly knowledge. If seen from the old Islamic school 
curriculum during the Golden Age of Islam, there is not much difference from the 
secular education curriculum. However, Islamic secular education is preventive 
rather than liberal. For instance, Islam does not permit premarital sex or drug abuse. 
By way of contrast, the Western liberal view does allow premarital sex, encourages 
the use of contraception and even permits the distribution of clean needles to drug 
users. 
However, in a multi-ethnic society the influence of Islam is becoming diluted, 
and Malaysian culture is being influenced by secular, rather than Islamic, knowledge. 
It appears that the secular forces within present day Malaysia are stronger than 
Islamic ones. Thus, the attempt to integrate Islamic education into the National 
Education System is a sign of the leadership's struggle to preserve Islam as a national 
ideology. Islamic subjects are being taught to all Muslims like any other subjects in 
national school. For the non-Muslims moral education is a compulsory subject. The 
integration of Islamic education in National Education could help to promote a better 
understanding of Islam among the various ethnicities. However, the integration of 
Islamic education in national schools has faced problems of lack of specialist Islamic 
teachers (ustaz). In addition, private schools do not emphasize the importance of 
Islamic knowledge even though some Muslims attended these schools. A final factor 
which has contributed to the marginalisation of Islamic subjects is that they are not 
particularly significant in the entrance requirements for tertiary education. 
Further, due to the need to preserve Islamic sanctity, it is feared that the 
integration of Islamic values in education could impede the development of Arts 
subjects which are against the concept of Islam (FF_ER, 23.8.1997; and Kahn and 
Low, 1992: 282-306). For instance, some Muslims believe that music education is 
unnecessary as it corrupts the student's morality. Thus, in general, this will also 
impede the development of other culture and arts subjects. In fact, during a "Seminar 
On Islamic Education" in 1987, one of the resolutions urged the Ministry of 
Education to reduce the time for teaching music in all Teacher Colleges and to use 
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the time instead for an Islamic subject. This move will be resisted by people who 
subscribe to other religions. This kind of problem will create an obstacle to the total 
integration of Islam into National Education. Coupled with the other problems in 
Sabah that I discussed earlier, decision makers are placed in a further dilemma; 
namely, whether to implement the Islamization process in schools. 
However, compared to the 1960s and 1970s, there have been many recent 
advances in Islamic education. More money is being allocated to it, and effective 
means of propagation can be seen in the rise of various Islamic institutions. The 
establishment of an Islamic International University is a symbol of this progress. In 
addition to formal schooling, Islamic education is now also emphasized on national 
television. As a result, these developments should also be implemented in secular 
spheres; especially in vocational education. Furthermore, the planners and decision- 
makers must be able to achieve some balance to ensure that increased funding of 
Islamic education does not deprive others of quality education. Besides, the 
curriculum should encourage children to think critically to overcome the present 
problem where students even at university level are still learning by rote. 18 Thus, the 
old Islamic culture of observance to strict rules is not so feasible in order to 
encourage critical thinking in line with the National Education Philosophy (B. H.: 
28.8.1990). 
5.4 The Issue Of A Burn iputera Quota In The Selection Of Students 
After the NEP finished in 1990, the Government continued the use of quotas 
and, in particular, fixed the numbers of Bumiputeras in tertiary education. The 
various institutions which were created by the NEP to promote the Bumiputeras' 
enrolment in education still remain in existence. However, it should be remembered 
that all children, irrespective of ethnicity, are eligible for the same schooling from 
primary to secondary levels. The only exception from this concerns parents who 
choose to send their children to Chinese or Indian vernacular schools. 
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The uncompetitive selection process for Bumiputeras in higher education and 
in scholarship awards has contributed to the falling quality of education in Malaysia. 
An example of these falling standards is that the British Medical Association has 
recently declared that it will no longer recognise an MBBS degree from Malaysia. 
The quota system has also affected the Bumiputeras' motivation to work hard for 
their examinations, as they know that they will be given priority over other ethnic 
groups. It is likely that this attitude will also spread among teachers, administrators 
and university lecturers. Furthermore, the Malaysian policy of positive discrimination 
in tertiary education and scholarships is not in line with the principles and aims of 
UNESCO. According to UNESCO education must be provided without distinction 
of race, sex, language or religion. Although the quota in favour of the Bumiputeras 
in tertiary education has increased the number of qualified middle-class Bumiputeras, 
it has polarised the society according to ethnicity and religion. In response, entry to 
tertiary eduction should gradually be made contingent upon educational achievement. 
One result of selection according to academic ability would be an improvement in 
the quality of Malaysian education. 
Although Sabah is still behind Peninsular Malaysia in education attainment, 
this should not be used to justify giving Sabahans priority in access to higher 
education. Measures to improve education attainment should include overall quality 
improvement in various levels. In fact, studies such as those conducted by Hoerr 
(1973: 247-273) and Selvaratnam (1988: 173-196) have found that preferential 
treatment for Bumiputeras does not help much in reducing social and income 
inequalities. Indeed, this is also the situation in terms of school performance i. e. 
preferential treatment is not helping the Bumiputeras (Ahmad, 1993). Furthermore, 
the students that further their education through MARA and Sabah Foundation loans 
are found to be defaulting their contracts. As a result MARA and Sabah Foundation 
have made several appeals in the newspapers for them repay their loans. The last 
resort by Yayasan Sabah is by publishing lists of defaulters in the newspapers and 
imposing restrictions on sending students overseas. However, the Sabah Foundation 
is still continuing its policy to develop local education particularly for the 
Bumiputeras and rural students. Thus, these provide evidences that competitiveness 
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in education is vital to preserve quality. The spirit of competitiveness is no exception 
to the rural students in order to face the Vision 2020 challenges. 
5.5 The Issue Of A cadem is A nd Vocational Education 
Historically, priority has been given to academic, rather than vocational, 
education. Vocational schooling was intended for students who were either not 
interested in academic education or did not have sufficient academic ability. The low 
priority given to vocational schools is can be seen from the numbers that were 
created: in the whole of Sabah there are only seven vocational schools! Thus those 
who did not complete their academic education found themselves with few skills 
except reading, writing, and arithmetic. Students in this position were obviously not 
well prepared to face life after school and, as a consequence, their prospects of 
employment were limited. 
In Sabah, however, the important educational question is not whether to 
emphasise academic or vocational education, as both facilities are not yet sufficiently 
provided for. However, more money has been invested in academic, as opposed to 
vocational, education. But the current emphasis on an export led growth strategy and 
especially on manufacturing based exports, will change the picture of development 
in Sabah. In practical terms, this means that more technicians and engineers are 
needed. In this context, there is an obvious comparison to be made with Taiwan 
which became a newly industrialized nation by emphasising technical and vocational 
education rather than university education. Indeed, the Taiwanese model is the 
closest one which Sabah can follow in developing its educational and human 
resources. Expertise in modem technology can be imported from other countries, but 
it is not rational to employ foreign technicians in Sabah when there is high local 
unemployment in this field. This is especially so considering that Sabah has a large 
youth population who will become employable during the Seventh Malaysia Plan 
(1996-2000). The advancement of vocational and technical education needs to be 
given serious thought. This is particularly pertinent as the Five Year Plans have 
shown that the number of Bumiputeras in Malaysian Universities already outnumber 
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the Chinese and non-Bumiputeras. Despite this, there is still an urban-rural 
imbalance in terms of development and income distribution. 
Nevertheless, in Sabah, there is still shortage of places in vocational and 
technical education for those who. do not complete and academic education. This 
shortage mainly arises due to a lack of qualified teaching staff. Another factor which 
contributes to the relative paucity of vocational and technical training facilities is that 
they represent more expensive alternatives to the normal school system. At the 
present time, Sabah only has 7 vocational schools compared to 131 public secondary 
schools. At the same time, the number of students at primary and secondary schools 
are increasing annually. This imbalance should be taken into account and not 
dismissed, so that it can be reduced, if not eliminated, by the year 2020. In addition, 
the special privileges given to Bumiputeras and the need to increase Bumiputera 
professionals means that many are being pushed up into the university and thus 
overlooked the importance of vocational education. In fact, the provision of more 
vocational schools provides students with better choice of education opportunities. 
In this manner, the more competitive ones can go to the universities, or even the 
vocational and technical studies if they so choose. Thus, the National Education 
System seems to encourage students to seek white collar, rather than blue collar, jobs. 
5.6. The Issue Of Urban Rural Imbalance In Education Development 
Historically, in comparison with the urban Chinese, the rural Bumiputeras in 
Sabah did not have a particularly good education. As I outlined in previous sections, 
during the administrations of the North Borneo Chartered Company and the British 
Colony, children's education was left either to the missionaries or Chinese society. 
Thus the Bumiputeras who were poor could not afford to send their children to 
secondary schools in the town areas. Further, for religious reasons, missionary 
schools were not attractive to some Muslim students. However, at that time students 
continued their secondary education at missionary schools irrespective of their own 
religion. Many rural Bumiputeras cannot even afford to complete primary school. 
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Achievement based totally on examination had also caused high numbers of students 
to drop-out, especially at the primary six public examination. 
In addition to the factors mentioned above another disadvantage which Sabah 
faces is its sparse population. This represents a handicap because priority is often 
given to heavily populated regions where there are strong demands for better 
education. Thus, a large proportion of the funds for education are being spent in the 
cities before the rural areas are even considered. As a consequence, rural schools 
will have to wait for the next Five Year Plan before they receive more funding. In 
fact, officials should not make excuses concerning the lack of funding for schools in 
rural areas with few students. The smaller the number of students, the better the 
quality of instruction will be. Unless this imbalance is solved, the quality of 
education in rural areas will continue to deteriorate (see Liew, 1990 and Hoerr, 
1973). 
5.7 The Issue Of Sabah's Manpower Needs 
One of the main factors required for industrialization is a skilled labour force 
and, in particular, skills in the fields of engineering and science. However, in 
comparison with Peninsular Malaysia, the growth of Sabah's manufacturing sector has 
been slow. The agricultural sector still makes a large contribution to the national 
income and employment. However, since the promulgation of Vision 2020 Sabah 
has had to develop its own industries. The areas that have been set aside for 
industrial parks are in Kota Kinabalu, Tawau, Sandakan and Kudat. The Kota 
Kinabalu Industrial Park at Telipok will be able to create about 70,000 jobs if it is 
fully completed. When phase one of the park is completed, it will provide about 
30,000 to 40,000 jobs. 
In this context, we can examine the demographic statistics in order to 
ascertain what Sabah's future manpower and training needs will be. According to the 
Sabah Population Survey in 1991, out of the total population of 1,026,406,743,602 
have little or no education; 132,830 with LCE, 104,762 with the Malaysian 
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Certificate of Education (4 Thanawi); 3,657 with the Malaysian Certificate of 
Vocational Education/Malaysian Certificate of Education (Vocational); 15,655 gained 
a Higher School Certificate (includes Islamic education), 12,367 gained a diploma, 
and 11,193 a degree and 2340 people were unaccounted for. The survey also showed 
that the population entering the labour force according to age is, in the age group 20- 
24; 25,709 with LCE/SRP; 31,605 with MCE/SPM; 1285 with MCVE; 6359 with 
HSC; 2,444 with diploma and 934 with degree; and 392 unknown; out of a number 
of 75,050.19 
In 1991, Sabah also has a population of 172,290 people between the age of 
10-14 all of whom will be able to enter the workforce, colleges, universities and 
vocational training by the year 1996-2000 (i. e. during the 7th Malaysia Plan). 
However, the number of places available in local public tertiary institutions 
throughout Malaysia by the year 2000 will be about: 32,000 for teacher education, 
21,290 for certificate courses, 61,900 diploma courses, and 167,900 degree courses 
(7th Malaysia Plan). 
The labour force survey of 1992-1993 shows that Sabah has a large number 
of unemployed people between the ages of 15 and 24. In the age groups 15-19 and 
20-24,44.6% 20-24,35% respectively were unemployed. In terms of their 
educational attainment 5.9 of the unemployed have no formal education, 19.4% with 
primary education; 69.9% with secondary education; 3.6% with tertiary education. 
This indicates that it is the less educated, rather than those with higher academic 
qualifications, who are more likely to be employed in the Sabahan job market. This 
phenomenon is the effect of mismatch of the education system with the job market 
or structural unemployment. 20 
From the preceding discussion is it apparent that, on the one hand, Sabah has 
an unemployment problem among school leavers and on the other, a shortage of 
skilled manpower. However, since the handful of industries in Sabah are still labour 
intensive, at the present the demand for skilled manpower is not so pressing. Most 
of the present industries use cheap and unskilled foreign labour from the Philippines 
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and Indonesia. Thus, the demand for skilled manpower is determined by the 
economic principle of supply and demand. For instance, before the ban on the export 
of logs which was Sabah's major export earner, this industry used many unskilled 
foreign labourers. After the ban in 1993, the demand for skilled manpower has 
grown due to the down stream processing of timber which has triggered the demand 
for skilled labour in the sawmills and furniture factories. It is believed that the 
downstream processing of timber will create more employment. As a result, training 
centres have increased the number of courses they run in timber and wood 
processing, and related areas. Kota Kinabalu Industrial Park still has a long way to 
go to before it is fully operational. But if Malaysia starts training its manpower, it 
will have sufficient skilled labour when most of the industrial infrastructure becomes 
ready by the year 2000. The main difficulty in fulfilling this goal, however, is the 
lack of training centres. The present skill training centres are run by the Human 
Resource Bureau, Ministry of agriculture, MARA, the Education Department, the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry and other public agencies can only admit 
a limited number of trainees. 
A study by the Economic Planning Unit and the Asian Development Bank in 
March 1991 showed shortages of skilled and unskilled manpower in various sectors. 
The ten employment sectors studied were manufacturing, construction, finance, the 
service, public and informal sectors, agriculture, fishing forestry and mining. The 
findings of this report make sense insofar as they acknowledge Sabah as lacking 
skilled manpower in chemical industries, construction, computer and science. 
However, it is ridiculous to suggest that Sabah has a deficiency of skilled workers 
such as chefs, customers services, drivers, and agricultural technicians. This 
imbalance indicates some weaknesses in the implementation of the overall 
development plan and the National Education Policy in particular. 
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6. NA 77ONA L EDUCATION PROBLEMS A ND FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICTS 
The goal of becoming industrialised by the year 2020 has led to new political 
conflicts in Sabah. The inadequacy of both educational opportunities and facilities 
in Sabah has made local leaders question the capability and sincerity of the Federal 
Government in providing such services. In the 1960s and 70s Sabah's problems were 
presented to the Federal Government through formal administrative channels. 
Further, due to the Industrial Master Plan that was promulgated in the 1980s under 
Mahathir's premiership, there was a strong awareness among Sabahan leaders of the 
need for skilled manpower. Due to the poor quality of education, the PBS 
Administration demanded that the Federal Government improve the quality of 
education as well as provide a fully fledged university for Sabah. Furthermore, in 
comparison with West Malaysians, Sabahans felt that they had been discriminated in 
terms of access to better education. This is a legitimate issue for a Government that 
wanted to gain support against the Federal encroachment on Sabah's rights under the 
"Twenty Points Agreement. " 
Due to the Federal-State crisis in Sabah, many Federal projects were blocked 
by the PBS Government and acquiring State land for building schools was difficult. 
This also affected many educational development projects; in particular, the 
construction of new schools. For instance, during the PBS Administration in Sabah, 
from the 60 education development projects supervised by the Federal Development 
Department, the PWD, the Federal Territory of Labuan, and the Federal Land 
Development Authority only 12 were implemented. These projects were new primary 
and secondary schools, teachers quarters, a special education programme, a 
co-curriculum centre, a sport secretariat, and construction of some vocational schools. 
From the allocation of RM142,8312,735 only RM68,637.49 was actually spent on 
these projects by the middle of 1995. 
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Furthermore, with strong Chinese support for the PBS Government, the 
Chinese schools were indirectly shielded from Federal supervision. Effort was made 
to improve Federal relations in Sabah by granting Federal Funds to some Chinese 
high schools. 
Thus, in the early 1990s, there were frequent visits by the Minister of 
Education and the Deputy Minister of Education from Kuala Lumpur to investigate 
Sabah's education problems. However, the federal leaders responded by saying that 
they could not meet the demand for a full university unless the Sabahans supported 
the federal government. If the demand was granted, it would probably encourage 
anti-federal sentiments or opposition. At the very least, the whole crisis indicated 
that another round of Federal-State political bargaining was necessary (Milne and 
Ratnam, 1974). 
These educational issues subsided when the National Front Government 
regained control of Sabah after the local elections in 1994. In fact, the PBS actually 
won these elections by a very small margin, but its elected assemblymen defected to 
the National Front. As a consequence, the demands for better education were taken 
seriously. This can be gauged from the establishment of University Malaysia Sabah 
within 100 Days of National Front Government. 
7. SOME UNINTENDED OUTCOMES 
The Malaysian National Education Policy has been reviewed three times since 
1957 which indicates the Government's awareness that education needs continuous 
revision in order to meet the nation's needs. During the 1957 Education Act, Malay 
was made the first language of instruction. It was aimed at creating both a 
Malaysian identity and shedding the last remnants of British influence. The 
Education Act was the beginning of an attempt to create uniformity in eduction at all 
levels through one National Education System. In 1961, this system underwent some 
reviews which emphasized the basic aims of Malaysian nationalism such as the use 
of Bahasa Malaysia, moral and religious education, and vocational and technical 
193 
education. The 1979 Cabinet Report on education was an attempt to reform the 
National Education System. In particular, it attempted to improve quality to meet the 
industrialization process, build a Malaysian nation through education and emphasize 
skills in reading, writing and Arithmetic (the "3Rs"). In addition, the 1979 report 
adopted a National Education Philosophy in order to create well educated, holistic 
individuals who are capable of contributing to the nation. Furthermore, National 
Education was used as a tool to implement the NEP's objectives of restructuring 
society. On the whole, the National Education Philosophy is a mechanism for the 
advancement of Bumiputeras and Malays. Due to this, it is undeniable that some 
efforts have been made to promote Malay and Bumiputeras participation in education. 
Indeed, by 1990 the effects of this policy could be seen as some Bumiputeras and 
indigenous Malays were working as doctors, engineers and in other professional 
capacities. Such a situation strongly contrasts with the position just thirty years 
previously. Further, much to the pride of those who planned the National Education 
System, the younger generation Chinese are now able to speak and write Bahasa 
Malaysia fluently. On the whole, this generation is no longer confined to their 
villages but are migrating to urban areas to seek better pay and living conditions. 
With more qualified Bumiputeras and Malays in higher education, this has reduced 
the prejudiced outlook that they are "lazy" and "backward". 
However, the unintended outcomes of the National Education deserve more 
attention in order for Malaysia to become a developed and united country by the year 
2020. Sabah's achievements in education are evidently below national standards. In 
terms of the restructuring objective, National Education in Sabah was not so 
successful in reducing the inequalities between the rich and the poor, and urban and 
rural areas. The National Education Policy benefits individuals rather than the nation 
as a whole. The additional demands which were placed on the education system in 
order for it to meet the industrialization programmes have exacerbated problems 
associated with a lack of teaching staff. Furthermore, the special privileges given to 
Bumiputeras in access to higher education have affected the quality of education in 
Malaysia. Effectively quality is being sacrificed for quantity due to the need to 
increase the number of Bumiputeras professionals. The education system is 
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influenced by politics, and thus it is difficult to achieve balance and continuity. This 
has led to differential rates of achievement according to subject. For example, in 
English, both teaching quality and examination performance have deteriorated since 
education has been nationalised. 
The uniqueness of the outcomes in Sabah is that people with no education 
have few problems getting employed. Whereas, there are large numbers of 
unemployed school leavers. 
It is likely that the implementation problems faced by the National Education 
Policy will result in a reform of the system. For instance, there have already been 
demands from Islamic educators to Islamize the system. Indeed, more Islamic 
subjects are beginning to be introduced in higher institutions and corresponding 
changes will also be made at pre-school, primary and secondary school levels. The 
Islamization process is an indication of a larger conflict which will face Malaysia 
unless the Vision 2020 challenges are carefully handled. This potentiality for conflict 
is rooted in the multi-ethnic nature of Malaysian society. With the new Deputy 
Prime Minister, Anwar (who is well known for his Islamic leanings and as former 
Education Minister) the implementation of Islamization measures in schools may 
become a reality. '-' 
8. CONCLUSION 
Although it is apparent from several studies that Sabah faces various 
educational problems, they cannot be solved easily. One of the reasons for this is 
that Sabah has been a victim of capitalist exploitation. For example, the creation of 
a proper infrastructure which would, in turn, create employment opportunities for 
local people is being neglected. The education policy and education planning that 
was meant to promote Bumiputera interest is worthless if no jobs are being created. 
Thus, it is no surprise that a majority of those completing vocational courses are 
unemployed (William, 1989: 71). In addition, many of the rural people still live by 
means of subsistence farming. 
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Furthermore, due to globalization, the education system cannot be based on 
narrow political interests or developmental and ideological approaches. Instead, it 
has to be founded on pragmatism and global knowledge approaches. For instance, 
development of economic capital must be balanced with development of human 
capital. This will avoid a situation where the state is capable of building more 
expensive hotels to attract tourists but neglects the fundamental issue of quality 
education. Besides, parents also need to show a sense of urgency when dealing with 
Sabah's educational problems. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ISLAMIZATION AND COMMUNITIES IN SABAH 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the problems of Islam as a national ideology in a multi- 
ethnic society. It identifies the various problems within the Islamic communities and 
the responses of other communities to the Islamization process that is occurring in 
Malaysia today. This is followed by discussions concerning: (a) the issues of Islamic 
values and the national unity and integration programmes; (b) the conflict between 
Federal and State Authorities responsible for the propagation of Islam; (c) the 
ideological conflict in economic matters; (d) the conflicting roles of Federal and State 
National Unity Agencies; (e) the informal process of implementation of the relevant 
policies; (f) Islam and communal interests; and (g) the unintended outcomes of the 
policies and strategies. In discussing these issues, it is important to note that Islamic 
and communal issues are legally regarded as sensitive matters and which should not 
be openly discussed in public. All these restrictions originate from the need to 
preserve national unity and integration as well as Islamic sanctity. Thus, it is 
extremely difficult to collect data on these matters particularly in the context of 
Sabah. 
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I. I Background to the Problems 
From the racial and ethnic compositions of Malaysia, the Bumiputeras are the 
dominant groups (Hirschman, 1987: 555-577). However, Bumiputeras are divided 
in terms of religion, politics, ethnicity and class. Conflicts are inevitable in a 
heterogenous Malaysian society when the dominant group tries to control the others. 
These divisive problems have made the issue of national unity prominent in Malaysia 
as a whole. 
For instance, economic differences arising from economic factors led the 
government of Malaysia to adopt the NEP (1971-1990). Basically, its objectives were 
to restructure Malaysian society, reduce income inequality and eradicate poverty (see 
chapters two and three for a discussion of NEP). 
However, the government failed to consider the ideological issues in the 
NEP's restructuring objectives. Islam, as an official religion, was left to flourish 
under the state authority. Thus, the Federal government had initially little power to 
intervene in matters concerning Islamic issues. There was no centralized control over 
Islam despite its status as an official ideology. It is not surprising that each state has 
a different interpretation of Islam and different Islamic legislation. The national 
economy was the main priority under NEP while Islam was left to the discretion of 
state governments. The issue of Bumiputera participation in the economy was used 
to maintain the Bumiputera legitimacy in government. Thus, the Bumiputera issues 
were being politicized. As a result the Malaysian society remains divided rather than 
united as envisaged in the Rukunegara. The various ethnic groups, beliefs and 
cultures are obstacles to national unity and integration. As politics is often 
economically motivated, there are some groups that feel left out. For instance, the 
traditional orthodox Muslims find it hard to participate in government and the 
economy where the basic principles of Islam are omitted. Traditionally Islam, and 
the state are inseparable. In addition, since Islam is an official religion, non-Muslim 
Bumiputeras felt themselves treated as second class Bumiputeras. Divisions among 
Bumiputeras of different ethnic and religious backgrounds have actually benefitted 
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the Chinese. This means the Chinese have more political bargaining power against 
the Bumiputera dominated government. In Sabah, the differences among 
Bumiputeras make the Chinese the king-makers in government (see Appendix M on 
voter composition by ethnicity). The Chinese can align with whatever party they 
choose as long as they remain united ethnically. ' Furthermore, from the economic 
point of view, the Chinese businesses and capital constitute a notable part of the 
nation's assets. 2 
1.1.1 Islam and the Problem s of Islamic Comm unities 
As an official ideology, Islam cannot be omitted from studies concerning the 
socio-economic and political problems of Malaysia as it plays a significant role in 
the Malaysian Administration. 
Basically, there are two recognised groups of Muslims, as well as various 
deviationist teachings. The main schools of Islam are the Sunnah Wal Jemaah and 
the Shiites. Officially, Islam in Malaysia belongs to the Sunnah Wal Jemaah school 
of Shafii and teaching of Al-Ghazali. (The three other schools are Hanafi, Maliki, 
and Hanbali). This school is based on the Syariah and the teaching of Prophet 
Muhammad (hadiths). This is in contrast to the Shiite Muslims who are more of an 
Islamic political movement. The Shiites, like the Sunnis uphold Syariah, Koran, 
Sunnah (tradition of the Prophet), and ijma (consensus). The main difference 
between Sunnis and Shiites is their view about qiyas (analogy). The Shiites replace 
qiyas with aql (reason) (see Nomani & Rahnema, 1994: 2-16). Historically, there has 
been some feuds between the two groups over the teaching of Muhammad. Due to 
these fundamental differences, the Malaysian Government decided to ban the Shiites' 
teaching. The Al Arqam movement is also banned in Malaysia as its teaching has 
Shiite influence (Hj. Abdullah, 1992). 
However, Malaysia does not practise the Hudud Penal Code which requires 
the death sentence for serious offenses such as murder and a hand to be chopped off 
for theft. Its legal system is inherited from the British Colonial Administration. 3 
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As a national ideology, Islam covers almost all aspects of Malaysian lives. 
For example, the values of Islam play an important role in shaping the major 
planning policies in Malaysia. The constitution provided that Islam should be the 
official religion of Malaysia. The Rukunegara's oath, although ceremonious, upholds 
the principles of Islam and promotes its greatness. Nevertheless, before the policy 
on "The Assimilation Of Islamic Values In The Administration" was introduced in 
1985, there were only a few Islamic institutions that worked directly to disseminate 
and preserve Islam as an official religion in Malaysia. The government's position at 
that time was more Malay nationalism than Islamization. Islam took the upper stage 
only in official ceremony and protocol. For instance, although the NEP was aimed 
at helping Bumiputeras and at eradicating rural poverty, fundamentally it did not 
realise that most of the rural poor were Muslims. (This is with the exception of 
Sabah and Sarawak where some of the Bumiputeras are non-Muslim. ) Infrastructural 
development of the Malay rural areas alone is insufficient unless this is coupled with 
the development of rural Islamic institutions. In fact, in the old days, the words 
"Malay" and "Muslim" were being used interchangeably. When someone converted 
to Islam, he was considered to be entering the Malay community or to be Malay. 
Thus without a clear definition of Islam in Malaysia, this official ideology is being 
misinterpreted by various groups (B. H.: 4.7.92 and N. S. T.: 17.4.96). 
After more than 25 years of independence, Islam has brought some changes 
to the administration of Malaysia. Traditionally, the Malay Kings were regarded as 
the protectors of Islam. However, with modernization, both the Islamic tradition in 
the palaces and the power of the traditional village Imam began to erode. ' Thus, 
without enough Islamic machinery the modern bureaucracy is becoming more 
powerful than Islam. The sanctity of Islam is also being challenged. This challenge 
is inevitable particularly in a heterogenous society such as Malaysia. Considering the 
heterogenous society, the leadership has been adopting a moderate stance on Islams 
However, the moderate approach in the administration of Islam has not only 
raised doubts among the non-Muslims, it has also received strong challenges from 
Islamic movements and the Pan Islamic Malaysian Party (PAS). Certain groups and 
200 
individuals (especially members of PAS) are involved in issuing and disseminating 
a "fatwa" (i. e. an order by Islamic authority) that Malays who are not members of 
PAS are unIslamic. This "fatwa" has not only created misunderstanding, disunity and 
misinterpretation of the Koran among Muslims, but caused various unusual incidents. 
Among them were: two imams in a mosque, performing marriage solemnization 
twice, refusing to pay the "zakat" (Muslim tithes) to the government "amils" 
(collectors of tithes), creating separate graveyards, boycotting other Muslims, 
quarrelling and separation among Muslim families. ' 
The Memali Incident on 19th November 1985 was a manifestation of the 
threat against the sanctity of Islam. This incident was caused by the deviationist 
teaching of Ibrahim Mhamood (Ibrahim Libya) who managed to instigate his 
followers to fight against the authority. This caused a clash between the followers 
of Ibrahim and the police. This clash led to the arrest of several followers, the death 
of Ibrahim and thirteen of his followers as well as four policemen (Memali Incident 
Report 21 of 1986). Prior to this, the former Minister of Home Affairs, Musa Hitam, 
had issued a white paper dated 8th November, 1984 on "Islamic Solidarity And 
Security. " Musa warned that certain elements had taken advantage of the Islamic 
revival to spread deviationist teachings based on the wrong interpretation of the 
Koran. ' This revival started after the Iran Islamic Revolution in 1979. 
Islamization is also deemed necessary to encourage Muslims to save and 
invest in banks and engage in economic activities. What has become an obstacle to 
their engagement in economic activities is the Islamic principle that prevents Muslims 
from living on interest. This problem has to be taken into consideration when 
devising any economic programmes that will affect Muslims. According to the 
Prophet Mohammad, a "dirham of riba" which a man receives knowingly is worse 
than committing adultery thirty-six times" or "Riba (Syariah rule against earning on 
interest) has seventy segments, the least serious being equivalent to a man 
committing adultery with his mother. "' 
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Furthermore, with the failure of the NEP and various social policies, the 
leaders of the United Malay Nationalist Organization look to Islamization as an 
alternative. Under the Policy on Assimilation of Islamic Values in Administration, 
which was introduced in 1985, the objectives are: to create a moral society that has 
a strong identity and is respected by other societies; a happy nation; the eradication 
of negative attitudes and to produce quality services. On the whole these objectives 
represent an attempt to strike a balance between economic development and the 
preservation of moral values. The policy is based on eleven universal Islamic values 
which are: trustworthiness, sense of responsibility, sincerity, dedication, moderation, 
hard work, cleanliness, good discipline, co-operation, and being kind and thankful. 9 
It is an attempt to reform and modernize Islam. These Islamic reform measures will 
in some ways serve to overcome the obstacles posed by traditional Muslims in the 
implementation of the development plan. 
The aim of the UMNO dominated National Front Coalition is to win the 
support of the non-Muslims. Their support is important in implementing development 
policies and in passing legislation in Parliament. Thus its strategy on Islamization 
is based on persuasion rather than force. On the other hand, there are Islamic groups 
who want to establish the Islamic state no matter what the consequences. Thus, 
religious forces can be seen to be intervening factors in the implementation of 
planning policies. Nevertheless, when Vision 2020 was promulgated in February 
1991, one should note that UMNO was voted out of power by PAS in the State of 
Kelantan during the 1990 General Elections. PAS (an Islamic based Party) won with 
overwhelming majority. 10 Thus, there is little doubt that the recent emphasis on 
Islamic values is an attempt to keep UMNO legitimacy in government. 
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1.1.2 The Dilemma Of Islam As A National Ideology In A Multi-Ethnic Society: The 
Challenges A head 
Vision 2020's nine challenges are divided into two groups: one is concerned 
with building national values and the other with economic growth through 
industrialization. Economic prosperity will consolidate the National Front's 
regimented style of Government. " The national values will hopefully help to unite 
the people of various ethnicities and bring the fourteen states closer together. 
However, the national values which are based on Islam are in contradiction with the 
values of the multi-ethnic society in Malaysia. Due to the need to accumulate wealth 
through economic activities, the capitalist ideology also intermingled with the Islamic 
ideology, ethnic cultures and religions. In principle, the Malaysian form of planning 
is based on a capitalist ideology that is set within the boundaries of Islamic values. 
However, to the non-Muslims, Islam does not become a hindrance to their capitalist 
pursuit. For instance, the problem of usury (riba) is not an obstacle to the non- 
Muslims. 
However, Vision 2020 faces various challenges from the traditional Muslim 
opposition. Actually, the challenges have led the present government to reform the 
Islamic Administration in order to preserve its legitimacy. 
'` Furthermore, this reform 
is necessary considering that many of the social ills and commercial crimes have 
involved Muslims. Although such reforms will help to consolidate the Muslims' 
support, it contradicts the policy on national unity. Simultaneously, although the 
capitalist concept of assimilation is a good alternative, it has been resented by the 
traditional orthodox Muslims. The motive behind the policy is to modernize and 
reform Islam so that it can meet the present global social, political and economic 
challenges as well as ethnic differences within Malaysia. 
It is very difficult to explain the Islamization policy in Malaysia without any 
truly successful model of an Islamic country that all Muslim countries can relate to. 
Most well established Islamic countries around the world do not face the communal 
problems as they are homogenous societies. Thus Islamic laws can be easily 
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implemented without much opposition. The problems of Islamic peaceful coexistence 
in a heterogenous society can be witnessed in history. For instance, India was 
divided into three, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh as Muslims and Hindus found it 
difficult to live together. The classic examples of religious conflicts can be found 
in Bosnia and Palestine/Israel. Thus, Malaysia is taking a high risk by adopting the 
policy on "Assimilation of Islamic Values". 
A study by Nagata et al (1980) recognised that the revival of Islam through 
Islamic missionary activities has challenged the traditional authority throughout 
Malaysia. The issue of Malay identity is becoming less relevant as Malays become 
better educated and wealthier. This might be the motive behind the Islamization 
programmes in Malaysia but Islamization could also have exacerbated the ethnic 
differences. 
From the economic point of view, religion (in this context Islam), is also an 
impediment to the implementation of development programmes and progress. A 
study by von Der Mehden (1980: 545-553) indicated that fundamentalist Muslims are 
boycotting many aspects of Western culture. This includes Western economics which 
are the root of present economic development, and also what they see as the immoral 
values. Thus, fundamentalist Muslims are obviously against the capitalist ideology. 
In principle, Islam is about the Greatness of Allah (Allahu Akhbar) and above all 
ideology. This is different from the protestant ethic which in itself helps to promote 
capitalist accumulation (Weber, 1976). However, Islam is not much of a hinderance 
to the development of capitalism nor is it against the cause of socialism (Jomo, 1996: 
143). This is as long as development is carried out in the name of Islam. 
Nevertheless, Islam has been used by certain parties to achieve their political aims. 13 
For example by using Islam against the capitalist system. 
In addition, national unity becomes even more difficult with the rise of a new 
class structure and ethnic politics. The NEP's restructuring objective had produced 
the new Bumiputera middle class and businessmen. By the 1980s, there existed new 
middle class Bumiputeras and businessmen in Sabah, although they were still few 
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compared to the Chinese. This new group of Bumiputeras will pose a challenge to 
Chinese based capitalism. According to Jomo (1986), the ethnic differences in 
Malaysia have changed into class differences. Thus, the urban areas in Sabah are 
centres of class struggle between the Chinese and the Bumiputeras. This, in itself, 
has produced a class society and a class struggle within the urban areas. This is a 
manifestation of the NEP, a policy that promotes Bumiputera capitalism. 
However, according to Hamilton (1977: 337-351) the Chinese capitalists are 
themselves fragmented. He found that the Chinese in Southeast Asia are adopting 
double identity. Hamilton suggests, 
"One aspect of the identity is sub-ethnic regional identification, the 
other aspect an ethnic Chinese identification. The stronger one's 
sub-ethnic identity, the more taken for granted and meaningful in a 
societal context one's Chinese identity becomes. If one can answer 
Teochiu or Sze-Yap or Hakka to the question 'what are you? ' then 
one's identity is securely Chinese. " 
(Hamilton, 1977: 348) 
Nagata (1977: 395-398) observed that in an urban Malaysian Muslim Mercantile 
community, the Indians, Arabs and Malays considered themselves to be Malay. 
However, under certain conditions they sometimes identify themselves according to 
their ethnic origins. Thus within the Muslim mercantile community, there is also 
some social differentiation. Ethnicity is not an independent variable. 
"The components of "ethnicity" then are variously cultural, of origin, 
religious, and sociopolitical, and "ethnicity" in or itself does not 
"determine" or explain any behaviour or relationship. " 
(Nagata, 1977: 397) 
Furthermore, Nagata found that, "urbanism per se does not appear to be a crucial 
variable either in dissolving or precipitating ethnic consciousness, in keeping groups 
apart or in providing pressure for coalition or assimilation. " Rather, factors of non- 
or supra-urban origin e. g. government policy and economic structure, must be 
invoked here. Furthermore, the use of the Malay Language as a national and official 
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language has not been able to resolve the ethnic differences other than as a lingua 
franca. Indeed, the other ethnic groups regarded this as an attempt to eradicate their 
languages and cultures. The other ethnic groups are adopting and learning Bahasa 
Malaysia just to gain entry into the Civil Service and to pass the public examinations. 
Some scholars are also puzzled that although Indians and Chinese have undergone 
modernization, their cultures have not changed. Thus culture as a praxis has a strong 
significance in explaining social relations or behaviour. 
On the other hand, Spicer's theory shows: "The degree of an ethnic group's 
identity will vary in direct proportion to the amount of opposition encountered by the 
group, the greater the degree of opposition, the greater the degree of identity, and 
conversely, the lesser the amount of opposition the lesser the degree of identity, " 
(Scott, 1990: 163). Let us consider this theory in the context of Malaysia. 
Considering the various policies under Vision 2020, the author thinks that it 
is an attempt to assimilate Malaysians of various ethnic groups into the positive 
capitalist culture. This claim is based on the USA assimilation model. However, the 
capitalist development in Malaysia is founded on the Islamic ethic. This is akin to 
Weber's work on the "Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. " However, the 
author thinks that this approach will cause various ideological contradictions as well 
as with the National Unity and Integration mechanism and the heterogenous society. 
The Islamic state hypothesis will be difficult realise concretely due to the multi- 
ethnic society. So would the Malaysian society be better off left alone to lead their 
own lives in a plural society as before the NEP (Milne, 1967)? To answer the 
question, let us consider some of the issues affecting the Islamization and the national 
unity and integration policies. 
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2. THE "A SSIMILA TION OF ISLAMIC VA L UES IN A DMINIS TRA TION" A ND 
"NA TIONA L UNITY " POLICIES IN PRA CTICE: ISLAMIC REFORMA 7ION TO 
PRE'SE'RVE IMAGE, MAINTAIN NA TIONA L UNITY AND PUBLIC 
CONFIDENCE 
2.1 National Unity 14 
After the Racial Riot in 1969, the NEP and the Rukunegara were promulgated 
as the initial mechanisms to bring about national unity and social order. Prior to this, 
there had been some effort by the government to unite Malaysian society in fighting 
the communists in West Malaysia after World War II and fighting the Indonesian 
confrontation just after the formation of Malaysia in 1963. Thus, some propaganda 
machinery already existed to make the people support the government and appreciate 
the newly formed Malaysian Nation. The electronic media are government controlled 
and the private press strictly monitored. Since then, national leaders have always 
emphasized national unity and integration in their speeches and various programmes 
are now being introduced to promote these. This is also supplemented by some 
legislation aimed at bringing about order and controlling the dissemination of 
sensitive issues by irresponsible groups and individuals. 
The top level committees which have been created to take care of national 
unity and national integration are all under the control of the National Security 
Council. Under this council are the Psychological Warfare Committee; the 
Committee for the Integration of States in Malaysia; and Working Committees for 
the Integration of States in Malaysia (an implementation committee responsible to the 
main committee). In turn, these committees involve various government agencies 
working together to promote and preserve national unity and integration. 
The Ministry of National Unity and Social Development is more of an 
implementation agency. It is here that the various programmes are planned, budgeted 
and co-ordinated. However, this ministry is answerable to the national level 
committees. The main agency involved in promoting these programmes is the 
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Department of National Unity. The main objective of the Department of National 
Unity is in line with the Vision 2020 national development policies, the constitution 
and Rukunegara. It is to preserve, promote and consolidate national unity and 
national integration. Uniting the people of various ethnic groups and religions from 
the 14 states in Malaysia is an ambitious task. 
The process of national integration works hand in hand with national unity. 
The committee responsible for national integration is the National Integration 
Committee. Their work involves building a national identity which will bring the 
people of the 14 states closer together. This is in accordance with the Rukunegara 
and the Malaysian constitution which both provide for the people of Malaysia to live 
together in peace and harmony. The duties of this committee are: identifying the 
problems of national integration; identifying similarities and positive aspects of the 
regions in Malaysia; and making proposals for consolidating cooperation, 
understanding and integration. 
The duties and functions of these top level management committees look very 
interesting. Thus let us go down the line to see how the programmes work in 
practice. Under the Ministry of National Unity and Social Development, a 
specialized agency, the Department of National Unity is created with the specialised 
function of promoting national integration and unity. The Department has its branch 
in Sabah. Its vision, mission, objective and motto are all based on the concept of 
promoting and preserving national unity. It adopts all the good values and traits of 
a good neighbour. Its basic principle regarding communal consensus is unity in all 
community matters and decisions. At the ministerial level, there is a panel of 
advisers on national unity which has been created according to the Compulsory 
Regulation of National Consultative Council 1970. The Panel of Advisers on 
National Unity was formerly called the National Consultative Council. Since 1990, 
many new programmes have been introduced which are: the creation of the 
Committee On National Integration (30th January 1990); the annual Unity Day 
declared on 16th September 1992; and the Youth Camp programme (1994). These 
programmes and committees are needed especially when Sabah - under the PBS - 
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began to raise issues of regionalism. This regionalism is evident in slogans such as 
"Sabah for Sabahans" and the "20 points" condition for Sabah when it joined 
Malaysia in 1963. The role of the Committee on National Integration is to make sure 
that the right and proper programmes of integration, based on the positive aspects of 
the values and similarities of the people of the regions are implemented. For 
instance, the Department of National Unity conducts various activities which include 
exchange visits between Sabahan and Sarawakian with West Malaysians and vice 
versa. Such exchanges involve Malaysians of all age groups, sexes and regions as 
the target groups. Workshops are organized to find ways and means to promote and 
preserve national unity. There are also various programmes which are aimed at 
promoting good neighbourly relationships. The neighbourhood programmes include 
leadership, youth groups, neighbourhood watch, etc. There are also travelling 
incentives such as cheaper fares for people to travel so that they can understand each 
other's cultures. The competitions in writing, arts, poetry and sports are also being 
organised. There are also various publications in the form of magazines, newspapers, 
journals and reports which are aimed at promoting national unity and good 
relationships among Malaysians of various ethnicities and beliefs. There are also 
unity awards as an incentive for those who have made some contribution to national 
unity. 
Besides the Department of National Unity, other public sectors are also taking 
steps to promote national unity in Malaysia. The Public Service Department (PSD), 
as an independent and politically impartial agency, has been playing an important 
role in national integration and in uniting the people of various ethnic groups. The 
PSD as co-ordinator of all government departments is taking steps to ensure that the 
Vision 2020 challenges are being met. In addressing the challenges of a united, 
balanced and harmonious society, the PSD is promoting national integration dialogues 
and transfer program between the Sabah and Sarawak administration with the Federal 
administration. It attempts to achieve some uniformity in the administrative 
machinery. Thus, it needs to have uniformity in aims and aspirations, values, 
systems, procedures and techniques. This can be achieved through a unity of 
thinking, action and service. 
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In promoting dialogues among Civil Servants of the fourteen States in 
Malaysia, the Government has created the Federal and State Governments Relation 
Committee. This committee is chaired by the secretary of state for Malaysia and 
attended by secretary generals of various federal ministries and state secretaries of 
the 14 states. The forum facilitates the implementation of certain government 
policies. It also fosters understanding between federal and state governments on the 
various public services. The Public Service Department and State Government of 
Sabah and Sarawak public relation meetings have been successful in dealing with 
certain internal problems since they were formed in 1988. They help to expose 
officers from both sides to the latest development in the areas concerned. The forum 
also helps officers to become acquainted with each other, build administrative 
networks and thereby improve quality. It has proved useful in settling matters 
relating to personnel and in fostering strong relations. 
Although most of the Public Service Department programmes have proved 
effective in fostering national integration, much more needs to be done both in terms 
of quality and quantity. As national integration is not static but changes with time, 
continuous innovation is needed to meet the current challenges. For instance, when 
Sabah was under the opposition party, PBS, the post of Federal-State Relation Officer 
was created. When the National Front parties formed a new government in Sabah 
in 1994, the post was abolished. 
The Ministry Of Information Malaysia also plays an important role in 
propagating national integration and unity. This is in line with the principles of 
Rukunegara (National Ideology Oaths) and Vision 2020. It serves as the 
government's mouth-piece. The various agencies under the ministry are: Department 
of Information, Department of Broadcasting (RTM), BERNAMA (national press 
agency), National Film of Malaysia, Malaysian National Film Development 
Corporation, Malaysian Press Institute and Tun Abdul Razak Broadcasting Institute. 
During the communist insurgencies after World War II in West Malaysia, and 
the Indonesian confrontation after the formation of Malaysia, the ministry played an 
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important role in the propaganda war. Its efforts were successful in winning the 
people's hearts and minds. Through its mobile units, the people were shown 
propaganda movies and talks about possible threats to the nation. During peace time, 
the Ministry, through its various agencies, continues its role by propagating national 
integration and national unity. 
Furthermore, Malaysia has adopted the National Culture Policy. Due to its 
heterogenous society, Malaysia is now trying to develop a single Malaysian culture 
for all the various ethnic groups. The thrust of this national culture will be the 
Malay culture. 15 However, some of the cultures from other ethnic groups that are 
relevant are also inculcated into the national culture. However, Islam will be the 
most influential in the formation of the new Malaysian National Culture. One of the 
objectives of the National Cultural Policy is, "consolidating national and racial unity 
through culture" (Dept. Of Information, 1992: 291-292). Thus, there is now a 
growing concern to rehabilitate, preserve and develop culture, to instil cultural 
leadership, to campaign for national awareness, nationalism and nationhood, improve 
the standard and quality of the arts and to meet the needs of the social culture. In 
line with the policy, various cultural activities, research, arts performance, courses 
and other facilities are being implemented. Other than the various agencies at 
Federal and State level, the development of Malaysian national culture needs the 
involvement and contributions of the private sectors such as the cultural associations. 
This is in line with the privatization policy. 
The various government agencies involved in national integration and national 
unity have spent millions of ringgits in trying to implement the various programmes. 
However, the social activities aimed at promoting national integration and national 
unity are intangible things. Although some of these activities were conducted, it was 
difficult to reach the target groups. For instance, activities such as public talks and 
film shows do not now attract a meaningful audience. Civic activities conducted in 
the Malay areas are seldom attended by other communities such as the Indians and 
Chinese. The Chinese, as business communities, construed it as a waste of their 
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time. However, activities that will bring them good business are being attended by 
the Chinese. 
In addition to these national integration and unity programmes, economic 
activities aimed at restructuring society and reducing the inequality gap were outlined 
under the NEP. This NEP objective is being continued under the National 
Development Policy (1990-2000) in modified form. However, the institutions for the 
preserving of Bumiputera privileges remains. 
2.2 The Islamic Values 
Besides ethnic differences, the Muslims are also divided in their beliefs on 
Islam. Islamic revival after the Islamic revolution led to the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism in Malaysia. Prior to this, the traditional rural Muslims had been an 
obstacle to the government in implementing development plans. Their traditional 
Muslim beliefs were not in line with the government's moderate modern views of 
Islam. In addition, the Islamic party PAS has been inciting Muslims against the 
government. Thus, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Malaysia has divided the 
Muslims further. Furthermore, as the author mentioned earlier in the chapter, some 
traditional Islamic movements are preaching deviationist teachings. For instance, the 
Al Arkam Movement believed in their leaders as saviours. They led their own lives 
separate from other communities and Muslims until their movement was banned in 
1994.16 
Thus, when Mahathir took over the premiership in 1981, he introduced several 
Islamic institutions. He established the Islamic secondary schools complete with 
hostels, an International Islamic University, Islamic Bank, Islamic Insurance 
Company, and revamped the Islamic Affairs Division in the Prime Minister's 
Department. In 1985, he introduced the policy on the Assimilation of Islamic values 
in the Administration. However, as a first step, the policy will be implemented only 
in the government administration. In line with the revival of Islam and for political 
reasons, Mahathir established a branch of the Islamic Affairs Division of the Prime 
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Minister's Department in Sabah. Other reasons for the expansion of the Division 
were the problems of deviationist teachings and the existence of anti-Islamic elements 
who were trying to destroy Islam. " Thus the government is adopting a policy which 
will propagate the good values of Islam. This will help to preserve harmony, social, 
economic and political stability as well as to guarantee the security of Malaysia. By 
the 1990s, the modernization and reformation of Islam will have touched almost all 
aspects of Islam. These cover circumcision procedure, marriage and polygamy, 
education, welfare, economy and administration of Islam at various levels. Even some 
of the unIslamic palace traditions are being abolished. 18 However, Mahathir has 
always emphasized tolerance on religious issues in Malaysia. 19 
The above discussions of national unity, national integration and Islamization 
indicates that the government has not neglected the problems which stem from a 
multi-ethnic society. Like the US, the Malaysian constitution does guarantee that the 
people will live together in peace, harmony and be free to practise their own beliefs 
and cultures. The policy and programmes on national unity and integration provide 
good mechanisms for preserving, maintaining and promoting national unity and 
integration. However, the spirit of the constitution and the values of the 
government's overall policies are based on Islamic ideology. Although national unity 
and national integration aims to build a national identity, the direction taken by the 
government is toward assimilation of the people into Islamic values. The policy on 
AIVA clearly stated that the implementation would be based on persuasion rather 
than force. Due to its heterogenous society, there is no law that prevents the building 
of Christian churches (see article 11, Federal Constitution). In Sabah, the building 
of more churches under the PBS government, received a negative response from the 
Islamic community; especially from West Malaysia. Furthermore, the incidence of 
Kadazan Islamic converts reverting back to their old beliefs are being criticized 
(Unar, 1994: 28-36). Although freedom of religion is provided in the Constitution, 
such actions are regarded as an embarrassment to the national ideology and the 
administration of Islam in Sabah. 
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3. THIS CONFLICT' BETWEF_N FEDERA LA ND STA TE- ISLAMIC A UI'HORITIES 
AND THE CHALLENGE OF ISLAMIC ADMINISTRATION 
According to article 3 of the Federal constitution, although the state 
government has power to make its own law regarding Islam, the Yang Di-Pertuan 
Agong is regarded as the head of Islam in all the fourteen states. Thus, with the 
approval of the Council of Rulers the Agong can make rules and decisions on Islam 
which apply to the whole of Malaysia. Despite this constitutional provision, the 
federal government has to take over responsibilities regarding Islam which are 
thought to be of national and political interest. For instance, the Federal Government 
has jurisdiction over areas such as the propagation of Islamic values and the 
management of pilgrimages. In addition, all matters regarding the management of 
the newly introduced Islamic economy are under Federal jurisdiction. 
3.1 Islamic Affairs Division of the Prime Minister's Department (BAHEIS) '0 
The Islamic Affairs Division of the Prime Minister's Department (BAHEIS) 
was extended to Sabah on Ist June 1984. This extension to Sabah and to the rest of 
the 14 states is an initial measure to streamline the administration of Islam. 
However, the expansion of BAHEIS to Sabah is on the pretext of helping JAHEINS 
(Department of Islamic Affairs Sabah) and MUIS (Sabah Islamic Council). Its 
presence has actually lightened the financial and administrative burden of MUIS and 
JAHEINS. For instance, BAHEIS has taken over the administration of three 
missionary training centres from MUIS on Ist June 1984. These centres are: Islamic 
Missionary Training Centres, Keningau; Islamic Missionary Training Centres, Kudat; 
and Islamic Missionary Training Centres, Kundasang. BAHEIS has also taken over 
the responsibility of managing the Koran and the fundamentals of Islam classes 
throughout Sabah. Since the conception of this program in 1990, it now has 33 
supervisors, 1,683 teachers, and 42,075 students. The classes can be conducted in 
community halls, at the village mosques, or the teacher's house. Thus, it is based 
partly on the old concept of "Malay village pondok school. " This concept has helped 
many youngsters to read the Koran which gives the great pride to Malay/Muslim 
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parents in Malaysia. Parents will usually organise a small festival when their 
children have finished the reading of the Koran. Traditionally, during these 
ceremonies, the children are required to read a chapter of the Koran to assess their 
competence. Each indigenous group of Muslims have their own way of celebrating 
these events. The expenses for these classes are increasing yearly. In 1995 the 
expenses was RM4,352,389.13 compared to RM638,707.00 in August 1992 
(BAHEIS, 1996). 
The missionary unit of BAHEIS conducts 8 types of course such as: 
workshop/course on Assimilation of Islamic Values; Convention of Missionary 
bodies; courses for the Islamic Family, Islamic Excellence, Islamic Understanding 
and Islamic Life, Islamic Leadership, Moral Development, and Islamic Converts. 
Other than that, the missionary unit also organises Koran classes for adults, lectures 
by visiting lecturers, and other social and religious activities which are aimed at 
educating the people and propagating Islam. 
In general, the role of BAHEIS is to strengthen the Islamic belief in the 
challenges from various non-Muslim communities in Sabah. At the same time, it is 
propagating Islam and indirectly gaining Muslim converts. This is not a stated aim 
but its strategy of propagation is through persuasion rather than by force. The 
expansion of BAHEIS to include Sabah is an historical moment for Sabah. This is 
due to the fact that the formal Islamic institution in Sabah was only started in 1971 
with the establishment of MUIS. Thus, the MUIS (now JAHEINS) is still lacking 
skilled man power and is uncertain on the implementation of the Syariah law. For 
states that have a long history of Islamic Sultanates such as Selangor, Perak, Kedah, 
Negeri Sembilan, Kelanan, Pahang, Perlis, Trengganu and Johore, the expansion of 
BAHEIS is construed as infringing on the state's own power. Thus, the expansion 
of BAHEIS to Sabah is more of an assistance. In fact, the existence of BAHEIS 
helped the state, especially when the Chief Minister was a Christian. During the riot 
in 1986, the Muslims put up banners at the state mosque and during the 
demonstration walk demanded that the Federal government intervene to protect Islam 
which they thought was going to be neglected by the Christian Chief Minister who 
215 
gained power in 1985. It was not really a religious demonstration as it was instigated 
by politicians who were ousted from power during the 1985 Elections, but they made 
use of the Sabah State Mosque as their base (Talib, 1991: 8-10 and Luping, 1994: 
411-414). 
3.2 The Department of Islamic Affairs Sabah (JA HEINS) =' 
Due to the lack of experience on the part of JAHEINS, it is likely that their 
management will follow in the foot steps of BAHEIS. However, the establishment 
of a formal Islamic institution was necessary due to various problems facing the 
Muslim community in the early days of independence. Furthermore, under Colonial 
rule Islam was being suppressed by the Colonial authority. With the establishment 
of MUIS, the administration of Islamic affairs is being improved and modernized. 
In doing so, this relieves the United Sabah Islamic association of some of their 
administrative burden. For example, duties such as Islamic education, Islamic tax 
collection and distribution (zakat), management of the pilgrims visiting Mecca, 
mosque management and other administrative duties are being handled by MUIS. 
MUIS also served as the implementing agency for all Islamic development projects 
such as building mosques, the preaching of Islam and all welfare programmes. 
The Islamic administration was revamped December, 1995 within two years 
of National Front Government in Sabah. The role of MUIS is now focused on the 
formulation of policies. Its previous functions have been divided into three 
departments which are Department of Islamic Affairs Sabah, Syariah Court, and the 
Mufti Department. The organizational structure of JAHEINS is divided into the 
Administrative and Financial Division, Divorce and Marriage Division, Development 
Division, Dakwah Division, Syariah Administration Division, Education Division, 
Investigation and Enforcement Division, Prosecutor Division, and Publication and 
Public Relation Division. Thus, with the establishment of JAHEINS, Syariah Court 
and the Mufti Department, the process of putting Islam into its rightful place as an 
official religion has been achieved. From the author's point of view, the old 
management in which Islam was under control of a council with legislative authority 
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was improper as it treated the management of Islam as informal. Thus the Islamic 
community felt that the sanctity of Islam might be threatened, especially if a non- 
Muslim Chief Minister took power. As I mentioned earlier, Islam and the state are 
inseparable. In principle, the Head of State as the head of Islamic affairs in Sabah 
can balance the power of the Chief Minister. However, Sabah had a bad experience 
in the past in which Muslim converts who did not have sufficient knowledge of Islam 
were appointed as Head of State (Tuan Yang Terutama). Thus, either way, the 
sanctity of Islam can be tarnished. This might be the reason that in the USA, there 
is a separation of religion and the state. 
Due to the Islamization process, the administration in Sabah has recently 
made various Islamic legislations. These indicate a move towards rationalization of 
Islam in Sabah as well. The motive behind all these new legislations was to preserve 
the sanctity of Islam and promote the good image of Islam as an official religion. 
The legislation is appropriately timed, especially when the motive behind the 
establishment of various Islamic institutions and policies are wrongly construed by 
non-Muslims as attempts at Islamization. Furthermore, Islam itself has been 
challenged by global problems and western capitalist ideology. These legislations are 
the Islamic Family Law, 1992; Sabah Zakat Act, 6 of 1963; Syariah Court Act, 1992 
and other Acts relating to the proceeding of civil and criminal cases in the Syariah 
court. 
3.3 The Islamic Family 
Let us examine some of the challenges faced by these Islamic institutions. 
As mention earlier, Islam and the local traditions have co-existed for a long time. 
As such, it is hard to differentiate between tradition and Islamic practice especially 
in marriage. Actually the solemnization of a marriage is basically a simple process 
but it has been complicated by local customs requiring various traditions to be 
performed before the marriage ceremony is over. The long marriage ceremony is a 
hindrance to modern economic activities. Indeed, some of these ceremonies last 
about a month starting from the preparation stage as if they were royal marriages. 
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In divorce, traditionally the wife simply returns to her parents together with her 
children and no contribution to their welfare is made by the ex-husband. There is 
very little dispute about this matter especially among low income families where no 
property is involved. Thus the family problems are being kept in silence. Jones 
(1994) was impressed that local customs were able to handle the problem of children 
involved in multiple divorced families without trauma. In addition, global problems 
have challenged the sanctity of Islam. The present work environment is not practical 
for the enforcement of Syariah law which regulates the relationship between men and 
women especially of mixed religions. The western ideology of equality between 
sexes has also challenged the enforcement of Syariah Law. In sex offence cases 
involving Muslims and non-Muslims, the non-Muslims usually go free. " 
Furthermore, due to the need to preserve the sanctity and image of Islam, prospective 
couples are required to undergo a blood test for HIV before marriage. Besides this 
test, the prospective couple will soon be required to read a chapter of the Koran. 
Although this helps to overcome Koran illiteracy among Muslims, it poses obstacles 
for marriage into the Muslim families and those of other religions. This in itself 
defeats the purpose of the missionary activities to gain more Islamic converts. In 
addition, it will question the Muslims rights to marry outside Malaysia. However, 
the Sabah Islamic Family Law 1992 merely formalised the Syariah rules on marriage 
and family which in the past have been influenced much by traditional customs. 
Thus, the law has not covered these new Federal Government proposals, except that 
Sec. 53(l)(f)&(k), provided that a marriage can be dissolved on account of illness. 
3.4 Islamic Tithes 
Regarding the Zakat (Islamic tithes), there needs to be more improvement in 
its management and collection. Since the state is the authority in management and 
collection of the Zakat, there is no uniform management on the collection and 
enforcement of Zakat laws. There are two types of Zakat. The Zakat Fitrah is 
compulsory and is based on payment of two kilos of rice or in money to the sum of 
RM2.40 per head. The second Zakat is compulsory only for those who are affluent. 
It is paid from a proportion of the person's wealth which is calculated according to 
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the Sabah Zakat and Baitul Mal Enactment in this context. The Federal Government 
has little power to address the problems of poor Zakat collection, as Islamic affairs 
are the concern of each individual state as provided in the Federal constitution. In 
addition, there is a structural problem in the system of Zakat management as regards 
traditional and fundamentalist Muslims. Colonial administration had taught the 
traditional Muslim communities to fend for themselves in regard to Islamic affairs. 
It is this group of Muslims and fundamentalists that resist payment of Zakat to 
government appointed amils (Zakat collectors). Scott's (1987) study of Zakat 
collection in the state of Kedah found that Malay peasants in the state of Kedah 
resisted payment of the Zakat, and this reluctance seemed common outside Kedah as 
well. The recent information shows that only 30% of the Muslims throughout 
Malaysia pay their Zakat. This was revealed by a Minister in the Prime Minister's 
Department, Dr. A. H Othman (N. S. T.: 28.10.93). The second reason for non- 
payment of the Zakat might be that urban Muslims who are in waged employment 
are beginning to lose faith in the system. If seen from the spirit of Islamic revival 
and reformation, this should not have happened. The urban Muslims are easily 
accessible as most have fixed addresses where collectors can reach them. In fact 
some employers are co-operating with the Islamic authorities in the collection of the 
Zakat. Furthermore, the wage earners are being taxed twice, firstly by the Inland 
Revenue Department and secondly, by the Islamic Zakat. This obviously is unfair 
to the Muslims themselves. People are willing to pay taxes as long as they can enjoy 
the public goods paid for through taxation. However, urban Muslims have few 
religious facilities within the multi-ethnic urban communities. Furthermore, the Zakat 
has not directly benefitted the poor. The existence of the secular form of Welfare 
has also made Zakat redistribution impractical. The traditional and fundamentalist 
Muslims will also refuse to receive a Zakat distribution if it is from a questionable 
source. This conflict is inevitable in a multi-ethnic society and a capitalist market 
economy. Furthermore, since the government allocates for the building of Islamic 
infrastructures, the issue of poor Zakat collection does not arise. Thus, it is 
inevitable that taxes from non-Muslims are used for the purpose of Islamic 
development. In fact, and in principle, the building of mosques and Islamic 
219 
education are community responsibilities. Therefore, state assistance in the building 
of Islamic infrastructures has helped to foster Islamic dependency on the government. 
In Sabah particularly, the Zakat money was spent on building the modern 
MUIS complex. This complex only benefits the urban Muslims as it is used to house 
business premises and government agencies. By way of contrast, the rural mosques 
still have no proper amenities such as running water and electricity. However, 
modern buildings and big mosques do promote a good image of Islam externally. 
Furthermore, since the Muslim communities have no say in how the Zakat money 
should be spent, it is opened to abuse. Although in principle the money paid for 
Zakat should be paid sincerely in the name of Allah, it is difficult to sustain the 
sincerity when in some cases it appears to be spent on boosting a party's political 
image rather than on helping the poor. The distribution of mosques and suraus 
(places for Muslim prayer) does not indicate that the funds are spent in districts with 
the greatest need. Semporna and Tawau districts, which have a large Muslim 
population have about the same number of mosques as Beaufort, a district with 
relatively few Muslims. 
3.5 The Syariah Legal System 
With regard to the Islamic Legal System, its role as an institution for the 
Muslims is unquestionable. However, the position of Islam as an official religion is 
being questioned since the secular English legal system is still in place. The English 
legal system which is a legacy of the colonial government has been used since 
independence. It sounds practical in dealing with cases affecting the multi-ethnic 
society in Malaysia. However, in line with the Islamization process, the Islamic and 
Malaysian Legal Systems have not escaped the attention of reformers. On 30 
December 1992, the Syariah Court Enactment was passed, nearly 30 years after 
independence. The changes were partly due to the initiative of the Mahathir 
leadership which Muslims should applaud. With Islam as an official religion, it is 
logical that the Syariah Court should be housed under one roof with the secular court 
(Nawawi, 1989). Nawawi's view is based on that of Tun Salleh. It seems that the 
220 
Islamization process can no longer be halted. The orthodox Muslims fear that the 
Syariah rules will continue to be violated if the secular court continues to dominate 
the national scene. Capitalist development actually favours the secular system. For 
instance, the native court in Sabah which was introduced during British rule to 
preserve the native interests has lost some of its significance. 
The pressure to unite the secular court and the Syariah Court by the Islamic 
movements was criticized by the President of Aliran, Democratic Action Party leader 
Lim Kit Siang and the Malaysian Bar Council. The Malaysian Bar Council considers 
that the federal secular legal system is still effective in dealing with the present 
society. In considering the problems of Syariah law in a multi-ethnic society, one 
should simply look into cases of adultery which involved Muslim and non-Muslim. 
Due to various technical reasons, non-Muslims usually go unpunished. 
3.6 Mosques and Prayer Places 
The development of mosques and prayer houses has also been politicized. 
Election constituencies and villages under opposition control will find it difficult to 
request the building of new mosques and prayer places as construction of these 
infrastructures is politically motivated. Despite that, the number of mosques and 
prayer places is still insufficient to accommodate the increasing number of 
worshippers. At present, there is an average of 934 Muslims per mosque or prayer 
place. Since, the mosques and prayer houses are built by the government and 
politically motivated, opposition Muslims will hesitate to use them for prayers. If 
this sentiment is not dealt with, inevitably there will be separate prayer places in the 
same community in the future. Financially, this will strain public funds to the limit. 
If the state is under an opposition party, special request for minor development 
projects in the BN (National Front) constitution, such as the building of prayer 
places, are undertaken by the Federal authority. Even this is being disputed as the 
management of mosques and prayer places is under the responsibility of JAHEINS 
(formerly MUIS). Since the mosques and prayer places are under the state, 
sometimes it is difficult for federal agencies to obtain approval to conduct religious 
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talks in these places. This happened especially when Sabah was under the PBS 
government and, in itself, prevented implementation of the Islamization programmes 
under BAHEIS during that time. 
1.7'HE ECONOMIC ISSUES: CONTRADICTIONS OF CA PITALISM AND THE 
ISLAMIC ALTERNATIVE 
The Islamic alternative was introduced in the early 1980s when Mahathir 
became Prime Minister. At that time, the Malaysian economy was seriously affected 
by world recession. Prior to this, Muslims had enjoyed better Islamic Administration 
under the UMNO dominated Government in comparison to the Colonial 
Administration. Thus, the Islamic Economic System represents a broadening to the 
power of Islam as its original aspiration was only to be an official religion and moral 
guidance. 
However, judging from the present economic policies, the Malaysian economy 
as a whole is based on the capitalist system. Since usury and any form of gambling 
are prohibited in Islam, the secular system poses a problem to the traditional 
orthodox and fundamentalist Muslims. They have alleged that Syariah principles 
have been ignored by the infidel National Front Government policies. This was 
indicated by various demonstrations by these fundamentalists during the 1980s which 
also involved the Pan-Islamic Malaysia Party-PAS (GOM, 1984). Thus, although the 
schemes attracted some less religious Muslims, they lacked participation from 
traditional Muslims in the rural areas. If this situation is not addressed then it will 
impede the industrialization programmes for the Malays and Muslims. In addition, 
the problem of poverty among Muslims is regarded as creating a bad image for Islam 
as a national ideology. Even worse, some Muslims who have been influenced by 
"deviationist" teaching of some Islamic movements such as Jamaat Tabligh and are 
refusing to work. Furthermore, loan facilities provided by the Ministry of Industrial 
Development and International trade, have attracted very few Malays and Muslims. 
Thus, the Islamic alternative can provide strong incentives for Muslims to become 
involved in trade and commerce. 
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The Islamic Economic System will not only help to project the good image 
of Islam among non-Muslims, it will also bring the Muslims closer to Allah. Further, 
it is a peaceful means of propagating Islam. Other than that, due to the oppression 
of the West against Islam, it is proper that Muslim countries develop their own 
Islamic Economic Systems and Islamic Banking which are free from usury. Islamic 
Economic development also symbolise the revival of Islam among Muslims and, in 
some ways, also attempt to overcome dependency problems on the West. 
The introduction of the Islamic Economic System has no direct intention of 
Islamizing the non-Muslims through economic means. However, in the long run, 
Islamization will have a strong influence on the non-Muslims. The process of 
Islamization through economic means seems to be a long-term strategy and a means 
of socialization into the Malaysian society. The implementation of the system is 
marked by the establishment of institutions such as Islamic Banking, Islamic 
Insurance, as well as an Islamic form of business and financial management. 
The first Islamic Banking in Malaysia was started with the passing of the 
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad Act 1983. Historically, the first Islamic Banking System 
was established in Egypt in 1963. This type of bank provides the same facilities as 
a conventional commercial bank except that it does not award interest. Instead 
dividends or bonuses are awarded to its customers. However, this is a comparatively 
slow way to earn money from ones savings as the money cannot be used for 
unlslamic means. Once Islamic Banking becomes popular it will divide the bank 
customers in Malaysia into two groups. This means taking away some of the 
customers from the secular banks. This, indirectly, divides the people economically. 
With better incentives from the Islamic Bank due to the government assistance, it is 
likely to attract more non-Muslims in the future. However, Islamic Economics seem 
to lean towards socialism except for the provision on property ownership. Thus, it 
could not depart from the old subsidy concept under the NEP where the Bumiputeras 
were kept dependent on the government for the sake of political legitimacy. 
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However, interest free banking was expanded to allow commercial banks in 
Malaysia to open an Islamic Banking counter. As a result, by 1995, there were 23 
commercial banks, 18 finance companies, and 3 merchant banks practising interest 
free banking (N. S. T.: 24.7.96). Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Berhad has 
decided to adopt the Islamic Banking System fully in all its 65 branches. Bank 
Kerjasama Rakyat has two branches in the major towns of Sabah (in Kota Kinabalu 
and Tawau). The earliest Islamic Bank in Sabah is the Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 
in Kota Kinabalu. In May 1996, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad introduced the 
Customers Service Centre (PPP). This will enable BIMB to reach the various 
communities in Malaysia and Sabah particularly when the service is extended. PPP 
has the same loan facilities and level of efficiency as the conventional system. The 
BIMB Customer Service Centre will be expanded to 73 BIMB branches throughout 
Malaysia. According to the 1995 Bank Negara Report (the central bank of 
Malaysia), the Islamic Banking System is showing good progress. Furthermore, there 
are also indications that the Chinese are now showing some interest in interest free 
banking. This is a sign of success for Islam. However, the Chinese are probably 
merely taking advantage of the interest free loans. 
In the Islamic Insurance System, the Takaful Act 1984 allowed the 
establishment of Syarikat Takaful Malaysia Ltd. and MNI Takaful Ltd. Both have 
branched out to the major towns of Sabah. 
The creation of various Islamic economic institutions indicates that Malaysia 
is moving in the direction of an Islamic state. Nevertheless, the amount of capital 
in the Islamic economic institutions in Malaysia is still small compared to that in the 
conventional economic institutions. Thus, Islamic Banks are still not able to compete 
on equal terms with the conventional bank system. Since Islamic Economic 
institutions are public enterprises, the concept is not in line with the privatization 
policy. Comparatively, Islamic banking lacks the freedom of the capitalist economic 
system. Furthermore, when an Islamic bank conducts business with conventional 
banks overseas, they cannot avoid the problems of usury. In Malaysia, where there 
are many conventional banks, this problem is inevitable (see also Roy, 1991). In 
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Pakistan, even though Islamic Banking has been introduced, "banks have consistently 
opted for financial instruments closely resembling interest-based finance" (Cornelisse 
and Steffelaar, 1995: 687). In addition, as the Islamic economic institutions are 
attempting to promote the good image of Islam, they may also become engaged in 
activities which are beyond their means and capability (Khan and Mirakhor, 1990: 
372-374). On the whole, Islam as a national ideology (especially the concept of 
usury), cannot not mix with the capitalist ideology, if, indeed, it is not firmly 
opposed to that ideology. In the future, it seems likely that globalization of the 
economy will bring the two ideologies into conflict with one another. This will 
become an obstacle to the economic development and political unity in Malaysia. 
Only good economic growth and the reduction of poverty among Muslims in 
Malaysia will be able to promote a good image of Islam to other communities. 
Unless this is achieved, ethnically divided politics will be inevitable. Capital is vital 
in economic development but this issue is always being overlooked by Islamic 
scholars and leaders. For instance, at the congress on "Islam and Vision 2020" 
organized by IKIM on July 1992 where Islamic scholars and leaders gathered to 
discuss Vision 2020, no mention at all was made of capital. 
Based on the NEP experience, it seems that the Government will need to keep 
funding the Islamic Bank at a loss in order to preserve its Islamic image. 
Furthermore, studies on the Islamic Bank in other Islamic nations such as Pakistan 
indicate that its way of operating is still not as attractive to customers as conventional 
banks. 
5. CONFLICTING ROLES OF T HE FEDERAL A ND STA TE NA 7YONA L UNITY 
DEVELOPMENT A GENCIES 
Even though there are religious and ethnic differences in Malaysia, there are 
policies, institutions and legislations which are designed to deal with such matters. 
Thus Malaysia is ready to overcome any ethnic or religious conflicts. Even though 
the NEP obviously discriminated against the Chinese, there were no direct physical 
measures such as deportation. The measures adopted by the NEP were to restructure 
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society and to reduce the inequality gap between the various ethnic groups so that, 
in the end, poverty would be eradicated among the indigenous people of Malaysia. 
Thus the Chinese understood the situation and had a choice. The Chinese are not 
totally excluded from important posts in the administration. In fact, some Chinese 
have become ministers, secretaries or directors in federal and state ministries and 
departments. However, there are some strategic posts which the Chinese cannot hold; 
especially those of Prime Minister and Deputy Minister. The suggestion by former 
MCA leadership to have a post of Deputy Prime Minister for the Chinese 
encountered a strong resistance from the UMNO leadership. 
With the implementation of the policy on the Assimilation of Islamic Values 
in Administration, it is difficult for the Chinese to hold strategic administrative posts. 
So far they have been able to hold the posts of head of departments which require 
exceptional professional skills such as medicine, public work, and science. These are 
also areas where the Bumiputeras still lack skills. 
Although there are institutions at all levels of administration which share the 
common goal of achieving national integration and national unity, in practice these 
departments are constrained by financial restrictions. This has prevented close 
cooperation between departments. Only a top level co-ordination committee could 
resolve such problems. Each department has its own limits to which it can make a 
contribution. Federal departments cannot spent money on projects that are under the 
responsibility of the state departments. There is some unity only during national 
celebrations where funds are being provided by the central committee. However, for 
most of the time departments and agencies do their own routine work. Thus, it is 
difficult for agencies to share views and performance of their work on national unity 
and national integration especially at a departmental level. The conflict is even more 
serious between federal departments and state departments where the finances are co- 
ordinated by two different treasuries. In addition these agencies are not located tinder 
one roof but are generally spread all over the town or city. However, types of co- 
operation which do not involve finance such as manpower are not a real obstacle. 
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Furthermore, there are few publicly or privately organized conferences in which 
national unity and integration can be discussed. 
The state agencies responsible for national unity and national integration are 
the Ministry of Social Development and National Unity, the Chief Minister's 
Department and the National Integration Unit at the Institute of Development Studies 
Sabah. Nevertheless, information gathering on these matters is controlled by the 
Federal agencies such as the Special Branch of the Police Department, the 
Department of Information, Department of Broadcasting, Ministry of Internal Security 
and the Department of National Unity. Most of this information can only be shared 
between top level co-ordination committees in Kuala Lumpur. Thus, the state 
agencies in Sabah have little information. Inquiries about this information should be 
best made at the federal agencies. In addition, any controversial information revealed 
by state agencies could be construed as against the internal security of the nation. 
Thus, compared to the federal agencies, the state has little impact on national unity 
and national integration. The lack of power on the part of the state has, in the past, 
been the main source of dispute between Sabah and the Federal government. The 
community leaders in Sabah have communal support but the federal level of 
administration controls the agencies. It is actually the local community leaders who 
make the programmes a success. Thus, development from below should be effective 
in dealing with the low participation in these programmes. This involves 
empowerment of the local communities through increased democratization of the 
administration. This will be the overall goal of Vision 2020. All this depends on 
the leadership implementing national unity and national integration programmes. 
However, centralization of power and domination of UMNO in Malaysian politics 
are the source of ethnic and religious conflicts. Nevertheless, so far this has been 
countered by Chinese domination of the economy. Thus, where the economy is 
concerned, there needs to be some form of bargaining. This will be useful in 
balancing the unequal power structure. This is the symbol and logo of National 
Front politics. Therefore, let us examine the problems of national unity and ideology 
further in the context of the national politics. 
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6. NATIONAL FRONT POLITICS, THE ISLAMIZA TION PROCESS AND 
NATIONAL UNITY DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRA TION 
Since the formation of Malaysia, the Islamization process in Sabah has begun. 
During British rule, the growth of Islamic organizations was suppressed. Christianity 
was propagated and Churches were built in almost every district in Sabah. These 
Churches belonged to both the Roman Catholic and Protestant denominations. Thus 
in Sabah, the Chinese and the non-Muslim Bumiputeras who went to schools run by 
the church were more likely to adopt Christianity. Although Muslim children had 
no choice but to go to church run schools, they did not adopt christianity. Despite 
the non-existence of formal institutions at that time to propagate Islam, the Islamic 
community was not attracted at all to Christianity. In fact, there was a feeling of 
prejudice among the Muslim students to join the morning prayers at the church-run 
schools. The independence of Sabah through Malaysia was also engineered by a 
Kadazan led party, the United Kadazan Organization. However, Islam was being 
championed by Tun Mustapha through the formation of United Sabah Islamic 
Organization. Mustapha was also the President of the United Sabah Nationalist 
Organization. This political party was dominated by Muslims from various races 
and ethnic groups in Sabah. Thus the attempt to dominate the political scene in 
Sabah was began by both the Islamic and Christian groups. 
When Tun Mustapha became the Chief Minister of Sabah in 1967, he began 
the institutionalization of Islam in Sabah by setting up the Sabah Islamic Council. 
He later amended the state constitution and declared Islam the state religion. Thus 
the growth of Christianity was being checked by the official religion, Islam. Today 
the issue of Islam as the state religion is still being disputed by Christian and 
Kadazan led political parties. Thus, this historical event has sown the seed of 
communal problems in Sabah. 
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Another problem facing Sabah is the domination of its business sector by the 
Chinese. However, after the racial riot in 1969, the Government took steps to 
promote Bumiputera interest. Until now, Sabah has not been able to reduce the gap 
with the Chinese in terms of capital ownership as envisaged by the New Economic 
Policy. 
However, due to the multi-ethnic component of the society, the Sabah state 
government has always adopted the concept of power sharing in government. The 
concept is the same as that practised in West Malaysia. Since independence in 1963, 
Sabah has formed an alliance government which was a coalition of various ethnic 
parties representing the various communities in Sabah. The Alliance concept of 
government lasted until 1976. The Alliance was replaced by a new party, 
BERJAYA, which was also a multi-racial party. The various communities are united 
into one party. In 1985, the BERJAYA government was toppled by another party, 
Parti Bersatu Sabah (Sabah United People's Party). This time, the PBS was headed 
by a Christian Kadazan. The PBS ruled until 1994 when many of its assemblymen 
formed new parties and joined the National Front coalition after the State Elections 
(Luping, 1994: 465-500). 
Therefore, the community relations in Sabah have been influenced by changes 
in government. The concepts are identified as feudal, colonialism, pluralism, ethnic 
integration and finally back to pluralist politics. Under the Alliance system, Sabah 
was dominated by the Muslim party. However, each party works to preserve the 
interest of its own community. In a multi-racial party, the guiding principle is to 
unite the people of various communities in Sabah under one party. Although the 
Alliance Government promoted the Bumiputeras' interests, the non-Muslim 
Bumiputeras have lower status as Islam is the official religion. When Sabah was 
under the PBS which was headed by non-Muslim Bumiputera (1985-1994), the non- 
Muslim Bumiputeras were overjoyed. Although historically, non-Muslim and 
Muslims had taken it in turns to rule the state, under PBS the community was 
polarised further by its policy of promoting the Kadazan interests. Thus, in a multi- 
racial party, Sabah faces the problem of which community should head the 
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government. The multi-racial concept could be misused to discriminate against other 
ethnic groups, and exists only in name to gain popular support. On the other hand, 
in the Alliance or National Front concept, each party serves to protect the interest of 
its community. Although this helps to bring social and political stability, it also faces 
the danger of fragmentation. Politics which are based on religion and ethnicity in 
Malaysia act against the policy of National Unity. The former Chief Minister under 
the opposition PBS government attacked the present National front politics as lacking 
truly democratic values (Borneo Bulletin: 2.9.1991). He quoted the principles of 
Rukunegara of liberal, democratic and tolerant, as well as the caring culture of Vision 
2020 to stress his point. On the contrary, the principles were not fully implemented. 
This was his response to the issues of national unity in Sabah and Malaysia despite 
being in the opposition. Although being under the opposition after the PBS went out 
of the National Front Coalition, Pairin was aware of the importance of unity among 
the people of Sabah for PBS future (see Appendix M on the ethnic and political 
composition of the people of Sabah). He is opposing the Federal policies but not the 
Sabahans' unity. 
7. ISLAMIZATION VERSUS COMMUNAL INTERESTS 
Malaysia is made up of various races and ethnic groups (Hirschman, 1987: 
555-577). Sabah in particular is made up of 47 ethnic groups each with their own 
language, beliefs and culture. From the religious point of view, there are some 
similarities in the Asiatic religion such as Buddhism, idol worship or paganism. 
Some of the ethnic groups are Muslims, but their cultures are different. They are 
united only from the point of view of religion. However, traditional farming 
techniques are about the same except in the way that wealth is distributed among the 
kin. However, their languages are completely different, with Malay being used as 
the lingua franca (see maps in Appendix N on the distribution of various ethnic 
groups, religious beliefs and languages according to districts in Sabah). Despite this, 
each ethnic group speaks Malay according to its own native slang which 
distinguishes it from the real Malay. However, there are some contrasting differences 
between ethnic groups due to their ways of earning a living. For instance, 
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traditionally the Bajau Laut are fishermen who live in their boats, but many of them 
have settled on the shore by building stilt houses near the coast. These houses are 
linked to the land only by foot bridges. There are also some differences in Chinese 
, 
kinship patterns, languages, cultures and in the ways they earn a living. They are 
mostly traders and have a strong love for wealth. They prefer a male heir to their 
wealth and trades. However, like the Kadazans, some Chinese have converted to 
Christianity. During the Colonial time, the Christian missionaries converted many 
of the local natives. Although Islam is the state religion, many of the Kadazans do 
not seem to be attracted to Islam due to their strong cultural differences. This is 
especially their love for the local rice wine and drunkenness. " Thus, the flexible 
Christian traditions seem to be their nearer to their ideal religion than is Islam. 
In 1985, the communal differences were heightened when the PBS, under the 
leadership of a Christian, formed the new state government in Sabah after winning 
the state general elections. At this time, the State-Federal relationship also turned 
sour as the PBS harboured anti-Federal sentiments. This, in itself, affected the 
national integration and national unity programmes. The rise of the PBS in Sabah 
also coincided with the promulgation of the policy on Assimilation of Islamic Values 
in Administration, a process to turn Malaysia into an Islamic state (Mutalib, 1993: 
78-122). The introduction of Islamic mechanisms might be seen as a threat to the 
beliefs of the non-Muslims. The PBS's rise was also partly caused by corruption in 
the BERJAYA government. 24 In addition, Sabah had poverty problems among the 
rural non-Muslim Bumiputeras. 25 Let us examine the problem in more detail. 
The PBS government continued to use the 20 points agreement to protect 
Sabahan rights from Federal encroachment. 26 This included a demand for an 
increased share in the petroleum income from the newly discovered oil field off the 
west coast of Sabah. Thus, the national integration and national unity programmes 
were perceived negatively by other communities particularly from the opposition 
groups. 
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As mentioned earlier, formal mechanisms for the implementation of national 
unity programmes have been in place since the racial riot of 1969. Nationally, and 
on paper, these programmes seem to make sense. But at the state level, social- 
political and economic factors rendered them impractical. In the first instance, the 
values and ideology of the national plans are in contradiction with the other 
communal interests. Thus, this has restricted the freedom of other communities as 
well as the Muslims themselves. In fact, in 1990, the Malaysian Consultative 
Council for Sikh, Christian, Buddha and Hindu Sangam protested against the policy 
on Assimilation of Islamic Values in Administration. They gathered signatures to 
protest against the said policy (B. H.: 11.4.1990). In 1993, the human rights group 
"Jubilee Campaign" claimed that Christians in Malaysia were being oppressed. Islam 
is the intervening variable behind the national unity programmes. Thus, separation 
of the state from religion will enhance the national unity programmes. For instance, 
the policy on Assimilation of Islamic Values in Administration has no meaning to the 
non-Muslims. While Islamic values are being practised by Muslims, the non- 
Muslims felt that it was also right that they enhance their own religious beliefs. '' It 
is insulting to the non-Muslim staff to pay attention to a policy which they neither 
understand nor believe in. This situation has rendered the policy impractical in many 
multi-ethnic organizations by creating a conflict of values. The policy also questions 
the sincerity of the Head of Department in implementing it. This is because it is 
difficult for a head who lacks knowledge of Islam to propagate such values among 
the staff. 
As the policy on Assimilation of Islamic Values In Administration has been 
motivated by an Islamic revival in the UMNO dominated government, the 
implementation problem of the policy leads to a leadership split. Some construed the 
implementation problem as a leadership problem in Islam. This split has occurred 
at both the state and national levels. 28 The split is not only among the UMNO 
leaders, it also happened within the multi-racial party itself. Apart from the growing 
popularity of the Islamic party PAS, the Islamization problem has divided the UMNO 
party into the Islamic group under Anwar and the Mahathir group. Although this is 
being denied by both leaders, evidence has shown the contrary. In Sabah, the 
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leadership of Pairin under the multi-racial PBS has witnessed many Muslim leaders 
walking out of the party to join UMNO that has just expanded to Sabah. The split 
between PBS and the Muslim leaders happened after the plan to secede Sabah from 
Malaysia was exposed. Thus many Muslims began to support UMNO as it is a 
Muslim dominated party. This indicates that the Islamic revival is finally catching 
up in Sabah. The Sabah rights were overshadowed by the Islamic revival. The 
revival was, in part, caused by allegations that the Muslims in Sabah were being 
discriminated against under the PBS government. Even during the first year of PBS 
Government the Muslims had distrusted the Christian led government. They feared 
political deception and sought the federal protection. Perhaps the Muslim leadership 
themselves were dishonest to non-Muslim Bumiputeras while in power (Luping, 1994 
: 530-570). Some prominent PBS leaders including the younger brother of the Chief 
Minister were arrested under the Internal Security Act after the 1990 Parliamentary 
General Elections. The PBS government was finally ousted in the 1994 Sabah 
General Elections after they won with a small majority. The federal government 
engineered the defection of PBS elected assemblymen and a coalition government 
under the National Front was formed in Sabah. The parties represent the major 
ethnic groups in Sabah. These are: Sabah Democratic Party (PDS), Sabah People 
United Party (PBRS), Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), United Malay 
Nationalist Organization (UMNO), GERAKAN, Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP), 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This is too many parties for a population of only 
two million particularly in comparison with the USA or Britain. However, under the 
National Front umbrella they serve as a forum to discuss problems of ethnicity, 
religion, national integration and unity. This helps to streamline the implementation 
process of the Vision 2020 development programmes. (However, this time with more 
federal assistance and guidance as their new strategy). This can be seen in its 
various development programmes. In addition, the Chief Minister's post is being 
rotated among the three major ethnic groups Muslims, Kadazan, and Chinese. 
Furthermore, there is also conflict between traditional and modern Islam. 29 
Due to the differences between Federal and state government under the PBS, 
some key agencies such as the Federal Development Department were expanded to 
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Sabah. Formerly, most federal development funds were channelled through the state 
government. This indicated that the Federal government harbours some distrust of 
the state government in the implementation of the development plan. Furthermore, 
the Federal Secretary post was also created in Sabah to serve as a federal liaison with 
the state government. 
Ethnic and religious issues are often initially disguised by politicians as 
economic issues. However, as each side scores points against the other, they run the 
risk of creating religious and ethnic conflicts. Under the PBS, economic issues such 
as poverty have polarised the ethnic groups in Sabah. The rural people are being 
marginalised as economic development progresses. Since many of the poor are the 
Kadazans/Dusun, the issue of poverty attract their attention. At the same time, the 
Muslims are turning to Islam as their saviour, protection and political rallying 
strength. 3° Thus, the success of the national unity and national integration 
programmes depend on the co-operation of state leaders and their political ideology. 
Nevertheless, there is no sign that there will be a separation of religion and the state. 
In fact, the Islamization process is becoming increasingly bold day by day with the 
creation of more Islamic institutions. Despite this, Mahathir has maintained that 
Islam is a tolerant religion. What prevents good relations between Muslims and non- 
Muslims is the prejudice about Islam which is created by the Western media (N. S. 7'.: 
17.4.1996 & B. H.: 11.4.1990). In fact, many public relations measures are being 
carried out to promote the good image of Islam in Malaysia. One of these is to 
encourage new converts to preach Islam (B. H.: 19.8.1991) 
8. UNINTENDED OUTCOMES: THE LIMITS OF ISLAMIC REFORM AND 
NA 77ONA L UNITY PROGRAMMES 
According to the Rukunegara which was promulgated after the racial riot in 
1969, the overall aim of the nation was to create a liberal society. This would allow 
all the people of various ethnicities to live together in peace and harmony. However, 
Western liberal ideology places an emphasis on individual freedom, democratic 
institutions, the free market, and welfare (Lessnoff, 1986: 123-157). Thus, the 
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Malaysian aspiration of a liberal society has not met the requirements set by these 
prominent authors. Malaysian Islamic ideology is the main obstacle to the adoption 
of a fully liberal ideology. Furthermore, the Bumiputeras are still politically 
dominant over other non-Bumiputera groups, especially the Chinese. Free market 
ideology cannot be fully practised unless the Chinese and the Bumiputeras are 
capable of competing on equal terms. On the whole, structural problems have 
haunted the Malaysian policy on national unity and integration since independence. 
These problems did not emerge during colonial times as the constitution and the legal 
system were based on the liberal English Legal System. This had established the due 
process of administering society. Without these written laws, Malaysia would not 
have been created in the first place. All the 14 states in Malaysia inherited the same 
laws from the British Colonial Administration. Probably, the Islamic law imposed 
by the Islamic rulers would have been very severe without the English Legal System. 
Nevertheless, Islamic values have always played an important role in influencing the 
top decision-makers in Sabah. For instance, Tun Mustapha and Datuk Harris, 
although in conflict on many other issues, shared the same views regarding the 
propagation of Islam in Sabah. However, in comparison with Tun Mustapha, Harris 
was not directly involved in propagating Islam and converting the pagans of Sabah 
(Luping, 1994: 564-570). Islamic politics during both their leaderships dominated 
the Sabah scene. Thus, when they ruled there was little consensus among the various 
communities in Sabah. A multi-racial party which was aimed at uniting the people 
of various ethnicities existed only in name. Under the multi-racial party concept, the 
issues raised by some ethnic groups were construed as anti-national. Thus, in 1994 
Sabah reverted to the old alliance concept of government. Under the National Front 
umbrella, the various ethnic parties shared power in administering Sabah. However, 
Islam remains the dominant value in the government administration especially with 
the policy on Islamization. This policy clearly states that implementation of the 
policy will be based on persuasion rather than force. Thus, in the long run many 
people will become accustomed to Islamic values and make their own decision to 
convert to Islam. This will be possible as long as the government is able to preserve 
the good liberal and tolerant image of Islam. Mahathir has always shown tolerance 
in implementing Islamic programmes (N. S. T.: 11.4.90). To prevent further 
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misunderstanding about Islam, Mahathir established the Institute of Islamic 
Understanding in 1992 (B. H.: 3.7.92). Thus during the Mahathir era, younger Sabah 
leaders seem to be tolerant towards non-Muslims in regards to Islamic matters. This 
is in contrast to the previous experience under Mustapha and Harris Administration. 
Although the Rukunegara clearly spelled out the need for a liberal society, it 
seems that the contrary is actually occurring in Malaysia. Nationalists have blamed 
the colonial administration for causing unbalanced development and inequality in 
Malaysia. Malaysia inherited the already divided society from the colonial 
administration. It is this attempt to restructure society by replacing the old structure 
that upsets certain parties. This not only affected the Chinese but also people who 
have had to give up some of their traditional rights and power. Firstly, under the 
present system, even the Sultans are not free from the control of the Federal 
Government. The Federal government is encroaching on their rights to administer 
Islam in their states. Secondly, under the NEP, the Bumiputeras were given priority 
in all sectors of government and the economy. The Chinese regarded this as 
legalised discrimination but the pro-Bumiputeras called it positive discrimination. 
The NEP was, in fact, the beginning of the Federal build up of power. Due to this, 
many states such as Sabah and Kelatan are beginning to rebel against the Federal 
government. Instead of national integration, the states are questioning their position 
in Malaysia. Sabah, under the PBS raised the 1963 "20 points independence 
agreement" which guarantees an equal partnership with Malaya. It seems that the 
federal government is not confident that the state will implement the national 
planning policies. When the PBS raised the issues of Federal Departments in Sabah 
headed by West Malaysians, the Federal Government defended its decision on the 
grounds that there is still a lack of qualified Sabahans to hold the top federal posts 
in Sabah. It is not the lack of qualified Sabahans but that they are not being given 
the chance to lead. With weaker state government, the centralization of power in the 
Federal Government is inevitable. Although in constitutional terms Islam is a state 
power, the federal Islamic authority is the dominant force on Islamization. In 
practice, the state Islamic authorities are subordinate to the Islamic Affairs Division 
(BAHEIS) of the Prime Minister's Department. BAHEIS serves as a balance in 
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implementing Islamic laws and regulations at the state level. Thus, words such as 
"moderate" and "persuasion" form the theme of the Islamic campaigns in Malaysia. 
This is the theme shared by the late Prime Minister, Tengku Abdul Rahman who was 
also the President of PERKIM (Islamic Welfare Association of Malaysia). Thus, 
among the Islamic leaders themselves, there are differences on whether to adopt the 
direct Islamization measures or more moderate ones. Indeed, the division of UMNO 
into Mahathir's camp and Anwar's camp can be seen as a manifestation of the 
problem on the implementation of Islamic policies. The fast rising star of Anwar 
indicates the strength of the Islamic forces in UMNO. " Many leaders who seemed 
to have controversial attitudes on Islam were being ousted during the UMNO party 
elections in 1996. These ousted figures were mostly from Mahatltir's camp. With 
the backing of the Muslim supporters, Anwar can depose Mahathir at anytime. 
However, this needs to consider the global factors particularly the economy. 
Ethnic politics have been a recurrent feature of Malaysian government since 
independence and are difficult to abolish unless the UMNO party is dissolved 
followed by other ethnic parties. Ethnic differences are the most primitive form of 
difference. After nearly 30 years of independence these differences have evolved and 
have become more focused in the form of ideological differences. This also indicates 
that ethnic politics are now beginning to lose their power as people begin to 
modernize and become wage earners. Thus, the Islamization process may turn into 
religious conflict in Malaysia. This would become an obstacle in the creation of a 
liberal Malaysian society. 
The Islamic movements have regarded various social ills in Malaysia such as 
drug addiction, the abandoning of babies, idleness among youths, drunkenness and 
gambling as due to the slack enforcement of Islamic law during the NEP (N. H.: 
28.6.92). These problems also indicate that the Western legal system is not working 
well in Malaysia. As a response, Islamic movements have maintained that only Islam 
can build up good moral values among Malaysians. Furthermore, Anwar, the Deputy 
Prime Minister and Finance Minister, a former president of ABIM (Malaysian 
Muslim Youth Movement), believed that the Islamic Economic System will bring 
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Muslims closer to Allah. Muslim heads of department in the government sectors are 
also being criticized by the official missionaries for not giving the required leadership 
in implementing the policy on Assimilation of Islamic Values. '= The heads of 
department themselves are behaving in a controversial manner which does not reflect 
a good image of Islam. The corporate leaders are busy having official functions in 
top class hotels and neglect the five-times daily Muslim prayer. Further, the weekly 
talks on Islamic values which are especially organized for government staff are not 
being attended by heads of department and attendances are poor. On the whole, the 
new middle class Muslims in Malaysia have to make a choice whether to observe 
Islamic regulations or their professional responsibilities. Under the Islamization 
policy, such people receive more rewards for being staunch believers. At the same 
time, the modern world has placed other Muslims in a dilemma. Thus, it is right to 
say that the fragmented society in Malaysia has made it difficult to implement the 
Islamic policies. It is a problem of the whole rather than the parts. 
Although Islam is the official religion in Malaysia, the constitution guarantees 
that other groups are allowed to practice their own religions. Thus, there is no direct 
resistance to Islam. However, there are issues such as difficulty of appointing non- 
Muslims in certain posts such as Head of State, the involvement of non-Muslim 
officers in Islamic official functions, the integration of Syariah and secular courts, 
appointments in the public service, the difference of ideology and rendering the non- 
Muslim Bumiputeras as lower class Bumiputeras. 33 
Due to the Islamic ideology, the concept of a multi-racial party is no longer 
practical in Sabah. Muslims resist any form of unlslamic interference in their 
religion. For instance, when the former PBS Christian Chief Minister, Pairin read 
the Zakat Bill instead of a Muslim representative, UMNO made a great issue out of 
it (N. S. T.: 28.7.93 and 31.7.93). Thus, the ethnic parties united under the National 
Front remain the brand of politics in Sabah and Malaysia in general. As UMNO is 
the dominant party in the National Front coalition, it is likely that there will be less 
consensus in the coalition. Any criticism from individual members or controversial 
party decisions will be construed as against the concept of the National Front. In 
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Sabah, action has been taken against some party members of the National Front 
component parties for going against the wishes of the National Front. Thus, 
negotiation and consultation processes could be subdued as sceptics can be labelled 
as being against the party unity. This problem is coupled with the existence of 
money politics. " 
The National Front would continue to hold the reign of power as long as 
economic growth remains strong. Mahathir's government would continue to 
manipulate the economy to preserve the good image of the government. However, 
the various incentives of Bumiputeras in the economy deprive other ethnic groups 
from enjoying the same benefits. This prevents the creation of a truly competitive, 
democratic and free market economy. Since the Bumiputeras try to keep their special 
rights as much as they can, this also becomes an obstacle in national unity and 
integration. Even after the NEP ended in 1990, the institutions for the preservation 
and promoting of Bumiputera privileges in the economy have not been dismantled. 
Indeed, they have evolved further under the new National Development Policy. The 
Minister of Education who is one of UMNO's vice Presidents holds the opinion that 
the NEP can still be continued. 35 
Thus, Islamization and the preservation of Bumiputera privileges are obstacles 
to the creation of a liberal society and also stand in the way of the policy on national 
unity and integration. Probably, the hidden aspiration in national unity is to integrate 
the people by assimilation into Islamic values. This is in contrast to the assimilation 
into the capitalist values of the USA. Furthermore, this also contradicts the previous 
policies on industrialization, privatization, and corporatization which are all Western 
concepts. In addition, all the concepts that had been copied from Japan are not in 
line with Islamic concepts. Thus, the Vision 2020 plan in itself is fragmented. 36 The 
Islamic ideology cannot fit in with capitalist values nor with the socialist and 
Japanese values. 37 Islam is a religion which stands by itself while not preventing its 
followers from the pursuit of wealth. This is in contrast to the Protestant ethic which 
encourages its followers to seek wealth and prosperity. Therefore, in a multi-ethnic 
society, religion should be separated from the state. This is impossible to achieve 
239 
in Malaysia as Islam and the state are inseparable. Even the administration of Islam, 
which is a state responsibility, has been encroached on by the Federal Government. 
Furthermore, as a National Ideology, its image may become tainted by the 
"deviationist" teachings of some Islamic movements. The "deviationist" teachings 
have become so prominent in the current decade that some Islamic pressure groups 
are demanding that they be banned. 38 Thus, the policy on "Assimilation of Islamic 
Values in Administration" has indirectly caused the rise of more Islamic movements 
including the divisive deviationist ones. 
Despite the claims by Western scholars about Malaysian communal problems 
and authoritarian rule, the Sabah Public Complaints Bureau received almost no 
complaints up to 1995 concerning communal and religious discrimination (PCB, 
1994/1995). However, one cannot dispute historical facts. Most of the troubles in 
Malaysia and Sabah broke out during the election campaigns and just after the 
General Elections. Among these incidents are the Racial Riot of 1969, the swearing 
in of two Chief Ministers after the defeat of BERJAYA Party in the 1985 Elections, 
the Sabah Riot in 1986, PBS deception and betrayal of BN during the 1990 
Parliamentary General Elections, the secession plot in 1991, the Signal Hill Incident 
near the State Palace after the 1994 State Elections and several leadership tussles 
within the National Front Parties and the opposition. 39 In reaching a conclusion, one 
should bear in mind that economic and social aspects of these issues are both under 
state control. The economic aspect of the problems have been discussed earlier in 
chapter 4. Socially, Malaysia does not practice full democracy as some of the 
important instruments of self-expression and freedom are being controlled. 
Therefore, the communal conflict and differences are being instigated by the National 
Front and opposition leaders. Such conflict is being provoked as a way of protecting 
their political interests. The Prime Minister, Mahathir understood the problems well. 
Thus during the 1990 Sabah State Elections, and the 1990 General Elections, the 
government made a regulation that there should be no public rallies but only house 
to house campaigning. s0 Election campaigns during the national and state elections 
are also being shortened. During the 1996 UMNO Party Elections, Mahathir 
prohibited campaigning, money politics and the use of government facilities to ensure 
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smooth, fair elections and the unity of the party. The awareness of the political 
problems came after the UMNO spent millions of Ringgits during the 1994 Sabah 
State Elections to win back Sabah from the PBS. Therefore, during normal times, 
communal and religious problems do not surface much. This is because the people 
are busy earning their living rather than listening to politicians. 
However, Islam is being used by politicians to unite the Malays and to garner 
support. The National Unity Mechanisms are being used by the government as well 
to determine their political future and potential. Without the involvement of popular 
politicians, the Islamization and national unity and integration programmes will not 
be able to reach their target audiences. Thus, there is little wonder that the weekly 
talks on Islamization, and national unity programmes have very few participants, 
particularly in Sabah. 
9. CONCL USION 
One lesson to be learned from this chapter is that the people's interests are of 
paramount importance over any others. The UMNO dominated Government 
legitimacy can only be maintained if it can protect Islamic interests. This is as well 
as the Bumiputera interests. National Front Government will stay in power as long 
as they can manipulate communal and Islamic issues. Thus, these will impede the 
implementation of national development policies and programmes. Thus, the 
challenges ahead are to create a liberal democratic society as enshrined in the 
Rukunegara. This has remained the aspiration of the Malaysian society ever since 
the 1969 Racial Riots. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
From an examination of the various problems in both Sabah and Malaysia, 
it has been shown that the implementation of planning has similar encountered 
difficulties to those faced by other nations. In Malaysia, as elsewhere, the objectives 
of national planning are subjected to various social, economic and political 
constraints. Giving priority to economic planning over social planning will affect the 
social welfare of the people. The promotion of a particular ideology will not only 
conflict with the objectives of planning, but will also affect the beliefs of other 
interest groups. Thus planning will always come into conflict with some interest 
groups. This situation needs to be resolved before any national plan can get off the 
ground. The various cultures and beliefs of the people involved need to be taken into 
account. Thus it takes years before the plans can actually achieve any results. If the 
views of the relevant interest groups are neglected then this will condemn the plan 
to failure. 
For instance, after more than thirty years of national planning, the sanctity of 
Islam as an official religion in Malaysia is being affected. Malaysia is being invaded 
by various deviationist teachings of Islam. Thus, this creates a crisis in the Islamic 
values themselves which form the basis of the Malaysian National Planning 
objectives. 
Globally, planning to allocate scarce resources with the aim of improving the 
people's standard of living has been hampered by poor economic growth. This has 
either produced an equal but poor society or, alternatively, unbalanced development. 
However, planning is useful during time of scarcity though there is little need for 
planning in an era of mass production. Any form of national planning will always 
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be supplanted by individuals trying to pursue their own interests. Thus, the success 
of planning depends on the capability of managers to co-ordinate supply and demand 
in a global economy. In the case of the multi-ethnic Malaysian society, planners 
should be able to consider the needs and problems of the various communities. 
Again, in practice, this requires the co-operation of the decision-makers in ensuring 
that the various communities benefit from the development programmes. 
The structural problems faced by Malaysian society are a by product of 
colonialism and capitalist exploitation. After independence, Malaysia's economy 
continued to be dependent on agriculture and raw materials. Thus its national income 
is dependent on its agricultural exports which are subjected to falling prices due to 
economic recessions. This is exacerbated by its dependency on MNCs for its 
manufactured exports. Although foreign capital has created employment, the wages 
are not sufficiently high to overcome problems of income differences. This 
exploitation is worsened by the presence. of foreign workers. It was economic 
differences such as these which led to the 1969 Racial Riots as well as to state 
intervention with the adoption of the NEP. Due to the need to promote Bumiputera 
interests, it led to a situation where ethnic and Islamic politics take precedence over 
economic matters (Hua, 1983). The form of income redistribution which was 
adopted by the NEP necessitated a high degree of state intervention. As a result, the 
policy led to another cycle of dependency and exploitation. In terms of this general 
form of exploitation, Sabah can be seen an enclave as it was it less developed than 
most of West Malaysian states and hence not worth investing in. This situation has 
been overlooked in the process of implementation of national planning. --Thus, 
it 
makes it difficult to implement the plan. Furthermore, Malaysian society is 
characterised by the dominance of the Chinese community in the economic sector and 
the Bumiputeras in administration and politics. Hence, capital and political powers 
are in a potential conflict. To remain in power, the UMNO dominated Government 
has to exploit the communal and ideological issues despite attempts to liberalise in 
the 1990s. 
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Since Mahathir took power in 1981, he has been introducing various reforms 
in order to effectively implement the NEP's objectives. He has attempted to 
modernize Islam, started the privatization of public agencies and introduced the 
Malaysia Incorporated policies. However, these reforms have been impeded by the 
need to protect the Bumiputera's interests. Thus many of the public enterprises 
established in the name of Bumiputera advancement are not competitive or efficient. 
Malaysia is still not able to overcome its dependency problems, as evident in its 
reliance on the MNCs for its exports. The local industries are still not able to 
produce goods of sufficient quality which can be competitive in the international 
market. Bumiputera entrepreneurs still lack the capital, skills and motivation 
necessary for catching up with more advanced entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the 
decentralization of industries into the rural areas in order to overcome urban-rural 
imbalance in development is being jeopardised by a lack of genuine Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs and capital. Economic liberalization measures must take these 
problems into account. 
In Sabah, Bumiputera entrepreneurs and Vision Village development 
programmes have met with various structural weaknesses, particularly in terms of 
capital. Capital is an important factor in starting up new private enterprises and 
Vision Villages. Due to these problems, Bumiputeras are still reliant on the 
government for concessions and contracts favouring their businesses. This situation 
is unlikely to change unless the objective of achieving 30% Bumiputera ownership 
of capital is reached. Thus, these programmes have yet to achieve the objective of 
making Bumiputeras self-reliant like the Chinese. The examination of Vision 
Villages implementation in Sabah also brought to light the limitations of state 
intervention as far as its goals of social restructuring and reducing social inequality 
are concerned. Despite the distortions caused by market efficiency, unbalanced 
development between rural and urban areas and income inequality among the various 
ethnic groups have persisted. 
However, compared to West Malaysia where there has been consistent 
government intervention, the problem of poverty is especially pressing in Sabah. The 
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high prices of consumer goods in Sabah compared to West Malaysia indicate that 
there has been a lower level of intervention in the peripheral State. Stimulating the 
growth of incomes in Sabah is important in order to encourage people to save and 
invest. However, the region has been relying on timber and a few natural resources 
for its export earnings. Thus, Vision Village development and diversification in 
Bumiputera enterprises and the economy as a whole are necessary in dealing with the 
current problems of structural unemployment and poverty. The study also indicates 
that the mismanagement of public enterprises has persisted even after the end of the 
NEP. A profit-oriented privatization strategy must be adopted in all the public 
enterprises in Sabah. In addition, government loan schemes for Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs need to be reviewed so that only genuine entrepreneurs are given loans. 
For the time being, it is unlikely that the Vision Villages will be substantially 
developed. The government should be satisfied if living conditions in the rural areas 
are improved through the development programmes. However, various studies on 
development have shown that the democratization of management can help to 
improve socio-economic development in developing countries. Yet, this is also 
impeded by the need to preserve Bumiputera legitimacy in government. 
This thesis has also revealed structural weaknesses in national education in 
comparison to the challenges of Vision 2020. The National Education Development 
has been under way since the National Education Ordinance was adopted in 1957. 
The structure of education after independence up to the Mahathir era indicates a 
development of education for nation building as well as an attempt to meet the needs 
of an industrial society. At the same time, education has been used as a tool for 
socio-economic restructuring. As regards the nation-building aspect, the Education 
Act requires that government schools, mission schools, Chinese and Indian vernacular 
schools be classified as national schools so that these schools have one national goal. 
However, the National Education Policy is proving impractical in a multi-ethnic 
society. The Federal regulation on education since independence has restricted some 
freedom in education development. For instance, the quality of English instruction 
in schools has declined although English is becoming increasingly important with the 
globalization of the economy. At the same time, Islamization of schools will also 
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prevent the development of arts and science, and it may restrict human rights in 
education. Furthermore, the poor quality of education in the rural areas is a 
testimony to the failure of the Government to help Bumiputeras out of poverty. In 
fact, the recent attempt to computerize and modernize schools is poised to exacerbate 
the urban-rural imbalance in educational provision. In addition, the economically 
divided society has also created an employment structure where the Bumiputeras seek 
employment in the public sector while the Chinese dominate the private sector. The 
lack of vocational and technical schools has indirectly encouraged school leavers to 
seek white collar works. At the same time, in Sabah the economic structure is still 
largely based on agriculture and exploitation of raw materials. The Vision 2020 
development of education in Sabah will not be feasible until more jobs in industries 
can be created. 
This thesis has revealed various conflicts in Mahathir's Policies. For instance, 
the Islamization and National Unity policies are hampering national development. 
The aim of the Islamization policy was originally to instil universal Islamic values 
among the people of various ethnic groups in Malaysia. The policy led to the rise 
of Islamic social, political and economic institutions. Like the NEP, the Islamization 
policy is controversial because Malaysia is a heterogenous society. It contradicts the 
National Unity Policy, capitalist ideology, the National Cultural Policy, the Malaysian 
Constitution, Rukunegara, National Front Politics, the Federal and State Powers, and 
the secular laws, policies, systems and institutions. Politically, the policy divides the 
United Malay Nationalist Organization from within. The policy is misunderstood by 
non-Muslims as an attempt to Islamize them, which in itself creates further 
communal and political differences. In the Islamic administration, the policy is 
encroaching on state power which can cause a duplication of responsibilities and 
financing. In addition, the policy can cause role conflicts within the administration 
as religion is mixed with administrative duties. However, what is evident in the 
Islamization policy is that it builds a stronger, modern Islamic institution and 
preserves the legitimacy of the Malays in power. Thus, this has strengthen the 
structure for an Islamic state. Nevertheless, the policy has not attracted non-Muslims 
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to convert to Islam; in Sabah they appear to cling only the more strongly to their own 
religions. 
On the whole, it is indistinct national values, due to the multi-ethnic nature 
of society, which are the serious weak point in Malaysian aspirations to become an 
industrialized nation by the year 2020. The conflict of values in the National 
Development Plan has created a crisis situation; both in government and in public 
enterprises. It is the Islamic values that have been the iron cage of the decision- 
makers. In addition, the need to preserve Bumiputera interests will also be an 
obstacle in meeting the challenges of the Vision 2020 Development Plan. In effect, 
the Bumiputera-dominated government is taking one step forward and one step 
backward. This ambivalence in decision-making has delayed implementation of the 
programmes or even led to their abolition. 
1. SABA H'S DILEMMA AND THE ROLE OFDECISION-MAKER IN NA TIONA L 
DEVELOPMENT 
Due to the various problems of implementation in Malaysia National 
Development Plan, it is hard to create any effective strategy which can overcome the 
nine challenges of Vision 2020. The overall strategy for Malaysia National 
Development is to find a consensus in formulating and implementing its National 
development Plan (Richardson, 1970/71). Thus, an effective mechanism is needed 
by which the people can reach a consensus in developing their country, such as 
through further democratization. This may help to avoid the problem where the 
planning objectives and targets are in conflict with one another and unachievable. 
However, one should not blame planners and decision-makers for failure of planning 
since social, political and economic conditions are too complex and pervasive for 
their effects to be anticipated clearly and in the necessary detail. Planning should be 
used as an aid in decision-making rather than as a directive (Rutland, 1985: 28). 
However, even in indicative planning, decision-makers do not always base their 
decisions on the planners' information (Estrin and Paul, 1983: 195-197). 
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With the expansion of the roles of planners and decision-makers under Vision 
2020, it will be harder for both of these to determine the needs and demands of the 
multi-ethnic society. The usual practice in formulating the Five-Year Plan is that 
each state sends its own proposal to the Federal Government. ' However, the plans 
were mainly concerned with financial allocations for the next five years. Under this 
practice, it is unlikely that the demands and needs of communities will be met. Thus, 
democratization of the planning process could help to determine the needs and 
demands in the next five years. To reduce the severity of implementation problems, 
a broad ranging consensus must be reached in planning and implementation, 
especially on the social aspects of the plan. However, it is very difficult to achieve 
this under the semi-democratic Government in Malaysia. In fact, the implementation 
problems have led to more authoritarian Government despite the liberalization 
envisaged by Mahathir under Vision 2020. The dilemma brought about by 
Mahathir's new policies is conducive to a greater centralization of power than is usual 
in a federal system of Government. 2 For instance, in Sabah ethnic differences and 
planning crises have resulted in Mahathir instituting a rotation system for the post of 
Chief Minister in 1994 among three ethnic parties, Muslims, non-Muslims and 
Chinese. 
2. PROSPECTS 
Theoretically, the failure of the various development plans implies that there 
needs to be less state intervention in the functioning of the economy and society. 
However, Malaysia is still not prepared for such changes, due to structural conflicts 
as well as cultural and religious differences. Reformation of the implementation 
machineries and the adoption of new policies to solve the problems have brought 
various unintended outcomes. Even Mahathir's reformation of the implementation 
machineries and liberal policies since he took power in 1981 are being challenged 
from within his party as well as by the opposition. Thus, in the process of trying to 
convince the people of the needs for change, various development programmes and 
projects have been implemented in a haste and wastefully. However, income 
inequality still persists between the Chinese and the Bumiputeras. The racial 
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conflicts that broke out in Kuala Lumpur in 1969 are being used to justify the 
Government's present policies on income redistribution, National Education, 
Islamization, national unity and integration. ' 
Despite the nine challenges which Mahathir has outlined for Malaysia to be 
an industrialized and developed nation by the year 2020, what is being achieved is 
the institutionalization of government policies, in a manner that was prevalent under 
the NEP (1971-1990). 
3. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SABA H'S IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS FOR 
MA HA T HIR'S VISION 2020 
From the economic, political and social points of view the findings regarding 
the problems of implementation in Sabah are relevant to other countries in which 
state intervention is practised. ' However, my main focus has been on national 
development in Sabah and its relevance to Mahathir's Vision 2020. 
It would not be too extreme to interpret Malaysian planning as a mixture of 
Islamic and Bumiputera socialism, state capitalism, and Chinese capitalism. This 
fragmentation is the result of the government's policies concerning Islamization and 
the preservation of Bumiputera privileges as well as its existing social, political and 
economic structure. 4 Occasionally, when the economic and social problems have 
reached a critical stage, the government has invoked the concept of a free market. 
On the whole, decision-makers are indecisive when facing reality. The turn of events 
indicates that there is a strong conviction to maintain the status quo on Islamic and 
Buiniputera interests. As long as there are the same people and the same ideological 
principles in the bureaucracy, there will not be much change in Malaysian society 
and economy. Thus, Bumiputera and Islamic survival will become the main thrust 
of the future socio-economic development in Malaysia. This will also make it 
difficult to create a society based on merit and democracy. Furthermore, if Islamic 
fanaticism is allowed to grow in Malaysia then it would affect national development 
and economic growth as evident in Iran and other Islamic countries. 
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Since the findings of this thesis have raised various problems of national 
development planning and studies, let us compare the present results with some 
related studies of national development planning. Both liberalism and dependency 
are sources of national conflict in developing countries. ' Most studies on national 
development planning in general, and on development in Malaysia and Sabah in 
particular, have suggested that problems of development occur in terms of economics, 
demography, statistical analysis and material development. Due to the need to 
achieve set objectives, development planning has led to the rise of authoritarian 
government. However, in some countries, innovation in planning have been 
successful. Despite that, these approaches become a problem in explaining the 
conditions of the rural poor who are still dependent on subsistence farming for their 
living. Since the basis of the market principle is efficiency and competition, it 
cannot be applied to a subsistence economy. In addition, these traditional 
communities are still ignorant of their rights and civil liberties. Thus, their needs are 
determined from the top and consequently sometimes neglected. Despite two decades 
of restructuring through economic growth, Malaysian National Development planning 
is not able to overcome the inequality gap in Malaysia which is elusive and 
changeable. Furthermore, statistical data used in the analysis of the development 
problems will soon become invalid due to rapid social, political and economic 
changes. Thus many of the objectives of planning as evident in Malaysia are not 
being achieved (see Population Studies Unit, 1994; Silvalingam, 1993; Hj. Ahmad, 
1993; Kahn and Loh, 1992; IDS, 1989; Gomez, 1994; von Der Mehden, 1980; 
Johari, IDS 1989 and 1991). As a result, the NEP was not able to reduce Chinese 
domination in business and industries. The Chinese entrepreneurs did not pay much 
attention to the NEP but carried on with their capitalist pursuits. In fact, they might 
have benefited from the NEP development programmes as they operated most of the 
supply stores. Economically, therefore, the Bumiputeras are losing the competition 
with the Chinese, which is pushing the Bumiputeras further towards the margins of 
capitalism (Hashim, 1988; and Guinness, 1992). This will also lead to a more 
authoritarian government in the Bumiputera dominated administration. Theoretically, 
the "development from below approach" is appropriate for the national development 
plan, but - practically - it is difficult to implement within the present structure of 
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administration in Malaysia. According to King (1988), the problems of development 
in Sabah, Sarawak and the Indonesian region in Borneo are the same due to their 
peripheral location in relation to the centre of development. Thus, the development 
programmes benefit the well off rather than the poor and needy (Hua, 1983). 
Even in a more advanced state in Malaysia such as Selangor, unbalanced 
development is inevitable. And in Peninsular Malaysia, its western part is more 
developed than the eastern regions. ' The point which the author is making is that 
even in more developed regions of Malaysia compared to Sabah, national planning 
is not able to overcome unequal regional development without a full and fair 
democratic government. Decentralization of administration alone is insufficient 
without democratic participation at all levels. ' 
From the various problems identified in this thesis, the democratic approach 
to development could prove helpful in tackling the implementation problems in the 
national development plan. By "democratizing, " the author means not only political 
but social and economic participation as well. This will enable the problems of 
ethnic difference, income inequality, religious differences as well as the contradicting 
and conflicting policies to be solved by consensus. Domination of one ethnic group 
over another in government could cause unbalanced national development as was 
evident during the NEP in Malaysia. In addition, studies of other developing 
countries indicate that democratization can overcome the implementation problems 
of national development programmes. In Malaysian development planning, income 
redistribution has been the main theme since the beginning of NEP. This has been 
pursued through the provision of free education for all and a quota for Bumiputeras 
in education. The Government is also serious about achieving 30% Bumiputera 
ownership of capital. To achieve this goal, it has been giving loans to Bumiputeras 
to start their enterprises. In addition, infrastructure and agricultural development are 
being carried out in the rural areas especially for Bumiputeras. Although these 
programmes have been mismanaged and are inefficient, they have achieved some 
income redistribution in an economy dominated by the minority Chinese. 
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However, the redistribution objective has not been fully achieved. Some 
Bumiputeras have benefited more than the others under the NEP. The NEP also led 
to the growth of many Bumiputera public institutions to channel the various 
development programmes (MacAndrews, 1977). Income redistribution, however, 
cannot be efficient without an efficient democratic Government. Democratization 
remains the strongest challenge for Malaysians and the Vision 2020 development 
plan. It is the only means by which various differences and interests can be 
reconciled and their needs identified. For instance, although Islamization Policy is 
of central importance to Muslims in Malaysia, to the non-Muslims it is a challenge 
to their religious beliefs (Ingham, 1993). The emphasis on democratization is vital 
in Malaysia, although it is difficult to sustain in the face of the prevalent ethnic 
politics. 
The multi-ethnic Malaysian society needs strong opposition parties to ensure 
that one group does not dominate the others. This means that the opposition has a 
responsibility to educate society about the true state of affairs rather than representing 
only their ethnically based views. This will also help to educate the traditional 
communities in Sabah about their democratic rights and eradicate the tradition of vote 
buying in Malaysian elections. The above alternative is the only means to avoid 
social, political and economic crises due to faulty planning systems (Sklar, 1987). 
Democratic changes in place of ethnic politics will help to provide better and 
effective representation for these people in the planning process. 
The structural problems brought about by ethnic divisions coupled with the 
peripheral location of Sabah, have also made the implementation of development 
plans under the present system of government and planning particularly difficult 
(King, 1988). Furthermore, the structure of politics as orchestrated by the National 
Front Government has always been to maintain the Malay power to balance the 
Chinese economic domination in Malaysia. Thus, the problems of domination of one 
group in ethnic politics is inevitable in Malaysia unless some democratic steps are 
taken to overcome them. Furthermore, as the Government policies have led to the 
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rise of middle class Bumiputeras, class conflicts in the already divided society are 
inevitable. ' 
From all this evidence, the author hopes that this thesis will be able to 
contribute further to the areas of development planning. The failure and collapse of 
socialist countries provide ample evidence in favour of this thesis. State intervention 
has failed to prevent inflation and economic recessions, as well as bringing about 
balanced development and social equality. The failure of national planning in Sabah 
has led to conflict between the State and the Federal Government. This conflict is 
being exploited by politicians to fuel the indigenous and Sabahan chauvinism. Thus, 
this defeats the aims and purpose of the Principle of Rukunegara as well as the 
National Unity and Integration Programmes. This phenomenon has also occurred in 
other countries that have practised planning. 
Furthermore, this thesis provides some evidence that using the capitalist form 
of state intervention to overcome social inequality has led to further inequality and 
other unintended outcomes. Its alternative, the Islamic Economic System, means 
state ownership. For instance, the State has to maintain the Islamic Banking System, 
although at a loss, to preserve the image of Islam as an official religion. This has 
not solved the problems of income inequality as the Bank itself is being subsidized 
by the Government. In addition, evidence also shows that a majority of the Muslims 
do not pay Zakat (Islamic tithes) although, in principle, it is useful to finance the 
poverty eradication programmes particularly in the rural areas. This had created 
problems under the NEP as well. 
On the whole, the social, economic and political structures added to the 
uniqueness of the Malaysian cultures and religions, have made Mahathir's policies 
difficult to implement. Malay supremacy, as enshrined in the Constitution and 
Government policies, is not compatible with building a fair and united Malaysian 
society. 
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born tile Cliatt. 
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( lair' In t"nrtlr Itý"tný,,, 1'rJ nur lot 7r. nr Lrrýý"7 
Go Prý"/rrrnr (unLlrn ( Ih, .. r, r, r dci, l ur 19'j 
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M. "Il-mrlieJ J. twih4 Al. un.: mud Itic Iwir" ,, ,I 
tn: iettnrc, 1". -come im ,. ltcrl in tnt h, mLl , "( 
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rmmite In Fite aid tnJ tdtitr Ir" trt nih m, 16- 
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Snlltn t"Irlr. vntn^. rl l. unalul : \I. rrn .. It Il 17th 
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Source: Ongkili, Junes P. Hoderni:. ntyion In r,:: t tf"i1-iy':: ia 
(1960-1970). oxford 'University Prrr, e, 19 12. 
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Figure 1 Hap Of Sabah 
Source: Far Eastern EcoiiomIc Review; Anti Directorate 
Internat IonnaI t1appIi1q, 19RI, IloobeI, 1995. 
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Ti1, Ic 2. 
MALAYSIA: RATE OF POVERTY AND AVERAGE MONTHLY IIO UDEIIOLD 
INCOME ACC ORDING TO STRATA AND TARGET GROUP 1987 
Social Strata Rate of Ho. of Poor Average Total 11v. 
& Target Poverty households Income of Income 
Group poor 
Households 
W. MALAYSIA 17.3 485,800 225 1,074 
Urban 8.1 82,600 228 1,467 
Rural 22.4 403,200 224 853 
Target Groups: 
Rubber Small- 40.0 63,100 238 353 
holders 
Paddy Farmers 50.2 54,400 222 462 
Coconut 8mal- 39.2 4,900 225 492 
lholders 
Fisherman 24.5 10,700 251 633 
Estate 15.0 11,700 275 670 
Workers 
07D2U1 35.3 89,000 344 1,166 
Urban 16.4 8,100 398 1,164 
Rural 39.9 00,900 339 994 
Target Groups: 
Rubber Small- 
holders 68.3 4,200 384 506 
Paddy Farmers 79.4 28,700 282 416 
Coconut 73.3 1,400 309 677 
Farmers 
Fishermen 44.2 4,000 388 714 
Estate Workers 53.4 3,100 387 531 
67R7W7R 24.7 74,300 299 1,141 
Urban 7.5 4,500 306 1,749 
Rural 29.0 69,800 298 988 
Target Groups: 
Rubber Small- 
holders 62.5 3,300 306 408 
Paddy Farmers 56.2 42,000 291 481 
Coconut Small- 
holders 44.4 700 254 554 
Fishermen 27.5 2,200 353 755 
Pekerja Estate 7.7 100 202 1,142 
Source: Househ old income Survey 198 7. Department of 
Statis tics, Ku ala Lumpur 
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FIGURE 2 
MACHINERY FOR THE COORDINATION OF TI11' 
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
, 
(INSTRUCTION No. 1/1991) 
NATIONAL m-. vF. i. ovstt:., rr 
CUIINCII. 
CIIAIRAIAN: I'Rl?. Ir-. MINISTER 
I 
NATIONAL fEVFf. 01', 'IENT 
WORKING CONMI117F. F. 
CHAIRMAN: CHIEF SECRETARY 
TO TII1 GOVT. 
I 
imri. F. mEN'TATH)N 
CCU)RDINATIO)N UNIT 
SECRETARIAT 
MINISTRY Ill VEI. orMENT STATE: nI: Yr. 1. f)I'>IENT 
COMMITTEE COUlliCII. 
CHAIRMAN: SECRETARY CHAIRMAN: CIIICF MINISTER 
GfNL"RAL " SECRETARY: STATE 
SECRETARY: SECRETARY. DEVELOPMENT 
Dr". vcLOPMCNT o)'rICE: R 
DIVISION 
I 
IIEAUQIIARTERS 
I)Iw r/AGL'N(: Y 
rEI)E. R, \L I. I: VEL 
STATF: UF. \'I: I. or. %I1: N'r 
WORKING CO\I\1ITTEF: 
DEI'r/AGENCY CHAIRMAN: DISTRICT orrICrR 
STATE 4EVEL SECRItTARY: STATE. 
1)I: vr*imrMI: N r 
OI'I'IcC"R 
DISTRICT UEvF. L[)r. IF. NT 
COMMITTEE 
DfiPTfAGCNCY 
CILVRMAN: DISTRICT OrrlCCR 
DISTRICT LI: VI: L 
SLCkI: T. \RY: I'IIINCIFAI. 
A. S. CISTANI 
" I)IS1R1(T I)I1ICl. R 
II)IiV1. LOI MENTI 
Source: Prime Minister's Department. Development Administration 
Circular No. 2 of 1992: Guidelines For Development Project 
Planning And Preparation. Prime Minister's Department, Kuala 
Lumpur, (30.7.1992): 719. 
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Figure 3. 
The IS-EO MODEL: A SIMPLE REPRESENTATION 
Import Substitution Stage One (ISI) 
- paint, food, clothing 
Export Orientation Stage One (E01) 
- texriles, electronics components, gloves 
Import Substitution Stage Two (I82) 
- metal product, machinery, motor vehicle 
Export Orientation Stage Two (E02) 
- metal product, machinery, motor vehicle 
Source: Chee, Peng Lim. Industrial Development: 
An Introduction To The Industrial Master-Plan, 
Pelanduk Publication, Petaling Jaya, 1987: 12 
258 
Appendix F: 
t. - 7N ."\1 SCý Nt_ By PIMA t MPSG 
A wonitisnmr aaperf 0( 
tile t, nfntr. y mu ch to. 
oaulf hrJüflrialisatbn Is 
11,31 It 11 "Of ICCOI"11311leJ 
hp a parallel pfosvlh In the 
4Ka1 fmall. sod mtJlum" 
scale Iniuflrles (SMID) 
tech,, 
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Appendix G 
THE QUALITY AND PRODUCTIVITY MA)IAGEHEHT STRUCTURE 
The Advisory committee on 
Quality And Productivity 
Coordinator And Tasktorce on 
Quality and Productivity 
The Workforce Teams 
THE PROCESS OF QUALITY IMPROVEMENT RODEL 
I. STRATEGIC PLIdJUIHC 
1. Analysis of the situation and 
setting of objective, policy, program. 
activity and project 
STANDARD 
III. SETTI1-G THE PROCESS ST1tIDARD QUALITY 
IV. SETTING THE MANPOWER STANDARD QUALITY 
V. FROt LE[t SOLVING PROCESS 
1. Identification of the problenj 
12. Analysis of the proFlen 
3. Setting Alternative Solution 
14. Selection of Alternative ou 
5. Implementation of the Corrective Actions 
6. Measurement And Evaluation Of The Correc 
act 101's 
Figure 4. The Quality And Productivity Management Structure, And 
The Process of Quality Improvement Model 
SOURCE: Prime Minist"r's Department 1 April, 1991 
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Table 3. 
MEAN rIONTIILV GROSS IIOUSEIIUI. 1) 
INCOME BY E, *FIINIC CROUP, 
1990, AND 19952 
Etbnfc 
Grnuli 
1, r Cu, rent 
/'rites (R. 1) 
1990 1995 
Airragr" A,,, nutl 
Grots'dr Rate. 
(`'c) 
1990.95 
In Cnnsrnnr 
1990 friert (R. 1f) 
1990 1995 
Acrr. rFr" A, vn,,, f 
Growth Fore. 
(r") 
1970.95 
Nivil-csin 1,167 2,007 9.5 1.167 1,617 5.6 
Ci(izcns 1,169 2.021) 9.3 1.169 1,62S 57 
F3utnihutcrt 9.11) I. 60(1 93 910 1.2119 ý. "1 
Chinccc 1,631 2.895 10.0 I, f' I 2.133 G. 1 
Indiane 21)9 1 <. I S3 lrl. 1 1.2n't 1.715 6.2 , 
(D lhr"1. '_S I,? » 7. ý 
"55 1,1127 1? 
Nan"citi7 I, c I. IU5 1,719 
7.6 1,1)15 I. ) 5 ý. "Q 
1'01: 111' 1,611 2.596 . 
7.2 1,617 2,11')2 . 1.. 1 
Ci ti zc t» CCG I, 1 i; ),, 
S.! 2.1). ") 1r 
Bumiputera 1,332 2,162 Ö. ý 1.730 
Chinese 1,561" 3,152 9.1 2 
Indians 1,516 2,433 5. Z. 1,513 1.951 43 
Olliers I. 5')2 2.5 1.375 1,2 
7.1 _1. j 
Noil "citi icnc 
2, UU6 2,63h 5.11 2,0116 2,14'1 1.2 
Rural 951 Ir 111) 5.3 951 1.0111 1.3 
Citizcnc 957 1,310 5.3 957 11)55 1.6 
©umiputcra S2S 1.14(1 6.1 323 9.11 
2.2 
Chhtcsc 1.377 2.019 6. b 1,377 1.616 
2.7 
Indi: anc 991) I. "I9i 
7.1 910) 1.199 3.? 
Othcrc R. 13 1.1)61 4.0 R13 951 
02 
Nrnt"citizcns 733 915 . 
1.9 743 7RR 0.1 
aýrýr. r1) two 
rinne, to, In'i 're bnc4 nn the r, elü. 1 , 1, .d the , ". nahnlýl 
In«nn. t Snr. w. 11 19'11 
' 
" r,. f jr 1., 
I') '. nil. ,,, L_,, we . 
1"1, nf4 ]. It .. frrf"t )r9,. 3') ]. 
li r(. 1), 61), 
11 
-, 1, Lf, \ "., rh A ---14-- 
l r.. l.., I ib... ,. 
t 111-1 r........ ,...... 
in the r)"1) r""r1 uin -1). l Ih. », fnr renn, r.,. laýi). 
AIh ., r 2r.,. arr cl,.. frn l n. 1 ur., l 
SOURCE: %TH MALAYSIA FLAN 
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Table . 4aß. Incidence Of Poverty According To The Urban 
And the 
Rural Areas. 
INCIDENCE Or POVERTY AND NUMMER 
OF 1'oou HOUSEHOLDS. 
P), xi. I'195 AND 241011 
T "r. d 
1 "rw 
Ib/+. 7 u. n! T . -I 
I l0. " 
U. A.., lhr. l Tnrnl 
: frrf 
I/. M+ A. nrl 
AI+b7d. n CIIIseln Only 
) In 7 1 ro J. 7 1!. 
J 1 "" ... !O1 
Incidence or Poverl7 f7.1 . 
1 
. 
r! 11 1711. _ N, R 
: e5.6 : 7). 1 179 I, )1 t 
Nnn 1<r or Pmr Ilmuehnld. (10011 
17.1. 
' Ir t 
, 
1 2 1 0R 3.7 0) Il 1 1 is 
1lanlcore Pnveny' I. tlrknce (7.1 
1. 1 
A 
. . 
Nt 1 19: A9 7 230 3.3 1'1 w 
Ilnnaehol, Is Nuher of I1ard. nre"Pmr I IMMII 
137.1 la, t 
I. 11 1 
I: I 
1 3 3)7 I JII J 11 , 
770.3 
. 
(. 07f1.3 1.477.3 7.7\7h 1, w71A 
1r4. l IlnnaehnlJa ('Iwwl1 , 
\, JNAI - 1, , . . , 
Ow. 11r 
" ` 1 71 '1 n L1 141 A0 
7A 11 fl 
Incirknce of 1'arerl7 I. 1-) l. .1 
.1 1 
.. 
$111 9 417 : 93.9 311.3 191.1 A'1 A 7: 1 w 
Numher or Po,,, Ibnntbnlda (1101) 
AI'1 J . 0 . . 
: ) 29 7 J 0,1 f. 1 1n 
Inchlenee of Ilanknre Pn. enr' fat in 
1. J 1.: . 
1 91 7 :A 
. 
0 77 }J. ý J : I. 1 
Numhar of 16nkure"Prmr ILn1. chýdJ. 1'IwNll 
141.1 IA 1 .w I: A , 
4 317 11 
. 
117 0 
. 
' LONIt 1, )M. 3 :! W11 
Tý+. I Ilr. ratAnlrla 
IIMwII lý"IJ f" I. W7 . . . 
Mw. " 
" N"I""" 4.1. >10 
" YmrnY r . ý. H.. 1'MIt i. Awl ". w III. I. "14"ý"nº 1. ". rw)' 
I"wr r". ". w" NIl, ". I. r w. +. t" I. "r . 
I. +.. h. 1 ... e ""I IlM Yr""i. ". I.. 
A1. i. f"'. " 
tuMI Irr tiwA (nr t A"+"rl+"U lilt . "1 t 1. tJ""l 
. 0.1 M1111A prr .... h I".. A. wr4""LI ".. r ""I 
.1tu C". ud. 
"I Iº. vr 1"r IW5 u. MvJ w. IA. I+rlýn""wrý 
J. u "{ IAr IA.. v A""AI I..... +... 1"'"" 
" F. ""r 4"r IMYI. Non . r. M s.. ýkl: wr. l n 7. niw"1 rr. " .. . 
I. ar'. M""w `I' "ý""" ""ý" " ""''J. "". "1 ry+lrw .d 
Iwl"4 ºr"r". " - -" .r{. IM IH1 ºnl.. Io,.. "o4 Iln"". º 
(r".. " I.. I'r"l, A"""N 
.º wr.. u. rl.. ulwJ .. nr. 1 
" IIr. l"+. r.. n, k r". I. nwJ r "n1 º. II IM I... ,y In. r "n. ". ". 
" Iw"Mwkr w... tw.. r.. 
Table 4 b. SELECTED SOCIO. ECONC)MIIC INI)IGXWRS 11V STATE, 1990.95, 
Ua, 
1f. AllnrrJ 
Cnn nnJ Afurnr. 
cycles Prr (. (! UU 
PgrdnNnn 
Teleph wrn 
P', I. Ixxl 
Pryr.. 7ur ... 
Trlrri. i.. w 
Lrrw.., 
1- I! xw1 
It. p. drr6r. n 
lýr... wr 
Rut. ' 
I'. ) 
1'rY+Lnr" 
1'r. n r. i. J rirA 
1'ilw. l ltbrn 
I'%I 
I'. yýfmi. M 
rm. ijnl wiil 
! ln W. jay 
I'%I 
I f.. wr 
lf.. n. lnr 16rrr 
Mr 1, Ix*1 
IJ. r 1V-? r 
N.. Mr r"( 
Ij-n. n ff, 
14(M 
g -t. dr. r 
t. ncd n/ 
)'-J X. -I. 
Irr 1u q 1. 
(8.1 
fS"n'1 1995 IYW) 1vvt IwAl Itmi Ivxr I'rH lvrr 1v. ' Io'xr tvv. t lvv Ivy! Ivwl luvt I'M) 1991 
Johur 351.8 432.9 91.1 1841 116.3 114.1 l0"1.. 1 12. M1 79.1) V. 1.2 . 113.5 100.0 13.3 it, 4.11 4.1 2.1" ' 2'9 
Kedalr 212.0 269.7 42.1 118.0 $1.2 94.1 . VJ. 1 . R. ( 72.4 51.4 4.1.3 100.0 14.1 IOU 2.9 34 3.1 3,6 
Kelantan 162.0 180.5 29.6 68.0 41.2 56.6 79.3 54.0 31l. ( 0,7 7X. 3 100.0 13.5 9.3 1.1 4.0 I. 1 1.1 
Mdaka 316.7 458.8 79.3 200.9 1251.1 138.3 VIII 91.2 92.9 5. " 10(1rl 100.0 11.2 10.9 4.5 5.4 5,3 M, 6 
Ncgcri Senlhilan 321.1 398.4 82.7 174.2 126. ') 164') . 1i. x 9. (, 4 IT 7.., ( 96,9 V. 1.1 100.0 12.? 5.1 4.8 4.8 4.1 5.1 
I'ahnng 230.7 260.8 48.3 112.8 103.1 11 S. 6 X. 1.0 W7 7V.. 11,1 V. t, l Irn). ', 16.0 111.1 . 1.4 .34 1.1 Li 
Perak 260.3 375.3 73.2 164.4 110.3 135.0 S .+ 'j'). '14.1 V:. V 
05.. ) 100.0 t3.1 11-5 4.2 4.7 " 2.11 29 
Perlis 248.3 276.4 56.7 121.4 61.2 96.1 8n. ) 'n). 4 651. \7.6 955 100.0 16.9 6.7 1.0 3.7 611 7.1 
Pulau Pinang 448.7 651.8 130.0 232.0 13111,141! 1 fi1. ( 9.1.1 V7.5 'r)/ 03.5 101.0 10.2 8.3 6.5 74 29.7 1t1: 
Sabah! 109.4 101.0 62.9 81.7 65.11 SILO 71.3 7"Y. J 14. ) 4.5.11 78.0 31.6 37.8 2.4 2.2 11.4 Il. % 
Sarawak 176.6 215.0 68.0 116.3 Sc. t 67.2 :nn zu. r. 70.1 M-1 37.0 S OM 12.3 19.2 2.5 2.0 11,1 112 
Sclancnr 406.7 339.4 154.9 229.1 115.5 '194.6 Y). 1 416.3 901. 'I'). I0 101.11 100.0 11.9 1.0 3.5 5.1 11.1 'S 
Terengranu 155.0 181.4 40.1 89.1 76.11 87: ) '. 1.1) , r9.7 71.: x". 2 VO-1 I(N). 0 15.1 12.7 3.0 1.0 1.6 74 
Wilayah Pcr, ckufuan 350.9 616.3 224.3 369.5 145.8 201.4 92.7 94.0 101.4 11.00 11)0. (3 10(7.0 9.1 9.7 16.7 22.6 41.4 71.1 
Kuala Lumpur 
hluluysl: l 272.1 339.2 89.3 164.3 9'1.5 . 1118.5 X. S. 1 X9.3 S11.1 ßv. 1 1.1.. 5 9S. "S' 13.1 9.7 . 4.8 SJ 1.2 I. 6 
NInec 
Nclae ru percenu{e or pupulaiiun .: ed 10 and above . y1 a.. r 244.., I. 
Incl, Jet Wilay. h Pert utuen Lahuan. 
Source: Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000) 
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Appendix K 
WITH DESIRED 
NAT I ONAL. E DUCAT I ONRL PH I LOSCPW' 
MORkL 
VALUES 
ASPIRATIONS OF NATIONAL OPERATIONALIZATION OF NATIONAL ýD 
EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY 
---------_ -I ý- ----1 BELIEF LS A. V D 
1 
KNOWLEDGE SPRITUAL 
AND SKILLS 
OBEDIENCE TO GOD 
--- 
KNOw1 GEA BLE 
PRINCIPLES BELI-E F INTEGRATED ESIRED curriculum [ETCHING 
NG 
ýýENCE L 
_ vD HOLISTIC ORAL LEAA. 
%I 
IENCE syllabus, PROCESS DEVELOPME. ` [ ALUES PONSIBLE 
C 
PHYSICAL 
LANGUAGE 
t CNAL -I- CG NTRIBI, TE 
YAL 
. ýND ABLE 
L 
D PROSPER? } 
SCCETY AND 
IC 
BALt'. CED AND 
HAR%iO"IOLS 
PERSC\ 
THE EDUCATION SYSTEM IN MALAYSIA, 1989 
'' t7 10 
, 
9:. 
. 10. i1 
12 1] 14 
MG 
-6-: ý 
71; +_8 
t io. f. t Iý la 
Its t7 Il u", 1 '7, os : 9` 
4AliE 
, 
Pmf. IAIIY Ln: ': Cit :: C f: ntin. \ýr, Ilf'': l1 ý; C I: OýIn ýn r fnlf:. l "III nl( : Hl'i1 EDuCATIOIJ 
II Al II CIJI Ar IUtII 
IV 'f f uni: l'::! Il tl l'; 11111TiLS 
I7ECt+ntt: 
; I, 
f: 'CL 
LUt' [11 III'1'1.11 Ilta '_HS IrI! $. 
1I2at58 f- tn tl Iv v ýi". yjýL+ cou: '. [s 
C : avt+'egr17 
A , tC lOC. '. ttC UATICIIAL SCHOOL ACAI)F. fAtC t: nU l !. ft C 
COtLLE; ES1 
Iv V , 11 -I 
'V( 
Yl CHrn C! 
12456) __I X111 C, 1 f11111, \L 
:. iýl. l)Y 
: IA ftl)tIAL TYPE CIIIItt I $CIICOI. r1 
A. 1 rTUTAL rYP[ rA1. IIL $: H17VL r. MY; 
HCMQ': I; CLASS 
". {j LQWEf1 6EHTIf Ic. 1TL' tUF EI; CATILN 
11- m At A1'. `i t. l ý: I: uIll ll111: 111 Ef1UCAmri 
rj : A. 1.1 t'; I. % . mot 11111 11:. 111: rli 'IUI:. tT 1Ufl. 1L t: !U C41 ION 
h1.1 L AY S I. i 1M 011,11 11.1: t HT If IL ATt 
Figure 8. The Working of the National Education Philosophy and 
System of Education in Malaysia 
Source: Ministry of Education, 1990 
265 
Appendix L: 
1. c iccational Planning 
Committee 
CUP R; C:: _U'. l 
PLANN: NC AND 
DEVE_O'; ENT 
2, Central Curriculum 
Corn mittee 
FEDERAL ýE5R Implementat; cn 
LEVEL Cc^, mittee 
TA 
. CULL`* 1 
Iiý1FL_41E iýlTATIO'C 
4 K3Ec, 5. K SS. 
Tech n: ca Steering 
Comrr,. t'e_ 
I Committee 
c. _. _. e Implementation SiAiE Committee 
LEVEL 
I 7. ;; ritt Implementation 
Committee 
S. School KBSR 
SCHOOL Committee 
LEVEL 
Figure 9. Organization Chart of KBSR Implementation 
Source: Ibrahim, Noor Azmi. Inservice Training in Malaysia for 
the New Primary Curriculum (KBSR), in Educational Innovation 
in Developing Countries: Case Studies of Changemakers, edidted by 
Lewin, K. M. Macmillan, London, 1991. 
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Table 7 
Ethnic Composition of Each Constituency 
Constituencies No. of 
Voters Muslim % 
Non-Muslim 
Chinese % Bumiputra % 
NI Banggi 6,555 80.68 0.18 19.14 
N2 Kudat 15,298 45.2E 36.06 19.66 
N3 Bengkoka 9,003. 50.20 1.02 48.78 
N4 Matunggong 8,350 14.29 2.89 82.82 
N5 Tandek 6,938 52.39 2.19 45.42 
N6 Langkon 7,677 30.3E 2.15 67.47 
N7 Tempasuk 10,858 64.39 0.32 35.29 
N8 Usukan 12,452 82.98 6.67 10.35 
N9 Kadamaian 8,945 18.52 0.72 80.76 
N 10 Tamp aruIi 9,658 20.60 13.9E 65.42 
Nil Sulaman 11,771 63.33 12.59 24.0E 
N12 Kiulu 8,156 33.37 4.51 62.12 
N13 Kundasang 11,061 33.97 0.61 65.42 
N14 Ranau 10,329 20.98 6.82 72.30 
N15 Sugut 7,386 54.41 1.45' 44.14 
N16 Labuk 8,847 46.66 3.02 50.32 
N17 Sungai Sibuga 19,960 71.25 25.49 3.26 
N18 Elopura 14.311 30.19 68.40 1.41 
N19 Tanjung Papat 12,605 26.35 72.75 0.90 
N20 Karamunting 12,218 13.50 84.24 2.26 
N21 Sckong 13,764 79.40 11.34 2.26 
N22 Sukau 10.187 94.24 2.29 3.47 
N23 Kuamut 5,452 39.16 0.75 60.09 
N24 Tambunan 8,153 4.60 3.34 92.06 
N25 Bingkor 12,061 32.47 0.90 66.63 
N26 Moyog 14.242 21.80 13.30 64.90 
N27 Inanam 15,566 29.76 28.39 41.85 
N28 1. ika3 19,756 37.10 52.70 10.20 
N29 Api-Api 20,016 4.04 88.68 7.28 
N30 Sembulan 13.504 33.36 50.53 16.11 
N31 Petagas 20,350 52.34 22.87 24.79 
N32 Kawang 11,787 51.07 10.64 38.29 
N33 Buang Sayang 13.802 69.39 10.13 20.48 
N34 l3ongawan 11,868 63.43 12.73 23.84 
N35 Kuala Penyu 10,486 56.77 6.41 36.82 
N36 K11as 12,033 65.55 18.54 15.91 
N37 Lumadan 9.065 89.99 5.79 4.22 
Ný8 Sipitang 9,702 65.36 6.62 28.02 
N39 Tcnom 8,841 19.81 27.00 53.19 
N40 Ketnabong 7.366 19.10 10.79 70.11 
N41 Sook 14,724 18.6E 16.06 65.26 
N42 Nabawan 5,209 19.04 1.06 79.90 
N43 Merotai 18,662 81.19 11.64 7.17 
N44 Sri Taujung 24,720 40.92 57.31 1.77 
N45 I. ahad Datu 23.055 67.02 24.27- 8.71 
N46 Kunak 14,858 93.90 3.86 2.24 
N47 Balung 19.079 70.02 28.0E 1.90 
N48 Sulahayan 17.626 96.80 3.12 0.08 
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Table 8 
ANALYSIS 01 CONS II ENCII: s WON BY 
ßN AND PISS IN THE 1994 
SAISAII GENFKAI. ELECTIONS 
Malay/Muslim Ilumiputra Majority Constilncncics 
M uhy / Number Of Kadn: ad Won By 
Conslilucncy Alucllm CLlnasc I)uemn I'arly 
Banggi ( 6,555) 5,289 12 1.254 PBS 
B.: ngknka ( 9.003) 4.519 92 4.312 (IMNO 
'frmPasuk (10,858) 6,991 35 3,832 AKAR 
Usukan (12,452) 10,333 83 1,289 UMNO 
Sulan, an (11,771) 7.454 1,482 2,835 UMNO 
Sugnt -. ( 7,386) 4,019 107 3,260 UMNO 
Sungai Sibuga (19,960) 14.222 5.038 650 UNINO 
Sekong (13.764) 10,929 2,525 310 UNINO 
Su kw (10,197) 9.610 233 354 ANNO 
Peugic (20,350) 10.651 4.654 5.045 UMNO 
Kawang (11,787) 6,020 1.254 4,513 UMNO 
Nang Sayang (13,802) 9,577 1,398 2,827 UNINO 
Bong8wan (11.868) 7,528 1.511 2,829 UMNO 
Kuald Penyu (10,486) 5,953 672 3,361 PBS 
Klias (12,033) 7,888 2.231 1,914 PBS 
Lumadan ( 9,065) 8,157 525 333 UMNO 
'. Irrmai (18,662) 15.152 2,172 1.33E UMNO 
Labad Datu (23,055) 15,452 5,595 2,00E UMNO 
Kunak (14,858) 13.951 574 333 UMNO 
Balung (19,0,79) 13,360 5.357 362 UNINO 
Sulabayan (17,626) 17.062 550 14 UMNO 
Tandck ( 6,938) 3,673 152 3,113 PBS 
Kudal (15,298) 6,928 5,517 2,853 LDP 
" Chinese Areas 
Constituency 
Malay I 
AIus1Dn 
IVumhrr 
Chinese 
Of K I. z. t 
I)usun 
%Vo BY 
1'arly 
Likas (19,756) 7,329 10,411 2,016 SAI'P 
Api Api (20,016) 809 17,749 1,456 PBS 
Sembulan (13,504) 4,505 6.323 2.176 IRS 
Elopura (14,311) 4.320 9,789 202 SAI'P 
T. u jung Papal (12,605) 3,321 9.170 113 S. \PI' 
Karamunting (12,218) 1.650 10.292 276 I'US 
Sri Tmjong (24,720) 10.115 14.166 439 1'05 
Mixed arcas 
61aNy / Number Of K. Jazan/ Won By 
Constituency Alusllm Chinese Du- rv. rly 
Inanam (15,566) 4,633 4,419 6,514 PBS 
Tcnnm ( A, AdI) 1,751 2,387 4,707 POS 
Kadazan/Non"Alu: aim Rumiputcra arcas 
Consul ucncy 
MlyI 
M rühm 
Number or 
Cbhresc 
K-1-ma 
l)usun 
Won Ily 
Party 
Ata(unggong ( 8,350) 1,193 241 6,916 I'IIS 
I. angknn ( 7,677) 2.332 165 5.180 I'D5 
Kat ' ., n ( 
8,915) 1,651 6.1 7.2.35 HIS 
I'aruprruli ( 9.65A) 1,990 1.350 b, 318 1'115 
Kinin ( 8.1%) 2.722 3ro8 5.066 1'ns 
I'arnbunan ( 8,153) 375 272 7,506 ITS 
Dingkur (12,061) 3.916 109 8.076 POs 
Mloyog (14,242) 3,105 1,895 9,242 I'DS 
Keinabong ( 7,366) 1,407 795 5,164 JIBS 
Sook (34,724) 2,751 2,36.1 9,609 1'nS 
Nabawan ( 5,209) 992 55 4,162 1'IIS 
Kuanmc ( 5,452) 2.175 41 3,276 JIBS 
Labuk ( 8,8.37) 4,129 267 4,452 I'nS 
nanau (10,329) 2,157 701 7,469 I'ns 
Kunda. tiang (11,061) 3,757 68 7,210 1'nS 
Table 7 and 8 
The Ethnic Composition of the People of Sabah which are 
Politically Divided According to Ethnicity, Religion and 
Political Alignment 
Source: Luping, Herman. Sabahs Dilcnlma. Magnus Books, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1994. 
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RACIAL CLASSIFICATION O F48 SEA'1'ti 
F 
NONJ lv1US I It t 
13UMIPUI RA 
MAJORITY 
CHIIIIESE 
MAJORITY 
MUSLIM 
MAJORITY 
M MIX OF 1HE ' THREE RACES 
LANCUAOIS or SAUAI I 
LAHtUAIiI 
_tJ 
SARAII 
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Figure 10. Maps Showing the Distribution Of The Non-Muslim 
Bumiputera, Muslim, And Chinese Populations In Sabah 
Constituencies, Districts And Divisions. The Maps Also Indicate 
The Variety Of Larguages and Cultures Of The Sparsely Populated 
Region And The need For Effective Mechanisms To Unite Them As 
Malaysians. 
Source 1. Luping Herman. Sabah's Dilemma. Magnus Books, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1994. 
Source 2: Regis, Patricia. Demographv, in Sabah 25 Years Later, 
edited by Jeffrey Kiting an and Maximus Ongkili. IDS (Sabah), 1989 
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GLOSSAR Y 
ASB - Amanah Saham Bumiputera (Bumiputera Share Trust) 
ASN - Amanah Saham Nasional (National Share Trust) 
BN- National Front (Barisan Nasional) 
BAHEIS - Islamic Affairs Divison Of The Prime Minister's Department 
Bank Negara - Central Bank 
BCIC - Bumiputera Commercial And Industrial Community 
BERNAMA - Malaysia National News Agency 
BO - Build Operate 
BOT - Build Operate Transfer 
BPU - Bumiputera Participation Unit 
FAMA - Federal Marketing Authority 
FELDA - Federal Land Development Authority 
HRDC - Human Resource Development Council 
HRDF - Human Resource Development Fund 
HSC - Higher School Certificate 
IBRD - International Bank For Reconstruction And Development 
IDS - Institute For Development Studies, Sabah 
IKIM - Institiut Kefahaman Islam (Insitute Of Islamic Understanding) 
INFRA - Institute For Rural Advancement 
INTAN - Institiut Tadbiran Negara (National Institute Of Public 
Administration) 
ISO - International Standard Organization 
JAHEINS - Department Of Islamic Affairs Sabah 
KBSR - New Primary School Curriculum 
KBSM - Integrated Curriculum For Secondary School 
KPD - Rural Development Corporation 
LCE/SRP - Lower Certificate Of Education 
LDP - Liberal Democratic Party 
MARA - Council Of Trust For The Indigenous People 
MCA - Malaysian Chinese Association 
MCE - Malaysian Certificate Of Education 
MCVE - Malaysian Certificate Of Vocational Education 
MIDS - Ministry Of Industrial Development Sabah 
MIT - MARA Institute Of Technology 
MITI - Ministry Of International Trade And Industry 
MNC - Multi National Corporation 
MUIS - Sabah Islamic Council 
NAC - National Action Council 
NDC - National Development Copuncil 
NDP - National Development Policy 
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NEP - New Economic Policy 
NCTC - National Vocational Training Council 
PAS - Pan-Islamic Party Malaysia 
PBRS - Sabah People United Party 
PBS - Parti Bersatu Sabah (Sabah United Party) 
PDS - Sabah Democratic Party 
PKR - People's Development Leader (Pemimpin Kemajuan Rakyat) 
PERKIM - Islamic Welfare Association Of Malaysia 
PNB - Permodalan Nasional Berhad (National Equity Corporation) 
PPRT - Programmes Of The Hard Core Poor 
PUKONSA - Contractors Service Centre 
RIDA - Rural Industrial Development Authority 
RTM - Radio And Television Malaysia 
SAB - Sabah Action Blueprint 
SAPP - Sabah Progressive Party 
SEDCO - Sabah Economic Development Corporation 
SFI - Sabah Forest Industry 
SIMP - Sabah Industrial Masterplan 
SMI - Small And Medium Industry 
SUPP - Sabah United People Party 
SOPP - Second Outline Perspective Plan 
TQM - Total Quality Management 
UMNO - United Malay National Organization 
UNESCO - United Nations Education And Scientific Co-operation 
USNO - United Sabah National Organization 
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and Merinton (1976) The Transition from Feudal to Capitalism, NLB, and Manjun, 
Masidi. Report on Present and Future of Sabahan Bumiputeras in Trade and 
Commerce, presented at Bumiputera Economic Congress 1995 (Organized by Sabah 
Government and Bumiputera Chamber of Commerce). 
12. See Malaysian Economic Consultative Council (1990) Report, pp 98-107 
regarding evaluation of the NEP (pp. 17-120); Onkili, and Leong, in Johari (1989: 141- 
166) Socio-Cultural Dimension of Development Planning, IDS. 
13. Regarding procedures and list of public agencies to be privatized see GOM. 
Privatization Master Plan (National Printing Department, Kuala Lumpur, 1991); and 
Buang, Ambrin. The Major Policies of Malaysia (Dasar-Dasar Mama Kern jaan) 
(INTAN, K. L, 1990). 
14. See Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure for the Year 1996, page 593, 
expenditure heading D. 44. 
15. See SEDCO's Corporate Profile, 1996, page 34. 
16. See GOM. Malaysia YearBook 1995 (Department of Information, 1995: 281- 
290); Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000): pages 60,282 and 289 on the vendor 
development programme; "1995 Dialogue with the Minister of International Trade 
and Industry" on topic of "SMI" (Star, 25.2.95). 
17. Regarding unit trusts and property trusts see Bank Negara. Money anul 
Banking in Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 1994: 307-323). 
18. See Means (1991: 92-94) Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation (Oxford 
University Press. 
19. For instance attempts to debate matters in Parliament and give voice to 
Society's problems are being prevented by arresting or suspending the parliamentary 
member concerned, see the case of Lim Guan Eng an MP for Democratic Action 
party charged with sedition (report by Hiebert, FEER, 1995: 31); and Vatikiotis, 
Michael. "Conduct Unbecoming" (FEER, 18th June, 1992: 30). 
20. On being privatized, SFI debts owing to the Sabah State Government will be 
turned into shares (Business Times: 4.8.94). After the privatization of SFI, the State 
Privatization Committee formed in December 1991 has identified 20 more Sabah 
State agencies for privatization, (D. E.: 14.10.95). 
21. For instance the Deputy Prime Minister stated that the Government has issued 
a circular to all Government and private companies not to award contracts to foreign 
companies. This measure is taken foreign companies transfer their technology, train 
local manpower or use local components (Abdullah, A. & N. Gunalan, NST, January 
20,1996). Prior to this Mahathir's Look East Policy, has witnessed many contracts 
given to South Korean and Japanese contractors (See Means, op cit. 1991: 92-94). 
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22. See Nik and Ibrahim in INTAN. Malaysian Development Experience (INTAN, 
1994: 281). 
23. See Nik and Ibrahim in INTAN. Malaysian Development Experience (INTAN, 
1994: 281). 
24. On the role of PKR , see 
IDS. Rationalization of Fund Allocation for Minor 
Rural Projects (IDS, K. K, January, 1993). 
25. For details on the latest agricultural programmes and planning, see Ministry 
Of Agriculture. Department of A griculture, Sabah Seventh Malaysia Plan 1996-2000: 
Phase Two (New Programmes and Projects) (Department of Agriculture, February, 
1995); and Ministry of Agriculture. Department of Agriculture Sabah Seventh 
Malaysia Plan, 1996-2000: Phase One of Programmes and Projects Under Sixth 
Malaysia Plan and Extension to Seventh Malaysia Plan. (Department of Agriculture, 
December, 1994). 
26. Historically, Sabah has given priority to agricultural development as a 
majority of the people are primarily farmers. If seen from Sabah's budgets since 
1991 more has been spent on agriculture than industry: 
Millions of RM spent 
on agricultural 
development 
Millions of RM spent 
on industrial 
development 
1991 124 9 
1992 111 5 
1993 97 12 
1994 113 46 
1995 93 38 
It seems that as more funds are needed for industrial development and comparatively 
less should be allocated for agricultural development, (extracts from Sabah State 
Annual Development Budget, Ministry of Finance, 1991-1995). 
27. See working paper on "Rural Development Co-ordination: An Experience" 
presented at the District Officer Seminar Organised by Ministry of Rural 
Development, Sabah, Kota Kinabalu, 8-11 August, 1996 at Tuaran. 
28. See working papers presented by Institute for Rural Advancement (INFRA) 
on Vision 2020 Village Programme in Sabah (Presented at District Officer Seminar, 
organized by Ministry of Rural Development, Sabah, 8-11 August, 1996 at Tuaran). 
283 
29. For instance see the report on Rural Development in the District Of Kudat for 
two electoral constituencies. Although the financial allocation for the two 
constituencies in 1992 was around RM659,000.00, due to the large number of 
villages, every village will receive only a small amount of this funding annually. In 
N. 2 constituency (Kudat), the largest amount a village can receive for road repair was 
RM 10,000 and the smallest was RM4,000 (District Office, Kudat, 15th January, 
1993). 
30. See working paper on Rural development Co-ordination: An Experience 
(presented during the D. O's Seminar organized by Ministry of Rural Development 
Sabah, 8-11 August, 1996). 
31. During Datuk Harris' Administration in Sabah, he introduced measures to curb 
problems of mismanagement in pubic enterprise, see Campbell (1986: 326-327) 
Sabah Under Harris (Warisan, 1986: 326-327) and Jamalul (1992) "Government 
Linked Agencies and Corporations - Issues, Challenges and Strategies for 1990s" in 
Borneo Review 3 (2), December, 1992. 
32. Some authors indicate that the adoption of the Vision 2020 represents the 
Government's attempt to survive political challenges after the NEP, see Nathan 
(1989) "Politics of Survival" Asian Survey, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, February. 
33. See Ongkili, and Leong in Johari and Yaakub (1989: 141-166) Socio-Cullum! 
Dimension of Development Planning, IDS, K. K. 
34. For instance Sabah OPP (1995-2000) stated, "The OPPS is conceived upon 
the strategic framework to steer Sabah onto a new development trajectory and an era 
of rapid economic expansion. ... 
direction and guidelines to turn Sabah into an 
industrialized and prosperous State. " (Sabah Government, 1995); Regarding 
implementation problems of SAB see Pang. "The Making of a Development Plan for 
Sabah: Issues, Problems, Solutions. " (Paper presented at the Borneo Research Council 
Seminar on Change and Development, Kuching, 4-9 August 1990 (revised version Jan, 
1991); Also King (1988: 263-298). "Models And Realities: Malaysian National 
Planning and East Malaysian Development Problems" (Modern A sian Studies, 22 (2). 
35 For information on the latest development on KKIP see pamphlet on KKIP: 
New Growth Centre In Sabah (KKIP undated). 
36. See Yong Teck Lee's statement in a news report by Sham Singh (Daily 
Express: 16.6.1996). 
37. See Golingi, and Hung. Socio-Cultural Issues Encountered in the 
Implementation of In-Situ Rural Development Programmes; and Zainal and Hoh 
(1989: 93-128) Socio-Cultural Issues Encountered in the Implementation of Land 
Resettlement Scheme, both in Johari, Mohd. Yaakub. Socio-Cultural Dimension of 
Development Planning. IDS, K. K. See also King, and. Jali (1992: 29-30) Issues in 
Rural Development in Malaysia, DBP. 
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38. The increasing import of food indicates that Malaysia's agricultural policy is 
not able to provide food self-sufficiency. This problem is raised by Jomo (1989: 71- 
74) Mahathir's Economic Policies, INSAN, P. J. Sabah also indicates an increasing 
amount of food imports. In 1990 its import of RM716,935,000 compared to 
RM904,942 four years later, see GOM. Sabah Year Book Of Statistics (Department 
Of Statistics Sabah, October 1995: 127, Table 7.2). 
Chapter Five 
1. For problems concerning the shortage of science teachers and mathematics 
teachers, see Ahmad (1993) Reforniasi Dan Wawasan DBP, K. L.; and Department 
Of Education Sabah working paper 1995 regarding education development in Sabah, 
page 41. In addition, the Seventh Malaysia Plan report indicates that there was a 
shortage of 4,600 teachers mainly in Mathematics, English Language and science 
subjects (Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000) (EPU, 1996: 311). 
2. In its 1995 working paper, The Department of Education Sabah indicates that 
overall Sabah's performance in the Lower Secondary School Evaluation (PMR) was 
the poorest in Malaysia. Further, in the Malaysian Certificate Of Education, Sabah 
performance was also the poorest in the 1994 examination among the 14 states in 
Malaysia (undated). 
3. Malaysian Enrolment in Degree Level Courses According To Ethnicity: 
Bumiputeras Chinese Indians Others Total 
1970 3,084 3,752 559 282 7,677 
1980 19,051 16,988 3,924 316 40,279 
1985 
t 
23,838 11,237 2,460 303 37,838 
Source: Fourth (1980-1985) & Fifth (1986-1990) Malaysia Plan, Government Printer 
Malaysia. 
4. The trend of school enrolments from primary to tertiary level is 2,240,064 
(1970); 3,152,089 (1980); 3,756,273 (1985); and 4,118,827 (1990). The numbers of 
primary school are 6,454 (1981); 6,469 (1982); 6,518 (1983), 6527 (1984); 6,613 
(1985); 6,643 (1986); 6,703 (1987); 6,754 (1988); and 6,795 (1989). While the 
number of secondary schools are 1,007 (1981); 1032 (1982); 1045 (1983); 1,145 
(1984); 1,177 (1985); 1,210 (1986); 1,222 (1987); 1,252 (1988); and 1288 (1989) 
(Source: Ministry of Education: 1990). While the increases in numbers of teacher in 
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primary schools are 77,700 (1981); 79,796 (1982); 81,664 (1983); 83,765 (1984); 
91,098 (1985); 98,061 (1986); 105,420 (1987); 109,159 (1988); 111,729 (1989). 
In secondary schools, the increases in numbers of teacher are 51,459 (1981); 
53,870 (1982); 54,822 (1983); 55,782 (1984); 58,636 (1985); & 58,223 (1986), see 
(Fourth (1980-1985) and Fifth (1986-1990) Malaysia Plans, EPU, 1980 and EPU 
1986). 
5. For details of the problems in Malaysia on the aftermath of May 13th racial 
riots, see Means (1991: 1-53) Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation, Oxford 
University Press. 
6. For a discussion of the form of democracy in Malaysia, see Case (1993). 
"Semi-democracy in Malaysia: Withstanding the pressures for Regime Change. " 
Pacific Affairs. 
7. The functions of NCHL are: (1) To plan, create, and formulate policy and 
national strategy for the development of higher education; (2) To co-ordinate the 
growth of higher education; (3) To develop and facilitate the smooth growth of the 
institutes of higher learning; (4) To formulate policy relating to entry of students to 
institutes of higher learning; (5) To formulate policy and established guidelines on 
all matters relating to structure of pay and system of staff management of the 
University and University College Act, 1971; (6) To formulate policy and establish 
guidelines concerning the field and course of study; (7) To formulate policy and 
guidelines concerning the running of any course of study or training program by the 
institutions of higher learning through cooperation, joint entrepreneurship or any 
others, with any other universities or institutions of learning or education institutions 
or other organizations locally or overseas; (8) To formulate policy and determine the 
guidelines about the involvement of universities in commercial activities according 
to the power given to University and University College Act, 1971, and, (9) To take 
any actions or do any actions deemed appropriate or needed to enable effective 
implementation of its functions, (Education News report by M. F. Razali, Berita 
Harlan, 30.9.1996: 1). 
8. Glazer's study indicated that significant quality improvements were made 
within the College by some of the teams. As a result of the team process, many 
indirect gains occurred in the areas of job satisfaction, improved co-worker 
relationships, and office harmony. The emphasis ought to be placed on customer and 
process orientation. Further, the change in effort must be built on the principles of 
empowerment and mutual trust because without these, the participants will maintain 
the status-quo (see Glazer [1995] "Implementing Total Quality Management in a 
College of Business. " Ed. D, University of San Diego, 1994, Dissertation Abstracts 
International vol no. 8, Feb., 1995). 
Kyle's study (1996) shows that TQM is feasible in education but requires enough 
allocation and accuracy. There is no strong relationship between visionary leader and 
Total Quality Culture. This contradicts Dhiman's (1996) and Burns' (1995) studies 
which indicate the importance of leadership in the success of TQM. However, Lares 
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(1995) indicates that TQM improves students discipline, see (Kyle, L. "Visionary 
Leadership and Total Quality Management in Higher Education Administration, " 
Ed. D, W. Verginia University, 1995, Dissertation Abstracts International, v. 56, no. 8, 
February 1996; Dhiman, S. K. "Leadership Implications of TQM in Higher 
Education. " Ed. D, Pepperdine University, 1995, D. A. I, v. 56, no. 7, January, 1996; 
Burns, J. E. P. "A Cultural Case Study of the Implementation of TQM Principles at 
a Private Religious University. " Ed. D., Texas Tech University, 1994, D. A. I, v. 56, 
no. l, July 1995; Lares, J. S. TQM as a Means to Improve the Process of Student 
Discipline. " Ed. D, University of Pittsburgh, 1995, D. A. I, v. 56, no. 5, November, 
1995). 
9. Hsin's study (1994) in Taiwan, found that the implementation of 
computerisation in school is more effectively implemented in private schools than 
through government support, see (Hsin, Shih-Chang. "Implementing Computers in 
Schools: Two Case Studies in Taiwan" [Ph. D Dissertation, Indiana University, 
Dissertation Abstracts International vol. 55 no. 8 February, 1995]); Tengku Shadan's 
(1994) study of computerization in Malaysian schools indicated that the main 
obstacles to implementation were: teacher's lack of knowledge and skills in the 
curriculum content, problems with hardware, lack of reference materials, students' 
weakness in English or overall academic achievement, and inadequate time allocation 
for teaching the subject, see (Tengku Shahdan, Tengku Shahrom. "The 
Implementation of a National Computer Education Project in Secondary Schools in 
Malaysia: Teachers Perception [Ph. D Dissertation, University Of Gerogia, 
Dissertation Abstracts International vol. 55 no. 9 March 1955]); Another study by Al- 
Obiedat (1994) indicated that: "there is a lack of planning for selection and 
implementation of computers in the district and that no formal technology plan exists 
for administrators, teachers, students, and parental involvement. And school 
personnel did not preview or evaluate hardware or software before purchase" see (Al- 
Obiedat, Ahmad. "The Role of Administrators and Teachers in the Selection and 
Implementation of computer Technology in the "Classroom of Tomorrow" Program, " 
(Ph. D Dissertation, Western Michigan University, 1994, Dissertation Abstracts, vol. 
55 no. 4, October, 1994). Tengku Shadan (1994) and Al-Obiedat (1994) both suggest 
good planning is important in the success of a school computerization programme. 
10. The process of National Education development in Malaysia is divided into 
three stages which take the form of a pyramid (Ahmad, 1993: 242): 
Foundation Stage (the Razak Report 1956, and the Education Ordinance 1957): 
a. The establishment of National Education System 
b. Malaysia as the main language of instruction 
c. Curriculum which is orientated on Malaysian environment. 
d. Creating a common examination system for all. 
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Stabilization Period (the Rahman Talib Report 1960, and the Education Act, 1961: 
a. Implementation of Bahasa Malaysia as language of instruction 
b. The use of Bahasa Malaysia and English as official language in 
Examination 
c. Emphasis placed on vocational and technical education 
d. Emphasis placed on moral education and religion to meet the spiritual 
needs. 
Reformation Period (Cabinet Report 1979): 
a. Strong emphasis on 3M - reading, writing and mathematics. 
b. Strong emphasis on moral education and the aspired discipline. 
c. Malaysian based curriculum. 
d. Division of upper secondary education into academic and vocational 
streams. 
e. Education opportunities raise from 9 years to 11 years. 
f. Streamlining the educational management procedure. 
g. Improving the quality of education. 
11. For information regarding the Education Organization in Malaysia see 
Department of Education. Malaysia National Education System (Department Of 
Education, K. L, 1990; Ahmad, Hussein. Pendidikan dan Mas), amkat (DBP, 1993: 
417-451); Ibrahim, Noor Azmi in Lewin, Keith. Education Innovation in Developing 
Countries (Macmillan, London, 1991: 95-126). 
12. For the long standing problems of education development in Sabah, see Sabah 
Government. Memorandum and Justification for the Development of Higher 
Education in Sabah (Chief Minister's Department, Kota Kinabalu, December, 1973); 
Sabah Government. Memorandum firma: the State Government of Sabah to the Federal 
Government of Malaysia on Education in Sabah (Chief Minister's Department - 
Under Harris Administration 1976-1985); Sabah Regional Planning Study: Service 
Sector (Huntington Technical Service, for British Overseas Development 
Administration, Volume 3,1980: 1-29). 
13. Regarding vocational and technical education see Department of Education 
Sabah working papers 1995 (Department of Education, 1995: Page 35); See also the 
Deputy Minister of Education, Dr Fong Chan Onn's statement which admitted there 
were ill-equipped school laboratories (report by Lee Keng Fatt, NST, March, 1996); 
and Ahmad, Hussein. Antani Dasar dan Reformasi Wmtiwasan [DBP, 1993: 78 and 
283]). 
14. See Johari (1989: 5) Issues on Human Resources Development in Snhnh, IDS, 
Kota Kinabalu. 
15. See Singapore Government. Singapore Year Book 1995. Ministry Of 
Information Singapore, 1995: especially the chapter on education. 
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16, On the issue of English Language in school see the article by Vatikiotis, "The 
Language Lobby: Mahathir in Clash Over Use of Malay" (FEER, 8.10.1992); 
"Mahathir Grasp a Nettle: Decision to Promote English is an Example of his 
Pragmatism" (FEER, 31st March, 1994). 
17. This is characterised by problems such as the lack of English Language 
teachers as indicated in the Seventh Malaysia Plan Report; Primary School 
Evaluation Test 1993/1994 also indicates that students in Malay medium performed 
badly in English compared to Chinese medium schools (Department of Education 
working papers 1995: 53-54). 
18. Davies-Seaver (1994) found that children are thinking critically outside of 
school at a very young age. When critical thinking is fostered within an early 
childhood classroom, children will respond by becoming effective thinkers and 
education for them will be consistent with the thinking they are already doing outside 
school and thus more meaningful for them as a way of life (see Davis-Siever 
"Critical Thinking in Young Children. " Ph. D Dissertation, The University of N. 
Carolina at Greensboro, 1994, Dissertation Abstract International vol. 56 no. 2, August 
1995). 
19. See GOM. Sabah Population Survey 1991 (Department of Statistics, March 
1995: 218-360). 
20. See GOM. Malaysia Labour Force Survey Report. (Department of Statistics 
Malaysia, K. L, August 1995: 156, Table C. 1.22 and page 158 Table C 1.24). 
21. See Hiebert's article. "Required Lessons: Islamic-Civilzation Course Catches 
Many by Surprise" (FEER, 17 July, 1997). 
Chapter Six 
1. See Lee (1976). The Towkays of Sabah: Chinese Leadership and Indigenous 
Challenge in The Last Phase of British Rule, Singapore University Press; Han Sin- 
Fong. "A Study of Occupational Patterns and Social Interaction of Overseas Chinese 
in Sabah, Malaysia" (Ph. D Thesis, University of Michigan, 1971); Means (1991: 57- 
61), Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation, Oxford University Press; and 
Luping (1994). Sabah's Dilemma, Magnus Books, Kuala Lumpur regarding the 
Chinese politics in Sabah since independence in 1963. 
2. See data on capital ownership in Malaysia from "The Bumiputera Economic 
Congress Report" (Held at the Pusat Dagangan Dunia Putra, Kuala Lumpur, 10-12 
January, 1992); GOM. Outline Perspective Plan 1991-2000 (Prime Minister's 
Department, 1991: 35-38). 
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3. Regarding the UMNO and PAS conflicts on the implementation of Hudud and 
Islamic Law in Kelantan see Vatikiotis' article. "In God's Name" (FIER, 3 
September, 1992: 13); by the same author, "Against the Odds: Kelantan's Islamic 
Government Faces Uphill Task" (FEER, 23rd January, 1992: 23 and 26). 
4. Regarding the constitutional crisis due to conflict between the Administration 
and the Palace see Means (1991: 1 13-120) Malaysian Politics, Oxford University 
Press; see also articles by Vatikiotis. "A Code for the Royals: UMNO Seeks a Deal 
on the Role of Hereditary Rulers" (FEER, 12th March, 1992: 8-9); "Bending the 
Rulers" (PEER, 24-31 December, 1992: 1 2); "The Die is Cast: Constitutional Crisis 
Looms Over Sultan's Privileges" (FEER, 28th January, 1993: 12); "Tit for Tat: 
Mahathir Steps up Pressure on Reluctant Rulers" (FEER, 4th February, 1993: 13). 
5. See Buang (1990: 113-121) Dasar-Dasar Ulama Kerajaan Malaysia ('1'hc 
Malaysian Government Major Policies), INTAN, K. L.. 
6. See GOM. (1988) White Paper entitled, Preserving National Security. National 
Printer Department, K. L.. 
7. According to Means (1991: 71-74), there were forty deviant dakwah groups 
in 1981 in Malaysia with estimated 30,000 followers. These groups such as the 
Ahmadiyah, Jamaat Tabligh, Darul Arqam, and the Suffis such as Qadiani sect, 
Tarikat Mufaridiyah, Muhammadiyyah Tariqah. 
8. Quoted from Datuk Dr. Syed Othman Alhabshi (Deputy Director-General, 
Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia) editorial in New Straits Time, titled 
"Why It Is Necessary To Have An Islamic Financial System. " (1996 release). 
9. See Buang (1990: 116) The Malaysian Government Major Policies, INTAN. 
10. Regarding the dispute over Hudud and Islamic law between UMNO and Pas 
after PAS formed a Government in the 1990 Elections, see Vatikiotis' article "In 
God's Name" (FEER, 3rd September, 1992: 13). 
11. See von der Mehden (1992) "Economic Growth and Political Consolidation, " 
in Asian Survey, No. 2 February, 1992. 
12. Regarding the Al Argam movement see Abdullah, Abdul Rahman. Gemkan 
Islam Tradisional di Malaysia: Sejarah dan Pemikiran Jantaat Tabligh clan Danil 
A rgam. Kintan Publication, K. 1,1992; for information about PAS see Means (1991: 
61-64) Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation, Oxford University Press; Mutalib 
(1993) Islam in Malaysia: From Revivals to Islamic State, Singapore University 
Press; Mutalib (1990) Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics, Oxford University Press; 
GOM. The Memali Incident (Kertas Perintah 21/1986); Milner, (1986). Rethinking 
Islamic Fundamentalism in Malaysia (paper presented at a Conference on Islam held 
in June 1986 sponsored by the Centre for Continuing Education of the Australian 
National University). 
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13. For instance, using mosques and Islamic platform during political campaigns, 
see GOM (1984: 6-20) Ancaman Kepada Perpaduan Umat Islam dan Keselamatan 
Negara, Ministry Internal Affairs, 8th November. 
14. The discussions regarding the formal mechanisms of implementation are based 
on various Government publications, Department of National Unity, Sabah Branch 
pamphlets, magazines and working papers; the relevant legislations to deal with 
problems of national unity such as the Sedition Act 1948; Public Order (Preservation) 
Ordinance, 1958; and the Internal Security Act, 1960. 
15. For a detailed discussion of ideology and national culture, see Yusoff and 
Borhan (1985: 153-175) Ideologi dan Kebudayaan Kebangsaan, University Of 
Malaya; Joel and Loh Kok Wah (1992: 1-17) Fragmented Vision: Culture and 
Politics in Contemporary Malaysia. Asian Studies Association Of Australia In 
association With Allen and Unwin. 
16. See the order of the Fatwa Committee, Malaysian National Fatwa Council On 
Islamic Affairs banning all teachings of Darul Al-Arqam (From Haji Abdullah, 
Rahman. Gerakan Islam Tradisional di Malaysia: Sejarah dan Pensikira n Jansaat 
Tabligh & Darul Argxn. Penerbitan Kintan, 1992: 120-125). (The Fatwa Committee 
found that, Darul Al-Arqam teachings are not in line with the teaching of Prophet 
Mohammad. Their book "Aurad Muhammadiah, " Syahadah, and the belief on Imam 
Mahadi teachings are considered deviationist). 
17. On 8th November, 1984, the Ministry of Home Affairs under Dato Musa 
Hitam, issued a report on "The threats of Islamic Unity and National Security. " 
Musa, in the preface of the report, acknowledged the revival of Islam throughout the 
world. About two years later the Memali incident broke out and Musa was 
responsible for handling the affair. He later resigned from his posts as Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Home Affairs, see White Paper by Ministry of Internal 
Affairs entitled, Threat to the Islamic Unity and National Security (8 November, 
1984). 
18. A Committee is being set up to streamline the administration of Islam with 
ASEAN countries especially on fasting and Hari Raya Aidil Fitri (UM.: 24.1.1991); 
Islamic Lecture by Yusuf Islam, a former western Pop Star Who Converted to Islam 
(B. H.: 19.8.91); Effort to Co-ordinate Muslim Marriage in Singapore, Malaysia and 
Indonesia (UM. : 18.9.92); New Way Of Incision (UM.: 18.9.92); The National 
Fatwa Committee ruled that the Kings should not be adored as Allah (U. M.: 19.3.93); 
A better qualification is required for the appointment of future Imams. For instance 
a Village Imam must at least have a school certificate. As a first step a training 
centre - Darul Koran - was established to train the Imams (B. H.: 26.6.1993); 19 
Private Agencies Appointed To Manage Pilgrimage To Mecca (UM.: 6.2.94); A 
Strict Penalty under the Islamic Family Act (UM.: 7.94); A ban on Darul Arqam 
(D. E.: 6.8.94); Ashaari, leader of deviationist Darul Arqam arrested under ISA (711c 
Star. 4.9.1994); The Ministry of Education also required that Ujian Fardu Ain be 
compulsory examination for Primary 6 evaluation, Form III and Form V evaluation 
(B. H.: 15.12.1994); HIV Test Required For Prospective Bridegroom and Brides 
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(U. B.: 20.12.95); Dr Siti Hasmah Saddened by Polygamy Ruling (NST: 28.10.96); 
Ruling Prohibiting Muslims From Holding Key Post in Companies Involving 
Gambling (Sun: 7.8.96). 
19. At a press conference regarding the issue of "Assimilation of Islamic Values 
in Administration, Mahathir cautioned that other religious groups should not feel 
threatened by the policy. He said that various groups should be tolerant toward other 
religions to avoid frictions as religion is a sensitive issue, see B. H.: 11.4.1990). 
20. On the role and functions of BAHEIS see the BAHEIS Briefing Paper 
presented for the Federal Heads of Departments Meetings at Sabah No. 2/1996; 
BAREIS Activities Reports up to 1995 (undated); and BAHEIS various papers 
presented as part of its preaching missions in Sabah (undated). 
21. On the early development of Islam during Tun Mustapha's rule and the role 
of United Sabah Islamic Association in Islamic development in Sabah see Yusin, 
Muhiddin. Islam di Sabah (DBP, K. L, 1990; On the recent formation of the 
JAHEINS (Department of Sabah Islamic Affairs) which take over the running of the 
Islamic administration in Sabah see paper titled "JAHEINS" regarding administration 
structure and mission (undated). 
Many of the statistics regarding Islamic development are not released publicly but are 
obtained through consultation with the officers concerned; regarding Islamic 
legislations in Sabah see The Administration of Islamic Law Enactment 1992; The 
Zakat and Fitrah Enactment 1993; Syariah Criminal Procedure Enactment 1993; 
Syariah Civil Procedure Enactment 1993; Syariah Criminal Offenses Enactment 1995; 
Islamic Family law Enactment 1992. 
22. In the past, Mahathir had said that the government had no intention of 
applying Syariah Law on the non-Muslims. He cited several cases of sex offenses 
involving Muslims and non-Muslims where the non-Muslims were allowed to go free 
(B. H.: 11.4.1990). 
23. For details on the various communities in Sabah please see: Sutlive, Vinson 
H. "Female and Male in Borneo: Contributions and Challenges to Gender Studies. " 
Borneo Research Council, 1987; van Leur M, M. Nolten, O. van Renterghem, W. 
Roos. "Shifting Cultivation of the Rungus in Sabah, Malaysia: A Way of Life. " 
University of Utrecht, 1987; Dahlan, H. M. Sabah Traces of Change. UKM, 1983; 
Rutter, Owen: The Pagans of North Borneo. Oxford University Press, 1985; Han, S: 
"A Study of Occupational Patterns and Social Interaction of Overseas Chinese in 
Sabah Malaysia. " Ph. D Thesis, University of Michigan, 1971; Harrison, R.: "An 
Analysis of The Variation Among Ranau Dusun Communities of Sabah Malaysia. " 
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24. See Campbell (1986) Sabah UnderHarris. Nan Yang, K. L, p. 58-59 and p. 326. 
25. See Johari (1989: 14-22) Socio-Cultural Dimension Of Development Planning, 
IDS; GOM. Household Income Survey 1987, Department of Statistics, Kuala 
Lumpur; Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000) (EPU, 1996: 72,89-92). 
26. See Luping (1994: 52-55 and 520-522) Sabah's Dilemma, Magnus Books, 
K. L.. 
27. See Kahn, and Loh Kok Wah (1992: 79-106) Fragmented Vision, Allen & 
Unwin. 
28. Regarding conflict within UMNO see Aznam and Tasker "Divided Heartland: 
Elections will Test Bonds of Malay Unity" (TEER, 27th September, 1990: 18-21); 
Vatikiotis, "Power Machinations: Ruling Party Rivalries Spark Fears of Split" (PEER, 
August, 1992: 13); Vatikiotis "Party Games: Mahathir Again Forced to Intervene on 
UMNO Polls" (PEER, July 1993: 27); Vatikiotis "Taking Sides" (PEER, 19th August, 
1993: 16-17); Vatikiotis. "Young Turks on the Move" (Feer, 30th September, 1993: 
18-20). 
29. PAS, which was attempting to prove its credibility after winning the State of 
Kelantan in the 1990 General Elections, also challenged UMNO leaders to implement 
Hudud if they truly championed the cause of Islam. PAS is a more traditional 
Islamic association, see Vatikiotis "In God's Name" (FEER, 3rd Sept. 1992: 13). 
30. See Kahn (1992) and Loh Kok Wah. Fragmented Vision. Allen & Unwin, 
1992; Luping (1994: 405-593) Sabah's Dilemma, Magnus Books, K. L. 
31. See Means (1991: 88-89) Malaysian Politics, Oxford University Press; see also 
Jayasankaran S. "No Means Maybe: Deputy Premier Anwar Demurs As His Star 
Rises" (TEER, 2nd November, 1995); Spaeth. "Growing Impatient: Malaysia's Prime 
Minister Faces the Tricky Matter of When to Yield to his Chosen Heir" (Time, 10th 
June, 1996: 14-16). 
32. As part of the attempt to inculcate Islamic values among managerial level 
civil servants, the Government has popularised the well designed Nation Building 
course (Kursus Bina Negara). The course caters mainly for Muslim officers in 
secluded training camps for about a week. They received no outside contact during 
the army-like training and are given lectures and brain storming sessions mainly 
about Islam and how to build good spirit, values and attitudes. The lectures about 
Islam are mostly performed by invited lecturers specialised in Islamic fields from 
various institutions. For details see course papers such as, A rahan Tetap Ku sus Bina 
Negara (20th July, 1993; Program Bina Negara. " Rangka Ceramah Dan Kurliah; 
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33. See Luping (1994: 251-273) Sabah's Dilemma, Magnus Books, K. L.. 
34. See Gomez (1994: 48-276) Political Business: Corporate Involvement of 
Malaysian Political Parties, Centre for South-East Asian Studies, Townsville. 
35. This was referred to Najib's statement in mid-1996 during the period of 
UMNO party elections in the Malaysian National Television. 
36. See Kahn and Loh Kok Wah (1992 : 1-15) Fragmented Vision, Allen & 
Unwin; Jomo (1989: 1-37) Mahathir's Economic Policies, Insan, P. J.; also Jomo, K. S. 
"Malaysia's New Economic Policy And National Unity. " TWQ 10 (4) October 1989: 
36-52. 
37. See Jomo and Ismail (1992: 136-153) Alternatif Lkononri Is/am: Perspektif 
Kfitis Dan Haluan Bane. DBP, K. L.. 
38. By the end of 1991, the Islamic Affairs Division has identified 70 deviationist 
teachings in Malaysia compared to 40 in 1981 (Ulusan Malaysia: 28.11.91). The 
Darul Arqam claimed to have about 100,000 followers alone in Malaysia and many 
more overseas by the time it was banned on 5th August, 1994 (Reuters, in Daily 
Express: 30.7.1994). Prior to its banning the Darul Arqam Administration set up the 
Institute of Islamic Understanding in July 1992 (Berila Harian: 2.7.92 and 3.7.92). 
39. On problems before, during and after the various State Elections in Sabah, see 
(Luping, 1994: 115-500). See also Means (1991) Malaysian Politics: The Second 
Generalion, Oxford University Press= regarding the same problems in Malaysia as 
a whole. 
40. See Yong Teck Lee's case, a former PBS assemblyman and candidate charged 
for illegal procession during the 1990 elections. 
Chapter Seven 
1. See Pang Teck Wai. "The making of A Development Plan for Sabah: Issues, 
problems, Solutions" (Paper presented at the Borneo Research Council Seminar on 
Change and Development, Kuching, 4-9 August, 1990 (revised version Jan. 1991). 
2. See Luping (1994) Sabah's Dilemma: The Political History of Sabah, Magnus 
Books, Kuala Lumpur. 
3. On socialist planning problems see Rutland (1985) The Myth of the Plan, 
Hutchinson, London; Andrle (1976) Managerial Power in the Soviet Union, Saxon 
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195-197) French Planning in Theory and Practice, George Allen & Unwin Ltd.. 
4. See Kahn and Loh (1992) Fragmented Vision: Culture And Politics in 
Contemporary Malaysia, Asian Studies Association Of Australia in Association with 
Allen And Unwin. 
5 See Krasner (1985) Stnictural Conflict: The Third World Against Global 
Liberalism, University of California Press, London. 
6. See Fisk and Osman-Rani (1982) The Political Economy of Malaysia, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
7. On decentralization effects in Yugoslavia see Flaherty (1988) "Plan, Market 
and Unequal Regional Development in Yugoslavia. " Soviel Studies, XI: ! (January 
1988: 100-124). 
8. See Jomo (1988) A Question of Class: Capital, The State, and Uneven 
Development in Malaya, Monthly Review Press, New York; Jomo, and Shari. 
Development Policies and Income Inequality in Peninsular Malaysia (Institute of 
Advance Studies, University of Malaya, 1986); Jeong and Armer. "State, Class, and 
Expansion of Education in South Korea: A general Model. " Comparative Education 
Review, Nov. 1994; Gosh, B. N. "Class Relations and Economic Development in 
Malaysia. " Borneo Review 6(10), June 1995. von der Mehden, Fred R. "Malaysia 
in 1991: Economic Growth and Political Consolidation. " Asian Survey, Vol. XXXII, 
No. 2, February 1992. Johari and Chang "Issues in Malaysian Development 
Planning: Regional Inequality and Poverty" (Borneo Review 1 (1), December 1990). 
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